

THE  
VEDĀNTA - SŪTRAS

WITH THE  
ŚRĪ-BHĀSHYA  
OF  
RĀMĀNUJĀCHĀRYA

*Translated into English*

BY

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## PREFACE

The progress of the printing of this third volume was satisfactory till a serious breakdown in the health of one of us. However, after an interruption of some months, work was resumed and thankfully completed.

The Analytical Outline, most of the footnotes and the indexes have been prepared by us. In view of the bulk of this volume, it has not been found feasible to include in it, as originally hoped, a brief study of Rāmānuja's philosophy and criticisms thereon.

Our thanks are again due to Śrī Kārappaṅgādu Veṅkaṭāchārya Svāmin for his patient and illuminating explanations of the many difficulties and complexities encountered. Sri R. C. Srinivasa-  
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M. R. SAMPATKUMARAN,

December, 1965.

M. B. NARASIMHA IYENGAR.



## CONTENTS

|                          | Page |
|--------------------------|------|
| 1. Preface               |      |
| 2. An Analytical Outline |      |

### CHAPTER II, PART II

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 3. Adhikaraṇa I (RACHANĀNUPATTYADHIKARAṆA : Sūtras 1 to 9)        | 1  |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa II (MAHADDĪRGHĀDHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 10 to 16)         | 28 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa III (SAMUDĀYĀDHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 17 to 26)           | 37 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa IV (UPALABDHYADHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 27 to 29)          | 57 |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa V (SARVATHĀNUPAPATTYADHİKARAṆA : Sūtra 30)          | 63 |
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VI (EKASMINNASAMBHAVĀDHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 31 to 34)   | 65 |
| 9. Adhikaraṇa VII (PAŚUPATYADHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 35 to 38)          | 73 |
| 10. Adhikaraṇa VIII (UTPATTYASAMBHAVĀDHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 39 to 42) | 80 |

### CHAPTER II, PART III

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (VIYADADHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 1 to 9)   | 92  |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (TEJO'DHİKARAṆA : Sūtras 10 to 17) | 100 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (ĀTMĀDHİKARAṆA : Sūtra 18)        | 108 |

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (JNĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 19 to 32)      | 116  |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (KARTRADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 33 to 39)    | 131  |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (PARĀYATTĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 40 & 41) | 139  |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (AMŚĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 42 to 52)    | 143  |

#### CHAPTER II, PART IV

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (PRĀṆOTPATYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 1 to 3)                | 159 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (SAPTAGATYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 4 and 5)               | 163 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (PRĀṆĀṆUTVĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 6 and 7)              | 166 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (VĀYUKRIYĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 8 to 11)                | 169 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (ŚRESTHĀṆUTVĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 12)                    | 172 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (JYOTIRĀDYADHISHṬHĀN-<br>ĀDHIKARAṆA : Sūtras 13 and 14) | 173 |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (INDRIYĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 15 and 16)               | 175 |
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VIII (SAMJÑĀMŪRTIKḲIPTYADHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtras 17 to 19)  | 177 |

#### CHAPTER III, PART I

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (TADANTARAPRATIPATY-<br>ADHIKARAṆA : Sūtras 1 to 7) | 189 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (KṚITĀTYAYĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 8 to 11)          | 200 |

|   |             |
|---|-------------|
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (ANISHTĀDIKĀRYADHI-<br>KARAṆA: Sūtras 12 to 21) | Page<br>206 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (TATSVĀBHAVYĀPATY-<br>ADHIKARAṆA: Sūtra 22)      | 214         |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (NĀTICHIRĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtra 23)                 | 216         |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (ANYĀDHISHTHITĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA: Sūtras 24 to 27)  | 217         |

### CHAPTER III, PART II

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (SANDHYĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 1 to 6)                | 223 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (TADABHĀVĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 7 and 8)            | 230 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (KARMĀNUSMRITISABDAVI-<br>DHYADHIKARAṆA: Sūtra 9) | 232 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (MUGDHĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtra 10)                     | 234 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (UBHAYALINGĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 11 to 25)          | 236 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (AHIKUNḌALĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 26 to 29)          | 257 |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (PARĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 30 to 36)               | 263 |
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VIII (PHALĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 37 to 40)             | 272 |

### CHAPTER III, PART III

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (SARVAVEDĀNTA-<br>PRATYAYĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 1 to 5) | 278 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (ANYATHĀTVĀDHIKARAṆA:<br>Sūtras 6 to 9)            | 285 |

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (SARVĀBHEDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 10)                | 294  |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (ĀNANDĀDYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 11 to 17)         | 298  |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (KĀRYĀKHYĀNĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 18)               | 306  |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (SAMĀNĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 19)                   | 308  |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (SAMBANDHĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 20 to 22)        | 310  |
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VIII (SAMBHRĪTYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 23)             | 313  |
| 9. Adhikaraṇa IX (PURUŠAVIDYĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 24)              | 314  |
| 10. Adhikaraṇa X (VEDHĀDYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 25)                 | 317  |
| 11. Adhikaraṇa XI (HĀNYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 26)                   | 319  |
| 12. Adhikaraṇa XII (SĀMPARĀYĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 27 to 31)       | 324  |
| 13. Adhikaraṇa XIII (ANĪYAMĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 32)               | 331  |
| 14. Adhikaraṇa XIV (AKSHARADHYĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtras 33 and 34)  | 334  |
| 15. Adhikaraṇa XV (ANTARATVĀDHIKĀRĀṆA :<br>Sūtras 35 to 37)        | 338  |
| 16. Adhikaraṇa XVI (KĀMĀDYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 38 to 40)         | 350  |
| 17. Adhikaraṇa XVII (TANNIRDHĀRAṆĀNĪYAM-<br>ĀDHIKARAṆA : Sūtra 41) | 357  |
| 18. Adhikaraṇa XVIII (PRADĀNĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 42)              | 360  |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 19. Adhikaraṇa XIX (LĪṄGABHŪYASTVĀDHI-KARAṆA: Sūtra 43)          | 362 |
| 20. Adhikaraṇa XX (PŪRVAVIKALPĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 44 to 50)       | 365 |
| 21. Adhikaraṇa XXI (ŚARĪREBHĀVĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 51 and 52)      | 374 |
| 22. Adhikaraṇa XXII (ANGĀVABADDHĀDHI-KARAṆA: Sūtras 53 and 54)   | 378 |
| 23. Adhikaraṇa XXIII (BHŪMAJYĀYASTVĀDHI-KARAṆA: Sūtra 55)        | 381 |
| 24. Adhikaraṇa XXIV (ŚABDĀDIBHEDĀDHI-KARAṆA: Sūtra 56)           | 385 |
| 25. Adhikaraṇa XXV (VIKALPĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 57 and 58)          | 387 |
| 26. Adhikaraṇa XXVI (YATHĀŚRAYABHĀVĀDHI-KARAṆA: Sūtras 59 to 64) | 390 |

### CHAPTER III, PART IV

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (PURUSHĀRTHĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 1 to 20)         | 397 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (STUTIMĀTRĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 21 and 22)       | 420 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (PĀRIPLAVĀRTHĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtras 23 and 24)   | 423 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (AGNĪNDHANĀDYADHI-KARAṆA: Sūtra 25)           | 424 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (SARVĀPEKSHĀDHIKARAṆA: Sūtra 26)               | 426 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (ŚAMADAMĀDYADHI-KARAṆA: Sūtra 27)             | 428 |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (SARVĀNNĀNUMITYADHI-KARAṆA: Sūtras 28 to 31) | 430 |

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VIII (VIHITATVĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 32 to 35)              | 434  |
| 9. Adhikaraṇa IX (VIDHURĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 36 to 39)                  | 437  |
| 10. Adhikaraṇa X (TADBHŪTĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 40 to 43)                 | 440  |
| 11. Adhikaraṇa XI (SVĀMYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 44 and 45)                 | 445  |
| 12. Adhikaraṇa XII (SAHAKĀRYANTARAVIDHY-<br>ADHIKARAṆA : Sūtras 46 to 48) | 447  |
| 13. Adhikaraṇa XIII (ANĀVISHKĀRĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 49)                  | 453  |
| 14. Adhikaraṇa XIV (AIHIKĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 50)                        | 454  |
| 15. Adhikaraṇa XV (MUKTIPHALĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 51)                     | 456  |

#### CHAPTER IV, PART I

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (ĀVRITTYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 1 & 2)    | 457 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (ĀTMATVOPASANĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 3) | 460 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (PRATĪKĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 4 and 5) | 463 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (ĀDITYĀDIMATYADHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 6) | 465 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (ĀSINĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 7 to 11)     | 467 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (ĀPRAYĀNĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 12)       | 469 |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (TADADHIGAMĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 13) | 470 |



|  | Page |
|--|------|
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VIII (ITARĀDHIKĀRAṆA :<br>Sūtra 14)          | 474  |
| 9. Adhikaraṇa IX (ANĀRABDHAKĀRYĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 15) | 476  |
| 10. Adhikaraṇa X (AGNIHOTRĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 16 to 18) | 477  |
| 11. Adhikaraṇa XI (ITARAKSHAPAṆĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 19) | 481  |

#### CHAPTER IV, PART II

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (VĀGADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 1 and 2)             | 483 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (MANO'DHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 3)                  | 485 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (ADHYAKSHĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 4)             | 487 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (BHŪTĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 5 and 6)           | 488 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (ĀSṚITYUPAKRAMĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtras 7 to 13) | 490 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (PARASAMPATTYADHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 14)       | 500 |
| 7. Adhikaraṇa VII (AVIBHĀGĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 15)             | 501 |
| 8. Adhikaraṇa VIII (TADOKO'DHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 16)             | 502 |
| 9. Adhikaraṇa IX (RAŚMYANUSĀRĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtra 17)        | 504 |
| 10. Adhikaraṇa X (NĪŚĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 18)                  | 506 |
| 11. Adhikaraṇa XI (DAKSHIṆĀYANĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 19 and 20) | 507 |

## CHAPTER IV, PART III

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (ARCHIRĀDYADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 1)        | 511 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (VĀYVADHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 2)            | 514 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (VARUṆĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtra 3)          | 517 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (ĀTIVĀHIKĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 4 and 5) | 519 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (KĀRYĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 6 to 15)      | 521 |

## CHAPTER IV, PART IV

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Adhikaraṇa I (SAMPĀDYĀVIRBHĀVĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtras 1 to 3)     | 532 |
| 2. Adhikaraṇa II (AVIBHĀGENADṚIṢṬATV-<br>ĀDHIKARAṆA : Sūtra 4)       | 538 |
| 3. Adhikaraṇa III (BRĀHMĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 5 to 7)               | 540 |
| 4. Adhikaraṇa IV (SAṆKALPĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 8 and 9)             | 545 |
| 5. Adhikaraṇa V (ABHĀVĀDHIKARAṆA :<br>Sūtras 10 to 16)               | 547 |
| 6. Adhikaraṇa VI (JAGADVYĀPĀRAVĀRJĀDHI-<br>KARAṆA : Sūtras 17 to 22) | 554 |
| Transliteration  | 565 |
| Abbreviations  | 567 |
| Index to Quotations  | 569 |
| Glossarial Index of Sanskrit words and proper<br>names               | 581 |
| Untraced Quotations  | 604 |
| Index of Adhikaraṇas   | 605 |
| Errata   | 612 |

## AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

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### CHAPTER II, PART 2.

Chapter I of the *Vedānta-Sūtras* has declared the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world. Part I of Chapter II has refuted the objections raised against this view. The next Part sets out to rebut the views of other schools of thought about the cause of the world, so that the followers of the *Vedānta*, however dull or weak-willed, may not be shaken in their faith.

This Part consists of 42 *Sūtras*, divided into 8 sections, dealing respectively with the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the four schools into which Buddhist philosophy is divided, the Jainas, the Pāśupatas and those who reject the Pāñcharātra as non-Vedic. The Sāṅkhyas, being nearest to the *Vedāntins*, are first taken up in the *Rachanānupattiyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 1-28) of nine aphorisms, given hereunder :

1. The inferred principle (i.e., the *pradhana*) is not (the cause of the world), because of the impossibility of the fashioning (of the world by the *pradhana* without being presided over by the *Brahman*), and (because of another reason and) because also of the activity (of the *pradhana* when presided over by the *Brahman*).

2. If it be said that it (i.e., the transformation of the *pradhana*) is like that of milk and water (which are respectively converted into curds and the juices of various plants without the help of intelligent beings), it is replied that in those cases also (it is impossible to have creative activity without the superintendence of the *Brahman*).

3. Because also, if there is no dependence (of the *pradhana* on the *Brahman* in regard to the creation of the world), there arises the non-existence of that (condition of dissolution) which is in contradistinction (to the condition of creation).

4. (The *pradhāna* evolving into the world) is not like the grass etc. (eaten by cows and transformed into milk): for it (i.e., the transformation of the grass into milk) is not found elsewhere (when the grass is eaten by bulls or left uneaten).

5. If it be said that, like a (blind) man (who can act by himself in the presence of a lame person who can see) and like (iron acting by itself in the presence of) the loadstone (the *prakṛiti* can act independently), it is replied that even then (the *pradhāna* cannot produce the world).

6. Because also there can be no condition of being the principal (in regard to any of the qualities during *pralaya*).

7. In regard to the inferences made otherwise (than in the manner already stated, the same objections are valid), owing to the deficiency (of the *pradhāna*) in the power of knowing.

8. Even if it be accepted (that it may be proved that material Nature is the cause of the world, it should not be inferred as such a cause), because there is no purpose (served by such an inference).

9. (The Sāṅkhya view) is inconsistent, because also of the conflict of the mutually hostile reasonings (adduced therein).

The *Sūtras* confine themselves to an attack on the logical reasonings of the Sāṅkhyas in support of the inference that the *pradhāna* or undifferentiated, primordial matter is the cause the world. For what they claim to know from perception does not differ from the appraisal of the *Vedānta* and the scriptures have to be interpreted according to the principles laid down in the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā*, and not, in the light exclusively of the revelation of the sage, Kapila.

The universe is analysed by the Sāṅkhya into twenty-five principles—the individual self or the *puruṣa*, undifferentiated primordial matter or the *prakṛiti* and its twentythree evolutes, namely, the *mahat*, the *ahaṅkāra*, the five rudimentary elements, the five elements, the mind, the five organs of sense and the five organs of action. The *prakṛiti*, which is non-intelligent, consists of the

substances, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, in a state of equilibrium. Each of them is neither more nor less than any other in proportion. These substances, being supersensible, are known from their effects—lightness and luminosity, motion and steadiness, heaviness and stupefaction. The *prakṛiti* is eternal, all-pervasive, unlimited, eternally subject to modifications. It is the supreme cause.

The *puruṣa* or the soul is incapable of change, and hence neither a cause nor an effect. It is constituted of intelligence, has no attributes and is devoid of action. But, on account of the proximity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛiti*, agency is attributed to the former and intelligence to the latter. The classic example is the ascription of the redness of a china rose to a crystal near by. Thus the modifications of the *pradhāna* work out teleologically.

The *pradhāna* (or the *prakṛiti* in its primordial state) is inferred as the cause of the world. Because the world is an effect, it must have a single cause to avoid a *regressus in infinitum*, and this cause must be similar to the effect. It must be a thing capable of modifications, a part undergoing them while the rest remains without losing its essential nature.

It is argued against this that the non-intelligent *pradhāna*, without being presided over by an intelligent being, cannot produce any effects. For example, mere wood cannot become a palace or a chariot without an intelligent carpenter working on it. Moreover, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, if regarded as substances, make the cause more than one, and this leads to an infinite regress. When they have an unlimited nature, they all have the power of universal pervasion, and the disturbance in their equipoise, when one of them becomes more or less than another, cannot come to pass. But it is such a state of inequilibrium which is claimed to lead to creation. On the other hand, if *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are limited, they cannot be the cause of the world. The truth about

them is that, though present in the world, they are not its causes : they are not substances but merely qualities of the *prakṛiti*.

The same reasoning holds good even in regard to cases like milk becoming curds or water becoming the juices of different plants. Here, too, it is the *Brahman*, the Internal Controller, who brings about changes.

Again, alternation between creation and dissolution cannot arise through haphazard chance. It is the will of the presiding *Brahman* that causes the orderly succession of the two states, one after another.

The Sāṅkhyas object that a *Brahman*, who is perfect, blissful and kind, has no need to create the world, and that, too, an imperfect, miserable and unequal world. It is recalled that creation etc. are mere sport for the *Brahman* and that inequalities arise from the *karmas* of individual selves.

But cannot these *karmas* account for the cyclic alternation of creation and dissolution as well as for inequalities in creation? No, for the division of the *karmas* into the meritorious and the sinful is based on the *Veda* which declares them to be respectively of the nature of the worship of the Supreme Person and of what is contrary thereto. The pleasure and pain experienced in consequence of these *karmas* are dependent on His favour and disfavour.

The *Brahman* does not cease to be merciful or free because He allows the souls to do what is harmful to themselves or judges them according to their deeds. Mercy is the inability to see the suffering of others without caring for one's own advantage. But it does not mean the unmanliness of condoning transgressions. Such mercy the *Brahman* has. On the erring selves merely ceasing to persist in their transgressions, He forgives their accumulated sins and endeavours to redeem them.

The Sāṅkhyas now point to the example of the grass, water etc. eaten by cows being transformed into milk. Likewise, the *prakṛiti* by itself can become the world. This cannot be, for grass that remains uneaten by cows or is eaten by bulls is not changed into milk. (If the presence of a self favoured by *adṛiṣṭa* is needed, why should such a self be present always in a cow and never in a bull?).

Another example of the Sāṅkhyas is that of a lame man and a blind man teaming up, so that the vision of the one and the ambulatory capacity of the other can be purposefully used. Similarly, the blind *prakṛiti* begins to act in the presence of the intelligent but inert *puruṣa*. The example and the argument fail because the *puruṣa* who is actionless and all-pervading cannot move nor suffer modifications. Nor can the example of the loadstone and iron help. The loadstone has the property of attracting iron, unlike the *puruṣa* who cannot have any modifications. If the mere proximity between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛiti* suffices for creation, that proximity being eternal, creation must also be eternal.

Moreover, the initial disturbance in the equipoise of the *guṇas* which starts creation cannot be accounted for by the Sāṅkhyas. Nor can they explain how this equipoise is again restored in the state of *pralaya*. Even if other arguments are put forward to arrive at the *pradhāna*, the objection based on its lack of intelligence will prove fatal.

Suppose it is admitted that the *pradhāna* is capable of being proved by inference. Even then the objection remains that no purpose is served by such an inference. Enjoyment by and the final release of the *puruṣa* have been put forward as the purposes served by the *pradhāna*. But how can the immovable *puruṣa* see and enjoy the *pradhāna* or be separated from it?

The final argument against the Sāṅkhya system is that it is riddled with incurable inconsistencies. On the one hand, it is declared that the *purusha* has an essential nature which is eternal, immovable and incapable of action. On the other hand, the *purusha* is stated to enjoy the *prakṛiti* and also to win final release. Again, it is taught that by reason of the close proximity of the *purusha* with the *prakṛiti*, the intelligence of the one is superimposed on the other, and similarly the activity of the *prakṛiti* is mistaken to be that of the *purusha*. But such a mutual superimposition is impossible, because the *purusha* is incapable of modifications and the *prakṛiti* is non-intelligent. How then can the *prakṛiti* serve the purposes of the *purusha*? Mere proximity can answer no questions. If it is eternal, then both final release and bondage are likewise eternal. If it is not eternal, we have an infinite regress.

There is self-contradiction in the position of the *Advaitins* also, who hold that the unchangeable *Brahman* devoid of attributes is the witness of ignorance. The Sāṅkhyas have a slight advantage in that they admit the reality of the world and a plurality of souls to account for individual distributions of birth, death etc. Bhāskara's view that the *Brahman* who is free from modifications is associated with limiting adjuncts is also self-contradictory. Thus the creation of the world cannot be accounted for except on the view that the cause of the world is the *prakṛiti* presided over by the *Brahman*.

The next system attacked is that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with its well known atomic theory. The arguments are set out in the *Mahaddīrghādhikaraṇa* (pp. 28-37) consisting of *Sūtras* 10 to 16. These are :

10. (The whole of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory) also (is inconsistent) like the production of the tertiary particle (and the secondary particle) from the secondary particle and the infinitesimal atom (respectively).



11. In either view also there is no motion. Therefore it (i.e., the production of the world on the basis of previous motion in the atoms) is non-existent.

12. Because of the acceptance of the relation of coinherence also (there is inconsistency), as, by parity of reasoning, there results the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*.

13. Because also of the existence necessarily eternally (of the world which is related by *samavaya* to other things, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is inconsistent).

14. Because also there arises contradiction (of your view) owing to the possession (by atoms) of colour etc., for it is so seen.

15. Because also there is error in either case.

16. Because it (i.e., the atomic theory of Kaṇāda) is not accepted in the least (by the followers of the *Vedas*), entire dislike should be cherished towards it.

It having been shown that the inferred *pradhāna* cannot be the cause of the world, the claims of inferred infinitesimal atoms to be such cause are now considered and rejected. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the smallest unit of matter is the eternal infinitesimal atom. It has no dimensions and no extension in space. Two such atoms combine to form a secondary particle, and three secondary particles form a tertiary particle, the smallest visible thing. The tertiary particles have six sides each, and in varied combinations form the different things in the world.

The *Sūtras* deny that the infinitesimal atoms, as conceived, can give rise to secondary particles or that the latter can produce tertiary particles. How can the infinitesimal atoms, which have no extension in space, unite to produce things having such extension? The positing of such atoms has become a necessity to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to avoid infinite regress in analysing the world into its constituent parts. But this has led to other difficulties, and Rāmānuja asks them to accept quietly the *Brahman* as the cause of the world.

Other difficulties in the theory are also shown. The movements of the infinitesimal atoms leading to union into bigger things are supposed to be due to the *adrishṭa* (or the past *karmas*) of individual souls. The *adrishṭa* of the self cannot actuate the non-intelligent atom. If the moving atom is in association with the self, then creation has to be eternal; or if the ripening of *adrishṭa* to yield results is taken into consideration, we cannot have the cyclic succession of creation and dissolution. Co-inherence (or *samavāya*) accepted as an ultimate category to account for the relationship between such things as substances and their qualities, parts and the wholes they make up, motion and the moving object, a genus and its members, is an unnecessary assumption. If the *samavāya* is needed to account for these, then something else is needed to account for it, and infinite regress results. To posit inseparable existence with those it joins together as the nature of *samavāya* is to make an unnecessary assumption of something not perceived and then to indulge in further speculation in justification. The eternity of *samavāya* is attacked on the ground that it would make the world, which possesses it, to be eternal. Finally it is asked how the infinitesimal atoms, which are subtle and invisible, can possess the qualities of colour, taste, smell etc. For the theory speaks of four kinds of infinitesimal atoms—those of earth, water, fire and air—each having one or more specific qualities. If the atoms are denied these qualities, how can the qualities arise in their combinations? In either case, the theory is untenable. .

Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory has to be rejected altogether, having no point of affinity with the *Vedas*. Other types of atomic theory are then taken up. First, the Buddhist view is investigated in three sections. The first of these, the *Samudāyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 37-57), has ten *Sūtras* as under :

17. Although (the state of being) the aggregate (of effects) is assumed to have two causes, its production is not appropriate.

18. If it be said that, on the principle of the former being the cause of the latter, this (i.e., the production of the world) is appropriate, it is not so; because they (i.e., ignorance etc. mentioned as successive causes) do not stand in the position of the cause to the formation of the aggregate.

19. Because also the preceding (momentary) thing is destroyed when the succeeding (momentary) thing is produced, the production of the world is inappropriate).

20. If it (i.e., the cause) does not exist, there will result contradiction of the proposition; if otherwise, (then) simultaneity (of cause and effect).

21. Artificial as well as natural annihilation of objects does not result, because there is no break (in the continuity of existence).

22. Because also there is error in both the cases (there cannot be origination or destruction according to the Buddhist view).

23. Because also in the case of the *ākāṣa*, there is no difference (of it from other real things as an object of perception).

24. And because also of recognition (at a later moment of what was experienced at an earlier one, the momentariness of things is disproved).

25. (The external world cannot be known from inference) because in regard to what has ceased to exist, it (i.e., the passing over of its properties to another thing) is not seen.

26. The accomplishment (of everything) even to the indifferent (may result from the theories of momentariness etc.) thus.

Of the four schools among the Buddhists, two are disposed of in this section—the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. Both hold the external world to be real; but while the former regards it as perceivable also, the latter regards it as capable only of being inferred. Both look upon the external world as consisting of an aggregate constituted by the infinitesimal atoms of earth, water, fire and air. They also admit the unceasing flow of consciousness, love and hatred. To these, as to other Buddhists, all things are momentary.

First it is pointed out that the atoms cannot produce the elements and that the latter cannot produce the body, the sensory organs and the objective forms. How can the momentary atoms be brought together to form the momentary elements, and how can these latter produce the momentary body etc.? Moreover, it is only the unceasing flow of consciousness which is in the body and is overpowered by egotism as the knower that stands in the position of the self. Thus the perceiver is destroyed, as well as the thing perceived: the knower and the known are lost.

But it is claimed by the Buddhists that there is a cyclic chain of causes to account for the world. Ignorance which regards momentary things as permanent leads to mental impressions such as love, hatred etc. These lead in turn to the perceptual consciousness, the mind and its products such as names. Out of these are produced the earth and such other substances with forms. From these are formed the six organs of sense, and from these the body. This leads to feelings and they give rise to ignorance. The cycle then repeats itself. The reply to this is that ignorance can produce delusions, but not anything which can be practically realised. Can the delusion of silver in the mother-of-pearl produce silver afresh? The absence of a permanent self makes it impossible for mental impressions to persist.

The theory of momentariness indeed is riddled with difficulties. Everything being momentary, what is produced at any moment is derived from non-existence. If the destroyed thing at a previous moment is held to be the cause, it will then follow that any moment during which a pot has been in existence can become the cause of all the things in the three worlds. If the momentary pot can produce only other pots, why not all the pots at all times and places? If one momentary pot can produce only one effect, which is the cause of which effect? If the association of a momentary pot with a place is taken into

account, then permanence has to be attributed to the place. A thing brought into contact with a sense organ at a moment cannot exist at the later moment of production of knowledge. If the effect is produced even though the cause is non-existent, then all things will always be produced in all places. If it is urged that a momentary thing can be the cause of another momentary thing immediately succeeding it, then the cause and the effect cease to be momentary or have to be perceived simultaneously.

The theory of momentariness requires that everything suffers destruction every moment. The fact that we see many things persisting is explained as due to the destruction being subtle and unobserved. Rāmānuja refers to his own view set out under II. 1. 15 that in regard to whatever is existent there cannot be complete discontinuity in existence. Production and destruction of a thing merely refer to two states or conditions. The Buddhists may say that in the manner in which a light goes off completely and suffers destruction, we have to infer destruction in regard to everything. The only difference is that in the case of the light, destruction is visible, while in other cases it is unperceived. Rāmānuja replies that the light exists in a subtle state even after it goes off. His point is that from what is seen, what is unseen can be conceived ; but what is seen should not be ignored or denied.

Moreover, the theory of the momentariness of things, leads to creation out of nothing and the created things becoming nothing. If there is unobserved destruction every moment, then the whole world becomes a non-entity after a single instant. What comes into existence later on is produced from nothingness and must then have the character of nothingness.

After incidentally refuting the Buddhist view that space is a form of non-existence, the *Sūtras* urge another argument against momentariness by referring to the fact of

recognition. It cannot be urged that similarity is mistaken for identity in recognition, for even the knower is momentary in Buddhist view. The Buddhists however claim that **some** syllogisms support their theory. Pots etc. are momentary because they serve a purposeful object and are existent entities. What is not momentary is unreal. Again, all the momentary existences of a pot prior to the existence at the last moment are destructible, like the existence at the last moment. But these inferences are shown to be invalid. Counter-syllogisms can be advanced. A pot is permanent because it is an existent thing or because it can serve a purposeful object. Indeed, to be able to serve a purposeful object helps to prove what is opposed to momentariness. The destruction of the pot at the last moment is due to causes other than its essential nature, and it cannot serve to prove the momentariness of the pot.

Recognition, indeed, is perception supported by inference : and it sets aside the inference of the momentariness of things. The Buddhists who hold that both the knower and the known are momentary are barred from making inferences. But the Sautrāntika intervenes here with special pleading on his behalf. Knowledge of what is momentary is possible through inference. Although a thing has disappeared after giving up its form to the consciousness, its existence can be inferred. (Incidentally, Yogāchāra idealism is criticised and the reality of the variegated external world asserted.) •

The *Sūtrakāra's* reply to the Sautrāntika is that the external world cannot be proved from inference. When a thing possessing certain attributes passes out of existence, its attributes are not seen to pass over to another thing. The variety of the states of knowledge, arising from the variety of external objects, is due to the existence of external objects at the time of the origin of knowledge. Moreover, when momentariness, creation out of nothing and destruction without a cause are admitted, everything

may result to the indifferent also, because all things are accomplished without effort and latent effects, mental impressions or knowledge does not persist.

Yogāchāra idealists are next refuted in the *Upalabdhyadhikaraṇa* of three aphorisms (pp. 57—63), which are as follows :

27. There is no non-existence (of things other than knowledge) because it (i.e., the external world) is perceived.

28. Also, it (i.e., the knowledge appertaining to the condition of waking) is not (concerned with false objects), as is the case with dreams, because it is unlike in nature (to dreams).

29. There is no existence (of such knowledge as is devoid of objects), because it is not cognised.

The objections to the theory of the momentariness of things as held by the Buddhist realists cannot apply to the Yogāchāra idealists. They trace the variety in items of knowledge, not to external objects, but to the force of innate impressions flowing in an unceasing stream of distinct momentary ideas. Whenever a new idea is cognised, it is not due to the presence of a different external object, but to the force of the last preceding idea. It is argued that as the so-called external object and the idea of it in the mind are cognised together, both are identical. Our belief in an external world is due to error. The exact correspondence of the idea with the external object shows the postulation of the external object as an unnecessary assumption.

The *Sūtrakāra* refutes this theory by referring to the actual perception of the external world. When anything is known, it leads to practical realisation of external objects. Knowledge is always of the form connecting a subject with an object, as in "I know the pot". If the subject and the object are illusory, how can the knowledge alone be real? The fact that the object and the idea are apprehended together cannot prove them to be identical.

It is only different things which can be together. The correspondence of the object with the idea is due to the contact of the mind with the object. Attributive knowledge, which is a substance, is conjoined with the object, when knowledge arises.

If it be said that knowledge during the waking state need have no external objects even like knowledge during dreams, it is pointed out that the states of waking and dreaming differ. Even assuming for the sake of argument that dream-knowledge has no objective basis, we have to remember that the dreaming mind is subject to sleep and other misguiding factors. If all kinds of knowledge are claimed to be devoid of objects, this claim itself will prove to be without objective support. Indeed, knowledge, which is related neither to a subject nor to an object is nowhere found—not even in dreams.

The Mādhyamika nihilist is then refuted in the one aphorism of the fifth section—*Sarvathānupapattiyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 63-5)—thus :

30. Because also it (i.e., the theory of the Mādhyamikas) is altogether inappropriate.

The Mādhyamika view is that nothing can be proved to be existent. A pot is produced when the clay is lost as clay: the pot cannot be said to be a product of non-existence either. Nor can it be produced from itself. Nor from another thing, because all things other than it are the same in otherness, and on this reasoning everything should be produced out of every other thing. Thus nothing can be proved to have been produced. Belief in real things or ideas is based on error. There is no need to accept any real basis for error. Nothingness indeed is self-established.

Rāmānuja replies that a thing must be real, unreal or otherwise. The nothingness of the Mādhyamika cannot possibly be established. Existence and non-existence refer



to particular states of an existent thing. Moreover, the nihilist cannot prove the nothingness of all things except with a proof, and this proof itself is worthless unless it is real. If unreal, it proves all things to be real.

The *Sūtras* now proceed in the *Ekasminnasambhavādhikaraṇa* (pp. 65-72) to criticise and reject the views of the Jainas who also believe in an atomic theory. The four aphorisms of the section run thus :

31. (The Jaina theory) cannot be true because of the impossibility of the presence (of contradictory attributes) in one thing.

32. Thus the character of not being a whole (results to) the self.

33. Also there is no non-contradiction owing to (the self acquiring) modifications, because of other modifications.

34. Also, because of the persistence of the final condition (of the self in salvation), there is the permanence of both (the self and its dimensions in that state), and hence there is no difference (with the previous states).

Rāmānuja first sets out the essentials of the Jaina system. It analyses the world into six categories—the individual self, matter, *dharma* or the cause of motion, *adharma* or the cause of inertia, time and space. Matter consists of atoms possessing colour, taste, smell and touch. They are not of four kinds, but become fourfold on account of transformations. Time is atomic and space is infinite. The Jainas have another list from the point of view of the quest for salvation—the self, the non-self, the inflow of sense-impressions, bondage, austerities, meditation and final release.

The *Sūtras* attack particularly the Jainas' *syādvāda* and their theory that the self has the dimensions of its embodiment for the time being. The sevenfold predication of the *syādvāda* runs thus: A thing is; it is not; it is and is not; it is indefinable; it is and is indefinable; it

is not and is indefinable; it is, is not, and is indefinable. This view is rejected on the ground that contradictory attributes, such as existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence, identity and difference etc., cannot be found together in one and the same thing (without reference to time, place or circumstance). A substance may have many states, but the substance is one while the states are many and different. The Vedāntic view that the *Brahman* constitutes all things is clear and consistent, because He has all the intelligent and non-intelligent things for His body.

If the self has the dimensions of its embodiment, it has to suffer fragmentation when passing from a bigger to a smaller body. How can the whole of the self of an elephant pass into the body of an ant? If it be argued that there are expansion and contraction for the self, then it will become non-eternal like a pot. Moreover, the self in liberation is said to have particular dimensions and these do not alter. They must be taken as the real dimensions. The view that dimensions alter with bodies is therefore unreasonable.

The next section deals with the Pāśupatas (pp. 73-79) in four aphorisms.

35. The view in regard to (Paśu)pati as the Supreme Lord (is not to be accepted), because of (its) inconsistency.

36. Because of the inappropriateness arising from the superintendence (over the *pradhāna* or the creation of the universe which has to be attributed to an incorporeal Paśupati).

37. If it be said it (i.e., the presiding over of the *pradhana* by Paśupati) resembles that of the sensory organs (and the body etc. by the bodiless individual self), it is not so, because of (its leading to) the experience (of fruits of merit and demerit by Paśupati).

38. (If Paśupati has *adṛishṭa* in the form of merits and demerits, it will result in his) having an end and (his) wanting in omniscience.

Their system is mainly attacked on the ground that Paśupati, as the Supreme Lord is known here, is represented only as the efficient cause of the world. Rāmānuja also draws attention to the mutual inconsistencies between several subschools among them, particularly those of Kāpālas and Kālāmukhas. Moreover, there are practices and doctrines opposed to the *Vedas*. Indeed it is suggested that, from this point of view, it is counted along with the systems of the Buddhists and the Jains. Again, the identification of the Supreme Lord with Paśupati is opposed to the Vedic view which assigns that position to Nārāyaṇa.

Paśupati, regarded as incorporeal, cannot preside over the *pradhāna* and become the instrumental cause of the world. If he is endowed with a body, there are logical difficulties in the concept of an inferred and embodied Lord. The analogy of the bodiless individual self presiding over the senses etc. fails, because its supervision over the body is for the purpose of experiencing the effects of *adṛishṭa* and Paśupati cannot have such experience without becoming liable to mortality and lack of omniscience. (Moreover, it is an already embodied self which presides over the body.)

The eighth and last section, *Uṭpattayasambhavādhikaraṇa* (pp. 80-92), deals with the Pāñchārātra system in four aphorisms, as under :

39. (The Pāñcharātra is not authoritative) because it is not possible\* (for the individual self) to have birth (as taught therein).

40. And out of the agent (i.e., the *jīva*), the instrument (namely, the mind), cannot be produced.

41. However, it (i.e., the authoritativeness of the Pāñcharātra) is not negated, because they (i.e., Sankarshana etc.) are all of the same nature as what is Intelligence and the Source.

42. Because also of the negation (of the origination of the *jīva* in the Pāñcharātra itself, its authoritativeness is beyond question).

In the first two, the authority of the Pāñcharātra is attacked on the ground that it teaches the origination of the individual self called Sañkarshaṇa from the Supreme Lord and that of the mind called Pradyumna from Sañkarshaṇa. There is implied reference also to the teaching that the *ahaṅkāra* known as Aniruddha is born from Pradyumna. All this is opposed to the *Vedas*.

The attack is repulsed in the third aphorism which shows a turn in the argument by the word, 'vā' (or 'however'). The Supreme Lord Himself takes the form of the fourfold aggregate called the *Vyūha* and consisting of Vāsudeva, Sañkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. As Sañkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, the Supreme Lord Himself presides over the self, the mind and the *ahaṅkāra*. Because of this, the self etc. are called as Sañkarshaṇa etc.

The last aphorism points out that the origination of the self is denied in the Pāñcharātra itself. After quoting the *Parama Samhitā* to the effect that the self is beginningless and endless, Rāmānuja answers some other criticisms. The statement that Sāṅḍilya studied the Pāñcharātra as he failed to get satisfaction from the *Vedas* is not condemnatory of them. It merely shows that the teachings of the *Vedas* have been made easier to understand in the Pāñcharātra. The sage, Vyāsa, the author of the *Sūtras*, has himself upheld the authority of the Pāñcharātra in the *Mahābhārata*, where it is pointed out that Nārāyaṇa Himself taught the Pāñcharātra out of compassion and a desire to save erring humanity.

## CHAPTER II, PART 3.

After criticising all theories positing other things than the *Brahman* as the cause of the world, the *Sūtras* proceed to establish that all things in the world are the effects of the *Brahman*. Replies are given to claims that some things are not such effects.

The first section, *Viyadadhikaraṇa* (pp. 93-100), shows that the spatial ether is an effect created by the *Brahman* as the cause. It has the following nine aphorisms :

1. The spatial ether is not (created because there are no scriptural declarations to that effect).

2. But there is (origination in relation to the spatial ether according to the *Veda*).

3. It (i.e., the scriptural passage relating to the origination of the spatial ether) has a figurative sense, because that (origination) cannot possibly happen, and because also there is a scriptural passage (negating that origination).

4. And one and the same (word, 'sambhūta') has two meanings like the word, 'Brahman' (in another similar context).

5. There is no failure of the proposition (that by knowing one thing all things become known), because it (i.e., the spatial ether) is not distinct (from the *Brahman* on account of being the effect of the *Brahman*).

6. Because there are scriptural texts (declaring origination in relation to the spatial ether).

7. Also, wherever there is modification, there is differentiation as in the case of the world.

8. By means of this (reasoning), the element, air, is explained as having an origin.

9. The *Sat* alone has no origination, because (otherwise) there will be inappropriateness.

The *pūrvapakṣa* is that the spatial ether is not created, according to the *Veda*. The *Chhānd. Up.* in the section on creation (VI. 2) begins with the creation only of *tejas*. Indeed, the scripture cannot speak of the creation of the spatial ether : for, being all-pervading and without parts, it is eternal. Reference is now made to *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1. 1) where it is declared, "From that same *Atman* the spatial ether was produced." Any inference opposed to the scripture cannot be valid. This passage, however, is

claimed to have only a figurative significance. The *Chhānd.* text speaks of *tejas* as the first created thing, and *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 3. 3) speaks of the spatial ether as immortal.

But in the *Taittiriya* text several things are said to be produced—the spatial ether, air, fire etc. It cannot be that the scripture speaks figuratively in regard to all these. Moreover, the word, 'produced' (or '*sambhūta*'), is expressly used in regard to the spatial ether and is understood by way of supplying the ellipsis with reference to other things. How can it be used figuratively in the express statement and primarily when indicated elliptically? To this objection, the reply is given that in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (I. 1. 8-9) the word, '*brahman*', is used once in its primary sense to denote the Supreme Being and again figuratively for the *pradhāna*.

The view of the *Sūtrakāra* is that all these have to be understood in the light of the statement in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 1.) that by knowing the *Brahman* everything becomes known. This is possible only if all things are His effects. The text which speaks of the creation of *tejas* is preceded by the statement that Existence (or *Sat*) alone was in the beginning, one without a second. The spatial ether could not have been in existence then. In *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 8. 7), all this world is declared to have Him for its Self. Hence the spatial ether also is a modification or effect. If certain men are described as the sons of Devadatta and if it is explained with regard to some of them that they have been begotten by him, it follows that the rest are also thus begotten. When a general statement is made that all things in the world are the effects of the Supreme Self, and some only are specifically pointed out as such, this does not deny the other things being His effects. The immortality attributed to the ether in a text mentioned above refers only to its lasting comparatively longer than other things.

The element, air, which is described as immortal along with the spatial ether, is now seen to be an effect. The

*Sat* alone has no origination, because by knowing It everything becomes known.

The next section, the *Tejodhikaraṇa* (pp. 100-08), has eight aphorisms, as under :

10. The element of *tejas* is produced out of it (i.e., air); indeed, it (i.e., the scripture) says so.

11. The element of water (is produced from that element of *tejas*).

12. The element of earth (is produced from water).

13. (That the word, '*anna*', denotes the element of earth is made out) from the connected context, from the colour (of the earth), and from other scriptural passages.

14. But He (is the creator), because of His characteristic which consists of that willing (in the form of becoming manifold).

15. And the order (of creation) in a contrary manner is appropriate only as proceeding (directly) from Him.

16. If it be held that both the *viñāna* and the *manas* (mentioned) between (the *prāṇa* and the elements) are in the right order (of creation), because of inferential marks in this regard, it is not so, because there is no distinction in that respect (among all things mentioned).

17. But the words denoting them and relating to movable and immovable things is (non-secondary or) primary in signifying (the *Brahman*), because it (i.e., their expressive power) rests on (the) existence (of all things) being due to the penetration of that (*Brahman*) (within them).

The doubt is raised whether the *Brahman* is the direct cause of spatial ether only or of everything. It is argued that according to *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1. 1) the former view alone is correct. The other things are produced, in order, each from the preceding member in the series. Thus, as already stated, air is produced from ether; similarly, *tejas* is produced from air, water from *tejas* and the element of earth from water. The *anna* (or food),

said to be produced from water in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 2. 4) is the element, earth, because food is only a modification of that element and the effect is mentioned for the cause. The context also deals with the creation of elements. Moreover, the black colour attributed to food later in VI. 4. 1 makes it out to be the earth. And what is produced from water according to other texts is the earth only.

The answer to this view is that the *Brahman* is the direct cause of each and every thing. Its so called cause is only He Himself having that causal substance for His body. This is proved from the *Chhānd. Up.* text where *tejas* and water are said to will the creation of water and the earth respectively. Willing is appropriate only to the Supreme Self. In *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 7) and *Sub. Up.* (VII) every thing is described as being His body.

The different order of creation in *Mund. Up.* (II. 1. 3) is now discussed. Here it is stated: "From Him are produced the principal vital air, the internal organ of mind and all the senses, the elements of spatial ether, air, *tejas*, water and earth..." The claim that this represents the order of creation, because from the mind to the earth that order is followed, is set aside. For the order fails with the vital air and the mind. The former is a modification of the element, air, and cannot come earlier than the spatial ether. Nor can mind be produced from it. This text therefore only shows the *Brahman* as the direct cause of all these things.

But each particular word is known to denote a particular thing; how then can all the words denote the Supreme Self? All things are His modes and dependent for their very existence on His being within them. Therefore, all words denote Him primarily and only secondarily the various things they are generally taken to denote.



The next section, the *Ātmādhikaraṇa* (pp. 108-115), considers whether or not the individual self has origination in the following aphorism :

18. The individual self has no (origination), because there are scriptural statements (to that effect), and because also that it is eternal is made out from them (i.e., the scriptures).

The proposition that by knowing the *Brahman* all things become known has proved that the spatial ether has origination. Should it not prove the same with regard to the self also? Several scriptural texts are cited in support. Most of them speak of the origination of all things from Him ; *M. Nār.* (I. 4) refers specifically to the 'creation' of the selves. But *Sūtra* 18 repudiates this view. Reference is made to scriptural texts which deny origination to the self and affirm its eternity. The proposition mentioned above can apply to the self also. For while it does not suffer, in the state of creation, a change in its essential nature like non-intelligent matter, its intelligence, extremely contracted at the time of dissolution, now expands. On account of this, the selves are also effects and known through knowing the *Brahman*. Thus creation means for non-intelligent matter a change in essential nature, for the self an expansion of knowledge and for the *Brahman* His modes being in a gross condition.

Incidentally the views of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Yādvaprakāśa on the individual self are criticised and those of Rāmānuja upheld. Śaṅkara and Bhāskara hold the condition of the self to be due to ignorance and real limiting adjuncts respectively. The former view would make the *Brahman* suffer willingly from ignorance and the latter would subject Him to bondage. According to Yādvaprakāśa the *Brahman* Himself is in part the Controller, in part the individual self and in part non-intelligent matter. Thus, He has to undergo various changes and experience undesirable things. Rāmānuja's view that the *Brahman* has the intelligent selves and

non-intelligent matter as His body both in their subtle and gross states avoids all these difficulties and preserves for Him freedom from all evil and abundance of auspicious qualities.

The *Sūtras* now proceed incidentally to make some investigations about the nature of the individual self in five sections and devote the rest of this *pāda* to them. The first of these, the *Jñādhikaraṇa* (pp. 116-131), shows the self to be the knower in fourteen aphorisms. The first five are as follows :

19. It (i.e., the individual self) is the knower itself, because of them (i.e., scriptural statements to that effect).

20. Because the departure from the body, movement out of it and return to it (are known in relation to the individual self from the scripture).

21. (That the individual self is atomic is confirmed by the effecting) of the latter two (i.e., movement and return) by one's own self itself.

22. If it be said that it (i.e., the individual self) is not atomic in size, it is not so, because the context relates to the other (i.e., the *Brahman*).

23. Through the word denoting it (i.e., the atomic size) itself and through the comparative size given (the individual self is made out to be atomic).

The investigation starts, seeking to answer a possible objection that there can be no expansion or contraction in the knowledge of the self, because knowledge is not an attribute of the self but its essential nature. The Sāṅkhyas cite scriptural texts to show that the self is called *viज्ञāna* or intelligence. The Vaiśeshikas interpose with the view that the self is all-pervading and has intelligence as an adventitious attribute. It is only thus that the experience of pleasures and pains, according to the *adrishṭa*, can be explained by the mere movement of the body.

The *Sūtrakāra* proves the self to be a knower from scriptural texts. Particularly the teaching of Prajāpati in

*Chhānd. Up.* about the bound and freed self is referred to. The objection of the Vaiśeṣhikas that if the quality of being the knower were natural to the all-pervading self, room will be given to its being perceived always and everywhere, is next answered. It is pointed out that the scripture speaks of the self departing from the body, moving out of it and returning to it. The latter two things are not at all possible unless the self is atomic. To the criticism that in *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 25), in a context devoted to the self, it is described as great and that thus the self is denied to be atomic in the scripture, the answer is made that though the context starts with the individual self, the statement referred to is about the *Brahman*. Moreover, there are revealed declarations to the effect that the self is of the size of an atom. The size of the self is indeed compared to that of the ten-thousandth part of a hair and the point of a goad.

The question is then raised : how can the atomic self feel pain and pleasure all over the body ? This is answered with the help of two analogies in the following three aphorisms :

24. There is no contradiction as in the case of the sandal (paste).

25. If it be said that it (i.e., the case of the sandal drop) is accounted for by its particular position, it is not so ; because it (i.e., the individual self) is admitted (to have its location) in the heart.

26. Through the quality (of knowledge), however, (the individual self pervades the whole body) as is the case with (the quality of) light (which, starting from a single source, pervades many places).

A drop of sandal paste, though located only in a part of the body, produces pleasure pervading the whole body. Similarly, though the self is in the heart, it experiences the pain and pleasure all over the body. The manner in which this is done is explained on the analogy of a light, which, though located at a source, pervades many places. Know-

ledge is the quality which helps the self to pervade the whole body, though the self is in the heart.

The question is now raised how intelligence can be a quality distinct from the essential nature of the self itself. This is dealt with in the last six aphorisms of the section :

27. As is the case with smell (and the element of earth), so also there is distinction (between intelligence as quality and intelligence as essential nature), and it (i.e., the scripture) declares so.

28. It (i.e., intelligence) is (expressly) taught to be separate (from the individual self).

29. The denotation (of the individual self) by that (i.e., the word, ' *viñāna* '), is, however, due to its having that quality (of *viñāna*) as its essence, as is the case with the Omniscient Lord.

30. And because also it (i.e., the quality of intelligence) exists as long as the individual self exists, it is nothing wrong (to denote it by the word, ' *viñāna* '), as such (instances) are seen (in the world).

31. Because like masculinity etc., however, it (i.e., intelligence) is existent (even when it is not manifest), and is capable of manifestation.

32. Otherwise, it will lead to eternal perception or (eternal) non-perception (in regard to the individual self), or it will be restricted to either of them.

The example of the element, earth, and its quality of odour is cited to show that knowledge, as a quality of the knowing self, is distinct from its essential nature. The scripture also teaches to this effect. But it is objected that then the self is described in some texts as mere intelligence. It is explained that this is proper because intelligence is the essential nature of the self. For a similar reason, the *Brahman* is called Bliss. Moreover, the self has the attribute of intelligence all the time. Even during deep sleep etc. it is latent like masculinity in a young boy. Finally the Sāṅkhya theory of the all-pervading self leads to the eternal perception or non-perception of all things at

all places or both perception and non-perception at the same time. The Vaiśeṣhika view of an all-pervading self depending on sense organs leads to the same position. Rāmānuja's view is upheld that, the atomic self being in the body, there is perception of it there and nowhere else.

The next question taken up is whether the atomic self is the agent of actions. The *Kartrādhikaraṇa* (pp. 131-8) has seven aphorisms :

33. The agent of actions is (the individual self) because the *śāstras* have to be purposive.

34. (The individual self is the agent of actions) because of (its doing) the act of seizing (as taught), and because also the act of sporting is taught (in relation to it).

35. In relation to actions (the individual self is the agent), because it is so taught; if it were not so, then there would have been a change in the grammatical case (of the word denoting 'knowledge' in the context).

36. There would be no restriction (in regard to being the enjoyer), just as in the case of perception.

37. Because (in relation to the self) there would be the loss of power (to enjoy).

38. Because also there can be no concentrated meditation (on the part of the intellect).

39. There will be both (cessation and non-cessation of being the agent), as is the case with a carpenter (only in case the self is the agent).

The Sāṅkhya cites *Kāth. Up.* and *B.G.* to show that the self is not the agent of action, but that the 'qualities' of the *prakṛiti* perform them. In the former we have the declaration that the self can neither kill nor be killed : in the latter it is stated more than once that all actions are performed by the above-mentioned qualities. The claim is shown to be wrong because the commandments of the scripture have in view a self who is an agent. The *Kāth. Up.* passage merely refers to the immortality of the self : the *B.G.*, which elsewhere affirms the self to be the agent,

in the statements about the 'qualities' being the agent, points to the activities in *samsāra* being impelled by contacts with them. Reference is then made to *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 1. 18) to show that the self seizes the sense organs and plays with them in dreams. The *Taitt.* text (II. 5. 1) about the *viññāna* performing the sacrifice and other rituals shows the self to be the agent. The word, '*viññāna*', here cannot mean the intellect, because as an auxiliary instrument of knowledge it ought to be referred to only in the instrumental case. Again, if the *prakṛiti* were the agent of actions, since it is common to all, all actions would be for the enjoyment either of all selves or of none. Moreover, the agent cannot be different from the enjoyer. If the self is not the agent, how can it be the enjoyer? One seeking for final release according to the Sāṅkhyas has to meditate on the self being different from the *prakṛiti*. This meditation has to be carried out by the self and not by the intellect, which is an evolute of the *prakṛiti*. Finally, action follows desiring and willing; if the *prakṛiti* is the agent it has to be acting always, whereas if the self were the agent it can act or not as it chooses.

The sixth section of two aphorisms, the *Parāyattādhikaraṇa* (pp. 139-43), reconciles the Lord being the supreme cause with the self being the agent :

40. That (i.e., the power of being the agent possessed by the individual self) is, however, from the Supreme Being, because the scripture says so.

41. But He requires the efforts made (by the individual self), for the reason among others that mandates and prohibitions (in the *śāstras*) should not become purposeless.

That the self has the power to act only under Divine Providence is seen from the scriptural texts which describe the Lord as the Inner Ruler of all. The *B.G.* also speaks of the Lord being at the heart of all men and all activities being impelled by Him. But the commandments of the *śāstras* are meaningful because the Lord first requires the

initiative on the part of the individual self. Without His consent to the initial effort, no activity of the self can be accomplished. In the case of extremely good or extremely bad actions, however, the Lord is particularly interested. He favours those who perform the former and leads downward those who do the latter.

If the power of the self to act is derived from the Supreme Being, what is the relationship between the two? Scriptural texts seem to advance contradictory views. The position is clarified in the last and seventh section, the *Amśādhikaraṇa* (pp. 143-58) of eleven aphorisms, where the self is established to be a 'part' or *amśa* of the *Brahman*. The first three aphorisms set out the thesis :

42. It (viz., the individual self) is a part (of the *Brahman*), because distinction (of it from the *Brahman*) is taught and what is otherwise (i.e., because non-distinction also is taught). Moreover, some schools declare in their scriptures that He (i.e., the *Brahman*) is fishermen, gamblers etc.

43. (The individual self is a part of the *Brahman*) because a word in a Vedic text says so.

44. It is also declared in the *Smṛiti* (that the individual self is a part of the *Brahman*).

Though this thesis has been established under II. 1. 15 and II. 1. 22, the question is reopened on account of some scriptural passages affirming identity and some others distinction between the self and the *Brahman*. Four possibilities are envisaged. The self may be entirely distinct; it may be the *Brahman* Himself subject to illusions; it may be the *Brahman* with limiting adjuncts; or it may be a part of Him. Each of these views claims scriptural support.

The *Sūtras* support the last view on the ground that the scriptures affirm both distinction and identity. Distinction is taught when the *Brahman* and the self are described as the Creator and the created, the Controller and

the controlled, the Omniscient and ignorant etc. Non-distinction is taught when the self is declared to be the *Brahman* in various ways. The *Ātharvaṇikas* have a passage which says that fishermen, slaves, gamblers etc. are the *Brahman*.

Thus the other three views are dismissed as contrary to true scriptural teaching. The declarations of identity cannot be merely figurative. Those affirming distinction cannot be taken to be intended for subsequent sublation. If the *Brahman* with limiting conditions is the self, then there will be stultification of the relations of the Controller and the controlled etc. The Vedic passage that all beings are His one foot further supports the view that the self is a part of the *Brahman*. The *B.G.* also has an express statement (XV. 7) to this effect.

Several criticisms are met in the subsequent aphorisms. The following three explain how the evils of the individual self cannot affect the *Brahman*, even though the former is a part of the latter :

45. It (i.e., the individual self, is, however, a part of the *Brahman*) like light (being a part of the source of light) and so on. (As is the individual self) the Supreme Being is not so.

46. It is declared by the authors of the *Smṛitis* also.

47. Permission and prohibition are due to association with the body as is the case with fire etc.

The analogy of a source of light and the rays radiating therefrom is used to meet the criticism. The rays are qualifying attributes and the source the qualified object. Similarly, the selves are attributes of the *Brahman*. The evils of the attributes cannot touch the object qualified. This is how the concept of *aṁśa* has to be understood. The *V.P.* also uses the metaphor of rays from a fire. To a further criticism that distinctions in the rights and duties of different castes seem untenable if all selves are parts of the Lord, the answer is given that such distinctions are



**based on association with bodies of differing degrees of purity. Fire from the house of a person learned in the Vedas is pure, relatively to fire from a cemetery.**

**Further criticisms are now answered in the following aphorisms :**

48. There is no confusion (among the individual selves in regard to their experience) because also of the absence of infinite extension (in respect of each of them).

49. It (i.e., the reasoning in support of the view that the *Brahman* when subject to illusion is the individual self) is fallacious besides.

50. There is no cause regulative of the *adṛishṭa* (of the individual selves).

51. The case is undoubtedly the same in regard to mental resolves and other connected acts (of physical exertion).

52. If it be said that because the part (of the *Brahman* associated with limiting conditions) is distinct (from the part not so associated) and there is separation (among the experiences of the individual selves), it is not so, because all parts are included in all the limiting conditions.

The selves being atomic are distinct in each body, and there is no confusion among their experiences. The view that the *Brahman* subject to illusions is the individual self leads to confusion among such experiences. This cannot be explained away through distinctions among limiting conditions brought about by ignorance. For the concealment of the intelligence of the *Brahman* by ignorance is the destruction of His essential nature. Moreover, though the limiting conditions are distinct, the *Brahman* is one, and the confusion of the experiences of the selves is unavoidable. The separation of these cannot be established either on the basis of the *adṛishṭas* brought into being by the limiting conditions : for these conditions have a single substratum. Mental and physical acts which give rise to the *adṛishṭas* are similarly unregulated. The view that the selves are the *Brahman* with real limiting adjuncts also cannot avoid confusion among the experiences of the selves

and between their experiences and those of the *Brahman*. For all parts of the *Brahman* are included in all the limiting conditions, and the miseries of each part cannot but accrue to the *Brahman*.

## CHAPTER II, PART 4.

In the next part of the Chapter, the origination of the senses, *prāṇas* etc. which are the auxiliary instruments of of the self is dealt with. The first section, *Prāṇotpattya-adhikaraṇa* (pp. 159-62), in three aphorisms shows that the senses are created :

1. Similarly the *prāṇas* (or the senses are not created).
2. It (i.e., the plural number) is used figuratively, because of the impossibility (of its denoting many), as there is indeed a scriptural declaration in regard to Him (i.e., His existence) before creation.
3. Because the sense of speech is preceded by that (i.e., by creation, it does not exist before creation).

In *Śat. Br.* (VI. 1. 1) it is stated that non-existence was in the beginning, that this non-existence was the *rishis*, and that the *rishis* were the *prāṇas*. Does not this show that the *prāṇas* existed prior to creation? No. For there are other texts which declare that the Self alone existed in the beginning and that the senses etc. were created by Him. In this passage also, the word, '*prāṇas*', stands for the Supreme Self, and the word, '*rishis*', refers to His omniscience. The plural number in the case of these words is figurative, because many things cannot possibly exist before creation. Again, there are no effects of the senses like the sense of speech prior to creation, which would justify us in assuming their existence.

The next section, *Saptagatyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 163-5) of two aphorisms, establishes the number of senses to be eleven :

4. They (i.e., the senses) are seven because of the movement (along with the individual self being attributed only to seven) and because also they are so specified.

5. But the hand (i.e., the sense of grasping) and the other senses exist therefore during the existence of the individual self in the body; therefore it (i.e., that the senses are only seven) is not so.

The senses are claimed to be seven only on the strength of *Muṇḍ. Up.* (II. 1. 8) and *Kaṭh. Up.* (VI. 10) where seven senses are declared to move along with the self. Other scriptural passages which refer to a greater number must be deemed figurative because the additional 'senses' do not move with the self. The established conclusion is that there are eleven senses, consisting of the five organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, the five organs of action and the internal organ of the mind. All these are auxiliary instruments of the self in the body. *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 9. 4), *B.G.* (XIII. 5) and *V.P.* (I. 2. 47) prove this.

The third section shows that the senses are atomic and that the principal vital air is created. The *Prāṇa-ṇutvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 166-8), has two aphorisms:

6. They (i.e., the senses) are also atomic in size.

7. It (i.e., the principal vital air), which is also the most excellent (is created).

The infinitude of the *prāṇas* is claimed from *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 5. 13), but this is contradicted by IV. 4. 2, where the principal *prāṇa* and the senses are stated to leave the body on death. The infinitude is figurative and it refers to the multitude of effects which form the attributes of the *prāṇas*. To the claim that the principal vital air is not created because *R.V.* (X. 129. 2) speaks of the Supreme Being breathing before creation, the answer is that the passage merely refers to His existence. Other texts prove the origination of the principal vital air.

The next section, *Vāyukriyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 168-72), shows the principal vital air to be neither the element of  
III S.B.—F

air, nor its action, but a particular condition of the element. Its four aphorisms are as under :

8. It (i.e., the principal vital air) is not mere air or its action; because it is taught to be different.

9. It (i.e., the *prāṇa*) resembles the eye etc. (in being an instrument of the self), because of the teachings about it mainly in association with them.

10. That defect which is due to not having an action does not exist; indeed the scripture declares so.

11. That it has five functions is taught as in the case of the mind.

As *Muṇḍ. Up.* (II. 1. 3) mentions both the principal vital air and the element of air separately, both are distinct. But another scriptural text identifies both these. So it is made out the principal vital air is the element of air which has assumed a particular condition. But it is not a modification of the element which has changed into a radically different thing. Because it is listed along with the sense organs, it is also, like them, an auxiliary instrument of the self. Its function is to sustain vital activities in its fivefold form. The five forms are not different principles, but the principal vital air as related to particular functions.

The fifth section, *Śreṣṭhāṇuvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 172-3), establishes the atomic size of the principal vital air :

12. It (i.e., the principal vital air) is also atomic in size.

The scriptures describe the principal vital air as departing from the body immediately after the self: hence it cannot but be atomic. Other declarations to the effect that all things are established in or enveloped by the vital air merely refer to the dependence of all living things on it.

In two aphorisms, the next section, *Jyotirādyadhīsthānādhikaraṇa* (pp. 173-5), shows that the control exercised

over the senses by the individual self and particular gods is according to the will of the *Brahman* :

13. The control, however, by the god of fire etc., along with the individual self (over the senses), is due to His (i.e., the *Brahman*'s) resolution, because the scripture says so.

14. Because also that (i.e., the control by the *Brahman*) is eternal.

The control exercised by the *Brahman* is demonstrated by texts like *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 7 and III. 8) and *Taitt. Up.* (II. 8. 1). That this control is eternal is seen from other texts like *Taitt. Up.* (II. 6. 1) and *B.G.* (X. 42).

The seventh section, *Indriyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 175-7), establishes in two aphorisms that the principal vital air is not to be included among the senses :

15. Other than the most excellent (*prāṇa*), they (i.e., those denoted by the word, '*prāṇa*') are the senses, because of the mention (of these) as such (senses).

16. Because also the scripture declares distinction (between the senses and the principal *prāṇa*), as there is distinction (as to their functions etc.)

The principal vital air is not included among the sense organs, though the latter also are called '*prāṇas*'. The scripture distinguishes it from the senses: when the latter are at rest during deep sleep, the former keeps on functioning: the senses help to achieve knowledge or action, while the vital air maintains life. The senses are called *prāṇas*, because they are dependent on the *prāṇa* for their life.

The last and eighth section, *Samjñāmūrtikṛīptiyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 177-88), has the following three aphorisms :

17. The creation of names and forms, however, is taught as proceeding from the Maker of Tripartition.

18. The flesh etc. are (taught to be) earthy; according to the scripture, (so is it) in the case of the other two also (namely, water and *tejas*).

19. From the distinctive peculiarity of each of them arises that description, that description.

From the beginning of Chapter II, Part 3, the collective creation (when the modifications of the *pradhāna* are evolved) has been dealt with and shown to have proceeded from the *Brahman*. Now the question of individualised creation, that is, differentiation by names and forms when selves are united with bodies, is taken up. Is it the work merely of Hiraṇyagarbha or of the *Brahman* having him for His body? In this connection, the proper significance is discussed of the well-known scriptural text: "Entering by this individual self which is Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2) Hiraṇyagarbha is one with the collective individual self, and one view is that the above text clearly describes him as responsible for the differentiation of names and forms. The entrance and the differentiation are both carried out by the same agent; and the individual self, being a 'part' of the *Brahman*, has the same essential nature with Him, and can therefore be equated with Him as in the text. But it is definitely declared that the differentiation is carried out by the self, which is for that purpose named as something distinct from the *Brahman*. This is claimed to have support from *V.P.* (I. 5. 63). (Incidentally, the exact force of the instrumental case in '*ātmanā jīvena*' or 'by the individual self which is Myself', is made out as indicating the penetration and tripartition to have been carried out by someone other than the *Brahman*.)

The *Sūtrakāra*'s reply is that the creation of names and forms is taught as proceeding from the Maker of Tripartition, namely, the *Brahman*. The scriptural passage in question has to be interpreted thus: "Entering them, namely, the three elements of *tejas*, water and the earth, as this individual self, that is, as Myself qualified by the collective individual self as the body, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms". The birth of

- Hiranyagarbha is within the eggshaped universe, made up of tripartitioned elements.

This position is objected to on the ground that tripartition is subsequent to the creation of the eggshaped universe. In *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 3-5), it is stated that the Supreme Deity evolved the differentiation of names and forms and then made the elements tripartite; that food, water and *tejas* which are eaten are divided threefold; and that tripartition can be observed in the case of fire, the sun, the moon etc. This objection is disposed of by pointing out that the threefold evolution of food, water and *tejas* is different from the tripartition at the commencement of creation. Again, tripartition is illustrated with reference to fire, the sun, the moon etc.; it is pointed out how the pure, unpartitioned elements can be seen in them after tripartition. Lastly, the statement of tripartition subsequent to the differentiation of names and forms, has to be interpreted according to the true sense of the passage. Finally, the tripartitioned elements are each named after the preponderant element.

### CHAPTER III, PART I.

After establishing in the first two Chapters the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world, the *Sūtras* proceed in the third Chapter to describe the worship which is the means of attaining Him. To induce love for the *Brahman* and dislike for things of the world, the imperfections appertaining to the self in the states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep and the *Brahman's* freedom therefrom are first described.

In the first section, *Tadantarapratipattyadhikaraṇa* of seven aphorisms, it is shown that when the self moves from one body to another, it is accompanied by the subtle elements. The scriptural authority for this is found in "the *vidyā* of the five fires" as taught in *Chhānd. Up.* and

*Bṛih. Up.* The aphorisms first state the established conclusion and then answer some objections thereto :

1. While going to another than that (i.e., than this body), it (i.e., the individual self) goes associated (with the subtle elements), because it is so made out from the question and its examination (given in the context of the *Pañchagnividyā*).

2. But (there is association of all the subtle elements with the self) because they (i.e., these waters) are made up of three (elements); (they are called waters) owing to the preponderance (of the element of water in them).

3. Because, also, there is movement of the *prāṇas* (the individual self goes associated with the subtle elements when going from one body to another).

4. If it be said that, inasmuch as they (i.e., the sense of speech etc.) are declared in the scripture to move towards fire etc. (only to be absorbed into them, they do not move along with the individual self), it is not so : because of the figurative significance (of the words, 'speech' etc. in the context).

5. If it be said that, as they (i.e., the waters) are not mentioned at (the) first (oblation), (they do not move in association with the individual self), it is not so ; these (waters) themselves (move as such), on account of necessary consistency (between the question and its answer here).

6. If it be said that, inasmuch as there is no declaration in the scripture (about the individual self moving in association with the waters, the self does not so move), it is not so ; because it is learnt to be so in regard to those who perform religious and other (secular) works (of a meritorious nature).

7. But it (i.e., the statement relating to the gods eating the individual self) has a figurative significance because of its relating to one devoid of the knowledge of the Self. Indeed, the scripture declares so.

The *vidyā* is taught by King Pravāhaṇa to the son of Aruṇa. The course of the self is traced from the time it leaves a mortal body to ascend to the heavenly world till it returns to the earth and is reborn in a human body. It takes with it the sense organs and the material elements in a subtle state. In the heavenly world, the senses cause the



subtle elements to become an ambrosial body for the self. This body dissolves on the exhaustion of the auspicious *karma* through the enjoyment of celestial pleasures. The self then enters a raincloud, reaches the earth along with the showers, gets united with food-plants, enters a man's body with his food, gets associated with his semen, enters a woman's womb along with it and there gets a new body. At every stage, the subtle elements undergo accordant transformations. The whole process is represented as a series of five oblations offered by the sense-organs (or *prāṇas*): the oblation is of the subtle elements (or the waters).

Several criticisms are made. First, not all the elements are mentioned, but only water. The answer is that all the elements are needed. Indeed tripartition is undertaken for the creation of bodies. Water alone is mentioned because of its preponderance in the body. Moreover, the senses which are stated to accompany the departing self must have some support for themselves, and this can only be found in the subtle elements.

Secondly, it is objected that the scripture describes the senses like the eye, speech etc. as getting absorbed in the sun, fire etc. on death: hence they cannot move with the self. The answer is that this absorption is figurative, and it refers to their presiding deities ceasing to function in the body. The third objection is that the waters are not mentioned at the first oblation, but only *śraddhā*. The reply is that the necessary connection between the questions and answers in the context makes it clear that '*śraddhā*' means 'waters'; such a meaning is known elsewhere also in the scripture.

Fourthly, it is pointed out that the scripture does not describe the individual self as moving in association with the waters. The reply is that the scripture (i.e., *Chhānd. Up. V. 10*) describes the how those who perform religious and secular works of a meritorious nature reach the

heavenly world and after exhausting their store of merit return to the earth to be reborn as human beings. This has to be understood to mean something similar to what is described in the context of the five oblations. Finally, the scriptural statement that such persons in the heavenly world are eaten up by the gods has to be taken figuratively : they become the auxiliary instruments of the gods for their enjoyments.

Thus the movement of the self in association with the subtle elements is established against all possible objections.

The next section, *Kṛitātīyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 201-6), has four aphorisms :

8. At the end (of the experience of the effects of) the past deeds, he (i.e., the individual self) (returns) with the balance of *karmas* (after enjoyment), because it is so declared in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*, both through the same path as of going (from here) and also otherwise.

9. If it be said that it (i.e., birth etc.) is due to *charaṇa* (or good conduct), it is not so ; that word has a figurative significance. That is the opinion of Kārshṇājini.

10. If it be said that there is uselessness (for the *achāra* enjoined), it is not so, because there is need for it.

11. But good *karmas* and bad *karmas* alone (are denoted by the word, '*charaṇa* ') ; Bādari says so.

The descent of the individual self from the heavenly world to the earth has been discussed in the previous section. The question is now raised : does he return with a balance of *karmas*, or without it? The answer is in the affirmative, on the strength of *Chhānd Up.* (V. 10. 7), *G. Dh. S.* (XI. 31) and *Āp. D. S.* (II. 1. 2. 3). Birth in the world is caused by *karma* alone. The self returns from the moon to the sky along the path of the manes and then changes its course. The word, '*charaṇa*', in the *Chhāndogya* text quoted above raises the objection that it is conduct, good or bad, which leads to the attainment of births in particular wombs. Kārshṇājini answers this by

interpreting the word figuratively to stand for *karmas*. If it be further objected that this makes good conduct pointless, the reply is given that such conduct qualifies one for meritorious *karmas*. Bādari takes the view—and the *Sūtrakāra* agrees—that *charaṇa* means directly *karmas*. The mention of *karma* along with *charaṇa* restricts the meaning of the former to *karmas* enjoined by existent texts. Kārshṇājini's view about the qualifying role of *āchāra* is also accepted. Thus it is established that the self returns to the earth with a balance of *karmas*.

The next section, *Aniṣṭādikāryadhikaraṇa* (pp. 206-214) of ten aphorisms, deals with the question whether all selves reach the moon after death or only those who have performed charitable and religious works:

12. It is declared in the scripture about those also who do not perform religious works etc. (that they go to the moon).

13. The ascent and descent of others, however, take place after they enjoy (the results of their works) in *Samyamana* (i.e., the hell presided over by the god, Yama), because (their) going to it is declared in the scriptures.

14. They (i.e., the sages) declare (to the same effect) in the *Smṛitis*.

15. The seven (hells) also (are declared in the *Smṛitis*).

16. Even there (i.e., in the seven hells), owing to the activity of (control by) him (i.e., the god Yama), there is no contradiction.

17. But (there is no going to the moon on the part of those who do not perform religious and other works of a meritorious nature) because they (i.e., the two paths to the moon, the path of the gods and the path of the manes) are the results of knowledge and (meritorious) works (respectively), as they are so introduced as the subject-matter.

18. There is no (need for going to the moon and the fifth oblation for producing the body) in connection with the third place; because it is so made out.

19. In the world also, even this is known (that there is no need for the fifth oblation for producing the body in the case of some virtuous persons).

20. Because also it is (so) revealed in the scripture (that there is no need for the fifth oblation in regard to the production of some bodies).

21. The third word (i.e., the seed-born) includes those born from warm vapour.

The arguments in favour of the selves of all men, including sinners, going to the moon on death are : (i) that *Kaush. Up.* (I. 2) declares that all the selves who leave the earth go to the moon, implying the sinners reaching there after expiating their sins in hell under the control of Yama, the god of death ; and (ii) that, without going to the moon, the fifth oblation and hence the acquisition of bodies are not possible. The answer is that the *Kaushîtaki* text refers only to those who know the *Brahman* or perform religious and secular works of a meritorious nature. In fact, the attainment of the moon is described only in regard to those who travel along the paths of the gods and of the manes ; and these are the knowers of the *Brahman* or the performers of meritorious religious and secular works. As for the acquisition of bodies, it can be done in other ways. *Chhând. Up.* (V. 10. 8) speaks of the sinners being reborn without sojourning in the other world ; later on, in VI. 3. 1, it is stated that creatures are born from eggs, sprouts and from living organisms ; in the case of the second, among whom are included also germs born from warm vapour, the fifth oblation is not necessary ; moreover, men and women like Dhṛiṣṭadyumna and Draupadî were born from the fire without the need for the fifth oblation.

The question for discussion in the next section, *Tatsvābhāvvyāpattyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 214-6) concerns the relationship between the self returning to the world and the spatial ether, air, smoke, water-carrying cloud, rain-cloud, and rain-water with whom he is associated in turn before the fifth oblation is made in due course. It has only one aphorism :

22. He (namely, the self returning from the moon) attains indistinguishable likeness with that (through which he returns), because it is appropriate for him (not to have the enjoyment) of pain and pleasure here.

Here it is made out that when the self is stated in *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 10. 5-6) to become the air etc., what is meant is that he attains indistinguishable likeness with air etc. for the time being. The self does not attain likeness of nature with them. Nor does the self acquire them as bodies, for there is no experience of pleasure or pain in association with them.

In all these cases, the self does not stay long at any of the stages. This is made out from the next section, *Nāti-chirādhikaraṇa* (p. 216), with its single aphorism :

23. He does not stay long, because it is so specified.

The authority relied on is *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 10. 6), where it is stated that the self, after reaching the paddy-stalk etc., finds it very difficult to get out of them.

Now another question is raised. The above-quoted text states about the returning selves that after descending to the earth in showers they are 'born' as paddy, barley etc. Do they become the selves in the paddy etc., or do they merely get associated therewith? The issue is settled in favour of the latter view in the *Anyādhishṭhitādhikaraṇa* (pp. 217-22) of four aphorisms :

24. With things (such as paddy etc.) which are presided over by other individual selves (there is mere close contact of the descending self), because the expressions used in the context are similar to those used in the case of the former (i.e., the ether of space etc.). •

25. If it be said that (in regard to the descending self) there is impure (karma) (in the form of the effects of previously performed animal sacrifices which is the cause of birth as plants), it is not so, because the scripture says so.

26. For him who is associated with food there arises subsequently connection with one who sprinkles semen.

27. The body is obtained from (i.e., after descent into) the womb.

'Being born' as paddy-stalk etc. is not different from becoming the air etc.: in both the cases, there is only close association. There is no mention of any *karma* which can cause birth as paddy-stalk etc. Against this view, it is urged that the sacrifices which help in the attainment of the heavenly world also involve the sin of killing animals. After enjoying the auspicious fruits of sacrifices, the self is obliged also to suffer the results of this sin by being born as paddy etc. The *Bhāṭṭas* and the *Advaitins* reply that the killing of animals in sacrifices is an exception to the general injunction not to kill anyone. This reply is criticised on the ground that the injunctions about killing and non-killing relate to two different matters and do not stand in the relation of a general rule and its exception. The *Prābhākaras* now urge that killing is prohibited only as a means for the attainment of desires. The reply is given that sacrifices are also such means. Finally, *Rāmānuja* argues that the killing of animals in sacrifices is no sin at all, because the selves of the victims are thereby led to the heavenly world, as stated in *Ait. Br.* (VII. 4) and *Taitt. Br.* (III. 7. 92).

Moreover, subsequent to the 'birth' as paddy etc., it is stated of the returning self that he 'becomes' a sprinkler of semen: this can only mean that the self gets associated with a man. Later the self descends into the womb of a woman, and it is there that he acquires a body.

### CHAPTER III, PART 2. .

After pointing out the miseries of the self in the waking condition during death and re-birth, the *Sūtras* investigate in order the dream-state, deep sleep and swoon. The dream-state is considered in the six aphorisms of *Sandhyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 223-9):

1. During the twilight state of dreams, there is creation (of dream objects) (by the individual self); because it (i.e., the scripture) says so.

2. Some schools are of opinion that it (i.e., the individual self) is the creator (of desired things seen in dreams); and that sons etc. (are denoted by the word, 'kama', in the context).

3. That (creation in the condition of dreams) is, however nothing but a marvel (i.e., the result of the wonderful power of the Supreme Lord), because it (viz., the individual self's power of willing the truth) is not entirely manifest in its essential form (in the condition of *samsāra*).

4. It is obscured, however, through the resolve of the Supreme Being: through that (resolve) itself arise its (i.e., the individual self's) bondage and its opposite (i.e., emancipation).

5. And that (i.e., the obscuration of the individual self's nature) arises either out of (his) association with the body (during the state of creation) or (in another way during the state of dissolution).

6. Indeed, dreams are indicative (of both good and evil), because it is so made out from the scripture, and those who know what they (i.e., dreams) are say so.

The discussion on dreams centres mainly round two scriptural texts—*Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 3. 10) and *Kāth. Up.* (V. 8). The former says that roads, chariots, horses, varied enjoyments, wells, ponds and rivers are not existent in the dream-world, but created. It is determined that the Supreme Self creates them for the duration of the dreams. The individual self is incapable of creating them, for his power to will the truth is obscured in the state of *samsāra* as well as of *pralaya* though the resolve of the Supreme Self. Moreover, it is known from the scripture that some dreams are ominous; and if the individual self were the creator, such dreams would never be dreamt. The dream-objects are thus created by the Supreme Self out of His wonderful power. They are not existent, only in the sense that they cannot be experienced by others—and even by the dreamer except during his dreams. They are intended to reward or punish the self for insignificant *karmas*, good or evil.

We pass on now to the study of dreamless sleep in two sections. The first is the *Tadabhāvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 230-32) of two aphorisms :

7. (Dreamless sleep which is) the absence of that (i.e., of dreams) takes place in the veins, because it is so declared in the scripture, (takes place) in the Supreme Self, and also in the pericardium.

8. For that very reason, waking is from Him.

During deep sleep, the self is declared to be in the veins, in the pericardium and in the *Brahman* according to three different scriptural passages. It is determined that they are not alternative but concurrent : the self is in the *Brahman* who is in the pericardium which is full of veins. He is the bed, the pericardium is the cot, and the veins are the palace. Only thus will the scriptural text be appropriate which says that the awakening self has returned from Him.

The next aphorism, which constitutes a section by itself, called *Karmānusmṛitiśabdavidhyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 232-4), determines that the self which wakes after dreamless sleep is not different from the self which went to sleep :

9. But he himself (awakes who is in the condition of dreamless sleep), because it is made out from his *karmas*, from (his) recollection of himself after awaking, from scriptural statements (to that effect), and from the injunctions relating to final release.

It is pointed out that the self in deep sleep, though united with the *Brahman*, has not attained final release. It has only a temporary respite from the effects of *karma*. Its knowledge is extremely contracted. The necessity to exhaust *karma*, the recollection of the waking person that it is he himself who went to sleep, and scriptural texts declaring that the same person or self wakes up after sleep show this. Moreover, if sleeping is equivalent to emancipation, there is no need for the injunctions teaching the need and means for final release.



The condition of swoon is taken up in the single aphorism of the *Mugdhādhikaraṇa* (pp. 234-6):

10. In regard to a person in the condition of swoon, it is a half-way state towards death because this is made out by means of the argument by exhaustion.

The condition of swoon is shown to be different in kind from the states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep. There is no consciousness, and it is produced by causes different from those producing deep sleep. It is really a half-way state to death with a partial separation of the self from the body and contact with the *prāṇas* only in their subtle condition.

In the four sections of the *pāda* thus far, the imperfections appertaining to the individual self in the states of dreaming, dreamless sleep and swoon have been described. Now the *Sūtras* set out to show that the Supreme Self has the double characteristic of being free from all evil and full of auspicious qualities. The *Ubhayaśiṅgādhikaraṇa* (pp. 236-57) of fifteen aphorisms deals with this double characteristic. The first aphorism sets out the thesis, and the three following ones answer some objections thereto:

11. Not even on account of place (do evils appertain) unto the Supreme (*Brahman*); for He is described everywhere as possessing both the attributes (i.e., of being free from all evil and of being possessed of all auspicious qualities).

12. If it be said that it (viz., the accrual of evil to the *Brahman*) is due to the distinctions (relating to the conditions of beings with whom He is associated), it is not so, because there is a statement to the contrary in each case (in the context).

13. Also some (i.e., the followers of a branch of the *Veda*) say so.

14. Indeed, He has no form, because He is the chief.

Even though the essential nature of the self is to be free from evil and full of auspicious qualities, this essential

nature is obscured by *karma*. The *Brahman* being free from this taint does not suffer any obscuration of His essential nature. His association with bodies as the Internal Controller cannot lead to imperfections, because the *Vedas* and the *Smritis* everywhere proclaim the *Brahman* as devoid of evil and full of auspicious qualities. Even when describing His association with the embodiments of gods etc., they stress that His double characteristic is not affected in any way thereby. The distinctions of conditions which consist of association with such embodiments do not affect Him at all. The scriptural texts asserting His essential nature are not modified by others attributing its obscuration under special circumstances. Moreover, nothing is good or bad by itself, so that we can say that association with it is *per se* desirable or undesirable. Such association brings us joy or pain only according to *karma*.

The *Muṇḍaka* text (III. 1. 1.), which speaks of two birds sitting on a tree, one eating the fruit and the other shining without eating, makes it clear that the *Brahman*, while being associated with the body along with the individual self, does not experience the results of *karma*. Thus the *Vedic* school of *Atharvaṇikas* help in proving the *Brahman's* double characteristic.

It may be argued that the *Brahman*, having evolved the differentiation of names and forms after the entry into the world by the individual self which has Him for its self, has those names and forms; and that therefore He becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the commandments of the scripture. The answer is that, while *Brahman* is the differentiator, He is not involved in the effects of differentiation, namely, pain and pleasure. These effects are brought about by *karma* which belongs to the bound self, who is an attribute of the *Brahman*, and not to Him. In this sense, He may be said to have no form.

A criticism of the *Advaitins* is now taken up to the effect that the *Brahman* is devoid of attributes and has

the essential nature of luminousness. It is claimed that all the other qualities attributed to Him are negated in the declaration, "Not so, not so" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6). The next ten aphorisms deal with this theme :

15. Just as is the case with luminousness (so also is it the case with the qualities of being omniscient etc.) because they (i.e., the passages relating to them) should not be meaningless.

16. It (namely, the scriptural passage, " The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity ") declares only so much (as this, that His essential nature is luminousness, and does not deny other qualities).

17. It (i.e., the whole collection of *Vedānta* texts) reveals (His double characteristic); and it (i.e., the double characteristic) is also given in the *Smṛitis*.

18. For that very reason, the simile of the reflection of the sun (in water) etc. is given (in relation to Him.)

19. But because there is no apprehension (of the *Brahman*) as (of the sun) in water, (in His case) there is no such state of things (of being untouched by the evils of the places wherein He exists.)

20. To undergo increase or decrease on account of His being within them (is not true of Him); it is so because both (the illustrative examples) are appropriate and consistent; and there are seen (similar examples in the world).

21. Because it (i.e., the context) denies (in relation to the *Brahman* His) being only of that measure which is introduced in the context; later on, it declares (His qualities) abundantly.

22. That (i.e., the *Brahman*) is unmanifest; indeed, it (namely, the scripture) says so.

23. Moreover, in worship (He is apprehended), because the *Veda* and the *Smṛiti* say so.

24. The direct perception (of the *Brahman*) is obtained through practice in the religious work (of worship and meditation); (in such direct perception) it (i.e., the association of the *Brahman* with the corporeal and incorporeal forms) is like (His association with) luminousness (or knowledge) and is not distinct (therefrom).

To the *Advaitins* the reply is first given that the passages which proclaim the *Brahman's* auspicious qualities and His freedom from all evil have equal validity with those

which assert His luminousness. So the latter do not deny what is taught in the former. Indeed, the scripture everywhere refers to His double characteristic. The similes of the reflections of the sun or the moon in water and of the ether of space becoming distinct in pots etc. are given (in the *Yājñavalkya Smṛiti* and the *Brahmabindu Upanishad*) to make clear how He abides in all things without being touched by their imperfections.

It may be said that the simile of the reflections is not appropriate, as the sun is not really present in his reflections but only apprehended through illusion to be so. But the purpose of the figure is only to bring out immunity from imperfections. Just as the sun is not affected by the increase or decrease of the reflecting media, the *Brahman* is not affected by the imperfections of the things in which He abides. The simile has to be viewed along with that about the ether of space. The common element is freedom from imperfections and not real or illusory presence. For while the sun is illusorily present in His reflections, the ether is really present in pots etc. Distance in space, remoteness in time or separation in essential nature can account for this immunity. In the case of the *Brahman* and the ether of space the last reason is operative, while the sun is saved by distance in space.

A further objection is raised by the *Advaitins* about the qualities of the *Brahman*. It is urged that in *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 3) certain forms of the *Brahman*, corporeal, incorporeal and other, are first described, and then in the passage, "Not so, not so," all the modes of the *Brahman* are denied. Further on, the *Brahman* is declared to be pure existence only without attributes. *Sūtra* 21 replies that what is denied by "Not so, not so" is only the *Brahman* being completely described and comprehended by the previously mentioned modes. The earlier statements are not made merely with a view to their being denied reality later. Rāmānuja points out that the modes mentioned are not known by other means of knowledge, and that the scripture

cannot be taken to teach them with a view to declaring them unreal. When the *Brahman* is later on declared to be the Real of the real, it is taught that He is even more unchanging than the individual selves which suffer from contraction and expansion of knowledge, though not from any change in essential nature.

Moreover, the scripture is the only means of knowing Him. He is not made manifest by other means of knowledge; and the scriptures teach that He is directly perceived in loving meditation. In such meditation, His essential nature is apprehended as knowledge and bliss, and His corporeal and incorporeal forms also realised. The latter therefore should be as real as the former.

In view of the several digressions, in this section, the last aphorism sums up the conclusion:

25. Therefore there is the association (of the *Brahman*) with an infinity (of qualities). Consequently, (in regard to Him) there is the (double) characteristic (given above).

The next section, the *Ahikunḍalādhikaraṇa* (pp. 257-63) of four aphorisms, shows that, though the *Brahman* is identified with non-intelligent matter, He is free from the imperfections of the latter:

26. Because both (i.e., oneness and manifoldness) are undoubtedly taught (in relation to the *Brahman*, He is the non-intelligent world also), just as in the case of the serpent which assumes the form of coils.

27. Or it may be like the relation between (the rays of) light and the source (of the rays of light), because of (both of them belonging to) the (same) genus of *tejas*.

28. Or it may be as stated earlier (in the case of the individual self).

29. (It is so) because also those (i.e., the properties of the non-intelligent thing) are negated (in relation to Him).

Because the world of non-intelligent things has been declared to be a form of the *Brahman* in *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 3) which divides that world into corporeal and incorporeal

things, the question arises: in what way is the non-intelligent world a form of the *Brahman*? First, the analogy of the serpent remaining unchanged in its essential nature while assuming the form of coils or that of being straight is suggested. In this manner, the non-intelligent things can be configurations of the *Brahman*. In other words, a single substance can be in more than one state. It is then pointed out that the scriptural texts which speak of distinction between the *Brahman* and the world and those which deny that He undergoes modifications will be contradicted by accepting the above analogy. Just as rays and the source of light are one in both belonging to the same genus of *tejas*, similarly non-intelligent matter and the *Brahman* are suggested to be one. If *Brahmanness* is a common generic property in the Lord, the intelligent selves and non-intelligent matter, then all Vedic declarations about the *Brahman* will be contradicted. The right view is that non-intelligent matter is a part of the *Brahman* in the sense of an attribute incapable of existing apart from Him. (Light, genus, quality and the body are similarly *amśas* or parts of gems, individuals, the possessor of qualities and the individual self respectively). This is confirmed by the scriptural texts denying the properties of non-intelligent things such as change, decay etc. in relation to the *Brahman*. Thus the double characteristic of the *Brahman* is further upheld.

The next section, *Parādhikaraṇa* (pp. 263-71), controverts the suggestion that the *Brahman's* double characteristic is limited in that scattered scriptural texts indicate that there is a higher entity. Its seven aphorisms are as follows;

30. There is a higher being than Him, because it is so taught by the description (in relation to Him) of (being) a bridge, a measure of size, a relationship (of being the means to something higher) and difference (from the Highest).

31. But because of likeness (to a dam).

32. It (i.e., the description of measure) is for the purpose of worship, like the use of the word, '*pada*' elsewhere.

33. That worship is appropriate through (the association of the *Brahman* with) particular places, as is the case with light etc.

34. Because it is appropriate (to say that the Object of attainment is itself the means of attainment). •

35. Because, similarly another being than the *Brahman* is negated.

36. That all things are pervaded by Him is made out by such texts as those relating to His all-pervasiveness (whence it follows that there is none else higher).

Four reasons are urged for concluding that the scripture teaches a higher entity than the *Brahman*: (i) He is spoken of as a *setu* or bridge, which means that He is the means for reaching something else; (ii) such statements are made as that He has four feet or sixteen parts; (iii) the statement that He is the bridge of immortality suggests a higher entity; and (iv) there are specific declarations that there is an entity higher than the Highest. The reply is: (i) the word, '*setu*', means a dam and the context shows that the *Brahman* is so described to indicate that He preserves the worlds from confusion; (ii) the descriptions of measure are given to facilitate meditation and worship, just as the all-pervading light and the ether of space are associated with particular places and regarded for the time being as limited; (iii) He is said to be the bridge to immortality to show that He is the means as well as the goal of attainment; (iv) there are deliberate statements negating the existence of any entity higher than the *Brahman*; and (v) scriptural texts describe Him as all-pervading, which means that He controls and rules all things.

The four aphorisms of the next section, *Phalādhikaraṇa* (pp. 272-7), which is the last of this *pāda*, show the *Brahman* to be the giver of all fruits, whether salvation, worldly prosperity or anything else:

37. From Him are produced (all) the results because it is appropriate.

38. Because also it is so declared in the scriptures.

39. For the very same reason, Jaimini considers *dharma* (or religious actions themselves as producing the fruits).

40. Bādarāyaṇa, however, is of opinion that the former view is correct, because it is taught with reason (that He is the giver of fruits).

The conclusion set out is that the *Brahman* is the means for attaining not merely salvation but also all fruits in this world and the next. Rituals yield fruits only because they please the *Brahman*: by themselves, they perish momentarily and are non-intelligent, and they cannot yield any fruits directly. Jaimini interposes with the objection that rituals produce fruits by giving rise in the first instance to an *apūrvā* which in turn leads to the desired fruits. Bādarāyaṇa rejects the view of Jaimini. Fruits are produced either directly by the *Brahman*, when He is invoked, or indirectly by Him through the propitiation of various gods whose Internal Controller is the *Brahman*. This is the purport of the scriptures.

### CHAPTER III, PART 3

The next *pāda* deals, in 63 aphorisms divided into 26 sections, with different *vidyās* or forms of worship, through loving meditation, of the *Brahman*. The first section, *Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaraṇa* (pp. 278-85) of five aphorisms, establishes the principles by which *vidyās* mentioned in different scriptural texts are identified or differentiated:

1. That (meditation) which is known from all the *Vedānta* texts (is one only), because there is no distinction in regard to the injunction etc. (relating to it in all the *Vedānta* texts).

2. If it be said that, owing to distinction (due to repetition), there is no (identity among the forms of meditation) (it is not so); even in regard to one and the same form of meditation



(repetition is possible on account of the distinction of persons learning it).

3. That restrictive rule indeed is in regard to that study of *Veda* being so, because there is an extended application (of this rule) in the (work called) *Samachara*; it (i.e., the restrictive rule) is as in the case of the *sava* oblations.

4. It (i.e., the scripture) also shows (all meditations to be one).

5. Even when it (i.e., the meditation) is the same (in all the *Vedānta* texts), there has to be transfer of the constituent elements (of the meditation in one context to another context) because there is oneness of purpose, as is the case with the auxiliaries of an injunction.

In the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, it is laid down that rituals mentioned in different branches of the *Veda* are to be identified when the injunction, the name, the form and the result are the same. This principle is here applied to the different *vidyās* taught in the *Vedānta* texts. For example, the worship of the *Vaiśvānara* or the *Dahara* as taught in different contexts is identical. Though generally repetition in the scripture implies distinction, in some cases it may be due to the distinction of persons for whom it is meant. However, in regard to two identical meditations, the constituent elements of each have to be transferred to the other and combined with the latter's elements. The additional doubt, which justifies this section, relates to the restrictive rule of the *Ātharvaṇikas*, confining the teaching of the *Brahma-vidyā* to those who have performed the *śirovrata*. The answer is that the rule applies to the study of the *Veda* and not the performance of any meditation. This is confirmed by the work called '*Samāchāra*'.

The next section, *Anyathātvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 285-94) of four aphorisms, differentiates the *udgītha-vidyā* as taught in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Chhāndogya Upanishads*:

6. If it be said that it is otherwise (with the meditation on the *udgītha* as taught in the *Bṛih. Up.* and *Chhand. Up.*), it is replied

that it is not so, because there is no distinction (between the opening passages dealing with the *vidya* in the two *Upanishads*).

7. But, indeed, it is not so, because there is the distinction of contexts, as is the case with (the meditation on the *pranava* as the *Brahman* associated with) qualities like that of being better than the most excellent (which is different from another meditation on the *pranava* as the *Brahman* associated with other qualities).

8. If it be argued that it (i.e., oneness of the *vidyas*) is declared on account of (oneness of) names, it (i.e., such oneness of names) exists even then (when there is distinction of *vidyas*).

9. Because also it (i.e., the syllable, 'Om', forming the object of meditation) extends (to all the *vidyas* in *Chhand. Up. I*), there is appropriateness (in its forming the object of meditation in the *udgitha-vidya*).

The application of the principles laid down in the previous section to various cases of doubt concerning oneness of or difference between *vidyās* is begun from this second section onwards. The first case taken up is that of the *udgitha-vidyā* described in the *Bṛih. Up.* and *Chhānd. Up.* They are claimed to be identical on the following grounds: (i) The opening passages speak of the *udgitha* being used to help the gods to win the war against the demons. (ii) The form of the meditation requires the *udgitha* to be regarded as the *prāṇa*. (iii) Thus, in both, the commandments, the fruits, the forms and the names are identical. The reply is that the forms are different, because in the *Bṛih. Up.* meditation as the *prāṇa* on the singer of the *udgitha* is taught, while in the *Chhānd. Up.* meditation as the *prāṇa* on the *udgitha* itself is taught. The opening passages also differ. In the *Chhānd. Up.* the context is about the syllable, 'Om', which is a part of the *udgitha*, while in the *Bṛih. Up.* the whole of the *udgitha* is the theme. Thus the *vidyās* are different.

Meditation on the *udgitha* or its singer as the *prāṇa* having been taught thus far, that on the *prāṇa* itself is

investigated now in the *Sarvābhedādhikaraṇa* with its single aphorism :

10. Because there is no distinction among all (the three *pranavidyās* in the *Chhând. Up.*, *Bṛih. Up.* and *Kaush. Up.*), these (qualities of the first two) have to be transferred elsewhere (that is, to the third).

It is determined that the meditations on the *prāṇa* taught in the three *Upanishads* is identical, in spite of a difference in its exposition in the *Kaush. Up.* In the other two *Upanishads*, first the *prāṇa* is described as the eldest, the most praiseworthy and superior to the mind, eye, ear and speech. Then the qualities of the mind etc. are said to be the qualities of the *prāṇa* itself. But in *Kaush. Up.* the mind etc. do not express their dependence on the *prāṇa* and ascribe their own qualities to the *prāṇa*. But this makes no material difference: for the mind etc. being dependent on the *prāṇa*, their qualities belong to the *prāṇa*.

Before dealing with another meditation on the *prāṇa*, the *Sūtras* take up an incidental topic. The qualities of the mind etc. have been taught to be those of the *prāṇa*, because meditation on the *prāṇa* as the eldest and most praiseworthy cannot be undertaken without regarding it as possessed of those qualities. Similarly, it is now taught in the *Anandādyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 298-308) of seven aphorisms that certain qualities pertaining to the essential nature of the *Brahman* are to be included in all meditations on Him :

11. The qualities of (being) bliss etc. (are to be included in all meditations, because there is no distinction throughout) in regard to the Possessor of the qualities.

12. The qualities of having joy as the head (of the *Brahman*) etc. are not accepted (as qualities belonging to the *Brahman*); otherwise, bigness and smallness (will result to Him in different parts).

13. The other (qualities), however, (continue everywhere), because they are equal to the entity (they qualify).

14. For the purpose of constant meditation (the qualities are taught); because there is no other use (for them).

15. Because the word, 'Ātman', occurs.

16. The denotation of the Self resembles other cases, as is evident from the later passage in the context.

17. If it be said (that such determination of the denotation of the 'Ātman' is not possible) because of logical connection (with the preceding passage), it is, indeed, possible, because of ascertainment.

Reality, knowledge, bliss, purity and infinity are the qualities of the *Brahman* necessarily involved in the knowledge about Him: they continue in all the *vidyās*. But the declarations about joy being the head of the *Brahman* etc. in *Taitt. Up.* (II. 5) are only a figurative representation, intended to be helpful for the meditation on the *Brahman* as bliss. Once the infinite bliss of the *Brahman* is realised, the metaphor has no further use. Moreover, the Possessor of bliss is pointed out by the word, 'Ātman', and the Self cannot have parts.

But an objection can be raised. Earlier in the context in the *Taitt. Up.* the word, 'Ātman', has been used to denote a thing consisting of the *prāṇa*, a thing consisting of the mind and so on. Thus it has stood for things other than the Self. How can it be deemed to denote the Self when it refers to a thing consisting of bliss? The answer is that it is made out to be so, because of the later statement about this *Ātman* engaging in creation. The earlier use of the word to denote things other than the Self is in the course of outlining a series of concepts through which the Supreme Self can be comprehended by the intellect. Indeed, at the very beginning of the context, only the Supreme Self has been mentioned as the creator of spatial ether.

Meditation on the *prāṇa* is further investigated in the *Kāryākhyānādhikaraṇa* which consists only of one aphorism:

18. The new thing (i.e., meditation on water as the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*) (is enjoined in the *prāṇa-vidya*),

because of the statement (which is characteristic of the scripture) of what is not established.

Both in the *Chhānd. Up.* and *Bṛih. Up.*, water is declared to be the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*. The former goes on to say that, on account of this, both before and after taking food, we have to clothe the *prāṇa*, with water. This implies that there must be formal sipping of water on both the occasions. In *Bṛih. Up.*, this is expressly stated. It is determined that meditation, on the waters that are sipped, as the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*, is enjoined here, as it is a new teaching by the scripture. The sipping of water, however, is based on the authority of the *Smṛiti*.

A topic suggested by the *Anandādyadhikaraṇa* is now taken up in *Sūtra* 19 which constitutes *Samānādhikaraṇa* (pp. 308-10):

19. There being the same (characteristics in regard to the *Brahman* in the *Śaṇḍilya-vidyā* as taught in the *Agnirahasya* and the *Bṛih. Up.*) (there is oneness of *vidyās*); and because, in this manner also, there is no distinction.

The *Śaṇḍilya-vidyā* is found both in *Sat. Br. (X)* and *Bṛih. Up. (VII. 6)*. In both the *Brahman* is described as having certain qualities, including that of willing the truth. But in the *Bṛih. Up.*, some additional qualities are given such as those of being the controller of all and the lord of all. It is determined that the meditations are identical, as these additional qualities are to be included in that of willing the truth. (This is similar to the inclusion of bliss etc. in the essential nature of the *Brahman*, as taught in the *Anandādyadhikaraṇa*).

Yet another topic suggested by that section is considered in the *Sambandhādhikaraṇa* (pp. 310-2) of three aphorisms:

20. Through association (with the same object of worship) (there is oneness of the *vidyās* in the previous section); the same

is the case elsewhere also (i.e., in regard to the Persons within the sun and the eye).

21. Indeed, it is not so, because there is distinction.

22. The scripture also declares to the same effect.

In *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 4 & 5), the *Brahman* is taught to be worshipped as the Person in the orb of the sun and the Person in the eye. It is determined that the two meditations are different, because of difference of form. (In the two *Śāṇḍilya-vidyās*, there is no such difference, the *Brahman* in both cases being regarded as in the heart). The parallel context in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 6 & 7) enjoins transfer of the form of the one to the other: which itself proves the distinction of the *vidyās*.

Limitation by place is discussed in relation to another meditation in the *Sambhṛityādhikaraṇa* (pp. 313-4), which has only one aphorism:

23. For that same reason (the *Brahman's* qualities of) supporting (the eldest powers) and pervading the heaven (are limited to particular meditations).

The *Taitt. Br.* (II. 4. 72) and the *Rāṇyāṇīyas* speak of the *Brahman* as supporting the eldest powers, pervading the heaven and being the first-born. Though these qualities of the *Brahman* are described without reference to any particular meditations, they cannot be included in all meditations. For they have to be excluded from meditations which associate the *Brahman* with small places such as the heart. In such *vidyās*, the Infinite Lord is conceived as allowing Himself out of grace to be limited.

Association with the quality of pervading the heaven in a scriptural text makes other qualities mentioned there part of a single *vidyā*. The application of this principle to another case is discussed in the *Purushavidyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 314-7) with its single aphorism:

24. In regard to the *purusha-vidyā* also (there is distinction), because there is no declaration of other things.

Both in *M. Nār.* (XXV) and *Chhānd. Up.* (III. 16) there is a figurative description of the sacrifice as a human being. In the former, the self is the sacrificer, the body is the fuel, the breast is the altar and so on; in the latter, the *purusha* is the sacrifice, his first twenty-four years are the morning oblation and so forth. The two *vidyās* are found to be distinct, as the qualities are different. Moreover, in the previous section in *M. Nār.*, where this *vidyā* is begun, the fruit is declared to be final release, whereas in *Chhānd. Up.* long life is the reward.

The principle of contextual association gives rise also to the next topic, the *Vedhādyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 317-9), which consists of the following aphorism :

25. Because there is difference in purpose in regard to piercing etc. (the *mantras* referring to them are not elements of *vidyās*, though in close proximity thereto; similarly, the other *mantras* referring to the study of the *Vedas* are not elements of *vidyās*).

In the various branches of the *Veda*, some *mantras* and descriptions of rituals are found near the commencement of the *Upanishads*, which are devoted to *vidyās*. But this does not mean that such *mantras* or rituals become part of the *vidyās*. Their presence near the *Upanishads* is due to the fact that, like the latter, they have to be learnt in secret.

The same principle provokes the discussion in the *Hānyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 319-24) with its single aphorism :

26. In relation to the giving up and acquisition of *karmas*, however, the passage relating to acquisition is complementary; (hence thinking about both is enjoined) as is the case with the *kuśā*, *chhandas*, *stuti* and *upagana*. It has been already stated.

The theme is several passages which speak of what happens to the *karmas* of the man of *vidyā* when he dies. In some, the giving up of sin and merit by him is declared; in others, the merits reaching friends and the sins reaching enemies is mentioned: in yet others both are referred to.

It is ascertained here that in all cases both the giving up of *karmas* by the man of *vidyā* and their reaching other persons have to be thought of together. Passages declaring the latter are complementary to those declaring the former. Instances of other such complementary passages are given. The *kuśa* rods used for counting the *stotras* sung in sacrifices are enjoined to be from flowerless trees in one place and fig trees in another: the metres of the gods and demons are mentioned generally in one place, and elsewhere it is stated that the former come earlier; the commencement of the *stotra* of the *śhoḍaśin* is mentioned in one place, and its time given elsewhere; and from the enjoined singing by the *ritviks*, the *adhvaryus* are excluded by a specific exception.

The exact point of time when the *karmas* are given up by the self is determined in the *Sāmparāyādhikaraṇa* (pp. 324-31) of five aphorisms:

27. It is (only) at the time of the separation of the soul from the body (that the giving up of *karmas* by the emancipated soul takes place), because there is nothing else to be gone through (by the soul afterwards). Indeed, others say the same thing.

28. According to the intended meaning, without contradicting both (the scriptural texts and the nature of what they describe) (the teaching about the giving up of *karmas* at the time of death has to be understood).

29. The path will have a meaning if (giving up deeds takes place) at two times; indeed, if it be otherwise, there will be contradiction.

30. It can properly take place, because a thing having similar characteristics with it (i.e., the subtle body) is obtained (later on); as is the case in the world (a thing meant for one purpose, when no longer needed for it) can be used for another.

31. Those who hold offices have to remain as long as their offices last.

Some scriptural texts say or imply that the man of *vidyā* gives up *karmas* at the time of death, while



*Kaush. Up.* (I. 4), has a statement about the self shaking off meritorious and sinful *karmas* after mention of the self reaching the river Virajā, on the outskirts as it were of Heaven. It is determined that the *karmas* are shaken off at the time of death, and that the *Kaush. Up.* passage has to be understood in this light. It may be asked how the self can travel along the path of the gods or that of the manes, if the *karmas* are given up at the time of death and he has thus severed all connections with a body. The answer is that the subtle body continues, until he reaches Heaven and gains a divine form. Though brought into existence by *karmas*, it survives through the power of *vidyā* and helps the self to attain the fruits of the latter. However, men of *vidyā*, like Avāntaratapas and Vasishṭa, do not give up their *karmas* at the time of death: they are reborn again and again as long as their offices last.

The mention of the path of the gods above raises incidentally the question whether it is meant for all worshippers of the *Brahman*, or only for those practising particular *vidyās* in connection with which specific mention of the path has been made. This is dealt with in *Sūtra* 32, constituting the *Aniyamādhikaraṇa* (pp. 331-3):

32. In regard to all (worshippers), there is no restriction (about reaching the *Brahman* by the path beginning with light); (only when it is so) there will be no conflict with the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*.

It is determined that all who meditate on the *Brahman* will go through the path of the gods. The passages referring to the path in the *Bṛih. Up.* and *Chhānd. Up.* speak of the worshippers of *Satya* or *Tapas*, and these are well-known names for the *Brahman*. The path is not restricted to the followers of particular *vidyās*. *B. G.* (VIII. 24) also makes this clear.

Section XIV, the *Aksharadhyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 334-8) of two *Sūtras* investigates certain qualities of the *Brahman*

common to all *vidyās*, just as the previous section has dealt with a path common to the followers of all *vidyās* :

33. But there (is in all the *vidyas* relating to the *Brahman*) the inclusion of all the ideas relating to the *Akshara*, because of the sameness (of the *Brahman* everywhere) and because of those ideas being involved (in the conception of the essential nature of the *Brahman*); as is the case with the *mantras* of the *upasad* (the qualities follow their principal); this has been already explained.

34. Because of meditation over this much only.

In the *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 8) and *Muṇḍ. Up.* (I. 1), the *Brahman* is referred to as the *Akshara* or the Indestructible, and certain negative characteristics, such as being not gross etc., which differentiate Him from all other things, are enumerated in relation to Him. It is determined that these qualities of the *Brahman* are needed in all meditations: because the essential nature of the *Brahman* as being bliss etc. is not clearly distinguished from that of the individual self. The five characteristics, mentioned in the *Anandādyadhikaraṇa*, as qualified by those relating to the *Akshara*, fix that essential nature firmly in the mind. Only so much is necessary for this purpose, and all other qualities of the *Brahman* are to be limited to the particular *vidyās* where they find mention. The qualities following their Possessor in all meditations is similar to the *mantras* of subsidiary ceremonies being pronounced like those of the *Veda* where the principal ceremony is enjoined. The rule is found in the *Pūr. Mīm.*

The negative qualities which differentiate the *Brahman* from all things else and which indicate His freedom from evil have now been shown to be necessary for all meditations. This leads to a doubt regarding the teachings given by Yājñavalkya to Ushasta and Kahola in *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 4 & 5). To the former the *Brahman* is taught to be what sustains life and is different from the body, the senses, *prāṇa*, mind and intellect: to the latter He is described as having transcended hunger and thirst, sorrow, delusion, old

age and death. On analogy with the lesson in the previous section, the *Brahman* taught to Kahola alone seems to be the Supreme Self; the individual self appears to have been taught to Ushasta under the name of the *Brahman*.

The doubt is resolved in the *Antaratvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 338-49) of three aphorisms :

35. If it be said that what has been mentioned as being within (all) (in the reply to Ushasta in *Bṛih. Up.* III. 4) relates to the individual self who is the possessor of the multitude of great elements, and that, otherwise, there will be inappropriateness as regards the replies, it is replied that it is not so; it resembles (other) teachings.

36. Interchange has to be made (of each other's ideas by Ushasta and Kahola); indeed, they (i.e., the teachings of Yājñavalkya) particularise (one and the same *Brahman*); as is the case elsewhere (in the teaching on the *Sadvidyā*).

37. Indeed, that (Supreme Deity) Itself is (the subject in the *Sadvidyā*); (being) *Satya* and other qualities (are accumulated in regard to It).

It is determined that the teachings given to both Ushasta and Kahola refer to the same Supreme *Brahman*. Ushasta is first told that the *Brahman* is the Internal Self which sustains life in all beings through the *prāṇa*. To differentiate this Self from the individual self, it is further explained to him that he should not see the seer of the act of seeing. This implies (i) that the self is not the *Atman* who has to be seen and meditated upon, and (ii) the self which sees with the help of the sense of sight cannot be the agent of sustaining life. Kahola repeats Ushasta's question with a slight variation in emphasis, as he wants the Supreme *Brahman* to be distinguished from the individual self in a stronger and clearer way. He is taught the *Brahman* who transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow, delusion, old age and death; and this teaching satisfies him.

Granting that the teachings given to Ushasta and Kahola are both about the Supreme Self, do they not  
III S.B.—j

constitute two different *vidyās*? The answer is in the negative. Both the teachings are about the same subject and in answer to the same question. They both relate to the *Brahman* as the Internal Self of all beings. The injunction is given only in the teaching to Kahola. Hence between Ushasta and Kahola an interchange of ideas has to be effected, as each will benefit from the teaching given to the other, so far as it serves to differentiate the individual self from the Supreme Self. The method followed resembles that in regard to the *Sadvidyā* in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI) where different glories are predicated of the *Brahman* in successive stages of the teaching.

Rāmānuja refers in conclusion to the views of Śaṅkara on the last two aphorisms as constituting two different sections. In the first, meditation involving interchange between the individual self and the *Brahman* as subject is taught: in the second, meditations on the heart, the Person within the sun and the Person within the eye in *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 4 & 5) are said to be the theme. So far as the earlier aphorism is concerned, Rāmānuja feels that it is not necessary at this stage of the work, having been already dealt with. In regard to the second aphorism, the locus of the *Brahman* is different in each case; moreover, the fallacy of reciprocal dependence will arise if we scrutinise the relations between the fruits proclaimed for the various meditations.

Identity has been shown in regard to the *vidyās* taught to Ushasta and Kahola on the ground that the object of meditation in both is the Internal Self of all. Applying this principle, the *Daharā-vidyās* in the *Chhānd. Up.* and the *Bṛih. Up.* appear to be different, as not only the qualities enumerated, but the very objects of meditation seem to vary. This is dealt with in the *Kāmādyaadhikaraṇa* (pp. 350-7) of three aphorisms:

38. The qualities of willing the truth etc. are given elsewhere (i.e., in the *Bṛih. Up.*) and there (i.e., in the *Chhānd. Up.*), because

of the qualities of having the heart as the abode etc. (bringing them to the mind).

39. There is no rejection (of the auspicious qualities of the *Brahman*), because there is ardour (in teaching about them).

40. In regard to him who has attained (the *Brahman*), because of that (attainment) only, (there is free movement in the world of the manes etc.), because there are scriptural statements to that effect.

The teaching in the *Chhānd. Up.* identifies the subtle ether inside the heart with the *Brahman* and enjoins meditation on Him and such auspicious qualities of His as willing the truth etc. In the *Bṛih. Up.* the *Brahman* is the sleeper in the ether within the heart: among His qualities are His being the ruler of all, the controller of all etc. In spite of what may appear at first sight as pointers to prove the difference between the *vidyās*, it is shown that they are identical. In both, the object of meditation is the *Brahman* having the heart as the abode. The qualities of being the bridge, the support etc. are common to both. The qualities of being the ruler of all, the controller of all etc., mentioned in the *Bṛih. Up.*, are particular forms of the quality of willing the truth mentioned in the *Chhānd. Up.*

The *Advaitins* may object that in the *Bṛih. Up.* the the *Brahman* is described as 'Not so, not so' (IV. 4. 22), and that His auspicious qualities are enumerated only to be denied with a view to establish Him as being without attributes. Rāmānuja replies that in this very context, as in many others, these qualities are taught with ardour. The scripture cannot teach things which cannot be arrived at by other means of knowledge only to deny them later, thus deceiving man and involving him further in the coils of *samsāra*. It may be further objected that the meditation on the *Brahman* with the auspicious qualities taught in the *Chhānd. Up.* is said to lead to free movement in all the worlds which is a result appertaining to *samsāra*. The reply is that later in the *Upanishad* it is made abundantly

clear that it is the released self who has free movement in all the worlds.

*Sūtra* 41, the next aphorism which constitutes Section XVII, the *Tannirdhāraṇīyamādhikaraṇa* (pp. 357-60), deals with an incidental topic. Is the meditation on the *udgītha* enjoined at the very beginning of the *Chhānd. Up.* to be included as a part of every sacrificial rite with which the *udgītha* is connected, just as the qualities of willing the truth etc. mentioned in the *Chhānd. Up.* are to be included in the *Daharavidyā* of the *Bṛih. Up.*? The conclusion is thus set out:

41. That determined thinking is not compulsory because it is so seen to exist; indeed, its fruit, which is non-obstruction, is separate.

For the meditation on the *udgītha*, a separate fruit, namely, the overcoming of obstructions to the fruit of the main ritual, is prescribed. The meditation is optional, because it is stated that both he who meditates and he who does not can perform the rite. Thus the fruit described for the meditation is not mere eulogy, making the meditation compulsory in all cases, as with the injunction that the sacrificial ladle should be made of *parṇa* wood. On the other hand, that fruit is real like the fruit of wealth in cattle to one who brings water to the sacrifice in a milk-pail.

We revert to the *Dahara-vidyā* in the *Pradānādhikaraṇa* (pp. 360-1) with its single aphorism:

42. It (i.e., the repetition of the meditation on the Possessor of the qualities in the case of every quality mentioned in the *Dahara-vidyā*) has to be made, as is, indeed, the case with oblations; this has been already explained.

Meditation on the *daharākāśa* as well as His eternal and auspicious qualities is enjoined in the *Chhānd. Up.* The question is raised whether, even when meditating on

the qualities, meditation on the essential nature of the Supreme Self who is the Possessor of those qualities has to be repeated. The answer is in the affirmative. The essential nature is different from the form as qualified by the qualities, and the injunction is to meditate on the *daharākāśa* as so qualified. The analogy is given of three separate offerings being made to Indra, because in a single *mantra* he is described as the king, the great king and the independent ruler. Likewise, the meditation on the essential nature has to be repeated.

The object of worship in the *Daharavidyā* of *M. Nār.* is now investigated in *Sūtra* 43, which constitutes the 19th section, the *Līṅgabhūyastvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 362-5):

43. Because there is an abundance of indicatory marks (the *Nārāyaṇa-anuvāka* deals with the object of worship in all the *vidyās*); such passages are more powerful than the context; this has been already explained.

The *Nārāyaṇa-anuvāka* in *M. Nār.* where the supreme glory of *Nārāyaṇa* is declared, immediately follows the *Daharavidyā*. Even so, and though there is a reference to the heart there, it is determined that the *Nārāyaṇa-anuvāka* describes the Supreme Being who is the object of worship in all the meditations. This is because of the abundance of indicatory marks to that effect, and according to the *Pūr. Mīm.* indicatory marks have more force than the context. Among such marks are the use of the names such as the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Self, the Supreme Being etc. given in many *vidyās*. Through the denotations of such words, it is determined that *Nārāyaṇa* alone is the object of worship in all the *vidyās*.

The context has been shown to be weak in determining the true significance of the *Nārāyaṇa-anuvāka*. It is suggested that the force of the context remains unchallenged in regard to the *manaschit* fires etc. described in *Śat. Br.*

(X). This is the subject of the *Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇa* (pp. 365-74) of seven aphorisms :

44. They (i.e., the *manaścīt* meditation etc.) are admissible along with those (sacrifices) which are mentioned earlier, because they are given in the context as subsidiary to the sacrifice ; as is the case with the *manasa* ritual.

45. Because also of transfer.

46. But they are undoubtedly (of the nature of) *vidyā*, because it is so determined and because also there are scriptural statements to that effect.

47. Because self-sufficient scriptural texts etc. are more powerful (than the context), there is no contradiction (by the latter).

48. Because through the subsidiaries etc. (the sacrifice of knowledge is inferred to be separate) as in the case of other *vidyās* being separate; it (i.e., the injunction) also is seen ; this has been already explained.

49. It is not so ; it (i.e., a transfer) is obtained from some common feature ; as is the case with *Mṛityu*, where indeed there is no attainment of his world.

50. Through the subsequent (*brāhmaṇa*) also, it is known that the text (referring to the *manaścīt* ritual) establishes it as such (i.e., as consisting of knowledge); its being connected (with the ritualistic portion) is due to the abundance of the subsidiaries of the fire—sacrifice (which have to be mentally carried out).

The mental activities of a human life lasting for a hundred years are conceived of as 36,000 fires, each fire standing for a day's activities. Similar fires are spoken of as built of the *prāṇa*, the senses etc. The *pūrvapakṣa* is that, though these sacrificial fires are of the nature of mental construction, still they are involved in the sacrifice on the brick-altar mentioned earlier. The analogy is suggested of the ritual carried out on the tenth day of the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice : then the taking up of the *soma* juice, putting it down in its place, bringing it back and eating the remnant of the sacrifice are all imagined and carried out in the mind. This 'mental' rite forms part of the sacrifice itself. Moreover, each *manaścīt* fire is said to



be as much as the fire on the brick-altar mentioned earlier. Thus the *manaśchit* fires etc. are seen to be part of a sacrificial ritual, and cannot be regarded as *vidyā*.

These arguments are set aside because of the clear declaration that the *manaśchit* fires are built for knowledge only and that whatever ritual is done on the fire-altar, it is done through the mind now. The context is weaker than the self-sufficient scriptural texts which declare that those fires are built for knowledge only. There are also sentences bringing out the nature of the *manaśchit* fires as *vidyā*.

Though there is no injunction for a sacrifice of knowledge, still it has to be presumed, because the sacrifice of knowledge is seen to be distinct from the sacrifice of action. When the *manaśchit* fire is declared to be of the same magnitude as the fire on the brick-altar, the fruit of the fire-ritual is indicated for the mental ritual by transfer. For such transfer, it is not necessary that all intermediate operations should be on all fours in the sacrifice and its mental counterpart. For instance, a little earlier in the *Śat. Br.*, the characteristics of Death are transferred to the sun.

Finally, it is pointed out that the next section in the *Śat. Br.* enjoins meditation on the world as fire and the sea as the enclosing stones as a *vidyā* with a definite fruit. The Vaiśvānara meditation is also found near by. Though it may be said that the *manaśchit* and other *vidyās* should have found a place in the *Bṛih. Up.* and not in the *Agnirahasya* chapter, we have to remember that many subsidiaries of the fire-sacrifice have to be imagined in the *manaśchit vidyā* and there is hence propriety in placing it in the ritualistic section of the *Śat. Br.*

This section having been incidental, we have to take up the thread where we left it with the conclusion that Nārāyaṇa is the object of meditation in all the *vidyās*. It

has been established earlier (under I. 4. 6) that these meditations require the essential nature of the self also to be known. The question is now raised whether the individual self is to be meditated on as the agent and the enjoyer here in this world or as having the essential nature of being free from sin etc., which becomes manifest on attaining salvation. This is dealt with in the two aphorisms of Section XXI, the *Śārīrebhāvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 374-7):

51. Some are of opinion (that the individual self as associated with the qualities of being the agent of action etc. has to be meditated upon), because the self is of that character in the body.

52. It is not so ; what is different (from the bound self) (has to be meditated upon) ; because it is that form (of the released self who is free from sin etc.) which is to come to pass ; as is the case with (the) knowledge (i.e., meditation relating to the *Brahman*).

On the analogy of what is prescribed to those performing rituals, it is urged that the self has to be thought of as he is in this body. But the analogy is inapplicable, as rituals merely need the knowledge that the self is different from the body. But meditations on the Supreme Self require the individual self to be regarded as he would be in final release and as forming His body.

It has now been determined that wherever the Supreme Self is meditated upon, there the individual self has to be included. On this analogy, it is asked whether the *vidyās* connected with the subsidiaries of rituals are connected with every *Veda*. The answer is given in the two aphorisms of the *Āṅgāvabaddhādhikaraṇa* (pp. 378-80):

53. But they (i.e., the *vidyās*), connected with the subsidiaries of rituals, are not attached to the (particular) branches (of the *Veda* wherein they are mentioned) ; (they are connected) with every *Veda* ; because of (a reason).

54. Also, just as is the case with *mantras* etc., there is no contradiction.

It is determined that such meditations connected with the *udgītha* etc. are not confined to the particular branches of the *Veda* where they are mentioned. Wherever there are the *udgītha* etc., with all those places they get connected. This is because the scripture speaks of the *udgītha* etc. in a general way, and not as differentiated in particular branches of the *Veda*. The analogy is given of *mantras* etc. given in one branch of the *Veda* being applied in all the branches.

Of the *udgītha* mentioned above, it is known to be a part of the *sāman* hymn. Meditations have been prescribed on the *sāman* as a whole as well as on its parts like the *udgītha* etc. A similar situation obtains in regard to the *Vaiśvānaravidyā*, and this leads to the question whether meditation on the *Vaiśvānara* has to be carried out limb by limb, or on Him as a whole, or on Him as a whole and in association with each limb separately. This is the theme of Section XXIII, the *Bhūmajyāyastvādhi-karaṇa* (pp. 381-5), which has only the following aphorism :

55. The whole meditation is very superior; as in the case of sacrifice (parts are inferior); indeed, the scripture says so.

In the meditation on the *Vaiśvānara*, He is taught to be the Supreme Self with the heavenly world, the ether of space, the sun, air etc. as parts of His body. *Prāchīnaśāla* and five others, eager to worship the *Vaiśvānara*, get instruction from King *Aśvapati*. Each of them having been meditating on a part of the *Vaiśvānara* such as His head etc. is taught the whole shape as well as the fruit for the worship of the part.

It is determined that the worship of the whole *Vaiśvānara* alone is taught. The entire teaching constitutes one context, and hence the mention of fruits for the worship of particular limbs is a reference to a part of the worship of a whole made up of parts. There can be no

analogy with the teaching regarding the worship of the *Bhūman* in *Chhānd. Up.* (VII), where a series of objects of worship are enumerated, starting from name and ending with the *Bhūman*. For minor fruits are laid down for the worship of all things other than the *Bhūman*, whose worship leads to salvation. Here though separate fruits are mentioned for the worship of the parts of the Vaiśvānara, still the mere worship of parts is condemned and threatened with disaster.

A true analogy exists, however, with the sacrifice that may be made to the Vaiśvānara on the birth of a son. Separate fruits are mentioned for offerings on eight to twelve potsherds. Only the last has to be carried out, and the fruits for the offerings on less potsherds are included in it. Thus the worship of the whole Vaiśvānara as made up of parts is the teaching given.

The doubt now arises whether, as in the case of the Vaiśvānara meditation, which is concerned with all His limbs, all *vidyās* constitute really one *vidyā* teaching meditation on all the auspicious qualities of the Supreme Self. This forms the subject of *Sūtra* 56, which constitutes the *Śabdādhedādhikaraṇa* (pp. 385-7) :

56. They are different because there is distinction in the words etc. denoting them.

All *vidyās* can be claimed to be one because they are all devoted to meditation on the *Brahman*. But the settled conclusion is that the *vidyās* are different on account of the words describing them, their repetition without distinction in different contexts, numbers, qualities, contexts and names. This is parallel to the differentiation of rituals in the *Pūr. Mim.* *Vidyās* teaching the attainment of the *Brahman* in self-sufficient contexts are distinct. Each teaches the meditation on the *Brahman* as qualified by certain attributes. The topic has been taken up here to show that *vidyā* is enjoined meditation, and not the syntactical meaning of certain scriptural sentences that leads to salvation.

Distinction among the *vidyās* having been established, the question arises : is it enough to choose one, or is cumulation useful? The problem is dealt with in the two aphorisms of the *Vikalpādhikaraṇa* (pp. 387-9) :

57. Because they (i.e., the *vidyās*) do not differ in their results, there is freedom of choice in (regard to them).

58. But those (*vidyās*) relating to desires are either cumulative or not, according to desire, because there is no cause as is given above.

Cumulation is claimed to be useful, as leading to the experience of the *Brahman* in a magnified measure. There is the analogy of the rituals leading to the same result such as the *Svarga*. When one performs many such rites, he gets greater abundance of enjoyment in the celestial world. The answer to this is that the *Brahman*, when attained, becomes to the man of *vidyā* bliss unsurpassed in excellence. If such enjoyment of bliss results from a single *vidyā*, of what use is another *vidyā*? The fruit of all the *vidyās* is one and the same, and it cannot be magnified or reduced. But in regard to *vidyās* whose fruit is different from the attainment of the *Brahman*, cumulation of *vidyās* with the same objective can prove useful : for the result, being finite, can be magnified.

As in the case of the latter type of *vidyās*, are meditations connected with the *udgītha* and other such accessories of sacrifices, optional? Or are they compulsory in all cases? The last—and 26th—Section, the *Yathāśrayabhāvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 390-6) of six aphorisms, deals with this :

59. In the case of (the *upāsanas* dependent upon) the accessories (like the *udgītha*), they are like their basis (i.e., the *udgītha* itself) part of sacrifices.

60. Because also there is a commandment (to that effect).

61. Because the defect is cleared up (from a scriptural text).

62. Because also there are scriptural texts which show that the subject (of the meditation) is common (to all the *Vedas*).

63. This cannot be, because there is no scriptural text to show that it (i.e., the *udgītha*) co-exists (i.e., serves as an essential element).

64. Because also the scripture shows (that there is no invariable rule in regard to the adoption of the meditation).

The first four *Sūtras* set out the *pūrvapakṣa* view, advancing new arguments to upset the conclusion arrived at under *Sūtra* 41. Other topics having been suggested by the course of the discussions, we now revert back to deal with certain objections to the *siddhānta* there. These are: (i) The *udgītha* etc. being essential elements of sacrifices, meditations based thereon also must be adopted invariably. The separate fruits declared for such meditations elsewhere constitute mere eulogy, as in the case of the use of the ladle made of *parṇa* wood in sacrifices. (ii) The commandment to meditate on the *udgītha* is self-sufficient by itself: it does not refer to any other context or a separate fruit. (iii) The *Chhānd. Up.* refers to the defect caused by the failure to meditate on the *udgītha* by the *udgātṛi* priest and prescribes its rectification by meditation by the *hotṛi* priest. (iv) In *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1. 9) the use of the *praṇava* by priests of all the three *Vedas* is mentioned, and this *praṇava* is made out to be the *udgītha* which is the subject of meditation. Thus the *praṇava* with the meditation is prescribed for the rituals of all the three *Vedas*.

The last two aphorisms refute these arguments as under: (i) The statement about the separate fruit for the *udgītha* meditation prescribes a specific course of action for attaining it, unlike the statement about the ladle of *parṇa* wood. (ii) The commandment to meditate is linked up with the later statement about its fruit. (iii) The *Chhānd. Up.* in a later passage speaks of the *brahmā* priest who knows the *vyahṛiti-homa* protecting the sacrifice, the

sacrificer and all the priests. Thus, for curing the defects of a sacrifice, an alternative remedy to meditation on the *udgītha* is known. (iv) The argument about the *praṇava* with meditation being useful in all rituals is not specifically answered. But the implied reply is that it is mere *praṇava* only and not the *praṇava* with meditation. This is borne out by the previous *mantra* where there is a reference only to the mere *praṇava*. Thus it is formally established that the *udgītha* meditation is optional and not compulsory.

### CHAPTER III, PART 4.

The last *pāda* of Chapter III deals with the *karmas* which are accessories to *vidyās*. First, however, the question is taken up whether *karmas* are accessory to *vidyās* or *vice versa*. The first section of 20 aphorisms, the *Purushārthādhikaraṇa* (pp. 397-420), establishes that the highest object of human pursuit, namely, final release for the self, results from *vidyā*. The first aphorism states the settled conclusion thus:

1. Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that the (highest) object of human pursuit results from that (i.e., *vidyā* or meditation), because of scriptural statements to that effect.

The scriptural statements are those like the declaration in the *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1. 1): "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."

Objections to this view are raised in the following six aphorisms:

2. Because it (i.e., *vidyā*) is subordinate (to the *karmas*), the theory of (its being the means for attaining) the (highest) object of human pursuit is (eulogistic) as with other things; so Jaimini opines.

3. Because conduct (to that effect) is seen.

4. That (i.e., *vidyā* being accessory to *karma*) is established from the scripture.

5. Because there is connection.

6. Because the injunction is as regards him who is possessed of that (i.e., *vidyā*).

7. Because there is the restrictive rule.

Jaimini's view is briefly that *vidyā* is intended to purify the individual self with a view to bring about the proper performance of rituals. The declarations about the fruit of *vidyā* are merely eulogy. The primary intent of *Vedāntic* passages is to establish the essential nature of the individual self and differentiate it from the body. This thesis is supported by the following arguments: (i) Janaka, Aśvapati, Keśidhvaja and others like them who have knowledge of the *Brahman* are known to have performed sacrifices and other rituals. Their *vidyā* is only an accessory to their *karmas*. (ii) In *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1. 10) the increased potency of sacrifices performed by an agent with *vidyā* is declared. The *vidyā* is mentioned in general terms; though the context may make it out to be the *udgītha* meditation, still we have an independent scriptural text which mentions *vidyā* in general, and its force cannot be reduced by the context. (iii) In *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 2) it is stated that both *vidyā* and *karma* follow the self departing from the body. Their association can only mean, in the light of previous arguments, that *vidyā* is an accessory to *karmas*. (iv) In *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 15. 1), *karmas* are prescribed for one who has learnt the *Veda* with meaning, that is, to one possessed of *vidyā*. (v) *Iśā. Up.* (2) states that one should desire to live for a hundred years engaged in doing works. This shows the primacy of *karma*.

The next ten aphorisms reply to the objections :

8. But because there is the teaching about some one who is different (from the self who is the agent of works) (the object of human pursuit is attained from *vidyā*); (this is the opinion) of Bādarāyaṇa, as it is so seen given in the scriptures.

9. But scriptural declaration is equally available (in regard to *vidyā* not being subordinate to *karma*).



10. It (i.e., that scriptural text) is not universal in its application.

11. There is apportionment as in the case of a hundred (coins).

12. In respect of him who learns the *Veda* only (the performance of *karmas* is prescribed).

13. It (i.e., restricting the works enjoined on the knower of the *Brahman* to independent works) is not right, because there is no restriction (in the rule).

14. It (i.e., the permission given) is indeed for glorification.

15. According to desire (the life of the householder can be renounced)—some (think thus) also.

16. There is also destruction (of *karmas* by the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*).

17. Indeed, (this is so declared) in the scriptures also in regard to celibates.

The arguments are thus set out: (i) Bādarāyaṇa points out that in the *Vedānta* the *Brahman* is taught as hostile to all that is evil and full of auspicious qualities, and thus differentiated from the individual self who is liable to ignorance and other imperfections. It is this *Brahman* whose knowledge leads to the highest object of human pursuit. (ii) There are texts like *Ait. Ār.* (III. 2. 6) which declare the renunciation of *karmas* like sacrifices. This shows that those devoted to *vidyā* can give up *karmas*. Their engaging in *karmas* must be understood as relating to sacrifices and other works without the desire for fruits. Rituals performed in this spirit are later on (under III. 4. 26) shown to be accessory to *vidyā*. (iii) In *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1. 10), only a particular ritual is referred to, and not ritual in general, because it refers back to the *udgītha* mentioned at the beginning of the context. (iv) The *vidyā* and *karma* which follow the departing self do so, each to yield its own fruits. This cannot prove that one is accessory to the other: there is separation between them, as when a couple of hundred coins, received by a seller of lands and gems, are made out to be due, half to the sale of lands and half to the vending of gems. (v) In *Chhānd.*

*Up.* (VIII. 15. 1) the prescription of *karmas* is for one who has learnt the *Veda* by rote without understanding its meaning. This cannot show *vidyā* to be an accessory to *karma*. (vi) The works referred to in *Īśā. Up.* (2) and *B.G.* (III. 20) are not shown to be independent *karmas* leading to particular fruits: they should be taken to be those accessory to *vidyā*. In fact, in *Īśā. Up.*, the context indicates that *vidyā* is being glorified by pointing out that in virtue of its power one is not tainted by works. (vii) In *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 22) reference is made to men of *vidyā* who wish to renounce the householder's life. This proves that *vidyā* cannot be accessory to works like sacrifices which require a householder's life. (viii) In *Mund. Up.* (II. 2. 9) the destruction of the effects of *karmas* by the vision of the *Brahman* is described. This indicates that *vidyā*, which leads to the vision, is hostile to the rituals or *karmas* whose effects obstruct final emancipation. (ix) Among the four *āśramas* or stages of life, those of the student, the anchorite in the forest and the wandering ascetic require strict celibacy. In these stages, works like sacrifices are not possible: but even then *vidyā* is practised. Thus *vidyā* is not accessory to *karmas*.

Jaimini now raises another objection. This and the reply thereto are dealt with in the last three aphorisms of this section:

18. Jaimini is of opinion that there is (only) reference (to other stages of life than that of the householder), because there is no injunction (about them); indeed, the scripture excludes (them).

19. They (i.e., the other stages of life) have to be practised; (so says) Bādarāyaṇa, because of the equality (of all the stages of life) as stated in the scripture.

20. It is certainly an injunction, as is the case with bearing (figsticks above the ladle in certain rituals).

Jaimini urges that only the *āśrama* of the householder has scriptural sanction. Other stages of life may be referred to in the scripture, but they are not enjoined.

The references have other purposes in view, such as eulogy of the meditation on the *Brahman* etc. Moreover, the giving up of the sacrificial fire is severely condemned in *Taitt. Sam.* (I. 5. 2. 5). Bādarāyaṇa replies that all stages of life have scriptural sanction. In *Chhānd. Up.* (II. 23. 1) the four stages of life, divided into three groups, are referred to as the three bases of *dharma*. Meditation on the *Brahman*, which is common to all of them, is praised. In *V.P.* (I. 6. 39), the highest heaven is promised to those who practise devotion to the *Brahman* among all castes and stages of life.

Finally, it is determined that the scriptural statements about the four stages of life, though not in the injunctive form, must be taken to be injunctions, because they refer to things not arrived at by other scriptural statements or other means of knowledge. The bearing of figsticks above the ladle, in the funereal *agnihotra*, has been taken similarly to be an injunction in *Pūr. Mīm.* (III. 4. 15). Moreover, in *Jābāla. Up.*, injunctions for all stages of life are seen. The condemnation in *Taitt. Sam.* (I. 5. 2. 5) of one who gives up the sacrificial fire, and other such passages must be understood as applying to one not free from attachment. Thus, celibates are entitled to practise *vidyā*, which is seen to be the means for the attainment of the highest object of human pursuit.

The laudatory reference to one abiding in the *Brahman* in the *Chhāndogya* passage about the three bases of *dharma* leads to an enquiry as to whether the description of the *udgītha* as the best of the *rasas* in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1.) is mere eulogy or an injunction for a meditation. This is carried out in the *Stutimātrādhikaraṇa* (pp. 420-2) of two aphorisms :

21. If it be said that it (i.e., the description of the *udgītha* as the best *rasa*) is mere glorification, on account of the acceptance (already of the *udgītha* as an element of the sacrifice), it is not so, because it is new.

22. Because also there is the word denoting action.

III S.B.—I

It is true that the *udgītha* is already known to be an element of the sacrifice, but this does not make its description as the best of *rasas* merely laudatory. For this quality is new, not having been arrived at by other means of knowledge. Moreover, it is found near an injunction to meditate, and therefore it is proper to take it as prescribing the subject for the meditation. The subject is not exhaustively stated in the injunction itself.

A similar doubt as to whether the stories in the *Upanishads* are meant to praise *vidyā* or whether they are to serve as themes for the stories recited during the horse-sacrifice is taken up in the *Pāriplavārthādhikaraṇa* of two aphorisms :

23. If it be said that they (i.e., the *Vedānta* stories) are for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, it is not so because they are particularised.

24. Because, also, in a similar manner (to stories linked to injunctions about *karmas*), they are connected together in the same context (with injunctions relating to *vidyās*).

It is determined that the *Upanishad* stories are intended to establish injunctions in regard to *vidyās*. For only some particular stories are enjoined to be recited at the horse-sacrifice. In the earlier part of the *Veda* are to be found stories which establish injunctions about rituals. An example is the story that the tears of Agni became silver: it is meant to ban the gift of silver in sacrifices.

We now revert back to the topic discussed in the first section. A further objection is raised to the view that *vidyā* is possible for celibates also in *Sūtra* 25, which constitutes the *Agñindhanādyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 424-5) :

25. Because of the very same (scriptural text) also, there is no need (in the case of celibates) for kindling the (sacrificial) fire.

The critic relies on the fact that sacrifices are not possible for celibates while they have been claimed to be

accessories to *vidyā*. The answer is that while *vidyā* among householders needs the ceremonies of the sacrificial fire as accessories, among celibates it does not require them. In the case of the latter, there is need only for the *karmas* prescribed for their *āśramas*.

The question is now raised in the *Sarvāpekshādhi-karaṇa* (pp. 426-8) why *vidyā* should require sacrifices from householders :

26. There is certainly need for all works, because there are scriptural passages enjoining sacrifices etc., just as (there is need for the harness) in the case of the horse.

In *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 22), it is stated that the seekers of the *Brahman* desire to know Him by sacrifices, by giving gifts and by religious austerities associated with fasting. Thus sacrifices etc. are enjoined as accessories to works. And these are the means of attaining knowledge, as knowledge is of the nature of loving remembrance of the Supreme Person, who is pleased by the daily and occasional rites which are His worship. Among householders, *vidyā* thus stands in need of rituals, just as a horse needs harness.

Granted that works are needed for *vidyā*, are tranquillity, self-restraint etc. also needed? This question is answered in the single aphorism of the *Sama-damādyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 428-30) :

27. Even so (i.e., even when one is engaged in sacrifices etc. as a householder), one should be associated with tranquillity, self-restraint etc., owing to their being enjoined in the scripture as accessory to that (*vidyā*) and having necessarily to be practised.

In *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 23), tranquillity, self-restraint etc. are enjoined as accessories to *vidyā* by the statement that one should see the Self, being tranquil in mind, with the senses restrained, resigned, patient and absorbed in meditation. Works and meditation, being performed at different times, are not opposed to each other, though the

former are of the nature of the activities of the sense-organs and the latter are what is opposite thereto. Moreover, enjoined works form the worship of the Supreme Self and, by pleasing Him, destroy unhelpful innate impressions.

A doubt is raised about the need for a particular form of self-restraint, namely, that in regard to eating, in the next section, the *Sārvānnānumityadhikaraṇa* (pp. 430-3) of four aphorisms:

28. There is permission to eat all foods, only at the time of danger to life, because the scripture declares it so.

29. Because also there is no contradiction.

30. This is also stated in the *Smṛiti*.

31. For this reason also the scripture is against doing (i.e., eating) according to desire.

In connection with the *Prāṇa-vidyā* taught in *Bṛih. Up.* (VI. 1) and *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 2), it is said that nothing is unacceptable as food to one who meditates on the food of all creatures as the food of the *prāṇa*. This permission to eat all foods is, however, determined as applicable only under circumstances when there is danger to life otherwise. The story of Ushasti in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 10) proves that even a knower of the *Brahman* cannot eat forbidden food except when there is acute danger of death from starvation. In such a condition, Ushasti accepts the leavings of a mahout as food: but, because at the moment he is not suffering from unbearable thirst, he refuses water which is of the nature of leavings. The restrictions on a knower of the *Brahman* apply with greater force to the meditator on the *prāṇa*.

A *Chhāndogya* text (VII. 26. 2) speaks of pure food leading to a pure mind which can meditate steadily on the *Brahman*. A *Smṛiti* verse absolves from sin those who take forbidden food at times of danger to life. In the *Katha Samhitā* it is stated that one should abstain from

liquor in order to be saved from sin. Thus restrictions apply, except when there is acute danger to life.

After this incidental section, we have to take up the thread of discussion where we left it at the end of the *Sarvāpekshādhikaraṇa*. If sacrifices etc. are accessories to *vidyā*, why should they be performed by those who do not seek salvation? The answer is given in the four aphorisms of the *Vihitatvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 434-7):

32. Because also they are prescribed, even the ritualistic works of the religiously sanctioned stages of life (are to be performed).

33. They have to be performed also as auxiliaries (to *vidyā*).

34. Even in all applications they themselves (are to be performed) because in both the places there are marks (indicative of their identity).

35. The scripture declares that there is no overpowering (of it).

If the sacrifice etc. meant to be accessories to *vidyā* are the same as those laid down for performance by the householder etc., then the same rituals are being treated as daily or occasional rites by the householder etc. having no *vidyā* and as accessories to *vidyā* by the man of *vidyā*. If the rituals for the two purposes are different, each set will be performed by those for whom it is intended. The answer is that the rituals are not different, as the scriptural passages enjoining them do not differentiate them. Just as the *Agnihotra* has to be performed as a daily duty and may be performed also as a means to attain the *Svarga*, similarly the same rituals have to be performed as *āśrama*-duties by those who do not practise *vidyā* and both as *āśrama*-duties and accessories to *vidyā* by those who seek emancipation. The rituals can serve this double purpose. In *M. Nār.* (XXII. 1), it is taught that sacrifices etc., performed without desire for fruit, cannot hinder *vidyā*. Indeed, they purify the mind and help *vidyā*.

The question is now raised, whether those who stand outside the four *āśramas*, like widowers and those who have completed the student stage and are yet unmarried, are entitled to practise *vidyā*. This is discussed in Section IX, the *Vidhurādhikaraṇa* of four aphorisms :

36. But (there is indeed fitness) even for (those who are) outside (the stages of life), because it is so seen declared in the scripture.

37. It is also given in the *Smṛitis*.

38. There is also special help.

39. The other (i.e., belonging to a stage of life), indeed, is greater than this (i.e., not belonging to any stage) (because of more numerous duties and rites and) because also of the *Smṛiti*.

It is true that the duties of the *āśramas* serve as auxiliaries to *vidyā*. But men like Raikva, Bhīṣma, Samvarta etc., who belonged to none of the four *āśramas*, were devoted to *vidyā*. Moreover, there are other things besides sacrifices which can help *vidyā*. Among these may be mentioned prayer, fasting, giving gifts etc. The value of prayer is taught by *Manu* (II. 87), and in *Pr. Up.* (I. 10) austerities, celibacy, faith and meditation on the nature of the individual self are described as helpful to *vidyā*. But, of course, those in the four stages of life, having more *dharma*s to practise, are better placed in regard to the practice of *vidyā*.

If the widower and the bachelor who has finished his studies are entitled to *vidyā*, cannot the same thing be said of the perpetual celibates, anchorites and ascetics who have fallen from their vows of celibacy? The answer is given in the negative in the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa* (pp. 440-5) of four aphorisms :

40. But he who is already that (i.e., in the condition of a perpetual celibate or an anchorite or ascetic) cannot undo it (i.e., cannot be condoned for a fall), because of restraint from the absence of the duties of that condition: so Jaimini is of opinion.



41. Even that (expiation) which is mentioned in the chapter on qualifications (in *Pūr. Mīm.*) is not for him, because there is the *Smṛiti* text relating to his fall, as it does not prescribe it (i.e., the expiation).

42. Some are of opinion that it (i.e., expiation) exists because it (i.e., the fall from chastity) also is described (as sin) preceded by the word, 'minor', as is the case with consuming (liquor); this has been already explained.

43. But he (i.e., the person who falls from celibacy) is outside (the ranks of those who can be redeemed by expiation), because the *Smṛiti* says so and because also there is a custom (to that effect).

In the first place, the perpetual celibate, the anchorite and the ascetic are in specific *āśramas*, whose duties they cannot violate. They thus differ from the widower and the bachelor who has finished his studies: the latter two are not in any *āśramas*. Secondly, the expiation prescribed for the student for lapsing from chastity cannot apply to one who has taken the vow of perpetual celibacy. In regard to him the *Smṛiti* says that there is no expiation. Even if it is granted that his sin is described in some places as minor and that he can go through the ceremony of expiation, still it does not follow that he recovers the right to *vidyā*. For the *Smṛiti* makes it clear that the expiatory ceremony, whatever else it can do, cannot so purify him as to restore to him the right to *vidyā*. Moreover, the custom of the exemplary is to avoid the company of such men.

Arising from the investigation into the duties of those who perform meditation and those who do not, an incidental question comes up for discussion in the *Svāmīyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 445-7) of two aphorisms:

44. It (i.e., the agentship for the meditation on the *udgītha*) belongs to the sacrificer, because of the scriptural text relating to the fruit; so opines Ātreya.

45. It is the function of the *ṛitvik*, according to Auḍulomi; for which indeed he is hired.

In regard to the *udgītha* meditation, Ātreya's opinion is that the sacrificer who enjoys its fruit must necessarily be the agent, as in the case of the meditation in the *Dahara-vidyā* etc. But the correct view is stated by Auḍulomi that the officiating priest must carry out the *udgītha* meditation. All the mental and physical works included in any particular ritual have to be carried out by him alone. The text which mentions greater potency for the sacrifice carried out with the meditation implies that the priest is the agent of both. Though the meditation is optional, when chosen it is auxiliary to the ritual performed by the *udgātri* and has him for its agent.

Reverting back, after some incidental topics, to the auxiliaries of *vidyā*, the *Sūtras* proceed to discuss another auxiliary in the *Sahakāryantaravidhyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 447-53) of three aphorisms :

46. For him who has that (*vidyā*) there is the injunction for another aid (i.e., *mauna*) like (other) injunctions (about aids) and other things (implied by them); because it (i.e., *mauna*) is well-known (as such aid); it is the third thing (enjoined in addition to proficiency and childlike qualities).

47. But as it (i.e., *vidyā*) is existent in all (the *āśramas*), it is concluded with the householder.

48. Because like *mauna*, the others also are taught.

The discussion is based on *Bṛh. Up.* (III. 5.) where it is stated that one who has studied the *Veda* and attained childlike qualities and proficiency becomes a meditating sage or *muni*: such a person should worship the *Brahman*. The question that arises is whether the quality of the *muni*, namely, *mauna* or reflection, is prescribed as an aid to *vidyā*. It is determined that there is such a prescription. *Mauna* is different from proficiency and childlike qualities: it stands for thinking over the form of the Lord at times other than those of deep meditation. It is also different from *manana*, which is another aid to *vidyā* and which involves reflection on what has been

heard with a view to fix it in the mind. Though there is no injunctive suffix in the text, an injunction about *mauna* has to be presumed, as it has not been arrived at by other means of knowledge.

It may be asked : if *vidyā* can be practised in all the *āśramas*, aided by their duties and *mauna*, why does the *Chhānd. Up.* conclude with the teaching that the householder, continuing as such throughout his life and practising *vidyā*, attains the *Brahman*? The answer is that the reference to the householder is illustrative of all the stages of life. Similarly, in the *Bṛih. Up.*, in the context of the teaching about *mauna*, a reference is made to the ascetic. This also is illustrative. In the *Chhānd. Up.*, the section (II, 23) beginning with the three bases of *dharma* refers to all stages of life and declares that he who abides in the *Brahman* attains salvation, whatever stage he may belong to.

What are the childlike qualities, recommended along with *mauna*? This question is dealt with in *Sūtra* 49, constituting the *Anāvishkāraṇādhikaraṇa* (pp. 453.4) :

49. ('Childlike qualities' mean) not manifesting (one's nature): because there is connection (only between this and *vidyā*).

The qualities of a child include wanton wandering, eating indiscriminately and freedom from egotism and from advertisement of one's own greatness. It is this last quality that is needed by the man of *vidyā*. For wanton conduct and indiscriminate eating are prohibited by the scripture for one who seeks the Supreme Self.

After dealing with the accessories to *vidyā* thus far, this *pāda* concludes with two sections, the *Aihikādhikaraṇa* and the *Muktiphalādhikaraṇa* (pp. 454-6), which examine when *vidyā* itself comes into being. Each section has only one aphorism :

50. (The *vidyā* aiming at) worldly prosperity occurs, when there is no obstruction (which is accidental or extraneous); because it is so seen declared in the scripture.

51. In this manner, there is no definite determination as to (the *upasanā* with) the fruit of salvation, because it (i.e., the *upasanā*) bears that condition (of being the fruit in the absence of obstruction), bears that condition.

The rise of any *vidyā* aiming at worldly prosperity is brought about by previously performed meritorious deeds. In the absence of obstruction, the *vidyā* is produced immediately, and later on otherwise. The same is the case also with the *vidyā* aiming at final emancipation, even though the meritorious deeds leading to it are more eminent: for sins resulting from offences against the knowers of the *Brahman* may exist and they can offer obstruction even here.

#### CHAPTER IV, PART 1

Chapter IV deals with the fruit of *vidyā*, namely, salvation. In the first *pāda* of 19 aphorisms divided into 11 sections, the main theme is how *vidyā* frees one from sin. But before this is taken up, certain new details about *vidyā* are explained which remind us of the relationship between *vidyā* as the means and salvation as the fruit or indicate that *vidyā* itself is the fruit of the proper performance of rituals.

The opening section, *Avṛittyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 457-60), has two aphorisms:

1. Frequent repetition (of meditation) (is to be practised), because it is so taught.
2. Because also there is the *Smṛiti*.

It is determined here that meditation on the Supreme Self has to be practised over and over again. It is not like a sacrifice, which once performed yields its fruit in due course. For it is of the nature of loving remembrance frequently repeated so as to become contemplation. The scriptures, which use the words, '*vedana*', '*dhyāna*' and

'*upāsanā*', as synonyms, make this clear. Moreover, the V.P. distinctly declares that the stream of loving meditation requires the help of the first six of the eight stages of the *yoga* of mental concentration.

Whether the *Brahman* who is the object of frequent meditation is the Self of the worshipper or different is examined in the next section, *Ātmavopasanādhikaraṇa* (pp. 460-3), which has only one aphorism :

3. Certainly, they (i.e., the *Jabālas*) worship (the *Brahman*) as the self, and they (i.e., the scriptures) make us comprehend (Him as such).

The conclusion arrived at is that the worshipper should meditate on the *Brahman* as the Self of his own self : in this sense it is proper to have the notion, 'I', in relation to Him. Through such meditation, the injunction prohibiting meditation on Him as other than one's self is saved. But since the self is different from the body, the Supreme Self is different from the individual self who forms His body : thus the injunction to meditate on Him as distinct from one's own self is also saved.

Whether the meditation on the *Brahman* as the Self is necessary in the meditation on symbols is investigated in the next two aphorisms, constituting the *Pratikādhikaraṇa* (pp. 463-5) :

4. (The self) should not be (meditated on) in the *pratīka* (or symbol) ; indeed, he is not (that).

5. To view (the symbols) as the *Brahman* is (proper), because He is superior.

It is determined that meditation on the symbol as the *Brahman* does not involve regarding it as the self. The symbol is the object of worship, and the *Brahman* is an attribute of the viewing. The symbols are viewed as the *Brahman* and not *vice versa*, as He is superior to them.

The next *Sūtra*, forming a section by itself, the *Ādityādimatyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 465-6), is concerned with another topic of symbol-worship :

6. In regard to the auxiliary (such as the *udgītha* in the ritual), to view (it) as the sun-god etc. is indeed (proper), because it is appropriate.

The sun-god is superior to the *udgītha*, as he is a deity whose propitiation yields desired fruits. Hence, according to the rule laid down in the previous aphorisms, the *udgītha* etc. should be viewed as the sun etc. in connection with the meditations enjoined in such texts as *Ckhānd. Up.* (I. 3. 1).

Reverting back to the meditation on the Supreme Self, the *Sūtras* now take up the question in what posture it has to be carried out. The theme is discussed in the *Āsīnādhikaraṇa* (pp. 467-9) of five aphorisms :

7. Seated (one should meditate), because (then alone) it (i.e., mental concentration) is possible.

8. Because also of continued contemplation.

9. And it is in need of immovability.

10. Because also it is so declared in the *Smṛiti*.

11. Wherever there is one-pointedness, there (meditation must be practised), because no other particular is specified.

It is determined that one should meditate only when one is seated. Though the injunctions to meditate do not prescribe any posture, it is clear that concentrated meditation is possible only when one is sitting. Distracting effort is required to move or stand, and if one lies down, one tends to get sleepy.

One-pointedness of the mind has necessarily to be attained. The fixed sitting posture is indicated figuratively when the earth, the sky etc. are described as engaged in meditation in *Ckhānd. Up.* (VII. 6. 1). In *B. G.* (VI. 11-12), the sitting posture is unambiguously recommended. As

regards the time and place for meditation, whatever is favourable to one-pointedness is welcome. This is the purport of *Svet. Up.* (II. 10).

That the meditation which is *vidyā* has to be carried out throughout life is declared in the next aphorism, forming the *Āprayāṇādhikaraṇa* (pp. 469-70) :

12. It (i.e., meditation) should be performed until departure from life, because here also scriptural authority is seen.

The authority for this is *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 15. 1). It is thus made clear that the purpose of the *śāstras* is not fulfilled by the practice of meditation once or in only one day.

The main subject of this *pāda*, the effect of *vidyā* on sins, is taken up in the next five sections. The first, *Tadadhigamādhikaraṇa* (pp. 470-3), has only one aphorism :

13. On attaining it, non-attachment and destruction will result to the later and earlier sins respectively, because it is so taught.

The basis for the discussion is the alleged contradiction between a *śāstraic* statement that the effects of *karma* cannot perish except through experience and other scriptural passages. These latter make such statements as that sinful deeds do not taint the man of *vidyā* and that when the Supreme Self is seen all *karman*s perish. It is determined that there is no contradiction. To say that the effects of *karma* are exhausted only through expiation is to confirm the power of *karma* to produce fruits. The other statements establish that *vidyā* can destroy the power of earlier sins to produce fruits and cause obstruction to the power of later sins to produce fruits. (Of course, the later sins are those arising through inadvertence). It is really the displeasure of the Supreme Person which is seen as the effects of *karma*. *Vidyā*, being of the nature of His worship, destroys or obstructs the origination of that displeasure.

The next aphorism, constituting the *Itarādhikaraṇa* (pp. 474-5), deals with the action of *vidyā* on the effects of meritorious deeds :

14. In the case even of (meritorious) deeds which are other (than sinful), there is in the same manner (non-attachment as also destruction) : but there is non-attachment (in the case of deeds helpful to *vidyā*) after death.

Meritorious deeds, like sins, obstruct the fruit of *vidyā* which is salvation. In *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 4. 1) these are included in the term, 'sins'. Nevertheless, such effects of meritorious deeds as food, health etc. are helpful to *vidyā*. An extended application of the reasoning under the previous section makes it clear that there are non-attachment and destruction of later and earlier meritorious deeds also. But so far as those deeds whose effects are helpful to *vidyā* are concerned, they perish only after the death of the man of *vidyā*.

Whether *vidyā* destroys all sins and meritorious *karmas* without exception or only those which have not yet begun to yield their fruits is next taken up in the single aphorism of the *Anārabdhakāryādhikaraṇa* (pp. 476-7) :

15. It is only the two (i.e., sin and merit) which are earlier (than *vidyā*) and which have not begun to produce their fruits (that perish), because they (i.e., the *karmas* which have begun to yield fruits) last till death.

Though all sins and meritorious *karmas* are stated to be destroyed, we must except those which have already begun to yield their fruits. For only through them the man of *vidyā* lives and experiences pain and pleasure. It cannot be said that the body continues to live on, because of impressed tendencies : there is no authority for inferring their existence. Moreover, *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 14. 2) clearly declares that the man of *vidyā* will be blest only after the death of his body, and that till then there will be delay in his realising the fruits of his *vidyā*.



Section X links up with Section VIII. If the effects of the good deeds performed after the commencement of *vidyā* do not get attached to the man of *vidyā*, why should he perform the *Agnihotra* etc. to the end of his life? This question is answered by the three aphorisms of the *Agnihotrādyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 477-80):

16. The *Agnihotra* etc., however, have to be performed solely for producing that effect (i.e., the origination of *vidyā*), because it is so seen declared in the scripture.

17. Other than this (i.e., the *Agnihotra* and such rituals), (there are many good deeds) among the two (i.e., good deeds done before and after the origination of *vidyā*); such is the opinion of some.

18. Indeed (that there is obstruction to the fruit of good deeds is declared in the scriptural text beginning with): "That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation....."

It is held that the *Agnihotra* etc. have to be performed for the sake of *vidyā*. Otherwise, the purity of the mind will be affected, and *vidyā* will suffer. A further objection is now raised. If all the effects of good deeds other than those helpful for *vidyā* are destroyed, what is meant by the scriptural statement that, on his death, his friends take his good deeds? The answer is that the reference is to the many good deeds (done before and after the origination of *vidyā*) whose fruits have not been enjoyed on account of powerful obstruction. That such obstruction is possible is indicated by *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1. 9), which declares that the sacrifice, accompanied by the *udgītha* meditation, is potent enough to secure quick results.

The last Section of this *pāda* is concerned with the time at which the fruit of *vidyā* is attained. The *Itarakṣhapāñādhikaraṇa* (pp. 481-2), in its single aphorism, determines that the man of *vidyā* attains the

*Brahman* after exhausting through experience, the effects of the *karmas* that have begun to yield their fruits :

19. After exhausting the other two (i.e., the good and bad deeds which have begun to yield their fruits) through enjoyment, then he attains the *Brahman*.

The exhaustion of the effects of the deeds may take place in one or more births.

#### CHAPTER IV, PART 2.

The second *pāda* of Chapter IV describes how the self of the man of *vidyā* leaves the body to go to the *Brahman*. It has 20 aphorisms divided into 11 sections. The first four sections, comprising six aphorisms, explain what happens to the senses, the *prāṇa* and the mind at the time of death :

1. Speech (rests) in the mind (at the time of death), because it is so seen and because also there are scriptural statements to that effect.
2. For that very reason, all the senses follow (the sense of speech).
3. That mind (rests) in the *prāṇa*, because of the subsequent passage.
4. It (i.e., the *prāṇa*) (rests) in the lord (of the senses) (i.e., with the individual self), because it (i.e., the *prāṇa*) goes near it and does such other things (at the time of death).
5. In the elements (the *prāṇa* rests), because it is so declared in the scriptures.
6. Not with each element separately (is there any association of the *prāṇa*); indeed, the two (i.e., the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*) show it.

The first section, the *Vāgadhikaraṇa* of two aphorisms (pp. 483-5), investigates the behaviour of the senses at the time of death. According to *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 8. 6), the speech of the dying person rests in the mind. The doubt is raised whether the statement refers to the sense of speech or its function. The mind is not the

material cause of the sense of speech, and how can speech rest there? The answer is that the sense of speech is associated with the mind, but not absorbed into it. The other senses follow the sense of speech, according to *Pr. Up.* (III. 9), and rest in the mind in the same way.

Then, in the *Manodhikaraṇa* (pp. 485-6), comprising *Sūtra* 3, it is pointed out, on the authority of the same text, that the mind, conjoined with the senses, rests in the *prāṇa* at the time of death. The *Chhândogya* statements about the mind consisting of the *anna* (VI. 6. 5), of waters creating the *anna* (VI. 2. 4) and the *prāṇa* consisting of water (VI. 8. 6) merely show that the mind and the *anna* are nourished by the *anna* and water respectively.

In *Sūtra* 4, which forms the *Adhyakshādhikaraṇa* (pp. 487-8), it is determined that the *prāṇa* rests in the individual self, even though the scriptural passage about the sense of speech resting in the *prāṇa* declares that the *prāṇa* rests in the *tejas*. This conclusion is arrived at on the authority of *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 3. 38 and IV. 4. 2). There, all the *prāṇas* are said to go to the individual self and the principal *prāṇa* to follow the self from the body. So the *prāṇa*, conjoined with the self, rests in the *tejas*.

In the next section, the *Bhūtādhikaraṇa* (pp. 488-90), it is explained that the *prāṇa* rests not merely in the *tejas*, but in all the elements. The authority for this is *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 5). It is further explained that the association is not with each element separately, but with all of them together. For creation takes place only after the combination of the elements known as tripartition. In *V.P.* (I. 2. 52-4) the combination of the five elements among one another is taught.

The next seven aphorisms, constituting the *Āstitya-pakramādhikaraṇa* (pp. 490-502), take up the question  
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whether the departure of the self takes place in the same way in the case of one with *vidyā* and of one without *vidyā* :

7. It (i.e., the mode of departure of the soul from the body) is the same (in the case of both the men of *vidyā* and others) up to and before the commencement of the path : the immortality (of the man of *vidyā*) (is obtained) indeed, without burning (the connection with the body).

8. That (immortality of the man of *vidyā*) (must be understood as stated above), because up to the attainment of the *Brahman*, *samsara* (or connection with the body) is taught to exist.

9. Because also the subtle (body) (accompanies the departing self), for it is so known through authoritative means of knowledge.

10. For this reason, not through the destruction (of the body) (does he attain this immortality).

11. Because also this (i.e., continued connection with the subtle body) is appropriate, there is heat (in some part of the body of the dying man of *vidyā*).

12. If it be said that it (i.e., the departure of the self from the body of the man of *vidyā*) is negated in the scriptures, it is not so ; because (the non-separation of the *prāṇas*) from the embodied self (is alone stated in the context); indeed, this is clear, according to some.

13. It is said by the *Smṛiti* also.

This section arrives at the conclusion that the mode of departure of the self of a dying man is the same, whether he has *vidyā* or not, up to the time of its entry into the blood-vessels. Then, in the case of the man of *vidyā*, the self departs from the body through the hundred and first blood-vessel at the head ; in other cases, the self departs through other blood-vessels. It is not correct to say that the self of the man of *vidyā* does not depart from the body and that he enjoys immortality even in this world. The scriptural declaration to this effect (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 7*) refers to the effect of the *vidyā* on earlier and later sins and the experience of the *Brahman* at the time of meditation.

This conclusion is fortified by (i) scriptural statements which declare that, until the attainment of the *Brahman*, the self is connected with a worldly embodiment, and (ii) other texts which indicate the existence of a subtle body for the self even on the path of gods leading to the Highest Heaven. Moreover, at the time of death, the body ceases to have uniform warmth throughout, and heat is discerned only in some part. This shows that the subtle body, which has drawn into itself all the heat, is present there.

Even at this stage, a further objection is raised to the effect that the scriptural context in *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4) has to be understood as referring to the man without *vidyā* first and the man with *vidyā* afterwards. Of the latter it is claimed that the statement is made that his *prāṇas* do not depart at the time of death and that, being the *Brahman*, he attains the *Brahman*. Earlier in the *Upanishad*, it is alleged that Ārtabhāga questions Yājñavalkya about *prāṇas* of the man of *vidyā* and that he is told that they are absorbed here. The answer to this objection is as follows: (i) The departure of the *prāṇas* is denied, not from the body, but from the individual self. This is made clear by the Mādhyandina recension of the text. (ii) Ārtabhāga's query relates to one without *vidyā*: his *prāṇas* embrace the self, along with the subtle elements, and go along with it. The departure of the self with *vidyā* from the body through the blood-vessel in the head is confirmed by *Yājñavalkya Smṛiti* (III. 167).

The next two aphorisms, divided into two sections, the *Parasampattyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 500-1) and *Avibhāgādhikaraṇa* (501-2), deal with the momentary resting of the individual self in the Supreme Self at the time of death:

14. Those (elements) (are absorbed) into the Supreme Being, and, indeed, the scripture says so.

15. There is non-differentiation (when the individual self rests in the Supreme Self at the time of death), because there are scriptural statements to that effect.

A further stage in the progress of the departing self is his resting for a moment, along with the senses, the *prāṇa* and the subtle elements, in the Supreme Self. This is specifically declared in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 8. 6). This resting does not mean absorption into the cause, but only association in such a way that there cannot be separate dealing with those associated. The word, 'resting', is used in the same sense throughout the passage.

The next two aphorisms of this *pāda*, each forming a section, deal with the later distinctive progress of the departing self of the man of *vidyā* :

16. Through the power of *vidyā* and through the meditation on the path (of the departing self), which is its requisite, he is blessed by Him who is within the heart ; his abode has its edges made radiant ; and having its doors lighted up by Him, he starts out through the blood-vessel above the hundredth.

17. He certainly follows the rays (of the sun).

The man with *vidyā* has his heart lighted up at the time of death : this light enables the self to see the blood-vessel leading to the head and then travel along it. So much is determined in the *Tadokodhikaraṇa* (pp. 502-4). The *Raśmyanusārādhikaraṇa* (pp. 504-6) states that the departing self then goes up along the sun's rays, according to *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 6. 5). This applies even to deaths at night : for at night, the presence of the rays of the sun is felt through heat. Moreover, earlier in the passage, it is stated that the rays are connected with blood-vessels.

Granting that the self with *vidyā* can ascend along the rays of the sun even at night, does he do so ? This question is taken up in *Sūtra* 18 constituting Section X, the *Nisādhikaraṇa* (pp. 506-7) :

18. If it be said that it (i.e., the attainment of the *Brahman*) cannot be (for one who dies) at night, it is not so ; because contact (with *karmas*) lasts (only) up to the end of the body ; the scripture also declares it so.

The objection is based on a *sāstraic* statement about auspicious and inauspicious times of dying, night being included among the latter. The reply is that *vidyā* having destroyed the earlier sins and prevented the later sins from causing any taint, its devotee has merely to exhaust the *karmas* which have begun to yield their fruits. On death, this is completed. There is no further cause for bondage, and the man of *vidyā* must then attain salvation. Inauspicious times of dying are for those without *vidyā*.

Among the inauspicious times of dying is the southern course of the sun. This is dealt with in the final section of this *pāda*, the *Dakṣiṇāyaṇādhikaraṇa* (pp. 507-10) of two aphorisms :

19. For that very reason (there is attainment of the *Brahman* for the man of *vidyā* who dies) even during the southern course of the sun.

20. These two (paths) are also taught in the *Smṛiti* in relation to the *yogins* as things to be remembered (in their meditations).

The reasoning in the previous section applies here also. But there is an additional doubt raised by (i) a statement in *M. Nār.* (XXV. 1) to the effect that those who die during the southern course of the sun reach the moon and (ii) Bhīṣma and others waiting for the northern course of the sun so that they may die at an auspicious time. Though the selves reaching the moon are said generally to return to the earth, still in *M. Nār.* we have a supplementary passage, which makes it clear that the self of the man of *vidyā*, leaving the ultimate body during the southern course of the sun and reaching the moon, attains the *Brahman*. A rest on the moon differentiates such a self from one which departs from the body during the northern course of the sun. Bhīṣma waited for the winter solstice only to propagate the teaching about the auspicious times of dying. *B.G.* VIII. (23-6) which seem to refer to auspicious and inauspicious times of dying really describe the paths of the gods and the manes through

mentioning the presiding deities at various stages on them.

#### CHAPTER IV, PART 3.

The path of the self with *vidyā*, after leaving the ultimate body, is determined in the third *pāda* of 15 aphorisms divided into 5 Sections. The first four, comprising five aphorisms, deal with various details about the path :

1. Through the path beginning with light (the released self goes to the *Brahman*), because it is well-known to be so (in the scriptures).
2. *Vāyu* (has to come) after the year, because of general and particular terms (to show it).
3. After lightning, *Varuṇa* (has to be placed), because there is (such) a connection (between the two).
4. They (i.e., light etc.) are those who lead (the man of *vidyā* to the *Brahman*) because of their characterisation (given in the context showing them to be such).
5. Afterwards (i.e., after the lightning) it is by the person of lightning alone (that those going to the *Brahman* are led), because there are scriptural statements to that effect.

The path of the gods by which the self with *vidyā* travels to the *Brahman* is described differently in different passages of the scriptures. In *Chhānd. Up.* (IV. 15) the self is said to attain in order light, day, the bright fortnight, the months of the northern course of the sun, the year, the sun, the moon, lightning, the superhuman person and the *Brahman*. In *Kaush. Up.* (I. 3.) the stages are the worlds of Agni, *Vāyu*, *Varuṇa*, the sun, Indra, Prajāpati and the *Brahman*. We have in *Bṛih. Up.* (VI. 2) the same order as in the above-mentioned *Chhāndogya* text, except for the omission of the year and the moon and the introduction of the world of gods in the place of the former of these two. The same *Upanishad* in V. 10 has *Vāyu*, the sun, the moon etc.



The *Archirādigatyadhikaraṇa* (pp. 511-3) decides that these paths are the same. The path of the gods is well-known in the scriptures, and it is described with more or less completeness in different passages.

The next section, *Vāyuvadhikaraṇa* (pp. 514-6), determines the position of Vāyu as coming after the year on the path. Vāyu is mentioned before the sun in *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 10) and after Agni (or light) and before Varuṇa and the sun in *Kaush. Up.* (I. 3). The world of the gods is mentioned between the months and the sun in *Bṛih. Up.* (VI. 2). But the year mentioned in *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 10) has obviously to come after the months. Thus the world of the gods and Vāyu are arrived at between the year and the sun. It is determined that Vāyu is a particular and the world of the gods a general term to describe the same thing. There is a scriptural statement describing Vāyu as the mansions of the gods.

The *Varuṇādhikaraṇa* (pp. 517-9), comprising *Sūtra* 3, defines the position of Varuṇa. He is mentioned in *Kaush. Up.* (I. 3) after Vāyu and before the sun, Indra and Prajāpati. On the principle that an order based on meaning has greater force than one relying on a series of connected sentences, it is determined that Varuṇa, being the god of waters, has to be placed after lightning. After him, the positions of Indra and Prajāpati have to be fixed.

The succeeding *Ativāhikādhikaraṇa* (pp. 519-21) of two aphorisms discusses whether the light, day, bright fortnight etc., which are said to characterise in some sense the path of the gods, are sign-posts on the road, places of enjoyment or escorting deities. It is determined that they are escorting deities on the strength of the statement about the superhuman person leading the released self to the *Brahman*. What is true of him applies also to the others before him. (By light etc. are meant the deities presiding over them) Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati must be under-

stood to help him in his escorting duties : they have no independent roles to play.

The fifth—and last—section, *Kāryādhikaraṇa* (pp. 521-31), has the following ten aphorisms :

6. Bādari is of opinion that (he who is led by the escorting gods is he who worships) the effect (i.e., Hiraṇyagarbha who is produced by the *Brahman*), because movement on the part of him (i.e., such a worshipper) is appropriate.

7. Because also it (i.e., the place of attainment) is particularised.

8. Because of nearness, however, that description is given.

9. After the destruction of the effect (i.e., the world of *Brahmā*), along with its ruler it is stated he goes beyond,

10. Because also the *Smṛiti* says so.

11. (Only those who worship) the Supreme (*Brahman*) (are led by the group of gods), (according to) Jaimini, because it (i.e., the word, '*Brahman*' signifying the goal to which the released self is led) is used in its primary significance.

12. The scripture also shows it.

13. There is also no intention to attain the effect.

14. It (i.e., the group of escorting gods) conveys those who are not dependent on symbols, so says Bādarāyaṇa, because there is error in both the cases ; and there is also the maxim of accordant worship.

15. And it (i.e., the scripture) shows the distinction.

Having described the path of the liberated self and the escorting gods, the *Sūtras* proceed to answer the question: who are the travellers along the path ? Bādari urges that only those who worship Hiraṇyagarbha who is a produced effect move along the path. His reasons are : (i) To attain the all-pervading *Brahman* needs no movement on the part of the attainer : the effect of *vidyā* is merely the cessation of the ignorance about the *Brahman* who is eternally attained. (ii) In *Bṛih. Up.* (VI. 2.), the superhuman person is said to lead the selves on the path to the worlds of the *Brahman*. This can refer only to Hiraṇyagarbha who

lives in particular worlds. Moreover, in *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 14), one moving along the path is said to attain the mansion which is the court of Prajāpati (or Hiranyagarbha). (iv) Hiranyagarbha is called the *Brahman* because he is near the *Brahman* and is His first-born. (v) It is appropriate to declare that those who travel on the path do not return to *samsāra*, because when the world of Hiranyagarbha perishes in the dissolution of the universe, he and the selves in his world are all liberated, according to *Mund. Up.* (III. 2. 6). A *purāṇic* statement also is to the same effect.

Jaimini contends that only those who worship the *Brahman* get to this path. His arguments are : (i) When the scriptures say that the selves on the path are led to the *Brahman*, we have to understand the word in its primary sense to mean the Supreme Self. There is no reason to force us to accept a secondary significance. (ii) Just as the production of *vidyā* is dependent on the discharge of caste-duties, purity etc., its fulfilment requires movement towards a particular place. (iii) The view that the self with *vidyā* does not leave the body on death has already been rebutted in IV. 2. 12. (iv) 'The worlds of the *Brahman*' means 'the *Brahman* who is the world'. (The plural number has the force of the singular.) (v) Scriptural texts avow the attainment of the *Brahman* by the self leaving by the blood-vessel in the head. (vi) 'The mansion which is the court of Prajāpati' means 'the *Brahman*', in view of supplementary passage which declares release from ignorance and describes a meditation as the self of all beings.

Bādarāyaṇa finds fault with the views of both Bādari and Jaimini. Setting forth the correct conclusion, he declares that two types of selves travel on the path of the gods—those who have meditated on the *Brahman* having their own selves as His attributes and those who have meditated, in the manner taught in the *Pañchāgni-vidyā*, on their own selves as having the *Brahman* for their Self.

The experience of the *Brahman* in the case of each of these types is different, on account of the principle of results according to worship. But those who do not worship the *Brahman* or pursue the *Pañchāgni-vidyā*, but worship symbols do not get to the path of the gods: they enjoy particular fruits of a limited duration.

#### CHAPTER IV, PART 4

The greatness and glory of the released selves are described in the last part of Chapter IV in 22 aphorisms divided into 6 Sections. The first of these, the *Sampād-yāvirbhāvādihikaraṇa* (pp. 530-7) of three aphorisms, discusses the question whether the released self becomes manifest in his own nature, or becomes joined to a divine form:

1. After attaining (the *Brahman*), he (i.e., the individual self) becomes manifest (in his own true nature) because of the expression, "in one's own".
2. It is the released soul that is dealt with, because of (that being) the topic enunciated (here).
3. It is the self (in its essential nature) that is dealt with, because the context relates to it.

A scriptural text about the released self, *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 12. 3), declares that he rises up from the body, attains the Supreme Light and appears in his own form. This leads to the question: does the self get joined to a new and desirable form, or does he become manifest in his own essential nature? The former view is urged for the following reasons: (i) One's own nature is not a desirable goal of attainment, as may be seen from its being attained in deep sleep. (ii) The condition of final release represents not mere freedom from sorrow, but the gain of infinite bliss. (iii) It cannot be said that the bliss of the self is concealed in bondage and that it becomes manifest in final release. For knowledge is the essential nature of the self, and its concealment is its destruction. (iv) Bliss cannot be identified with knowledge or luminousness.

These arguments are refuted thus : (i) The scriptural text specifies manifestation in the self's own form. (ii) Though the essential nature is eternally manifest, it is concealed by the ignorance consisting of *karma*, and the removal of this ignorance leads to the manifestation of the essential nature. This is proved by the context in *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 7-12), where the essential nature of the self is taught, as freed from the conditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep and from the body produced by *karman*. Hence final release is the manifestation of the self in his own true nature. (iii) The same context teaches that the qualities of being free from sin etc. are natural to the self, that in *samsāra* these qualities are veiled by ignorance and that, after he attains the Supreme Light, his essential nature becomes manifest. In *Vishnudharma* (IV. 55-7), this is explained by the simile of a gem being cleaned of its impurities and of underground water becoming manifest on digging. The manifestation of the essential nature of the self means an expansion of his knowledge and bliss, contracted by *karma*.

Whether the released self experiences his own self as distinct from the Supreme Self or as His mode without separation from Him is examined in *Sū. 4* forming the *Avibhāgenadrishtatvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 538-40) :

4. Without separation from Him (the released soul enjoys the *Brahman*), because it is so seen declared in the scriptures.

It is true that there are texts which describe the released self as associated with the Supreme Self or as having similarity with Him or as having attributes similar to His. But they do not imply that the released self experiences himself as distinct from the *Brahman*. The texts which declare association, similarity, equality, identity etc. with Him have to be understood on the basis of the self being the mode and the *Brahman* being the Possessor of the mode. This is made out from the description of the Self as the Internal Controller.

An investigation about the the qualities which become manifest in the released self is conducted in Section III, the *Brāhmādhikaraṇa* (pp. 540-5) of three aphorisms :

5. Jaimini says that with that which pertains to the *Brahman* (i.e., His qualities) (the released self becomes manifest in his essential nature), because of statements etc. (in the scripture) to that effect.

6. Auḍulomi says that it is (revealed) as mere intelligence, because it consists of that.

7. Even in this manner, there is no contradiction, because of the existence of the earlier (mentioned qualities), on account of declarations (to that effect); so says Bādarāyaṇa.

The texts about the essential nature of the self describe it as consisting either of knowledge or of freedom from sin etc.

Jaimini believes in the released self having the qualities of being devoid of sin etc. These have been attributed to the *Brahman* as *Daharākāśa* in *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 1); then the self in its essential nature is said to be characterised by them in VIII. 7. Activities dependent on some of these qualities are ascribed to the released self in VIII. 12—such as eating, playing etc. Thus his essential nature cannot consist of mere knowledge. But this is precisely what Auḍulomi asserts. In *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 4. 12 and IV. 5. 13) we have a comparison of the self with a mass of salt and specific statements that he is in the form only of a mass of intelligence. The other qualities referred to by Jaimini mean only freedom from the effects of ignorance such as modifications, pleasure and pain.

Bādarāyaṇa takes the view that the essential nature of the self is characterised by intelligence as well as freedom from sin etc. The exclusive emphasis in the statement that the self is in the form *only* of a mass of intelligence refers to the fact that he is uniformly of the nature of intelligence even as a lump of salt is uniformly a mass of saltytaste. The whole of the self is distinct from non-intelligence.

Among the qualities of the self mentioned in *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 7) is that of willing the truth. Its exact scope is discussed in Section IV, the *San̥kalpādhikaraṇa* (pp. 545-7) of two aphorisms :

8. Solely through his willing (the truth) (the released self gets what he wants), because of scriptural statements to that effect.

9. For that very reason, he has none else as (his) lord.

Among the activities of the released self mentioned by a scriptural text, *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 12. 3), are eating, playing and enjoyment with vehicles or in the company of women or of relatives. Unlike as in the case of kings and others who successfully realise their wishes through other efforts besides willing, and as in the case of the Supreme Self Himself whose wishes come true through mere willing, the released self gets what he wants solely through the exercise of his will. This is made out from the scriptural text, which declares this in an exclusive proposition whose scope is not restricted by any other statement elsewhere. For this reason, the released self has none else (other than the Supreme Self) for his ruler : his wishes are not subject to prohibition and his will to hindrances.

Whether or not the released self has a body and the senses is discussed in the next section, the *Abhāvādhikaraṇa* (pp. 547-54) of seven aphorisms :

10. There is non-existence (of the body and the senses in regard to the released soul) (according to) Bādari; indeed, the scriptures say so.

11. There is existence (of the body and the senses in regard to the released soul) (according to) Jaimini, because of the declaration by the scripture of manifoldness (in regard to him).

12. Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion that) through that, he (i.e., the released self) is of both kinds, as is the case with the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice.

13. In the absence of the body (created by himself), it (i.e., enjoyment for the released self) appropriately results, as is the case in the condition of dreams.

14. When there is (creation of the body etc. by him), it (i.e., enjoyment for the released self) resembles the waking state.

15. The pervasion (of many bodies by the released self) is like that of a lamp; indeed, it (i.e., the scripture) shows it to be so.

16. It (i.e., the *Bṛih. Up.* text about the ignorance of the self when embraced by the Omniscient Lord) has in view either of the two, namely, dreamless sleep and death; indeed, it is so revealed in the scripture.

Bādari argues that the released self cannot have a body, on the authority of the scriptural text—*Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 12. 1)—which reveals that the experience of pleasure and pain can be transcended only when one ceases to have a body. Moreover, the attainment of final release is declared immediately afterwards to come to pass after the self leaves the body. Jaimini, on the other hand, relies on *Chhānd. Up.* (VII. 26. 2) to urge that the self does have one or more bodies, as desired, in the state of final release.

Bādarāyaṇa reconciles the two points of view by saying that both are true. The released self can have one body or more if he so wills: he need not have any body also, when he desires so. In the latter case, his experiences will be like those of a bound self in dreams: his enjoyments will be experienced with the help of a body and other things created by the Supreme Self (who does not want him to be without enjoyments even when he is indifferent). Of course, when he has a body etc. created by himself, his enjoyments will be like those of a bound self in the waking state.

Two objections are then answered. The released self can animate more than one body on account of his infinitely expanded attributive intelligence, just as a light can illumine a wide area. The *Bṛih. Up.* text (IV. 3. 1), which attributes ignorance to the self embraced by the Omniscient Self, refers to the states of deep sleep and



death when there is close association of the self with the Lord without the former having omniscience. In the state of final release, the self is not merely in intimate union with the Lord, but is also possessed of omniscience.

Whether the released self's quality of willing the truth includes within its scope the creation, sustentation and dissolution of the universe forms the theme of Section VI—the last in the *Ved. Sū. Known as the Jagadvyāpāravarjā-dhikaraṇa* (pp. 554-64), it has the following six aphorisms :

17. Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc. of) the world (the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the Lord), because of (the Lord being) the topic in the contexts (wherein the above activity is referred to) and because also of the remoteness (of the released souls therefrom).

18. If it be said there is scriptural teaching with regard to it, it is not so, because of the statement being about those (enjoyments) which are in the spheres of those (deities) who hold offices.

19. It (viz., the *Brahman*) does not at all exist subject to modification. Accordingly, the scripture speaks of the existence (of the released self in It).

20. And both the *śruti* and the *smṛiti* show it (i.e., the activity relating to the world) to be thus (i.e., as stated above).

21. Because the indicia relate merely to equality of enjoyment (for the released self with the *Brahman*).

22. There is no return because the scriptures say so : there is no return because the scriptures say so.

The scriptural texts which speak of the released self having the faculty of willing the truth and attaining the highest degree of equality with the *Brahman* cannot be taken to indicate that the creation, sustentation and dissolution of the world are included in the power and glory of the released self. For the passages in the scripture which deal with the control of the universe vest it only in the Supreme Self and do not mention the released self.

The statements about the released self being free to move about in all the worlds, enjoying whatever things he likes in them etc. mean that he enjoys as he likes all the enjoyments in the worlds which are ruled by the deities like Hiraṇyagarbha who hold offices and which are the manifestations of the glories of the *Brahman*. This does not mean that his enjoyments become finite : in experiencing the enjoyments in these worlds, he experiences the infinite and immovable *Brahman* with the manifestations of His glory. Even the eternal bliss of the released self is due to the eternal willing of the Lord. The highest degree of equality with the *Brahman* which the released self acquires is only in regard to the bliss which consists of the experience of the *Brahman* as He is in reality. The inferior status of the released self relative to the Lord does not mean that he can fall into bondage once again : for there is no *karma* influencing him, he does not desire the fall and the Lord who has striven hard to redeem him will never send him back to this world.

Rāmānuja concludes his *Sribhāṣya* by claiming that he has reconciled all the apparently contradictory scriptural texts, that logic has supported him and that his initial thesis has been upheld against all objections. This thesis is summed up as the attainment of the Supreme Person, who has the selves and non-intelligent things as His body, and who is possessed of auspicious attributes and hostile to all evil, through loving meditation and the discharge of one's duties so as to evoke His grace.

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श्रीः  
श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः  
**SRI-BHASHYA**

CHAPTER II

PART II

**ADHIKARANA I**

RACHANĀNUPATTYADHIKARANA

रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् प्रवृत्तेश्च

**Sūtra 1.** *Rachanānupatteścha nānumānam  
pravṛtiteścha* (175)

The inferred principle (i.e., the *pradbhāna*) is not (the cause of the world) because of the impossibility of the fashioning (of the world by the *pradbhāna* without being presided over by the *Brahman*), and (because of another reason and) because also of the activity of the *pradbhāna* (when presided over by the *Brahman*). 859

It has been stated (in Chapter I of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*) that the Supreme *Brahman* is the cause of the birth etc. of the world. The objections raised thereagainst by others have been refuted (in II. i). Now, for the protection of our views, the views of those who are opposed to us are

859. This *Sūtra* is interpreted thus in the *Sribhashya* and the *Vedānta-sara*. But the *Vedānta-dīpa* differs slightly, explaining: "because also of the impossibility

of the activity, in the form of the first impulse towards the fashioning of the varied world, when not presided over by the *Brahman*."

demolished (in II. ii). Otherwise, some little deficiency of faith in the views of the *Vedas* may even arise in the minds of a few dull persons who do not know of the views of these others being rooted in fallacious reasonings, so as to cause suspicion about the authoritativeness of the views of the *Vedas*. Therefore, the next (or second) quarter (of this Chapter) sets out to rebut the views of opponents.

There, first, the views of Kapila are refuted, because there is considerable room for the delusion that these are to be respected as containing the correct point of view, on account of their acceptance of principles<sup>860</sup> like finding the effect existent in the cause, which are allowed by the *Vedas*. By means of the aphorisms,—“Because the activity imported by the root *iksh* (to see, i.e., to think) is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not revealed solely by the scripture (viz., the *pradhāna*) is not (the *Sat* or Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the world)” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 5) and others,—what was stated was merely that the passages of the *Vedas* have a different import (from that claimed by the Sāṅkhyas). Here, indeed, what is being done is the refutation of the essence of that point of view. Therefore, there need be no suspicion of tautology.

Indeed, the settled position of the system adopted by the Sāṅkhyas is as follows. The epitome of the entities (accepted by the Sāṅkhyas is thus given): “The primordial matter is no product of modification; those (principles) which are (both) producers and products are seven, commencing with the principle known as the *mahat*; mere modifications (or products) are sixteen only; the *puruṣa* (i.e., the individual soul) is neither the unmodified (matter) nor its modification.” (*S. Kār.* 3).<sup>861</sup>

860. Another point of agreement between the Sāṅkhya and the *Vedānta* is the division of the material universe into 24 principles.

861. In this verse, Rāmānuja quotes: *shodaśaścha vikarāḥ*. The original has *tu* in the place of *cha*.

The primordial matter is known to be the substances, 'goodness', 'passion' and 'darkness' (or *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*); which respectively possess the nature of pleasure, pain and ignorance; the effects of which are respectively lightness and luminosity, motion and steadiness, heaviness and stupefaction; which are far beyond the reach of sensory organs; which are discriminated solely by the description given of their effects; which are each neither less nor more (than any other in proportion); and which have attained the condition of equilibrium. And this matter, which is the same as the condition of equilibrium of 'goodness', 'passion' and 'darkness', is one, and is itself non-intelligent; it is intended to help the enjoyment of final release of many intelligent souls. It is eternal, is all-pervasive, is eternally subject to modifications and is itself no modification of anything else. On the other hand, it is itself the supreme cause.

Its modifications, which commence with the principle, *mahat*, and which are also the root-principles of other modifications, are seven in number, viz., the *mahat*, the principle of egoity, and the rudimentary subtle conditions of sound, touch, form and colour, taste and smell. Of these, the principle of egoity is of three kinds, *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*, which arise in order out of the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Of these, the *vaikārika*, which is born out of (predominant) *sattva*, consists of the organs of sense etc.; the *bhūtādi* born out of (predominant) *tamas* is the cause of the subtle rudiments forming the causes of the great elements (of fire etc.); the *taijasa*, however, born out of *rajas*, is auxiliary to the two (former). The five great elements beginning with the spatial ether, the five organs of knowledge beginning with the ears, the five organs of activity beginning with speech, and the mind—these sixteen are mere modifications. 862

862. For the 25 principles, fold division of the *ahankara* is described in *S. Kar.* (25).  
see Note 169, Vol. I. The three-

On the other hand, the *purusha* (or the individual soul) being incapable of change, is not the root-principle of anything, nor is it a modification of anything; for which reason, it is destitute of attributes (such as knowership), is encased solely in intelligence, is devoid of action, is all-pervading and is different in different bodies. Being incapable of change, and being also devoid of action, it does not at all possess the quality of being the agent of activity as well as the quality of being the enjoyer.

Although the truth (about things) is in this wise, fools, merely on account of the proximity of the *prakṛiti* and the *purusha*, ascribe the intelligence of the *purusha* to the *prakṛiti*; and they also ascribe to the *purusha* the quality of the agent which belongs to the *prakṛiti*, in the same way in which (owing to proximity) they ascribe the red colour of the China-rose to the crystal (near it). Then they think—‘I am the agent,’ and ‘I am the enjoyer’. Thus, enjoyment is the result of ignorance, while the final freedom is the result of the knowledge of truth.

This above-mentioned (theory) they prove by means of perception, inference and scripture. Among them, in relation to the objects established by perception, there is not much scope for controversy (between the Sāṅkhya and the *Vedānta*). That the scripture is based upon the knowledge of omniscient persons like Kapila—this (view) also has been mostly thrown into the shade in the first *kāṇḍa* (i.e., the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*), while dealing with the characteristics of the several criteria of truth. That logical process of inference which says that the *pradhāna* mentioned above is alone the cause of the world,—this very view is invalidated here, as by invalidating it the whole of the views held by them (the Sāṅkhyas) becomes of itself invalidated.<sup>863</sup>

863. Perception, inference and revealed scripture are claimed to support the Sāṅkhya speculations. Ramanuja says that he has not much to quarrel

with in the things proved by perception according to them. For instance, both he and the Sāṅkhyas see the cause in the effect. Even here however

And they maintain as follows : It has necessarily to be accepted that the whole world has a single basis. If the production of effects is admitted to proceed from more sources than one, there will be a *regressus in infinitum*, so far as the cause is concerned. Indeed, threads and other constituents (of the cloth), being mutually joined together on all their six sides which form parts of themselves, give birth to the constituted product (i.e., the cloth); and those threads also are produced by means of their own constituents which are similar in nature (to the above-mentioned constituents of the cloth); and these (constituents of the threads) are also produced by their own constituents similar to the foregoing ones. Thus, it will have to be accepted that it is only when the infinitesimal atoms are joined together on their own six sides that they bring their products into existence; otherwise, extension will be impossible.<sup>864</sup> The infinitesimal atoms, also being wholes made up of parts, are similarly produced by their own constituent parts, which also are produced by their own parts.

Thus nowhere is the cause definitely determined to abide. Therefore, for the purpose of definitely determining the cause, a single substance, which has the power of undergoing varied and wonderful modifications, which itself remains without losing its essential nature (for the most part, after a part has undergone modifications); which is the abode of the *mahat* and other endless conditions—(such a substance) has to be accepted as the cause.

And this cause, which is of the nature of equilibrium among the three qualities (i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), is the *pradhāna*, to arrive at which fiction, they (the

there are some points of difference. Then, to the Sāṅkhyas, the teachings of Kapila alone constitute revealed scripture: but the *Pūrva-Mīmamsa* has correctly established what the *śruti* is. Thus the Sāṅkhya

theory rests now on inference. If their logic is refuted, their theory has nothing to rest upon.

864. This is a theory of the Vaiseshikas, which is discussed at some length in the next *adhikaraṇa*.

Sāṅkhyas) assign the following reasons. "Undifferentiated matter (or the *pradhāna*) is the cause of the totality of forms in the universe because (i) the differentiated things are of limited magnitude, (ii) there is similarity, (iii) its activity proceeds out of its power, and (iv) there is difference as well as non-difference between cause and effect." (S. Kār. 15-6).

The meaning is this. All the forms constitute the totality of forms, which is the whole universe having varied arrangements and being made up of bodies, worlds etc.; and the universe which, owing to its possessing varied arrangements, forms the effect, has an undifferentiated cause similar in nature to it. Why? Because of (its having) the nature of the effect. Indeed, every effect is seen to be differentiated from its particular cause, which has the same nature as it; it is also seen to be undifferentiated in it (in the state of dissolution). For instance, pots, coronets and other effects are differentiated (respectively) from clay, gold and other causes which have the same nature with them. They (i.e., the forms) are also undifferentiated in the latter. Therefore, the world which consists of all forms has its origin in the *pradhāna* which has the same nature with it; and it is also absorbed into it (i.e., the *pradhāna*). Thus the world has the *pradhāna* alone for its cause.

The *pradhāna*, which is the same as the condition of equipoise among the three qualities, is the cause which has the same nature with the world, because the world consists of pleasure, pain and ignorance, which are respectively due to an abundance of 'goodness', of 'passion' and of 'darkness'. For instance, the cause of the pot, which is made up of clay, is nothing other than the substance of clay.

That same (*pradhāna*), indeed, possesses the power of inducing the activity known as the production of that (world), because it is so seen.



That causality belongs only to the undifferentiated (*pradhāna*), which is of the nature of the condition of equipoise among the three qualities (of 'goodness', 'passion' and 'darkness') and which is unlimited either by space or time—this is made out by the fact of the differentiated entities, which consist of the *mahat*, the *ahankāra*, the subtle rudimentary conditions of elements etc., being limited in nature. The principles known as the *mahat* etc., being, like pots, limited in size, are not capable of producing the whole universe.<sup>865</sup>

Therefore, it is definitely determined that the world consisting of the three qualities has for its sole cause the *pradhāna* which is of the nature of the condition of equipoise among the three qualities.

To this, the following answer is given: "The inferred principle (i.e., the *pradhāna*) is not (the cause of the world), because of the impossibility of the fashioning (of the world by the *pradhāna* without being presided over by the *Brahman*) and (because of another reason and) because also of the activity (of the *pradhāna* when presided over by the *Brahman*)" (*Ved. Sū. II. 2. 1.*).

The inferred principle is that which is arrived at by the logical process of inference.<sup>866</sup> The *pradhāna*, upheld by you (as the inferred cause of the world) is not capable of giving birth to the wonderful creation of the world; because, while being itself unintelligent, it not presided over by an intelligent knower of its nature. Whatever is thus (non-intelligent and not presided over by an intelligent being)—that is (of itself) so (i.e., incapable of producing things); as for instance, mere wood etc., (are of no help)

865. The four reasons mentioned in the *karikas* are explained by Rāmañuja in the following order: (iv), (ii), (iii), (i).

866. The steps of the Sāṅkhya inference are thus outlined in

the S.P.: The world is an effect, because of its variety of arrangements, like a chariot. Being an effect, the world has for its cause a thing similar to it. For whatever is an effect is seen to have a cause similar to it, as is the case with pots etc.

in the construction of palaces, chariots, etc. It is seen that when they are not presided over by one who knows them, wood etc., which are non-intelligent, are incapable of producing effects. It is also seen that, when they, (i.e., wood etc.), are presided over by one who knows them, the activity relating to the production of effects begins. Thus what is maintained here (under this aphorism) amounts to this, that the *pradhāna*, when not presided over by an intelligent being, is not the cause.

By means of the (first) word, 'and' it is given as an additional (and contrary) reason that the invariable concomitance (of the causes, the *sattva* and other qualities, with the effect, the world) is not absolute. Indeed, the invariably associated (causality of the *sattva* and other qualities) is found too narrow to extend to the causalities relating to whiteness, oxness etc.<sup>867</sup> It should not, however, be urged that whiteness and other attributes, though invariably associated (with the effects), may not possess causality, but that gold and other substances, which are invariably associated with the effects (of coronets etc.), are certainly invariably associated with causality; and that (similarly) the *sattva* and other substances also, being invariably associated with the effect (of the world), are all invariably associated with causality. (It cannot be so) because the *sattva* and other things are all attributes of substances, but they are not the essence of substances. Indeed, the *sattva* etc., while they form the causes of lightness and luminosity, which exist in the earth etc., certainly constitute the particular characteristics of those substances. They are not, however, realised as invariably associated with effects as being substances like clay, gold etc. Moreover, the *sattva* and others are all well known to be purely attributes.<sup>868</sup>

867. When whiteness is a quality of the cause, it may be found as a quality in the effect also. But it cannot form the cause. Oxness is a particular configuration, and cannot be a cause.

868. The argument runs thus: the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, though present in the world, are not its causes. Like whiteness. They are present not as substances, but as qualities, as lightness etc., which are their effects.

What has also been stated above to the effect that, in order definitely to determine the cause, the world should have a single cause—that also is inappropriate, because the *sattva* etc., are more than one in number. For this very reason, no definite determinations can result in regard to the cause. Your view is that the *sattva* and others in a condition of equipoise are themselves the *pradhāna*. Therefore, inasmuch as the causes are many, the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum* (deduced by you) remains indeed in that same condition (which you pointed out, i.e., unrebutted). Moreover, the definite determination in regard to those qualities (as causes) does not result on account of their being (as claimed by you) unlimited in nature. Indeed, if they are unlimited in nature, all the three severally acquire the power of universal pervasion, and the condition of (one) being less or more (than another) cannot exist in consequence; the condition of inequality does not result (therefrom). Hence there can possibly be no production of any effect. Consequently, for the very purpose of producing effects, a limited nature has to be accepted in relation to the *sattva* and others.<sup>869</sup>

In such cases as those of the chariot etc., it is clearly seen that they are (when under construction) presided over by intelligent beings. But all other cases than these are also the subjects of the same predicate (i.e., are also presided over by intelligent beings). So says (the *Sūtrakāra* here).

### पयोम्बुवचचेत्तत्रापि

**Sūtra 2.** *Payo'mbuvachchettatrāpi* (176)

869. The arguments advanced in pages 5 and 7 are here refuted. From Ramanuja's reasoning so far, the following counter-inference is suggested. Being an effect, the world cannot have for its cause a non-intelligent thing not presided over by

the *Brahman*. Whatever is an effect cannot have for its material cause a non-intelligent thing not presided over by its knower, as seen in the case of pots etc. Whatever is not so cannot be an effect.

If it be said that it (i.e., the transformation of the *pradhāna*) is like that of milk and water (which are respectively converted into curds and the juices of varied plants without the help of intelligent beings), it is replied that in those cases also (it is impossible to have creative activity without the superintendence of the *Brahman*).<sup>870</sup>

What has been stated above to the effect that it is inappropriate for the *pradhāna*, when it is not presided over by the *Brahman*, to be able to bring about the creation of the variegated world—that is not right; because (creative) activity appropriately belongs (to that *pradhāna*) even as (it belongs) to milk and water. Surely, a continuous succession of transformations, beginning from the first vibration, is indeed quite naturally appropriate to milk, while it is undergoing transformation into the form of curds, without the help of any other thing.

Again, just as one and the same kind of water, released from the clouds, is seen to undergo transformation quite naturally into the forms of the varied juices of the coconut, the palmyra, the mango, the wood apple, the lime, the tamarind and others—in that same way, the *pradhāna* also (which is not at all presided over by anything else), which has a changeable nature and which in the state of dissolution remains undergoing transformations (without the equipoise of the three qualities suffering any disturbance), has (in the process of creation) appropriately attached to itself varied transformations arising out of the disturbance of the equilibrium of the three qualities. To the same effect, it is given thus: “By (naturally) undergoing transformations in the same way in which water does, (the *pradhāna* acts in the state of creation) through the disturbed equilibrium (of the three qualities) which is the same as the existence in things of

870. Śaṅkara's second *Sūtra* is *Pravṛtṭeṣcha*, included by Ramanuja in his first.

the qualities severally under the relation of the whole and the part." (S. *Kār.* 16).<sup>871</sup>

To this objection, the reply is given thus: "In those cases also". That milk, curds etc., which were pointed out above as being examples illustrative (of your view)—in those cases also, in the absence of the superintendence of the *Brahman*, no (creative) activity can be appropriately said to begin. The idea is that these cases also have been made the subjects of the predication (that they are presided over by the *Brahman*). What was stated under the aphorism—"If it is denied (that He is the sole cause) because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the *Brahman*), it is not right to say so. For it (i.e., creation) resembles (the production of) milk" (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 1. 24.)—is merely this much, that, though not in association with ordinarily seen auxiliary materials (other than His own body), He can appropriately undergo transformations solely peculiar to Himself; (but) the superintendence of the *Brahman* (over the *pradhāna*) was not disregarded there, because there is the scriptural declaration beginning with: "He who remaining within the waters....." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 4).<sup>872</sup>

### व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात्

**Sūtra 3.** *Vyatiṛekānavasthiteśchānapekshatvāt* (177)

Because also if there is no dependence (of the *pradhāna* on the *Brahman* in regard to the creation of the world)\* there arises the non-existence of that (condition of dissolution) which is in contradistinction (to the condition of creation).

871. Non-intelligent matter is always changing. In *pralaya*, the changes do not affect the equilibrium of the *guṇas*. Where they do so, we have creation. Even here, the unmodified cause goes on changing without affecting the *guṇas*, while every change of cause

into effect is due to a disturbance of the *guṇas*.

872. In II. 1. 24-5, it was shown that the *Brahman* needs no material instruments for creation. But it cannot take place without the *Brahman* presiding over the *pradhāna*.

For the following reason also (the *pradhāna* cannot produce the world without the help of the *Brahman*). If transformation (in the realm of the *pradhāna*) takes place independently of the superintendence of the Lord, who wills the truth, then scope is given for the non-existence of the condition of dissolution in contradistinction to (that of) creation; therefore, also, the *pradhāna* not presided over by the *Brahman* is not the cause of the world. If it is presided over by the *Brahman*, then, inasmuch as He possesses the quality of willing the truth, there results the definite determination regarding (the orderly succession of) creation, dissolution and varied creation (again).<sup>873</sup>

It should not however be maintained that, although it (i.e., the *pradhāna*) is presided over by the *Brahman*, since He has (certainly) attained all desires, (because He) is fully perfect (in auspicious qualities and glory), is (possessed of a nature which is) bliss unsurpassed in excellence, is faultless and stainless (i.e., is not subject to *karma* or the qualities), there is no motive for Him definitely to determine creation to be unequal, it follows that He is pitiless; that for these reasons this error (in reasoning) is the same in both cases:—because it is also possible for Him who is perfect to be active for play, because also it is possible for Him who is omniscient to have His special reason for determining creation and dissolution, (the special reason) being of the form of “seeing” (which constitutes His thought) in relation to the *prakṛiti* which has assumed a certain modification; and because again it is only the *karman*s of the individual souls that are capable of definitely determining unequal creation.<sup>874</sup>

873. The argument here is that alternation between creation and dissolution cannot arise, if there is no *Brahman*. It is His will that causes this.

874. The arguments in II. 1. 22-5 are here recalled and

summed up. The point now is that creation and dissolution take place in accord with the will of the *Brahman*. That they arise from or correspond to certain states of the *pradhāna* does not affect His freedom.

It may again be said that, under these circumstances, all definite determination results altogether from the *karmas*, which belong to the individual selves, and are of the form of merit and demerit, and that therefore a superintending lord is unnecessary; that the *pradhāna* itself, under the impress of the actually performed *karma*, which has the nature of merit and demerit, is transformed into particular conditions in accordance with the several aims of life; that in similar instances both of food and drink etc., which are both corrupted with poison etc. and refreshed, improved, and strengthened with particular good medicines, particular changes which form the cause of pain and pleasure are seen to arise according to definite determinations relating to place and time; that, consequently, the definite determination relating to creation and dissolution, the inequality in creation such as the conditions of gods, men etc., and the definite determination of final release (*kaivalya*) are all appropriate to the *pradhāna* itself which is associated with the power of undergoing modifications in all manner of ways.

(It is stated in reply :) You (our opponent) are quite ignorant of the essential nature of *karma*, which consists of both merit and demerit. The essential natures of both merit and demerit are capable of being learnt solely from the *śāstras*; and the *śāstras* are the collection of syllables known as the *Veda*, which has no beginning or end, which has an unbroken tradition of recitation and is untainted by even the trace of ignorance or heedlessness or any other (such evil). And this (*Veda*) declares that the two kinds of *karma* known as merit and demerit have respectively the nature of worshipping the Highest Person and of what is contrary thereto, and that the pleasure and pain which are the results of those *karmas* are dependent upon His favour or disfavour.

Draṇiḍāchārya says the same thing thus:—"The established law of the *śāstras* is that they (the people) desire to please the Self by means of works with the desire

to be given the fruits (thereof), and He, being pleased (with them), is (alone) capable of giving the fruits." The scripture also says the same thing thus : "(The Lord) who is the centre (lit. the navel) of the world, accepts (in worship) all the *karmas*, which arise out of the injunctions of the *śruti* and *smṛiti*, and are in various ways either already in existence or about to come into existence." (*M. Nār. Up.* I. 6).<sup>875</sup> The Divine Lord also declares the same thing thus : "He from whom all beings come into existence and by whom all this world is created—worshipping Him by his own works a man attains perfection (i.e., attains Him)" (B. G. XVIII. 46). And again : "I quickly throw into the repeated cycles of birth and death, (and there) into demoniacal wombs, all those cruel and evil ones, the worst of men who hate (Me)." (B.G. XVI. 19).

That Divine Lord, who is the Supreme Person, who has indeed attained all desires, who is omniscient, who is the lord of all, who wills the truth, who (in the creation of the world) resorts to what is mere play in accordance with His own greatness, who lays down the injunction relating to the twofold division of *karmas* to the effect that such and such *karmas* are good, and such and other *karmas* are not good—He gives equally thereafter to all the individual selves bodies, senses etc., fit for the reception of those (*karmas*), and gives them also the power of controlling those (bodies and other things);<sup>876</sup> afterwards, He reveals the *śāstras* which give

875. The two passages cited above are explained in the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*. In the *Upanishad* text, '*ishṭa-pūrtam*' which literally means sacrifices and acts of public beneficence, is taken to stand for all the rituals etc. prescribed in the *śrutis* and *smṛitis*.

876. The *Brahman* is here called the Divine Lord to show His auspicious qualities and His

freedom from evil. Hence He is the Supreme Person, having all the qualities needed for creation, which is mere play to Him. The beginningless moral division between right and wrong actions is in accord with His will. He gives bodies etc. to the selves like a father giving property to his children. The proper use of what is given is not the responsibility of the giver. (S.P.)



the knowledge of His own commandments ; and at last, for the purpose of helping the individual soul in the full realisation of those (commandments), He enters into ( the individual selves) constituting their internal self and remains controlling them (from within) as their passive guide.<sup>877</sup> The individual selves, however, which have their powers transmitted by Him, which have their organs of sense, bodies etc. given by Him, and which are supported by Him, select themselves such meritorious and unmeritorious *karmas* as are in accordance with their wills ; and then knowing him who performs the *karma* of the nature of merit to follow His own commandments, He makes him prosperous in duty, riches, fulfilment of desire and final release, which are all the aims of life ; and with the opposites of these (aims of life) He associates him who transgresses His commandments. Thus the difficulties relating to the want of independence etc. (on His part) do not find any scope.<sup>878</sup>

Mercy indeed is well known to be that incapacity (on the part of one) to bear another's pain which has no regard to one's own advantage ; and this (mercy), when it exists even in relation to a person who persists in transgressing one's own injunctions, does not make for good. On the other hand, it imputes unmanliness indeed (to that merciful one). The punishment of that (transgression) is alone a virtue in him. Otherwise, it will follow that punishment of enemies and other such acts cannot possess

877. As the individual self has free will, the Lord is not the inciter (*prayojayitṛi*) of his actions. In the initial effort of the self, the Lord is an indifferent onlooker (*upekshaka*). In the further stages He is a passive guide (*anumantrī*) ; if the activity is righteous, He helps by removing obstacles and giving rewards ; if unrighteous, He permits in anger and later awards punishment. Permission to do evil is also a form of

punishment. (*S.P.*) The subject is further dealt with under II. 3. 40-1.

878. The Sāṅkhyas ask : How can a merciful God allow individual selves to do what is harmful to themselves ? If His grace and anger are the result of the *karmas* of the selves, how can He be free ? If He is free and the selves do what He wills, how can they have responsibility for their actions ? These questions are now answered.

the character of virtue. By the mere cessation of the persistence in transgressing, He rejects (i.e., forgives) the sins accumulated (by men) through beginningless and endless (periods of time known as) *kalpas*, and consequently He Himself attempts to increase (their) happiness so as to make it unsurpassable.<sup>878</sup> The same thing is declared thus: "To those who are desirous of an eternal union (with Me), and accordingly worship Me, I give with love that faculty of understanding by which they come unto Me. Out of pity for them indeed, I remain in their mental structure (as the subject) of their thoughts and destroy the darkness born of ignorance by means of the shining light of (the) knowledge (relating to Me)." (B. G. X. 10-11).

Therefore the *pradhāna*, unpresided over by the *Brahman*, is not the cause of the world.

Again, it might be said thus. No doubt it has been stated above that even the predisposition to motion is not possible for the *prakṛiti* that is not presided over by the *Brahman*. Nevertheless, the activity relating to change is possible for that (*prakṛiti*) even when it is unassisted, because it is so seen (in ordinary life). Indeed, grass, water etc., which are used by cows etc., are themselves seen to change into the form of milk etc. Therefore the *prakṛiti* is of itself transformed into the form of the world.

To this he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer.

अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत्

**Sūtra 4.** *Anyatrābhavāchcha na tṛiṇādivat* (178)

879. Here is one of the sources for the doctrines of grace later developed among the followers of Ramanuja. The absence of illwill to God and freedom from obstruction to the operation of His mercy are

suggested as the minimum for the state of grace. In B.G. (II.11) quoted below, 'worship' should be taken as 'absence of illwill and a tendency to turn towards God.'

(The *pradhāna* evolving into the world) is not like the grass etc. (eaten by cows and transformed into milk): for it (i.e., the transformation of the grass into milk) is not found elsewhere (i.e., when the grass is eaten by bulls or left uneaten).

This (which has been stated above) is not appropriate ; because grass etc., not presided over by the *Brahman*, cannot undergo modifications, and therefore the illustrative example is unwarranted. How is it disestablished? "For it (i.e., the transformation of the grass into milk) is not found elsewhere." If indeed grass, water etc., either used or rejected by bulls etc., were transformed into the condition of milk, then it would have been possible to say that such (grass etc.) underwent transformations invariably without the supervision of the *Brahman*. But this does not exist. Therefore, it is only the *Brahman* (not accepted by you) that converts into milk what is used by cows etc.<sup>880</sup>

What has been stated under the aphorism—"If it be said that it (i.e., the transformation of the *pradhāna*) is like that of milk and water (which are respectively converted into curds and the juices of varied plants without the help of intelligent beings), it is replied that in those cases also (there is no creative activity without the superintendence of the *Brahman*)" (*Ved. Sūt. II. 2. 2.*)—, that itself has been explained at length (so as to deal with additional doubts) under this aphorism, with the object of

880. Five possibilities about the transformation of the grass into milk are implied. It takes place (i) by itself, or (ii) in the presence of an intelligent self, or (iii) an intelligent self favoured by the *adṛishta*, or (iv) an intelligent self with a specific resolve, or (v) the *Brahman*. The first three are refuted in order by the following questions: Why does not the grass,

not consumed by cows, change into milk? Why is no milk produced, when bulls eat grass? Why should the self favoured by the *adṛishta* be always in a cow and never in a bull or anything else near uneaten grass? The fourth alternative is not acceptable even to the Sāṅkhyas. The fifth survives all criticism and is acceptable to the *Vedāntin*.

denying that in regard to those very instances (of milk etc.), the reasoning employed is overwide.<sup>881</sup>

### पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि

**Sūtra 5.** *Purushāśmavaditi chettathāpi* (179)

If it be said that, like a (blind) man, (who can act by himself in the presence of a lame person who can see) and like (iron acting by itself in the presence of) the loadstone (the *prakṛiti* can act independently), it is replied that even then (the *pradhāna* cannot produce the world).<sup>882</sup>

Again, it might be said as follows. Although the *purusha*, who is wholly made up of pure intelligence, is actionless, and the *pradhāna* is defective in the power of 'seeing' (i.e., thinking), nevertheless, in consequence of the proximity of the *purusha*, the non-intelligent *pradhāna* commences its activity; because it is so seen. Owing to the close proximity of a lame person who possesses the power of seeing, but is wanting in the power of moving, a blind person who is assisted by that (lame) person's intelligence, while being destitute of the power of seeing, but capable of initiating motion, begins to move. In consequence of the close proximity of the loadstone, iron begins to move (being attracted thereby). Similarly, the creation of the world proceeds, being initiated by means of the conjunction of the *pradhāna* with the *purusha*.

To the same effect it is stated thus: "In order that the *purusha* may see (i.e., know and enjoy) the *pradhāna*, and similarly in order also that he may attain final release, there arises the union of both which is like that between a

881. The additional doubt here is that a self favoured by the *adṛishṭa* may be responsible for the change of grass into milk. The reply is given in the previous Note. *Pradarśanaya*

here means not 'for demonstrating', but 'for denying or refuting the demonstration'.

882. *Sūtra* 8 below is placed above this *Sūtra* by Śaṅkara.

lame man and a blind man. Creation is the result thereof". (S. Kār. 21.) The meaning is that the *pradhāna* works for creation etc., on account of the close proximity of the *purusha* and in order that the *purusha* may enjoy the *pradhāna*, and for the purpose of his final release. To this, the reply is: "Even then (the *pradhāna* cannot produce the world)." Under such circumstances, the impossibility of the *pradhāna* taking the initiative remains undoubtedly in the same condition as before.

Although the lame person is devoid of the power of moving, he can show the way and give directions in regard to the same and show thousands of other such attributes incidental to the occasion. The blind person also, being intelligent, begins to move after understanding his (i.e., the lame person's) directions and so forth. Similarly, in regard to the loadstone there are attributes like that of making the iron draw near. But the *purusha* who is actionless cannot possibly have such modifications. The mere close proximity (of the *purusha* to the *pradhāna* through his being all-pervading) being eternal, it follows that creation is eternal. Owing to his being always free (from union with the *prakṛiti*), there can be no bondage nor final release.<sup>883</sup>

### अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च

Sūtra 6. *Āṅgitvānupapattescha*

(180)

Because also there can be no condition of being the principal (in regard to any of the qualities during *pralaya*).

883. The lame person is marked by a number of temporary attributes, unlike the *purusha*. The blind person is able to understand and obey directions, unlike the *prakṛiti*.

The *purusha* who is actionless and all-pervading cannot move, nor suffer modifications. The example and the argument alike fail.

It has been accepted by you who say, “ (The *pradhāna* acts in the state of creation) through the existence in things of the qualities severally under the relation of the whole and the part ” (S. *Kār.* 16), that the creation of the world surely proceeds from the relation of the principal and the subordinate which has for its foundation the dominance or the subordination of the qualities. In the process of dissolution, however, as the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which exist in a condition of equilibrium, do not possess the condition of being in excess or in deficit mutually, the relation of the principal and subordinate (amongst them) is inappropriate ; and therefore the creation of the world cannot appropriately take place. If nevertheless inequality (between the qualities) is acknowledged to exist, it follows that creation is eternal. Therefore, also, the *pradhāna*, unpresided over by the *Brahman*, cannot be the cause of the world.<sup>884</sup>

### अन्यथानुमितौ च शक्तिवियोगात्

**Sūtra 7.** *Anyathānumitau cha jñasaktiviyogāt* (181)

In regard also to inferences made otherwise (than in the manner already stated, the same objections are valid), owing to the deficiency (of the *pradhāna*) in the power of knowing.

Even if there should be an inference about the *pradhāna* (being the cause of the world) by reasoning different from those so far attacked, the objection arising from the deficiency of the *pradhāna* in the power of being a knower will undermine (it). Therefore, in no manner

884. The question raised here is: how can the condition of equilibrium in the state of *pralaya* be disturbed, and how

the disturbed state of the *guṇas* in creation be restored to equilibrium again? Neither can be accounted for by the Sāṅkhyas.

whatsoever can the *pradhāna* be proved to be the cause of the world by means of the logical process of inference<sup>885</sup>

### अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात्

**Sūtra 8.** *Abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt* (181)

Even if it be accepted (that it may be proved that material Nature is the cause of the world, it should not be inferred as such a cause), because there is no purpose (served by the inference).

Even if it be admitted that the *pradhāna* is capable of being proved by inference, the *pradhāna* does not serve any purpose, and hence it should not be inferred to be the cause. According to the passage, "In order that the *purusha* may see (i.e., know and enjoy) the *pradhāna* and similarly in order also that he may attain final release (there arises the union of both)" (*S. Kār.* 21), the enjoyment and final release resulting to the *purusha* have been accepted as the purposes served by the *pradhāna*, and those two (purposes) cannot possibly exist.<sup>886</sup> The *purusha* who consists of mere intelligence, who is without action, who does not undergo modifications, who is free of impurities and who for that very reason has an eternally free essential nature of his own, cannot possibly have the enjoyment which is of the form of "seeing" the *prakṛiti*, and (cannot) also (have) the final release which is of the form of separation from that (*prakṛiti*). If it is imagined that one who has the very character mentioned above,

885. The Sāṅkhya inference (Note 866) and the *Vedānta* counter-inference (Note 869) have already been given. The point here made is that the mere fact of the *pradhāna* being non-intelligent cannot but lead to the postulation of its control by the *Brahman*.

886. According to Sāṅkara, the acceptance mentioned in this *Sūtra* is of the creative activity of the *prakṛiti*. Rāmānuja takes it to refer to the inference of the *pradhāna* as the cause of the world. This inference is shown to be helpful in accounting neither for the bondage nor for the final release of the self.

owing to his proximity to the *prakṛiti*, has that enjoyment, which consists of "seeing", pleasure and pain arising out of the particular modifications of the *prakṛiti*, then, as the proximity to the *prakṛiti* is eternal, final release will never result to him.

### विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम्

**Sūtra 9.** *Vipratishedhāchchāsamāñjasam* (182)

(The Sāṅkhya view) is inconsistent, because also of the conflict of the mutually hostile reasonings (adduced therein).

This system of the Sāṅkhyas is also injuriously affected by the conflicts of mutually hostile reasonings adduced therein. Thus, they accept the *purusha* as the enjoyer, the presiding controller, the witness and the seer of the *prakṛiti*, for the reason that the *prakṛiti* possesses the quality of being useful to another, the quality of being the object of perception and the quality of being the object of enjoyment;<sup>887</sup> and then they surely hold that final release also is capable of being attained by him with the help of the *prakṛiti* itself, which forms the means therefor; while so, they themselves also hold that final freedom and the quality of not being the agent of action constitute his essential nature itself, owing to his possessing an essential nature which is eternal and immovable and consists of pure intelligence. For this very reason, they say that the working out of the means of bondage and final freedom and the attainment of final freedom appertain to the *prakṛiti* itself. They again hold that, in consequence of the close proximity of the *purusha*, who is in the manner

887. As witness, the self realises in thought the true nature of the *prakṛiti*; as the seer, he perceives the *prakṛiti* with the help of the senses.

Because the *prakṛiti* has the quality of being useful to another, the self is the presiding controller.



mentioned above immodifiable and indifferent, the *prakṛiti*, by reason of mutual superimposition, takes the initiative in the acts of creation etc., and is also capable of helping on the *puruṣa* in attaining enjoyment and final release.

To this effect are the following passages : "The soul exists, because any collection of things (like the *prakṛiti*) must exist for the sake of another, because there must exist something contrary (in its qualities) to (the *prakṛiti* which is possessed of) the three *guṇas* etc., because there is superintendence, because there is an experiencing subject, and because there is effort for the sake of final release.<sup>888</sup>.....And from that contrast<sup>889</sup> it is established that the *puruṣa* is the witness, isolated, neutral, perceiving and without action". (S. *Kār.* 17, 19). After stating, "Accordingly, the activity of the *pradhāna* is for the purpose of the final release of the *puruṣa*" (*Ibid.* 57), they declare : "Therefore, in this way, no self is bound, nor is he released, nor does he move about in the circuit of *samsāra*. And the *prakṛiti*, which having many locations (or bodily forms) is involved in *samsāra*, is bound and is released." (*Ibid.* 62).<sup>890</sup> Accordingly, it

888. The Sāṅkhyas argue : Everything which is a composite collection, like a chariot, is for the benefit of another. The *prakṛiti* in the causal state is a collection of the three *guṇas* : in the created world, we see the effects of the *guṇas*. So the *prakṛiti* must be for another's benefit. The beneficiary cannot be a collection : else there will be infinite regress. Thus the self is arrived at as something non-composite and having characteristics opposite to those which are concomitant with being a collection and are enumerated in S. *Kār.* (11).

889. The contrast is described in S. *Kār.* (11) : "The *vyakta* (or the *prakṛiti* as manifest in its evolutionary modifications) consists of the three *guṇas*, is

incapable of bringing out effects by itself, objective, common (to all percipients), non-intelligent and changing. The *pradhāna* too is likewise. The self is the opposite (of the *prakṛiti* in these respects) and yet also (in some other respects) similar."

890. "In the same way" in S. *Kār.* (57) is explained in the unquoted earlier half of the stanza : "As there is the flow of the non-intelligent milk (in the cow's udder) for the sake of the growth of the calf..." In S. *Kār.* (62) bondage and release are said to belong to the *prakṛiti* ; that is, they are falsely attributed to the self. Vāchaspati Miśra in S. T. Kau. explains that this is similar to a victory or defeat being attributed to a king when it is won or lost by his soldiers.

is stated: "Therefore (i.e., because agency and intelligence are not found in the same place), from proximity with him (i.e., the *purusha*), the non-intelligent *liṅga* (being the evolutes of the *prakṛiti* from the *mahat* to the subtle principles), appears as if intelligent, and the indifferent self, similarly, becomes as it were the agent while the *guṇas* are the agents.<sup>891</sup> In order that the *purusha* may see (and enjoy) the *pradhāna* and in order that he may attain final release, the union of both takes place like that between a lame man and a blind man. Creation is the result thereof." (*Ibid.* 19, 20).

The qualities of being the witness, being the seer, being the enjoyer and other such qualities do not at all belong to him who is eternal and immovable, who is no agent, who is indifferent, and whose essential nature is self-abidance. Such a being, who has such a nature, cannot also possibly possess even the (secondary) erroneous knowledge (*bhrama*) which is based on the (original) superimposition (*adhyāsa*);<sup>892</sup> because erroneous knowledge and superimposition also possess the character of being modifications; they cannot also belong to the *prakṛiti* because they are particular attributes of intelligent beings.

Superimposition (*adhyāsa*) is for an intelligent individual soul to continue ascribing the property of one thing to another. It is an attribute of the intelligent self and is a modification. Moreover, superimposition etc. cannot happen to the *purusha* merely through proximity to the *prakṛiti*, because of his being incapable of modifications. Even if they should happen, they will result (to him) eternally. That (such) proximity is of no use has also been explained under (the *adhikaraṇa* starting with) the

891. The common feeling that we are intelligent agents is here regarded as a mistake and the reason therefor stated.

892. The basic erroneous knowledge is called superimposition (*adhyāsa*), and subsequent bits of erroneous knowledge arising therefrom are delusions (*bhramas*).

aphorism, "(The causality of the *Brahman* in relation to the world) cannot be predicated because of (this world) having an entirely distinct character (from Him)....." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 4).<sup>893</sup>

If it be said of the *prakṛiti* itself that it revolves in *samsāra*, gets bound and is freed from bondage, it is asked (in reply) how it can be of use to the *puruṣa* who is eternally free. Indeed, they speak to the following effect: "It (the *prakṛiti*) helps in various ways the *puruṣa* who renders no help to it. Being endowed with the qualities, it serves, without serving any purpose of its own, the purpose of him who is devoid of the qualities." (*S. Kār.* 60).

Similarly, they also say that the *prakṛiti* at once retires from the *puruṣa* by whom it has been seen in its true nature: 'Just as an actress ceases to dance after showing herself on the stage (i.e., to the spectators), similarly the *prakṛiti* disappears after it has enlightened the *puruṣa* of itself.....According to my thinking, there is nothing more delicate than the *prakṛiti*, which, saying, 'I have been seen,' does not again come in sight of the *puruṣa*." (*Ibid.* 59, 61).<sup>894</sup> This also is inconsistent. Indeed, the *puruṣa*, being eternally free and immovable, never has sight of that (*prakṛiti*), nor does he beget wrong superimpositions (thereby of its characteristics in himself). It cannot also see itself, as it is non-intelligent. It cannot also cause to itself the wrong superimposition that the seeing of itself by the *puruṣa* is the seeing (of itself) by itself, because it is itself non-intelligent and because also the modified condition known as seeing cannot possibly belong to the *puruṣa*.

<sup>893</sup>. The argument is given under *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1. 10).

<sup>894</sup>. The simile of the dancer is given to show how the *prakṛiti* stops acting in respect

of the released self. Once it is 'seen' and its true nature understood, it ceases to bind the self. Rāmānuja argues that the self, according to the Sāṅkhya, cannot 'see' the *prakṛiti*.

Again, it may be said that mere proximity alone (of the *prakṛiti* to the *puruṣa*) is the seeing (of the *prakṛiti* by the *puruṣa*). It has been already stated (in reply) that proximity (which is based on the essential nature of the self) being eternal, it follows that the seeing also is eternal. Surely, even casual proximity, which is not part of his essential nature, cannot appropriately belong to him who is immovable.

Further, if it be said that the cause of his final freedom is seeing (the *prakṛiti* by him), which is of the form of his own proximity, then the cause of bondage also will have to be that very same thing; and therefore both bondage and final freedom will have to possess the character of eternity. If it be said that the cause of bondage is false perception, while the cause of final release is the perception of the essential nature of things as they are in reality, then inasmuch as both these kinds of perception also are not other than what has the nature of proximity, it follows that both exist for all time.

If proximity is non-eternal, its cause has to be searched for, then its cause (i.e., the cause of this cause) also, and so on; thus there results the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*. If, again, with the object of avoiding this fallacy, the existence of the essential nature alone is (said to be) proximity, then because the essential nature possesses the character of permanence, bondage and final release are both eternal.

Consequently, such and other contradictory reasonings coming into conflict with one another, the system of the Sāṅkhyas is inconsistent.

Those also (i.e., the *Advaitins*), who maintain that the *Brahman* who is unchangeable, eternal, devoid of attributes, and self-luminous, and who consists of pure intelligence, comes to have unreal bondage and final release (which is not unreal), owing to His being the witness of

ignorance—in regard to them also, there is inconsistency for the reason that, in the manner depicted above, to be the witness of ignorance, to beget wrong superimpositions out of it etc. do not possibly result (to Him). There is, however, this much of difference. The Sāṅkhyas admit here a plurality of *puruṣhas* to account for the individual (and non-simultaneous) distributions of birth and death, and other such conditions,<sup>895</sup> while those (i.e., *Advaitins*) do not admit even that, and so there is absolute inconsistency (in regard to them).

What has been stated above to the effect that there is difference (between the Sāṅkhyas and the *Advaitins*) owing to a division of opinion to the effect that the *prakṛiti* is real (according to the Sāṅkhyas) and unreal (according to the *Advaitins*)—that also is improper, because whether it is real or unreal, he (i.e., the individual self or the *Brahman* as the case may be), who is eternal, immovable and self-luminous and who consists of uniform intelligence, cannot appropriately possess the character of being the witness of other things. When it (i.e., the *prakṛiti*) is unreal, however, it is admitted to be the object of perception and to be capable of being stultified. Therefore this (view) is even more inconsistent.<sup>896</sup>

According to the view also (of Bhāskara) which says that difference and identity are the results of limiting adjuncts, the *Brahman* who is associated with the limiting adjuncts is of that same nature,<sup>897</sup> and therefore

895. Ram nuja is here referring to *S. Kṛ.* (18), whose language he is using. It runs : "The plurality of the selves is established on account of the individual distributions of birth, death, bodies and organs, on account of the absence of simultaneity in the activities (of different embodied persons), and on account of difference in the proportions of the three *guṇas* (in different persons)".

896. The immovable self cannot see and thereby subject itself to modification. If what is seen is real, then there is only one modification. If unreal, the self has to see twice—first wrongly and then rightly. This is suggested by the words ; "even more inconsistent".

897. The nature of the *Brahman* is here conceived to be eternal, free from modifications, free from evil etc.

association with limiting adjuncts etc. cannot appropriately result (to Him); thus there arises inconsistency which has been already explained.

## ADHIKARANA II

### MAHADDĪRGHĀDHIKARANA

#### महदीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम्

**Sūtra 10.** *Mahaddīrghavadvā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām* (184)

(The whole of the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika theory) also (is inconsistent) like the production of the tertiary particle (and the secondary particle) from the secondary particle and the infinitesimal atom (respectively).

It has been stated above that the view according to which the *pradhāna* is the cause (of the world) is beset with inconsistency, for the reason that it is supported by conflicting arguments contradicting one another, in consequence of its being based upon what has the semblance of logical reasonings. Now what is sought to be established is that there is inconsistency also in the view which holds that the infinitesimal atom is the cause (of the world). To this effect is the aphorism: “(The whole of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory) also (is inconsistent) like the production of the tertiary particle (and the secondary particle) from the secondary particle and the infinitesimal atom (respectively).” (*Ved. Sūtr. II. 2. 10*).

“Inconsistent” is to be understood (from the previous aphorism). ‘*Vā*’ is used in the sense of cumulation (so as to mean ‘also’). “From the *hrasva* (lit. the short one) and the *parimaṇḍala* (lit. the round

one) means "from the secondary particle and the infinitesimal atom." "Like the *mahaddīrgha* (lit. what is big and long)" means "like the arguments about the production of the tertiary particle". Likewise, all else also that is accepted by them (the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣhikas) are inconsistent. The meaning is that, similarly to the theory which relates to the production of the world from the infinitesimal atom through the secondary particles etc., all else (in their reasonings) are also inconsistent.<sup>898</sup>

Accordingly, threads and other divisible parts produce the whole (cloth), when they are conjoined on six sides forming their own parts. The infinitesimal atoms can become the producers of secondary and other particles only when they are conjoined together on all their six sides. Otherwise, as infinitesimal atoms have no distinct and particular locations in space, although thousands of infinitesimal atoms are conjoined together, the (resultant) dimension will not exceed that of one infinitesimal atom: and consequently atomicity and minuteness (which are the qualities of the secondary particle), and magnitude and length (which belong to the tertiary particle), and other qualities<sup>899</sup> will not result (to the infinitesimal atom). If distinct locations in space be admitted, the infinitesimal

898. The theory regards the smallest unit of matter as the *paramāṇu* or the *parimaṇḍala*, rendered as the infinitesimal atom. It has no dimensions and no extension in space, and is almost like a mathematical point. It is eternal. The *dvyāṇuka* is a secondary particle formed by two atoms. Three of these form the tertiary particle, the *trasareṇu* or the *tryāṇuka*, the smallest visible thing. It has magnitude. This analysis of matter is supported by two syllogisms: (i) The mote in the sunbeam (which is a *trasareṇu*) has parts, as it is visible like a pot. (ii) Each of its parts has

also parts of its own, as it helps, like the potsherd, to form a thing with magnitude. Thus the *dvyāṇuka* and the *paramāṇu* are established.

899. The secondary particle has *ānūtva*, translated as 'atomicity'. This is different from *paramānūtva* or *parimaṇḍalya*, the quality of the infinitesimal atom. Ramanuja asks how the point-atoms, which are without extension in space, can unite to form the world. A cube or rectangular prism has six sides, and a sizable solid structure can be built only by an assembly of such prisms.

atoms become divisible into parts and made up of their own parts, and they (the parts of the atom) are made up of their own parts, and so on, thus resulting in a *regressus in infinitum*.

It should not be urged that the inequality between a mustard seed and a mountain arises solely out of the smallness or largeness in the number of the constituent parts; that if the infinitesimal atom is held to possess an infinite number of constituent parts, equality in respect of the infinity of constituent parts arises between the mustard and the mountain, and there is thus no inequality between them; and that, therefore, it has necessarily to be accepted that the ultimate constituent part has a limit. Because, if the infinitesimal atoms have no locations in space, then any size exceeding the magnitude of a single infinitesimal atom cannot come into existence, and therefore the mustard and the mountain will themselves not be established. If it be asked what then we are to do, it is replied that the view based upon the *Veda* may be accepted.

This aphorism is, however, being explained by others (i.e., the *Advaitins*) as intended to relate to the refutation of the objection raised against the theory which maintains that the *Brahman* is the cause. This (explanation) is inconsistent (with the subject dealt with in this second quarter of the second Chapter) and tautological. The objection raised by others against the theory which holds that the *Brahman* is the cause having been set at naught in the previous quarter (of this second Chapter of the *Ved. Sūti.*), what has been undertaken in this (second) quarter (of the second Chapter) is, indeed, the disproof of the views of other schools (than the *Vedānta*). The possibility of the origination of the world out of the intelligent *Brahman* has also been already well explained under the aphorism which runs thus: “(The causality of the *Brahman* in relation to the world) cannot be predicated



because of (this world) having an entirely distinct character (from Him)....." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 4).

Therefore, the meaning of the *Sūtra* undoubtedly is that, like the production of the tertiary particle and the secondary particle out of the secondary particle and the infinitesimal atom (respectively), all else also that is accepted by them (i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas) is inconsistent.

To the question what else it is that is here inconsistent, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :

उभयधापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः

**Sūtra 11.** *Ubhayadhāpi na karmāstastadabhāvaḥ* (185)

In either view also there is no motion. Therefore, it (i.e., the production of the world on the basis of previous motion in the atoms) is non-existent.

Indeed, according to the view which says that the infinitesimal atom is the cause, the origin of the world is thought to take place in the order which begins with (the production of) the secondary particle, which is based on the conjunction of the infinitesimal atoms, which results out of the motion resident in them. It being so, the earliest motion which is found in the infinitesimal atom and forms the cause of the origin of the whole world, is held to be produced by the *adrishṭa* (or the unseen result of works),<sup>900</sup> as in the following passage : "The upward flaming forth of fire, the horizontal motion of air, and the

900. If the first motion of the atom is caused by the *adrishṭa*, where does it reside? (i) It cannot be in the non-intelligent atom. (ii) If in an intelligent self, how can it activate the non-intelligent atom? (iii) If in an intelligent self associated with

the atom, creation has to be eternal. (iv) If in an intelligent self associated with the atom at a particular time when the *adrishṭa* ripens to yield results, how to account for creation or dissolution? These questions are asked here.

earliest movement of the atoms and the mind—these are the results of the *adrishṭa*.” ( ? ).

This above-mentioned motion found in the infinitesimal atom is either produced by its (i.e., the atom's) own *adrishṭa*, or it is produced by the *adrishṭa* found in association with the individual self. In both the cases, also, it cannot possibly be found to exist, because it is not possible for the *adrishṭa* which is produced by the working out of the merit and demerit of individual souls, to be found resident in the infinitesimal atom. If it be so found, it follows that it will be capable of production always. Moreover, it is not possible for the *adrishṭa* found resident in the individual self to be the cause of the production of the motion resident in the infinitesimal atom.

Again, it may be said that motion is originated in atoms through the association of the individual self possessing the *adrishṭa*. Under such a circumstance, the unceasing flow of the *adrishṭa* being eternal, it follows that creation is eternal.

It may, however, be again said that the *adrishṭa* is capable of giving fruits, provided it is ripe (therefor); that some *adrishṭas* then and there assume the condition of yielding fruits, while others do so in other future births, and others again in other future periods of time known as the *kalpas*; and that, therefore, because of dependence on the ripening (of the *adrishṭa*), (its) capability to produce always does not follow. (But) it is not so; because it is not established by any authoritative means of knowledge that the *adrishṭas* which are produced by many kinds of *karmas*, performed not simultaneously and without previous understanding (among one another) by the infinite individual selves, can all at one time attain one and the same kind of ripening (that yields fruits).

For this very reason, the simultaneous absorption of all things and their existence in a condition unripe for yielding fruits (i.e., *pralaya*) do not come to pass during two *parārdhas* (or periods of time each equal to half the life of *Brahmā*).<sup>901</sup> Again, motion does not exist in the atoms in consequence of the association (with them) of (the individual souls, possessing) the particular *adṛishṭa* assigned to them at the will of the Lord, because under the aphorism, “(That the *Brahman* is the cause of the creation etc. of the universe follows altogether from the scriptures) because scriptures form the source (of the knowledge) relating to Him” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 3.), it has been already explained how such a Lord as is arrived at by the logical process of inference is disproved. Therefore, the origination of the world has not for its basis the motion associated with atoms.

### समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादन्वस्थितेः

Sūtra 12. *Samavāyābhyupagamāchcha  
sāmyādanavasthiteḥ* (186)

Because of the acceptance of the relation of coinherence also (there is inconsistency), as, by parity of reasoning, there results the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*.

“Because of the acceptance of the relation of coinherence also”, there arises inconsistency. Why? “As by parity of reasoning there results the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*.” Because coinherence also requires by parity of reasoning some other thing to explain it, like an organic whole, a genus and a quality

901. The life of *Brahmā* the creator and a period of complete dissolution alternate, and each is said to last for a period called *parā*, equal to about

311,040,000,000,000 solar years. (Vide the *Yugas*, page 7, by Prof. M. Rangacharya.) A *parardha* is half a *para*.

(which require the parts, the species and the substratum of the quality respectively to explain them); that other thing which explains (coinherence) also similarly requires some other thing (to explain it), and so on; thus there results the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*; and inconsistency arises undoubtedly in consequence.<sup>902</sup>

What is said is this. "Whatever forms the cause of the perception here of things which are inseparably associated with each other and which stand to each other in the relation of the container and the contained, that is *samavāya*."<sup>903</sup> Coinherence is thus understood. If in regard to genus, species etc., which are (mere) perceptions of an inseparable existence, coinherence is admitted to be capable of bringing about that condition of being the perception of inseparable existence, then, in regard to *samavāya* also, owing to its similarity to it (i.e., the genus and the members of the genus etc., in being part of an inseparable existence with those related by it and requiring something else to account for it), the cause which gives it that character (of being *samavāya*) has to be sought after; of this (cause) also, similarly (the cause has to be sought after), and so on; thus there results the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*.<sup>904</sup>

902. The point here is that *samavāya* is an unnecessary assumption.

903. This is quoted from the *Prasastapada-bhashya* (VH) on the *Vaiśeshika-Sūtras*. The *Sūtra* commented on is VII. 2. 26: "That is inherence from which arises the idea, 'This is in this', in regard to two things related as cause and effect." (Contrast this with inferential knowledge explained in terms of 'This is of this' in IX. 2. 1.) The relation of *samavāya* is said to subsist between parts and wholes, qualities and substances, motion and moving bodies, classes and members thereof, and particularities and eternal substances.

*Prasastapada* gives the examples of the cloth and threads, the mat and the reeds, existence in substances, qualities and motion, substance-ness in substances etc. The essential requisites are inseparable coexistence and the relation of the container and the contained. Those related by *samavāya* need not necessarily be causes and effects.

904. A genus and a member thereof are inseparably co-existent. If the relation of *samavāya* has to be assumed to account for this, what about that relation itself? For it is also inseparably coexistent with the genus and the member.

If it be said that this capability of having an inseparable existence may be assumed to be the nature of *samavāya*, then that same nature ought to be assumed in respect of the genus, the qualities etc. On the contrary, it is not proper to accept the coinherence which is not seen and then to postulate this characteristic (of inseparable existence) in reference to it.<sup>905</sup>

Whether *samavāya* is accepted to be eternal (as by Kaṇāda) or not eternal (as by Prabhākara), this error mentioned above (as affecting it) is the same in either case. He (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives an additional reason in case it is accepted to be eternal thus.

### नित्यमेव च भावात्

Sūtra 13. *Nityameva cha bhāvāt*

(187)

Because also of the existence necessarily eternally (of the world which is related by *samavāya* to other things, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is inconsistent.)

*Samavāya* possesses the character of a relation; therefore, if (this) relation is accepted to be eternal, the world also which possesses this relation will undoubtedly acquire permanent existence; thus there arises inconsistency.<sup>906</sup>

905. The Vaiśeṣika argument is that inherence does not reside in substances etc. by conjunction or inherence, but by innate nature. This is replied to here.

906. *Samavāya* is inferred to be eternal because the cause of its origination is not known from perception, inference or any other source of valid knowledge. One consequence following from this is set out in the *Sūtra*. Rāmānuja's argument implies that, if *samavāya* is eternal, the postulation by the Vaiśeṣikas of eternal atoms and God is unnecessary. Other attacks on the eternal

*samavāya* are given in the *Ś.P.* The Prabhākara view, which accepts a different kind of inherence, is thus set out by Dr. Ganganath Jha: "Subsistence or inherence (*paratantratā*) is not *nitya* or eternal (like the *samavāya* of the logician): because it exists in perishable things also, being a relation whereof, it cannot be eternal; it is both produced and non-produced, perceptible and imperceptible in accordance with the nature of the things to which it belongs. Nor is it one (like the logician's *samavāya*): it is as many as there are things." (*The Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*).

### रूपादिमत्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात्

**Sūtra 14.** *Rūpādimatvāchcha viparyayo darśanāt* (188)

Because also there arises contradiction (of your view) owing to the possession (by atoms) of colour etc., for it is so seen.

The four kinds of infinitesimal atoms (of the elements) of earth, water, fire and air, are admitted (by you) to possess the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch ; 907 and therefore in contradiction of the conditions of subtlety, indivisibility etc., which are all accepted (by you as characterising infinitesimal atoms) there result (to the atoms) non-eternity, grossness, divisibility etc. ; for pots which possess colour etc., are seen to be non-eternal and to be produced out of other causes of a similar kind (having colour etc.). Indeed, an unseen thing assumed in accordance with what is seen, is not capable of definitely establishing one's own accepted particular conclusion. It is assumed by you only in accordance with what is seen that infinitesimal atoms possess colour etc. Therefore, also, it (i.e., the atomic theory) is inconsistent.

Again, with the object of avoiding this error, infinitesimal atoms may not be admitted to possess colour etc. To this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus.

### उभयधा च दोषात्

**Sūtra 15.** *Ubhayadhā cha doṣāt* (189)

Because also there is error in either case.

It is not merely the admission alone that the infinitesimal atoms possess colour etc., that is erroneous ;

907. The earthly atoms possess all the four qualities, those of water lack smell. The fiery ones have colour and touch. The airy atoms have touch only.

even though they are admitted to be devoid of colour etc., inasmuch as the qualities of the effect are based upon the qualities of the cause, the earth and other things (which are effects) will have to be devoid of colour etc. If with the object of avoiding this (difficulty), they (i.e., the atoms) are admitted to possess colour etc., then the error mentioned above comes into existence; thus, error arising in either case, there is inconsistency.

### अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा

**Sūtra 16.** *Aparigrahāchchātṛyantaṁamanapekshā* (190)

Because it (i.e., the atomic theory of Kaṇāda) is not accepted in the least (by the followers of the *Vedas*), entire dislike (should be cherished towards it).

Although the theory advocated by Kapila is given up, owing to its contradiction with the scriptures and with logical reasoning, yet, in consequence of its upholding the view that the effect is (already) existent (in the cause) and such other views, it is acceptable in certain parts (of it) to the believers in the *Vedas*. On the other hand, in regard to the view advocated by Kaṇāda, inasmuch as it is inappropriate, owing to its not being accepted in any respect whatsoever, those who are desirous of final release should cherish an entire dislike towards it.

## ADHIKARANA III

### SAMUDĀYĀDHIKARANA

समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः

**Sūtra 17.** *Samudāya ubhayaheṭuke' pi tadaprāptih* (191)

Although (the state of being) the aggregate (of effects) is assumed to have two causes, its production is not appropriate.

The Vaiśeṣikas who maintain that the infinitesimal atoms form the cause of the world have (till now) been discomfited. The Saugatas (or Buddhists) also admit that the infinitesimal atoms form the cause ; therefore it is that it is (now) stated immediately afterwards<sup>908</sup> that, even according to their opinion, the production of the world and the practical realisation thereof cannot be appropriately explained.

These (Buddhists) are divided into four schools. Some of them (i.e., the Vaibhāshikas) admit the external things which consist of the elements and the products of those elements, and which have all of them the nature of an aggregate constituted by infinitesimal atoms belonging to the elements, earth, water, fire and air, as also the internal things consisting of the unceasing flow of consciousness, love and hatred ; (they hold) that these are all established by perception and inference. Others, however, (i.e., the Sautrāntikas) are of opinion that all the external things consisting of the earth etc. are capable of being inferred by means of the understanding. Others, again, (i.e., the Yogāchāras) hold that the understanding without (any) external objects is alone the real entity, while all the external objects resemble the objects perceived in dreams. All these three schools also hold that the reality accepted by them is momentary in nature ; they do not accept, at least, even as they are in essence, the self, the element of the ether etc., which are all above and beyond the abovementioned elements, the mind and the modifications of the mind. There are others still (i.e.,

908. The atomic theory and the doctrine that the effect is not existent in the cause are common to Kaṇāda and the

Buddhists. While all things are momentary to the Buddhists, Kaṇāda holds the body to be momentary.



the Mādhyamikas) who uphold the nothingness of all things.<sup>909</sup>

Of these, those who maintain the reality of external objects, (i.e., the Vaibhāshikas and Sautrāntikas)—they are surely contradicted (at first). And they are of the following opinion. The earthly infinitesimal atoms possess the characteristics of colour, taste and touch; the fiery ones again possess the characteristics of colour and touch; and the airy ones possess the characteristic of touch. All these are brought together into masses in the forms of the earth, water, fire and air: out of these elements of earth etc., also are produced the aggregates known as the body, the sensory organs and the objective forms. And this being so, it is merely the unceasing flow of consciousness which exists inside the body and is overpowered by egotism as the knower that stands in the position of the

909. The division of Buddhist philosophy into four schools is possibly for the sake of facilitating analysis and argument. The *Vaibhāshikas* are said to be followers of the *Vibhāṣā*, an ancient commentary on the philosophical teachings of the Buddha known as the *Abhidhamma*. They are realists. The *Sautrāntikas* are said to go back to the *Sūtras* or the *Sutta*. They are representationists holding that only a part of reality is perceived and that the rest has to be inferred. The *Yogācāras* are idealists: they evidently derive their name from their association with yoga practices. The *Mādhyamikas* claim to hold a middle position in various ways. But they are extreme nihilists. All the schools analyse the world into five *skandhas* (or aggregates or groups). The *rūpaskandha* comprises the physical elements (except the *ākāśa* which is not recognised as an element by the Buddhists) and the sense organs. That of *viññāna* is the stream of

consciousness which seizes knowledge and the idea of the ego superimposed thereon. Pleasure, pain and indifference resulting from likable, hateful and neutral experiences constitute the *vedāna-skandha*. The *saṃjñā* (i.e., name or symbol) collection is taken to refer to judgements. Finally, we have the collection of innate impressions and tendencies (*samskāras*), that consist of attachment, aversion and delusion. Of the five *skandhas*, that of *rūpa* is external. Of the rest, that of *viññāna* refers to mind and the others are mental products according to Bhāskara. Vāchaspati refers to another view that even the *rūpa-skandha* is a mental product. Rāmanuja places the phrase, "*chitta-chaitta-rūpān*, consisting of the flow of consciousness and its products," between '*bāhyān*' (external things) and '*ābhyantārān*' (internal things), so as to qualify both, if necessary, or the latter alone.

**Self.** Out of this alone does every practical realization in the world take place.

It is stated in reply to this : “ Although (the state of being) the aggregate (of effects) is assumed to have two causes, its production is not (appropriate) ” (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 2. 17) The (state of the) aggregate which has the atoms for its cause and is made up of the earth and other elements, and that (state of the) aggregate which has the earth and other elements for its cause and consists of the body, the organs of sense and the objective forms—although (the state of being) the aggregate has (thus) two causes, its production is not appropriately brought about. The meaning is that the production of the aggregate which consists of the world is not appropriately brought about. Because it is admitted that the infinitesimal atoms as well as the earth and the elements are of a momentary nature. The infinitesimal atoms and the elements which are (both) momentarily destructible—when are they operated upon to form a mass, indeed, when are they brought together, when do they form objects of perceptive knowledge, when do they assume also the condition of being practically realised so as to be worthy of acceptance, rejection etc. ? Who is the knowing self, and what objects of knowledge does he contact (through the senses) ? Which knowing self knows which object of knowledge and when ? Which knowing self accepts which thing that has already become an object of knowledge, and when ? The perceiver is indeed destroyed ; the thing perceived is also destroyed ; and similarly the knower and the known are lost. (That being the case) how can one know what is perceived by another ? And how can one take to oneself a thing known by another ?

Although a series (of perceptions) possesses unity in nature, it is not admitted in relation to them that they possess as things in reality the character of being different entities from the members of the stream (of perceptions) ; on that basis there cannot result to the members of the

stream (of perceptions) any kind of practical realisation or such other things. It has been stated before already that the thing 'I' is the self and that it is itself the knower.

### इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्न संग्रातभावानिमित्तत्वात्

**Sūtra 18.** *Itaretarapratyayatvādūpapannamiti  
chenna saṅghātabhāvānimittatvāt* (192)

If it be said that, on the principle of the former being the cause of the latter, this (i.e., the production of the world) is appropriate, it is not so; because they (i.e., ignorance etc. mentioned by the Buddhists as successive causes) do not stand in the position of the cause to the formation of the aggregate.<sup>910</sup>

It may be said that the formation (becoming the object of knowledge, practical realization) etc. of the aggregate are appropriate, because, among ignorance and others, the preceding one forms in order the cause of the latter one.

What is said is this. No doubt all things are of a momentary nature. Nevertheless, they are appropriately called into being by ignorance itself. Ignorance indeed is false knowledge, and in regard to momentary things etc., it finds scope for the idea of permanence etc. Out of it are produced love, hatred etc., which go by the name of mental impressions (*samskāras*). Out of these again is produced perceptual consciousness, which has the nature of the flaming forth of the mind. Out of this are also produced the mind and the products of the mind known as 'names'. Out of these are produced the earth and the

910. The Sūtra as given is claimed by the Ś. P. to follow the *Vṛitti*. Śaṅkara reads: *Itaretarapratyayatvāditi chennot-pattimātranimittatvāt*. The B.P.

gives another reading also. This is the same as Śaṅkara's with the difference that there is the word *upapannam* after *pratyayatvāt* and before *iti*.

substances possessing forms. Out of these are produced the six senses known as the 'six seats'. Out of this is produced the body known as the 'touch'. Hence result feelings etc. And hence again are produced the aforementioned ignorance etc. In this manner, this circular motion of the wheel, which begins with ignorance, and is based upon (the) mutual dependence (of these things), is without beginning. All this again cannot come into existence in the absence of the aggregate consisting of the earth and other elements and the products of elements. Thus the formation of the aggregate is all appropriately brought about.<sup>911</sup>

To this the reply is given : " It is not so because they (i.e., ignorance etc. mentioned by the Buddhists as successive causes) do not stand in the position of the cause to the formation of the aggregate." This is not appropriately brought about, because the above-mentioned ignorance etc.<sup>912</sup> do not stand in the position of the

911. The reference here is to what is known in Buddhism as *pratītya-samutpāda*, a cyclic chain of 12 causes to account for *duḥkha* and *samsara*. Usually these are listed thus : (i) *avidyā* (ignorance), (ii) *samskāras* (impressions), (iii) *viñāna* (clear consciousness), (iv) *nāma-rūpa* (name and form), (v) *śaḍāyatana* (six organs of sense), *sparsa* (contact, i.e., of the senses with exterior objects), (vii) *vedanā* (feeling), (viii) *trishṇā* (desire), (ix) *upādāna* (clinging effort), (x) *bhava* (becoming, beginning of existence), (xi) *jāti* (birth, existence) and (xii) *jarāmaraṇam śokaparidevanāduḥkhaḍaurmanasyopayaḥ* (old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despondency). (The English renderings are according to Kern. Ramanuja interprets differently here and there.) One way of understanding the chain is to suppose that

the first two refer to the previous life and the last two to the next. The rest belong to the present life, the first five as the consequences of the previous life and the last three as the causes of the next. Ramanuja completes the cycle with the first seven. *Avidyā* consists of regarding the momentary as permanent, the transient effect as eternal and misery as happiness; and, the *Mādhymikas* would add, regarding the void as real existence. *Sparsa*, rendered as 'body', is explained by *Vachaspati's Bhāmata* as 'the collection of name, form and sense organs'. (Śāṅkara by the way lists the twelve causes.)

912. The cycle of *avidyā* giving rise to an aggregate and the aggregate in turn giving rise to *avidyā* is denied on the ground that *avidyā* cannot produce any aggregate.

cause to the formation of the aggregate consisting of the earth and other elements, and the products of the elements. Indeed, neither the ignorance which gives rise to the idea of permanence etc., in regard to impermanent things etc., nor the love, hatred etc., which are based upon that (ignorance), attain the character of a cause in relation to the aggregation of a different thing which is momentary. As a matter of fact, the idea of silver in the mother-of-pearl and other such ideas do not become the causes for the production of the aggregate of the mother-of-pearl or other such things.<sup>913</sup>

Moreover, whoever has the idea of permanence in regard to whatever is momentary, he is himself destroyed then and there ; therefore, there can be none in whom love etc. can take birth. For those who do not accept one single, permanent substance as forming the seat of mental impressions, it is not possible to postulate the persistence before consciousness of (such) innate impressions.

### उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्

**Sūtra 19. Uttarotpāde cha pūrvanirodhāt** (193)

Because also the preceding (momentary) thing is destroyed when the succeeding (momentary) thing is produced (the production of the world is inappropriate).

According to the theory which holds that things are momentary, the creation of the world is not appropriately brought about for the following reason also. At the time

913. *Avidyā* can produce delusions, but not anything which can be practically realised. Mistaking an oyster-shell for silver does not create any

silver afresh; the falsely perceived silver in the shell cannot be used for making ornaments or vessels.

a thing is produced at a subsequent moment, that which is produced at the previous moment is lost; therefore it does not stand in the position of a cause to the thing produced at the subsequent moment. If non-existence is taken to be the cause (of the thing produced in the second moment), all things will always be produced in all places.<sup>914</sup>

Again, it may be said that the existence (of the prior thing) at a former moment is itself the cause (of the posterior thing). In such a case, any moment during which a pot has been in existence may become the cause of all the things existing in the three worlds, such as buffaloes, horses, walls, stones etc., which succeed that (pot) in point of time.<sup>915</sup>

Again, it may be said that the character of being the cause (of things at a subsequent moment) appertains to the very same kind of things existent at a former moment. Under such a circumstance also, one and the same pot existent at a former moment will be the cause of all pots which are found to exist in all places and have come into existence at a subsequent moment.<sup>916</sup>

You may again think that one (thing) is the cause of only one (other) thing. Even then, it is not known which is the cause of which one. Again, it may be said that with whichever place whichever pot having a momentary existence is associated, that (momentary pot) is the cause

914. The theory of the momentariness of things regards anything persisting in time as consisting of a series of discrete entities, each lasting for a moment. Between any two members of the series, there must be an interval, however minute. This implies that what is present during the subsequent moment has been produced from the immediately preceding 'non-existence'.

915. The question here is: does the mere existence of a prior thing, without reference to the nature of the thing, cause the thing existent in the subsequent moment?

916. If a momentary pot can produce a series of other momentary pots existent during subsequent moments, why should it not produce all the subsequent pots in the world?

of the pot existing during the subsequent moment and solely associated with that place. Do you then attribute permanence to that place?<sup>917</sup> Moreover, a thing which has been brought into contact with the eye and other sensory organs cannot exist at the (later) time of the production of knowledge, and therefore nothing can become an object of knowledge.<sup>918</sup>

### असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा

**Sūtra 20.** *Asati pratijñoparodho*

*yaugapadyamanyathā* (194)

If it (i.e., the cause) does not exist, there will result contradiction of the proposition ; if otherwise, (then) simultaneity (of cause and effect).

It has been stated above that, if the effect is produced even though the cause is non-existent, then all things will always be produced in all places. It is not merely the contradiction of the production (of effects) that is the result. Your proposition will also suffer contradiction. Your proposition runs thus: "The dominant, the auxiliary, the supporting and the immediate causes are the four causes that lead to the production of knowledge." The dominant (cause) is the sensory organ.<sup>919</sup>

917. Buddhist idealism does not accept the reality of space. But if a momentary pot associated with a momentary place is claimed to give rise to a series of momentary pots associated with momentary places derived from the first momentary place, what about a pot taken from one place to another?

918. The point here is that there is an interval of time, however minute, between the sense organ contacting the object of knowledge and the rise of perceptive knowledge.

919. Generally, but not always, four causes are mentioned by the Buddhists. In respect of a cognition of blueness, the *Bhāmāṭi* analyses them thus: the dominant, auxiliary, supporting and immediate causes are respectively the eye, the ocular aura (for which see p. 82, Vol. I), etc., the blue object of knowledge and the state of consciousness during the immediately preceding moment. Another list of the four causes omits the auxiliary, but adds *hetu* as the true and effective cause.

Again, it may be said that, in order that no contradiction of the proposition may result, during the moment a (given) momentary pot is in existence, the production of another momentary pot is effected. If so, then will follow the simultaneous perception of two momentary pots which stand in the position of cause and effect. And as there is no such perception, the proposition relating to the proof of the momentariness of things will also have to be given up. If it be said that momentariness has been undoubtedly established, then will follow simultaneity between sense-contact and knowledge.<sup>920</sup>

### प्रतिसङ्ख्याप्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात्

**Sūtra 21.** *Pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhā-prāptiravichchedāt* (195)

Artificial as well as natural annihilation of objects does not result, because there is no break (in the continuity of existence).

Surely the production of effects out of nothing has been negated in the manner mentioned above. It will now be stated that unobserved annihilation cannot appropriately result to whatever is really existent. The meaning is this: That gross annihilation (of the pot, for instance) which is capable of being perceived as coming into existence immediately after the stroke with the mallet etc., and which is the same as the termination of a similar series (of conscious states), that subtle unobserved

920. If one momentary thing is to be the cause of another momentary thing *immediately* succeeding it, then either the causal and effected things cease to be momentary, or they have to be perceived simultaneously. It may then be urged

that the later momentary existence is merged in the previous one: in which case there has to be simultaneity between sense contact and perception, as also between the causal thing and the effected thing.



annihilation which, even during the continuance of a similar series (of conscious states), comes into being every moment, and is incapable of being perceived—these two (types of annihilation) are denoted by the words, “artificial and natural annihilation”, by those who maintain the momentariness of things; both those cannot possibly come into existence.

Why? Because there is no break. Because in regard to whatever is existent there cannot possibly be complete discontinuity (in existence). And (this) impossibility has been demonstrated by us under the aphorism, “The identity (of the world) with Him...” (*Ved. Sūti. II. 1. 15*), while we were maintaining the identity of the effect with the cause, by pointing out that the production and destruction which belong to a real existence are indeed nothing other than its attaining distinct conditions, whereas the substance associated with (these) conditions is one only and permanent.<sup>921</sup>

It may however be said that complete destruction is seen to happen to a light which goes off, and that therefore it is inferred that destruction elsewhere also is complete. It is not right to say so; because it is definitely determined, in consequence of the perception in pots, dishes etc. of the persistence of clay and other substances, that the destruction of a substance is nothing other than its attaining a different condition: therefore, in regard to lights etc., “it is possible to have no perception for the

921. The theory of momentariness requires that the persistence of anything in time must be deemed illusory. It is supposed that destruction overtakes everything in the world every moment, but it is subtle and unobserved. When a pot is seen to exist for a number of moments, a series of similar momentary pots are seen in reality and not one pot. The destruction of a pot by a blow

with a hammer is different. It is gross and visible. (The two types of destruction are included by the Buddhists in the 75 *dharmas* or categories into which they analyse the world. Unobserved destruction includes failure to notice things when the attention is engaged elsewhere. Deliberate destruction as a category refers to the final destruction of bondage.)

reason that they have attained a subtle condition; consequently, in such cases also, it is proper to make the very assumption that they have attained a different condition.<sup>922</sup>

### उभयधा च दोषात्

**Sūtra** 22. *Ubhayadhā cha doṣhāt*

(196)

Because also there is error in both the cases (there cannot be origination or destruction according to the Buddhist view).

It has been stated above that the view accepted by those who maintain the momentariness of things—that creation proceeds out of nothing and that products acquire the character of nothingness—cannot possibly be held. The (simultaneous) acceptance of both those divisions of the view also gives rise to error. If production is taken to proceed out of nothingness, products will all invariably consist of nothingness. Indeed, whatever thing is produced out of whichever (other) thing, that is seen to consist of that (other) thing, even as water-jars, crowns etc., produced out of clay, gold etc., are seen to consist of clay, gold etc. Moreover, it is not accepted by you (i.e., the Vaibhāshikas) that the world consists of nothing, nor is it so perceived.<sup>923</sup>

If whatever is really existent undergoes unobserved destruction, the whole world will have to attain the

922. Against Ramanuja's argument that destruction means only the passing of a substance into another state, the Buddhists cite the example of a lamp going off. The destruction there is complete, and we should infer a similar but unobserved destruction in the case of pots etc. The reply to this is that the observed persistence of clay in the conditions of pots, potsherds etc. cannot be explained away to

suit a mere theory. It will however be legitimate to assume from the persistence of clay that the lamp-flame also persists in a subtle condition. From what is seen, what is unseen can be conceived; but what is seen should not be ignored or denied.

923. The point here is that whatever is produced from a non-entity must itself be of the nature of a non-entity.

condition of nothingness after the lapse of a single moment. If, however, the world is produced again, there will surely result to it the condition of nothingness, as mentioned immediately above. Therefore, in both the cases also, there arises error, and hence production and destruction do not take place in the manner stated by you.<sup>924</sup>

### आकाशे चाविशेषात्

Sūtra 23. *Ākāśe chāviśeṣāt*

(107)

Because also in the case of the *ākāśa*, there is no difference (of it from other real things as an object of perception).

For the purpose of establishing the permanence of external and internal things, it has been disproved that both artificial and natural destructions have the character of nothingness. Incidentally thereto, what is (here) sought to be controverted is the nothingness also of the *ākāśa*, which is, along with those two (destructions), enumerated by the Buddhists as being nothing.<sup>925</sup>

It is not right to attribute nothingness to the *ākāśa*; because, like the earth etc., which have all been accepted as being positive entities, the *ākāśa* also similarly possesses without difference the property of being established by unstultified perception. Indeed, the *ākāśa* is perceived to be the place wherein the hawk and other such creatures fly, as in the expressions, "The hawk flies here," "The eagle flies here," etc.

924. The reply is here given to a possible argument from the Vaibhashika that, while he does not regard the world as a non-entity, he holds that it suffers unobserved destruction every moment.

925. Among the various *dharma*s or categories into which the Buddhists analyse the

universe, three are classed together as *asamskrīta* (i.e., not compounded, not produced, nor producing). These three are the two types of *nirodha* (or destruction) referred to above and the *ākāśa* (or space). Having dealt with the *nirodhas*, the *Sūtras* incidentally take up the Buddhist view about the *ākāśa*.

It is not possible, moreover, to say that the *ākāśa* is merely the negation of the earth etc., because such a statement does not admit of any alternatives (in reference to it). Is the *ākāśa* the antecedent non-existence of the earth etc., or (their) consequent non-existence, or (their) reciprocal non-existence, or (their) absolute non-existence? Because in any case whatsoever the perception of the *ākāśa* has to be an impossibility. If the antecedent non-existence or the consequent non-existence of the earth etc. is taken to be the *ākāśa*, then, inasmuch as the perception of the *ākāśa* cannot be had so long as the earth etc. are in existence, the world will have to be without the *ākāśa*. If the reciprocal non-existence of the earth etc. is taken to be the *ākāśa*, then, inasmuch as reciprocal non-existence is existence in different particular things, in their interspaces there can be no perception of the *ākāśa*. Absolute non-existence, however, cannot possibly be brought about in relation to the earth etc. Because non-existence also is explained to be a particular condition of things actually existent, therefore the *ākāśa*, even though it be a negative entity, cannot possess the property of being a non-entity.<sup>926</sup>

It is nothing wrong, even if the *ākāśa*, which exists within this egg-shaped universe, possesses the property of being perceived by the eye, owing to its possessing form in consequence of its undergoing a fivefold division, as pointed out while giving the teaching relating to tripartition.<sup>927</sup>

926. See Note 37 in Vol. I for the various kinds of non-existence. In regard to reciprocal non-existence, Rāmānuja clearly sets down the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* point of view.

927. Both the Naiy. yikas and the Buddhists seem to think that the *ākāśa* is incapable of being perceived—because it has no form or because it is a form of non-existence. Rāmānuja's reply refers to the scriptural account of tripartition, for an explanation

of which see Note 169 in Vol. I. From tripartition, the fivefold division (or *pañcāhikarāṇa*) may be made out to be that stage in the creative process by which each one of the five elements is so constituted as to possess the characteristics of all the five. What we call the element, earth, for instance, at the stage of the fivefold division, is constituted predominantly of the earth and to a lesser degree of the other elements.

## अनुस्मृतेश्च

Sūtra 24. *Anusmṛiteścha*

(198)

And because also of recognition (at a later moment of what was experienced at an earlier one, the momentariness of things is disproved<sup>1</sup>.

What is (here) explained is that same permanence of things which has been already introduced in the very beginning. Recognition is the knowledge relating to things already experienced. The meaning is that it is knowledge leading to subsequent remembrance. The totality of things which have been experienced at a past time is recognised thus: *This* (which is seen now) is *that indeed* (which was seen before). And it is not possible for you to say that this is an error of identity (in regard to things) based upon similarity, as is the case with lamp-flames and such other things, because it is not accepted (by you) that there is one knower who is in error. Indeed, one does not constantly meditate on the identity or similarity of one's own experience with that experienced by another. Therefore, those who hold that there is an error of identity based on the experience of similarity abiding in things belonging to different periods of time, have necessarily to accept the oneness of the knower.

Further, we do not find any means of proving distinctions (from moment to moment) in regard to pots and other objects of knowledge also, as we find in regard to lamp-flames, so that we may presume recognition as having similarity for its basis.

And suppose it is said: The momentariness of pots etc. is proved by perception and inference. Surely, perception which relates to external objects existing in the present time gives rise to the knowledge that its own external object is logically excluded from things not

existing in the present time, in the same way in which the blue colour is (logically excluded) from the yellow.<sup>928</sup> And thus whatever exists in the present time is understood to be a distinct thing from what was existent in the past or will be existent in the future.

Inference also may run thus: Pots etc. are momentary, because they serve a purposeful object and are existent entities. What is not momentary, as, for instance, the (imaginary) horns of the hare etc.,—that is an unreal thing. Similarly, all the momentary existences of a pot prior to the existence at the last moment are destructible, because they are momentary existences of the pot, like the existence of the pot at the last moment.

All this has already been disproved on the ground, among others, that the relation of cause and effect (under those conditions) is itself inappropriate.<sup>929</sup> Moreover, falling as it does within the range of perception, the logical exclusion of what exists in the present time from what does not exist in the present time, does not give rise to the knowledge that whatever thing exists in the present time assumes the condition of a different entity (at another time). On the contrary, it gives rise only to a capability (on the part of things existent at the present moment) to be associated with the present moment. And by this much, it is not proved that it (i.e., whatever exists at the present moment) acquires the character of a different entity (from what exists at other moments), because it itself can possibly be in association with a different moment.

928. The reply to this given below is that association with two times does not necessarily imply two things. Just as the blue lotus flower is both blue and a lotus, similarly a thing can be in association with two different times, explains the S. P.

929. Recognition is perception supported by inference: and by its help, the inference of the momentariness of things which is opposed to perception, is set aside, as shown in the immediately preceding *Sūtras*.

Two causes, however, have been given above to prove the momentariness of a thing—that it is an existence and that it has to serve a purposeful object: this leads to the fallacy of contradiction, because it (i.e., the twofold cause) forms the means of proving the opposite of what is intended to be proved. It is indeed possible to argue thus: A pot or some such thing is permanent, either because it is an existence, or because it serves a purposeful object: whatever is not permanent, that is non-existent and does not serve any purposeful object, as, for instance, the horns of a hare.<sup>930</sup>

Again, to be able to serve a purposeful object may certainly help to prove what is other than momentariness. Indeed, it has been already stated that things which undergo momentary destruction are incapable of leading to any practical realisations, and therefore (in relation to themselves) they cannot serve any useful object.<sup>931</sup> Similarly, the last momentary existence of a pot is seen to undergo destruction as the result of a (visible and external) cause (like the stroke of a mallet); therefore the other momentary existences of the pot can also undergo such destruction as is brought about by certain causes; thus, till (the stroke with) the mallet and such causes overtake it, there is certainly permanence (for the pot).<sup>932</sup>

930. Here the fallacy known as *prakaraṇa-sama* or *sat-pratīpakṣa* is pointed out. If the minor term of an inference can be connected to the contrary of the major term by another middle term, we have this fallacy. The usual example given is the counter-balancing of the inference, "Sound is eternal because it is audible like soundness", by the counter-inference, "Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot".

931. The fallacy here is known as *viruddha*, as the middle term proves the opposite of what is intended to be proved.

932. Because the pot undergoes destruction at the last moment of its existence, it is inferred by the Buddhists to undergo destruction every moment. The reply is given here that the destruction of the pot at the last moment is due to causes other than its essential nature, and that, in the absence of such causes, there is no basis for proving the momentariness of the pot during other moments. There is a variant reading, *mudgaradihetunipātāt*, for *amudgaradihetunipātāt* adopted for the translation. With *prak* understood, the meaning is the same.

It should not, however, be urged that that (stroke with the) mallet and other such things are no causes of destruction, but that, on the contrary, they are the causes of producing the (two) halves of the pot and other such series of things which are distinct (from the pot); because it has been already explained that the destruction of the pots etc. is nothing other than the attainment of the condition of being the two halves of the pot (etc.) Even if the destruction (of a pot) is admitted to be a different condition from the production of the (two) halves of the pot, it is proper (to hold) that, owing to their directly preceding it, (the stroke with) the mallet and other such things form the causes of the destruction.

Therefore, the permanence of things, which is known through recognitive perception, is not capable of being negated in any manner whatsoever. One who says that the recognitive perception which relates to the oneness of a thing connected with an earlier and a later time, relates to a different entity—says that the knowledge relating to blueness etc. relates to a thing other than blueness etc.

Further, according to those who hold that the knower and the known are momentary in character, the admission of the logical process of inference also—which is based on the ascertainment of (the) invariable concomitance (of the middle and major terms), and also on the remembrance of that (invariable concomitance)—can hardly be entertained. Similarly, the statement, among others, of the reason in conformity with the proposition to be proved, "This is momentary," cannot also appropriately result to you, because, at the very moment that the proposition to be proved is started, the speaker (thereof) has gone out of existence.<sup>933</sup> Indeed, it is not possible

933. It is stated here that inference is possible neither for oneself nor for others, so long as the momentariness of things is believed in. The latter arises from the former and is expressed in the formal syllogism. Of the distinction between the two, Croce has said: "Indian logic

studies the naturalistic syllogism in itself, as internal thought, distinguishing it from the syllogism for others, that is to say, from the more or less usual but always extrinsic and accidental forms of communication and dispute." (*Logic as the Science of Pure Concept*).



for these who do not know what has been stated by another to complete it.

### नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्

Sūtra 25. *Nāsato 'dṛishṭatvāt*

(199)

(The external world cannot be known from inference) because in regard to what has ceased to exist, it (i.e., the passing over of its properties to another thing) is not seen.<sup>934</sup>

So far, surely, those errors have been pointed out which belong in common to the Vaibhāshikas and the Sautrāntikas, who both maintain the reality of the external objects. It being so, what has been stated above to the effect that, (according to the theory of the momentariness of all things) at the time of the genesis of the knowledge relating to an object brought into contact with the senses, that (object) is not existent, and therefore it is not possible for any object to become an object of knowledge—in regard to that, the Sautrāntika raises the following objection. The non-existence of a thing at the time of its knowledge need not result in its not becoming an object of knowledge. Indeed, it is only the property of being the cause of the origin of knowledge that constitutes being the object of knowledge.<sup>935</sup>

And by so much it does not follow that the eye etc. (which are the causes of the origin of knowledge) form

934. This Sūtra is explained by Śaṅkara as refuting Buddhist nihilism.

935. The B.P. cites an analogy. By perceiving the movements of the branches of a tree at a distance, one infers a breeze blowing there, and can go there to enjoy it. The knowledge about the breeze is through

inference and not perception. Similarly, the so called direct perception of the external world which leads to purposeful action, is really of the nature of an inference. The Sautrāntika claims that his theory of knowledge reconciles the momentariness of things with a real objective world.

the objects of knowledge ; because it is admitted that the condition of becoming the object of knowledge comes to the object of knowledge only through giving up its own form (to the consciousness). Although a thing has disappeared after giving up its own form (to the consciousness), it is nevertheless inferred to exist in the form of blueness etc., which is found in association with knowledge. Moreover, the form of every posterior state of knowledge does not result from every prior state of knowledge ; because then it will follow that during the existence of a series of states of knowledge relating to blueness, the state of knowledge relating to the yellow colour cannot originate. Therefore, the variety relating to knowledge is solely due to the external objects.<sup>936</sup>

To this, the reply is given thus : “(The external world cannot be known from inference) because in regard to what has ceased to exist, it (i.e., the passing over of its properties to another thing) is not seen” (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 2. 25). The above-mentioned blueness and other forms which are found in association with knowledge—they cannot be the forms of external objects which have disappeared out of existence and which are not really existent. Why ? “Because it is not seen.” Indeed, when a thing possessing particular attributes has gone out of existence, its attributes are not seen to pass over to another thing. Reflections etc. are also only of what is permanent.<sup>937</sup> Even then it is not merely of the particular attributes (that there is reflection, but also of the possessor of those attributes). Therefore, the variety which appertains to states of knowledge and which arises out of the variety of external objects, results only from the existence of external objects at the time of (the origin of) knowledge.

936. Yogācāra idealism is here attacked by the Sautrāntika.

937. The *Ś.P.* says that in addition to reflections (from

mirrors) such phenomena as those which arise when a china rose is placed by the side of a transparent crystal are meant here.

Once again, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) speaks of the errors common (to both the *Vaibhāshikas* and the *Sautrāntikas*).

**उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः**

**Sūtra 26.** *Udāsīnānāmapi chaivam siddhiḥ* (200)

The accomplishment (of every thing) even to the indifferent (may result from the theories of momentariness etc.) thus.

Thus, that is, when the theories of momentariness, of creation out of nothing and of destruction without a cause, are all admitted, everything may result to the indifferent, i.e., even those who do not hold themselves in readiness to act. What is accomplished by efforts etc. is either attainment of what is desirable or the avoidance of what is undesirable. Indeed, if all things are momentarily destructible, every preceding thing, or the attribute associated with it, such as latent effects etc. (leading to Svarga etc.) or knowledge etc. (leading to final release), does not ever persist anywhere in the succeeding moments; and therefore, there is nothing that remains to be accomplished by efforts etc. Under such a circumstance, because all ends are accomplished without effort, the fruits appertaining to this world and the next, and the final release result to the indifferent also.

## ADHIKARANA IV

### UPALABDHYADHIKARANA

**नाभाय उपलब्धेः**

**Sūtra 27.** *Nābhāya upalabdheḥ* (201)

There is no non-existence (of things other than knowledge) because it (i.e., the external world) is perceived.

The Yogāchāras who maintain that the reality is mere knowledge, raise the following objection. What has been stated above to the effect that the variety relating to knowledge is due to the variety of external objects—that is not appropriate ; because those very items of knowledge themselves that refer to external objects and possess several forms are, like the objects, wonderfully varied in character. And the variety in essentials appropriately results solely from the influence of innate impressions. The innate impressions also are nothing but an unceasing flow of completely distinct ideas. That the knowledge having the form of a pot produces the knowledge having the form of the two halves of the pot ; that which produces the knowledge of that (pot) of the kind mentioned above is the knowledge of the pot antecedent thereto ; and that which produces the knowledge of this pot of the kind mentioned above is the knowledge of the pot antecedent to this (last-mentioned pot) ; such a stream is called the innate impression.

If it be asked how knowledge which is internal can possess the form of mustard seeds, mountains etc., which are all external, the reply is given thus. For an external object to be also capable of practical realisation is to be dependent on the shining forth of knowledge (in the consciousness), because otherwise there can be no difference between what is known to oneself and what is known to another. And it has necessarily to be accepted that knowledge which is shining, possesses forms, because that (knowledge) which has no form is not associated with shining. And the form which is obtained by perception in relation to knowledge is one only, and the appearance of that (form) as though it were external is also the result of error. And as knowledge and the external object to

which it relates are both as a rule perceived together, therefore also the external object is not other than knowledge.<sup>938</sup>

Again, those who admit (the existence of) external objects, have also to accept necessarily that knowledge has the form exactly corresponding to the external object to which it refers; because in regard to various states of knowledge relating to pots, clothes, etc., the peculiar characterisation of knowledge by each of those external objects cannot appropriately result to it without its exact correspondence with those particular external objects, since by so much alone all practical realisations are brought about, and the postulation of external objects over and above that (knowledge) is unwarranted by any authoritative means of proof. Therefore, the real entity is nothing but mere knowledge; and there is no external object in existence.<sup>939</sup>

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply, "There is no non-existence (of things other than knowledge) because it (i.e., the external world) is perceived." It is not possible to maintain the non-existence of external objects which are other than knowledge. Why? Because knowledge is obtained in the form of causing in the knower the capacity that leads to practical realisation of

938. The illusion of two moons is cited by the *S.P.* as favourable to this Yogācāra argument. In the cognition of the two moons, both are apprehended together; and hence the second moon is not different from the moon. The *B.P.* suggests a syllogism: Blueness etc. are not different from knowledge (about them), because they are necessarily apprehended along with the knowledge; as in the case of the second moon.

939. The argument runs thus: Knowledge shines only with form, and two forms, one relating to knowledge and another to the object, are not cognised. Moreover, the object and the idea are apprehended together. Further, the idea in the mind corresponds with the object in every particular. All these can be explained without assuming the existence of an external world and on the basis of knowledge being the only reality.

particular external objects.<sup>940</sup> Thus indeed all men in the world obtain their realisation, "I know the pot." Those who, with the help of the import of the root, *jan*, to know (namely, knowledge), which has the above-mentioned form, which is related to a subject and also to an object, and which, having the world as its witness, is directly shining forth—(those who with such help) prove that mere knowledge alone is the reality, they become the laughing stock of the world.<sup>941</sup> This has been explained with great skill at the time when those who were secret supporters of Buddhist views but had put on the guise of supporting the *Veda*, were controverted.<sup>942</sup>

What has been stated above to the effect that, in consequence of their simultaneous perception as a rule, blueness and its knowledge are identical with each other—that is opposed to their (i.e., the opponents') own statements, because being together is to be the cause whereby is proved the difference between things (which are together). However, the necessary simultaneous perception (of an object) along with that knowledge the sole essence of which consists in the capacity to realise an external object—this, it is ridiculous to say, proves the non-distinction (of knowledge) from that (object).<sup>943</sup> Further, the various kinds of knowledge which undergo unobserved destruction, are devoid of any continuing and persistent form; therefore the innate impression can hardly be

940. The reply is given here to the contention that knowledge possesses form because it cannot otherwise shine forth. When blueness is apprehended, *Ś.P.* explains, it is not the form of the knowledge; it is a form conducive to the practical realisation of the object of knowledge.

941. Knowledge shines forth only as related to a subject and an object. If the two latter are illusory, how can knowledge alone be proved to be real? It cannot be on the basis of some

other knowledge, because such other knowledge is not cognised. If on the basis of the same knowledge, then, as some elements of it are stated to be unreal, what remains also has to be unreal. (*Ś.P.*)

942. See pages 68-72 of Vol. I.

943. Togetherness in being perceived implies two different things and not one. The presence of the differentiating cause can prove only the difference.

established. How can the later knowledge, which is produced by the earlier knowledge which has gone out of existence, receive its innate impression (from the earlier)? Therefore, the variety relating to knowledge is certainly due to the variety of things.

The specific characterisation of the knowledge which is directly perceived as having the character of inducing the capacity for practical realisation relating to particular external objects is dependent upon the relation of (that knowledge) with those particular external objects (themselves). And (such) relation has the characteristic of conjunction. Indeed, knowledge is also a substance. It has already been stated<sup>944</sup> that it is nothing contrary to reason that in the same way in which the substance of a ray of light, which is an attribute (of the substance) of light, possesses the character of a substance,—(in the same way) knowledge, also, which is an attribute of the individual self (possesses the character of a substance). Consequently, there is no negation of external objects.

It has been stated by other schools (than the *Vedānta*), with the help of the illustrative example of the knowledge had in dreams, that the various kinds of knowledge appertaining to the waking state are also devoid of objective support. To this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer.

वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्

**Sūtra 28.** • *Vaidharmyāchcha na svapnādivat* (202)

Also, it (i.e., the knowledge appertaining to the condition of waking) is not (concerned with false objects), as is the case with dreams, because it is unlike in nature (to dreams).

It is not proper to say that the various items of knowledge appertaining to the condition of waking are

devoid of objects; because those (items) differ in character from the knowledge produced in dreams. Indeed, the various items of knowledge had in dreams are produced out of sleep and other such misguiding instruments, and are moreover stultified (later), whereas the various kinds of knowledge appertaining to the condition of waking are the opposites thereof; therefore they have not the same nature with them (i.e., the items of knowledge in dreams). And if all kinds of knowledge are taken to be destitute of objects, whatever object also is sought to be established by you, cannot result; because inference also, which has no objective support, is devoid of objects. If that (inference) is associated with an object, then the nature of knowledge becomes uncertain; and therefore the absence of objects (in knowledge) is well disproved.<sup>945</sup>

**Sūtra 29.** *Na bhāvo 'nupalabdheḥ*

(203)

न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः

There is no existence (of such knowledge as is devoid of objects), because it is not cognised.

There can possibly be “no existence” of mere knowledge unassociated with objects. Why? Because it (i.e., such a thing) is nowhere cognised. Indeed, knowledge, which is neither related to a subject nor related to an object, is nowhere found. That, even in the

945. Some syllogisms are implied here, and criticised as fallacious: (i) Knowledge in the waking state is devoid of objects, as it is of the nature of knowledge, like knowledge in the dreaming state. The reply to this is that knowledge is devoid of objects only under certain circumstances like dreaming etc. (This concedes, for the sake of the argument, that dream knowledge is devoid

of objects.) (ii) Knowledge in general is devoid of objects as it is of the nature of knowledge. The answer to it is that this inference which is knowledge has an object. So knowledge is seen, even according to the supporter of the syllogism, to be both with an object and without it. Thus the nature of knowledge is not conclusive of its being without objects.



case of the knowledge had in dreams, and in other such cases, there can be no non-existence of objects, has already been established, while the various theories about the manifestations of things to the consciousness (i.e., theories of perception and error) formed the subject-matter of discourse.<sup>946</sup>

## ADHIKARANA V

### SARVATHĀNUPAPATTYADHIKARANA

#### सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च

**Sūtra 30.** *Sarvathānupapattiescha*

(204)

Because also it (i.e., the theory of the Mādhyamikas) is altogether inappropriate.

Here the Mādhyamika who maintains that everything is a void raises the following objections. Indeed, the view which holds the nothingness of things is the highest and ultimate opinion expressed by the Buddha. Momentariness etc., were explained on the admission of the existence of external objects so as to be in keeping with the intellectual capacity of (particular) pupils. Knowledge and external objects are all non-existent. Nothingness alone is the reality; and the acquisition of the condition of non-existence is itself final release; thus verily does the opinion of the Buddha stand.

This itself is indeed proper; because nothingness, being incapable of being proved by reason, is self-established. A reason has certainly to be sought for in regard to (the proof of) what is existent; and that which is existent is not produced either from positive existence or from negative existence. Surely, the origin of anything

is not seen to proceed out of a positive existence. Indeed, pots etc. are not produced out of lumps (of clay) etc., when they are not pressed (i.e., destroyed). Nor is the origin (of anything) produced out of negative existence; because, when lumps (of clay) etc. are destroyed, pots etc., which are produced out of negative existences, will necessarily possess the character of non-existence.

Similarly, the production (of a thing) is not possible either from out of itself or from out of another thing. If a thing is itself produced out of itself, it will lead to the error of *petitio principii*, and also there will be no purpose served by it. If one thing is produced out of another, it leads to the production of everything out of every (other) thing, as there is no difference in the otherness (of other things). The absence of destruction also results from the absence of birth. Therefore, nothingness alone is the reality. Consequently, birth, destruction, existence and non-existence are all merely erroneous knowledge<sup>947</sup>

Moreover, on the ground that there can be no error without a basis for it, it is not necessary (like *Advaitins*) to accept some real entity or other as the basis of error; because error can rise, even though the misleading cause of that error, the quality of being the seat of error, the quality of being the knower and other such things are all unreal; similarly, error can possibly rise even though its basis is unreal.

For all these reasons, nothingness is the reality.

If it be so stated, it is stated in reply: "Because also it (i.e., the theory of the *Mādhyaṃikas*) is altogether inappropriate." (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 2. 30) Your view that all things are nothing is not possible, because it is altogether

947. The nihilist logic of negation is set out briefly as proceeding on the basis that existence alone needs to be proved. When there are no reasons for existence, non-existence remains self-established. Rāmanuja's reply presently makes a further analysis of the *Mādhyaṃika*'s 'void'.

inappropriate. It is asked whether your proposition is that all is real, or unreal, or otherwise. In any case, the nothingness believed in by you cannot possibly exist, because it has been already established that in the world the words, "existence" and "non-existence", as well as the states of knowledge corresponding to them, relate to particular conditions of a thing which is actually existent. Therefore, by him who wants to prove the proposition that all is nothing as well as by him who seeks to prove the proposition that all is real existence, the proposition that is actually enunciated is that all things actually existent certainly possess the capability of being associated with particular conditions of existence; therefore, the nothingness accepted by you is nowhere proved to exist.

Moreover, after arriving at nothingness, with the help of some means of proof or other, one who desires to prove nothingness will have to accept the reality of such means of proof; if such (means of proof) is taken to be non-existent, then all things are real; consequently, in any case the nothingness of all things also is inappropriate.<sup>948</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VI

### EKASMINNASAMBHAVĀDHIDHIKARANA

#### नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात्

**Sūtra 31.** *Naikasminnasambhavāt*

(205)

948. The Sūtra is understood to mean that the Mādhyamika system is inappropriate altogether—that is, both in its principles and its proofs. Rāma-nuja first criticises Nāgārjuna's well known view that the ultimate principle or void is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both simultaneously, nor different from both—but beyond these four alternatives. He mentions

only the first two, as all possibilities other than existence fall under 'non-existence' in his view. Ś.P. explains the Mādhyamika scheme thus: A pot is existent as a pot and non-existent as a potsherd. It is also not existent as a potsherd and not non-existent as a pot. Rāma-nuja finally clinches his case by pointing out that the Mādhyamika cannot prove his theory at all.

(The Jaina theory) cannot be true because of the impossibility of the presence (of contradictory attributes) in one thing.

The Buddhists have been refuted so far. The Jainas also hold, in regard to the world, that it has, among other things, the infinitesimal atoms as its cause; therefore, the view of the Jainas is sought to be discredited immediately afterwards.

They (i.e., the Jainas) are surely of the following opinion. This world, which consists of selves and non-selves, is without a Lord; and it is made up of six substances; and these are known as the *jīvas* (selves), *dharma* (the cause of motion), *adharma* (the cause of inertia), *puṅgava* (matter), *kāla* (time) and *ākāśa* (space). Of those, the *jīvas* are of three kinds—namely, the bound, those who have obtained perfection through *yoga* and those who have attained final release. *Dharma* is known to be that particular substance which, in regard to things possessing motion, forms the cause of motion, and which pervades the whole world. And *adharma* forms the cause of inertia and is all-pervasive. The *puṅgava*, indeed, is that substance which possesses colour, smell, taste and touch; and it is also of two kinds, namely, that which consists of atoms and that which has the nature of their aggregates: and it consists of air, fire, water, earth, the body, the world etc. Time is a particular atomic substance which forms the cause of the practical realisations of the present, the past and the future. The *ākāśa* also is one and consists of infinite spatial divisions. Out of these again are also abstracted five substances which are other than atoms and are known as *astikāyas* (i.e., groups), namely, the *jīva-astikāya*, the *dharma-astikāya*, the *puṅgava-astikāya* and the *ākāśa-astikāya*. The term '*astikāya*' is used to denote a substance which exists in more places than one.<sup>949</sup>

949. Several technical terms of the Jainas are given here. *Astikāya* has been defined as that which has existence and magnitude. It has many *pradeśas* or portions of space occupied by

They (i.e., Jains) also make another list of things which is helpful to the *jīvas* in the attainment of final release, and which comprises in it the *jīvas*, the non-self, the *āsrava* (the influx of sense-impressions), *bandha* (bondage), *nirjara* (austerities), *saṃvara* (meditation) and *moksha* (final release). From the brief mention made of final release, the means for attaining final release are also to be understood; and such means consist of perfect knowledge, sight and conduct. Of those things, the *jīva*, however, is that which possesses the qualities of knowledge, sight, pleasure and power. The non-self consists of all those things which are fit for the enjoyment of the *jīva*; the *āsrava* is the sensory organs etc., which form the instruments of enjoyment of those (*jīvas*). Bondage also is of eight kinds, namely, the fourfold *ghāṭikarmas* and the fourfold *aghāṭikarmas*. The first set of these is that which injuriously affects the knowledge, sight, power and pleasure which are all the natural qualities of the *jīvas*; the other set forms the cause of the bodily configuration, its personality, its preservation and its consequences of pleasure, pain and indifference. *Nirjara* is the *tapas* which is the means of attaining final release and which is learnt from the teachings of an *Arhat*. *Samvara* is known to be that restraint of the sensory organs which has the nature of mental concentration. *Moksha*, on the other hand, is the manifestation, in its natural and true form, of the self of him whose sins, beginning with attachment, have all been removed.<sup>950</sup>

atoms. The atoms of time do not form groups, and there is no *kālāstikāya*. The *pudgala* atoms have each only a single *pradeśa*, but in combination they become *kāyas*. See Nemichandra's *Dravyasaṃgraha*.

950. The inflow of *karma-pudgalas* into the *jīvas* through sensory and physical experience is *āsrava*. The means to check it is *saṃvara*. The *karmas* already in the *jīvas* are destroyed by *nirjara*. The four *ghāṭi-*

*karmas* (or murderous *karmas*) are those which veil determinate knowledge, hinder faith in the teachings of religion, cause indifference to the quest for emancipation and actively obstruct such quest. The *aghāṭi-karmas* (or non-murderous *karmas*) are those which give the self its life-span in a body, endow it with name and form, determine the family in which it is born and bring to it pleasure and pain.

The atoms also which form the cause of the earth etc., are not of four kinds, as in the theory of the Vaiseshikas and others (i.e., the Buddhists), but are all of one nature. The distinctions (among them) such as the earth etc. are the results of (their) transformations. They also say that the whole of the totality of things has a varied character, in that it is differentiated into existence and non-existence, the eternal and the non-eternal, the identical and the different etc. (This is) because universally the sevenfold doctrine comes into operation thus : A thing is ; a thing is not ; a thing is and is not ; a thing is indefinable ; a thing is and is indefinable ; a thing is not and is indefinable ; and a thing is, is not and is indefinable. Because the whole of the totality of things is made up of the modified states of substances, they hold that existence, oneness, eternity etc. are appropriate : and as consisting of modified states, (it is made up of) the opposites of these. Modified states also are particular conditions of substances, and these (conditions) also have a positive as well as a negative form, and hence existence and non-existence and all else will be appropriate.

It is stated here : “(The theory of the Jainas) is not true, because of the impossibility of the existence (of contradictory qualities) in one thing”. This is not appropriate. Why? Because of the impossibility of the existence (of contradictory qualities) in one thing. Because in one and the same thing, it is impossible for contradictories such as existence and non-existence to be found together, as is the case with shadow and light.

What is said is this. Because a substance and its characteristic, which is a particular condition denoted by the word ‘modification’ (or *paryāya*), form distinct categories, it is not possible for contradictory attributes to meet in one and the same thing. Thus, a thing which is qualified by one particular modification such as existence cannot possibly be, at that very same time, associated with non-existence, which is the opposite of that

(existence). The impermanence of a substance is its being the abode of the particular modifications known as birth and destruction ; the opposite of this is also permanence, and how can this co-exist in that (substance)? To be different (from a thing) is also to be the seat of a contradictory attribute (in relation to that thing): its opposite also is to be identical, and how indeed can this co-exist in that (substance)? For instance, it is not possible for the generic properties of the horse and the buffalo to co-exist in one and the same thing at one and the same time. This thing has already been fully explained at the time that the upholders of *Bhedābheda* were refuted under the aphorism, "That (*viz.*, the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*) results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture)". (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 4)<sup>951</sup>

Inasmuch as time is perceived to be merely an attribute of things, it cannot be predicated of it that it has separate existence or non-existence, nor are these required

951. The *syād-vāda* of the Jāinas, known also as the *sapta-bhaṅgī-naya*, is here stated and criticised. It is claimed to be a sevenfold description of any object, exhausting all possibilities of statement about what it is, what it is not and what its relations are with other things. The word, 'syāt,' is the potential third person singular of the verb, 'as' (to be); as such it means 'may be'. But the Jāinas claim that the word is used as an indeclinable. It is a conventional symbol to indicate the sevenfold description and no more. The word 'bhaṅga' should be taken to indicate something like difference. A thing is existent with reference to its own essential nature, substance, time and place. It is non-existent with reference to the essential nature,

substance, time and place of any other thing. As these two statements, one affirmative and the other negative, can be made only successively and not simultaneously, the thing is indescribable. When we take into account the indescribability of a thing along with its existence or non-existence or both these together, we have three other alternative modes of description. Rāmānuja's reply is that it is a semantic solecism to speak of a thing as having contradictory attributes at the same time. When a substance has many states, it is the substance which is one and the states which are many. The arguments used against Bhāskara under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1. 4) are also recalled. See Vol. I, pp. 282-4.

to be disproved (here). To those who practically realise things, the practical realisation that time is or is not resembles the practical realisation relating to the existence or non-existence of the genus etc. Indeed, it has already been stated that genus etc. are perceived merely as adjuncts of substances. It may however be asked how it is declared by those who are learned in the *Veda* that one and the same *Brahman* constitutes all things. The reply has been given that it is because the Highest Person, who is omniscient and omnipotent, and who wills the truth, has all intelligent as well as non-intelligent things for His body. It has also been already stated that the difference is complete between the body and the embodied being (on the one hand) and their several attributes (on the other).<sup>952</sup>

Moreover, the six substances beginning with the *jīvas* do not possess the character of being the modifications of one substance, and therefore in relation to them it can hardly be predicated, among others, that they are one or many, either because they consist of one substance or because they consist of modifications. Again, it may be said that these six substances are so (i.e., many or one), either through their own modifications or through their selves individually. In this case also, there results contradiction of the admitted theory that all things vary in character from one another, because there is no mutual identity (between them). Therefore, this view held by the Jainas is improper (here) also. The errors already pointed out in regard to the view which holds that infinitesimal atoms not presided over by the Lord are the cause, continue to remain in force as before (in regard to the view of the Jainas also).<sup>953</sup>

952. The atomic nature of time is denied. The relationship of body and soul between the world and the *Brahman* is referred to in many places. For instance, see Vol. I, pp. 195-9. The term 'body' is defined under

*Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1. 9). See Vol. II. p. 326.

953. The criticism of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika atomic theory in the *Mahadāvṛghatva-dhikaraṇa* above (pp. 28-32), is referred to.



एवं चात्माकात्स्न्यम्

Sūtra 32. *Evam chātmākātsnyam* (206)

Thus also, the character of not being a whole (results to) the self.

Thus, that is, if your admitted theory continues to be,<sup>954</sup> there will also result to the self the character of not being a whole. Your position is indeed this, that the *jīva* which has no definite dimensions in space, has also the dimensions of the body (it occupies). It being so, inasmuch as the self which occupies the bodies of elephants and the like, has to occupy a smaller space when it enters the bodies of ants etc., which occupy a smaller space than those (bodies of elephants etc.), the character of being a whole does not result to it. The meaning is that incompleteness results (to it).

Again, it may be said that the self, owing to its possessing the properties of contraction and expansion, attains the different states denoted by the term, "modifications" (or *paryāyas*) and that thereby the above contradiction is negated. To this, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following reply.

न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः

Sūtra 33. *Na cha paryāyādyapyavirodho vikārādibhyaḥ* (207)

Also, there is no non-contradiction owing to (the self acquiring) modifications, because of other modifications.

It is not possible to set aside the above contradiction by reason of (the self) acquiring different conditions

954. S'āṅkara understands 'evam' (or 'thus') in the *Sūtra* as in the manner of the objection raised in the previous *Sūtra*. Ramanuja differs; he interprets

the word to mean: "if the Jaina system, as set out above, is accepted." This, in his view, avoids tautology.

consisting of contraction and expansion, because the resulting evil, such as (other) modifications and impermanence etc. due to those (modifications), will lead to the assumption (by the self) of a character exactly equivalent to that of a pot.<sup>955</sup>

### अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः

**Sūtra 34.** *Antyāvosthiteśchobhayanityatvādaviśeṣaḥ*  
(208)

Also, because of the persistence of the final condition (of the self in salvation) there is the permanence of both (the self and its dimensions in that state), and hence there is no difference (with the previous states).

The final dimension of the self is found in association with the condition of final release. This remains established owing to (the self) not taking up any other body thereafter; hence the self and its dimensions in association with the condition of final release are both eternal; and therefore that (final dimension) is the natural dimension of the self; and so there can be no difference with the prior (state). Consequently, the self cannot possess the dimension of the body. Accordingly, this view of the Jainas is indeed full of inconsistencies.<sup>956</sup>

955. The Jainas think of the *jīva* as a substance, and as such it undergoes modifications. It also has magnitude, the number of *pradeśas* varying from body to body and also in the same body from time to time. The *pradeśas* of the *jīva* are also sometimes called its *avayavas* and sometimes *parīkṣas*. These views are criticised. Two difficulties arising therefrom are expressly mentioned—the attribution of modifications (such as birth) and of impermanence (or death) to the self.

Others are implied—such as an outward direction to its functioning and its incapacity to become the object of knowledge. These can mean only the destruction of the essential nature of the self.

956. If the self realises its true nature on liberation, and if the self has dimensions, the dimensions in the freed state must be its natural ones. The Jainas agree that the self has a *pratiniyata-svarūpa* (definite form of its own), but not that it has any definite magnitude.

न च कर्तुः करणम्

**Sūtra 40.** *Na cha kartuḥ karaṇam* (214)

And out of the agent (i.e., the *jīva*) the instrument (namely, the mind) cannot be produced.

Out of the agent who is the *jīva*, the instrument which is the mind, cannot be produced as stated (above under II. 2. 39): "Out of Saṅkarashaṇa is born the mind called Pradyumna". Because from the scriptural passage, "From Him is born the *prāṇa*, the mind and all the sensory organs" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1.3), (it can be made out that) the origin of the mind is from the Supreme *Brahman*.<sup>963</sup> Thus, inasmuch as it (i.e., this system) deals with things opposed to the *Veda*, the authoritative-ness of this system is also negated.

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply.<sup>964</sup>

विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः

**Sūtra 41.** *Vijñānādibhave vā tadapratishedhaḥ* (215)

963. It may also be implied here that the birth of the *ahaṅkāra* from the *manas*, according to the *Pāñcharatra*, is again opposed to the Vedic teaching, where the *manas* is produced from the *sattvika* variety of the *ahaṅkāra*.

964. The *pūrvapaksha* here mentions or implies the following arguments against the *Pāñcharātra* system: (i) This system is condemned in this *Adhikaraṇa*, because this *pāda* of the *Ved. Sūt.* is devoted wholly to the condemnation of other systems of thought. (ii) All the *Sūtras* here condemn this system. It is not the case that the first two are critical and the last two favourable. (iii) *Sūtra 42* means that the system is to be rejected because it is opposed

to the *Veda* and also suffers from internal inconsistency. Compare the use of the word, '*vipratishedāt*', here with its use in *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 2. 9). (iv) Sāṅḍilya's praise of the system for helping him after the *Veda* has failed him is censure of the *Veda*. Rāmānuja's reply is: (i) This *Adhikaraṇa* is also condemnatory, as it sets aside the views of those who regard the system as lacking in authority. (ii) *Va* in *Sūtra 41* indicates a new line of thought, namely, the beginning of the reply to the criticisms in the two preceding aphorisms. (iii) '*Vipratishedāt*' has to be understood in conformity with the context. (iv) Sāṅḍilya found the system easier to understand than the *Veda*, but not opposed to it.

However, it (i.e., the authoritativeness of the Pāñcharātra) is not negated, because they (Sāṅkarshaṇa etc.) are all of the same nature as what is intelligent and the source (i.e., the *Brahman*).

By means of the word 'vā' ('however'), the view (above indicated) turns round (i.e., is rejected). Whatever is intelligent and is also the source (of being),<sup>965</sup> that is the Supreme *Brahman* who is indeed the intelligence and the source. If Sāṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha indeed have (like Vāsudeva) the same characteristics as the *Brahman*, then the system which is devoted to teaching about them cannot be denied authoritativeness.

What is said is this. This is the objection raised by those who are ignorant of the position of the Bhāgavatas (i.e., the followers of the Pāñcharātra)—that the origination of the *jīvas*, which is opposed to the *Vedas*, is upheld by them. Their position is that He who is known as Vāsudeva, who is the Supreme *Brahman* Himself and who loves His devotees, exists out of His own will in four forms in order to be the object of the devotion of His devotees.

To the same effect, it is given in the *Paushkara Samhitā*, commencing with the following passage: "Wherever indeed the fourfold Self is, as a matter of duty, worshipped by the Brāhmaṇas, under His names in the proper order, as an object of devotion, that is the *āgama* (or the scripture)." (?)<sup>966</sup> That this worship of the fourfold Self is also (the same as) the worship of the Supreme *Brahman* under the name of Vāsudeva is declared in the *Sāttvata Samhitā* thus: "To those

965. 'Ādi', here rendered as 'source', is in the neuter gender. B. P. points out that it is to be taken as the nominative singular of 'adin' (i.e., 'the eater'). The Destroyer is also the Source. The description of the *Brahman*

here as *viññānādi* is based on *Pañcharātra* sources according to Ś.P.

966. Here we have as it were a definition of the word, 'āgama', under which name the scripture of this system is known.

Brāhmaṇas indeed who worship (God) under the names of *Sat*, *Brahman*, and *Vāsudeva*, this is the supreme *śāstra* which produces discrimination, the great *Upanishad* dealing with the *Brahman*." (?)<sup>967</sup>

It is this very Supreme *Brahman* known as *Vāsudeva* who is the embodiment of six qualities in their perfection, and being differentiated into the divisions of the supremely subtle (*para*), the aggregated (*vyūha*), and the great and the mighty (*vibhava*), is well reached by devotees, when He is worshipped by them according to their qualities with religious works based on knowledge. It is also declared by them (i.e., their *śāstras*) that the *vyūha* is attained by worshipping the *vibhava* and then the subtle Supreme *Brahman* known as *Vāsudeva* is attained by worship of the *vyūha*. The *vibhava* is indeed well known to be the class of manifestations in the forms of *Rāma*, *Kṛishṇa* etc. The *vyūha* consists of *Vāsudeva*, *Śaṅkarshāṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*, and is thus a fourfold aggregate. The subtle is the Supreme *Brahman* who is in the form solely of the six qualities and is known as *Vāsudeva*.

As it is said in the *Paushkara (Samhitā)* in the following and other passages: "For the reason that this Supreme *Brahman* who is imperishable and is known by the name of *Vāsudeva*, is well attained from this *śāstra* by means of rituals based on knowledge.....". (?) Therefore, because *Śaṅkarshāṇa* and others are of the nature of forms taken at will by the Supreme *Brahman*, and because it is declared that (the Supreme *Brahman*) has births of the form of the assumption of bodies at will arising out of motherly love for devotees as established in the scriptures from the text, "The Unborn One is born in many ways". (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 13. 1), there can be no contradiction of the authoritativeness of the *śāstra* which states this (above-mentioned teaching). Because the

967. Ś.P. points out that the context in the *Paushkara Samhitā* refers to *Śaṅkarshāṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*.

individual self, the *manas* and the *ahaṅkāra* are presided over by Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha (respectively), there is no opposition (to the *Vedas*) in they themselves (i.e., Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha) being denoted by the words, 'the individual self' etc. ; this is similar to denoting the *Brahman* by the words, 'ākāśa' 'prāṇa' etc.

### विप्रतिषेधाच्च

**Sūtra 42.** *Vipratishedūchcha*

(216)

Because also of the negation (of the origination of the *jīva* in the Pāñcharātra itself, its authoritative-ness is beyond question).

Indeed, even in that system (i.e., the Pāñcharātra), the origination of the *jīva* is negated.<sup>968</sup> As stated in the *Parama Samhitā*: "The nature of the *prakṛiti* is said to be that it is without consciousness, that it is meant for another (i.e., the *jīva*), and is eternal and ever changing, that it has (or is made up of) the three qualities (i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), and that it is the field for (the experiences of) those having the bondage of *karma*. Between it and the *puruṣa* (i.e., the individual self), the relation is by pervasion. He (i.e., the *puruṣa*) is determined in real truth to be beginningless and endless." (?) Because there are to be found in all the *Samhitās* (of the Pāñcharātra) statements in this manner about the *jīva* being eternal, the origination of the essential nature of the soul is certainly negated in the Pāñcharātra. How there happens to be discussion about birth, death etc., of the soul in the *Veda* and in the world will be explained under the aphorism, "The soul is not (produced), because of (the declaration in) the

968. Sūtra 41 upholds the way is a strained interpretation. authority of the Pāñcharātra. Sūtra 42 refutes the pūrva-To understand it in any other paksha.

scriptures....." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 18). Hence the doubt that there is lack of authoritativeness (for the Pāñcharātra) on account of the theory of the origination of the *jīva* is thrown to a great distance, because the origination of the *jīva* is negated there too.

And that loud proclamation of some persons that this system is opposed to the *Veda* because it is made out from the following text, "Śāṇḍilya, having obtained no satisfaction in all the *Vedas* with their subsidiary branches of knowledge, studied the Pāñcharātra scripture" (?), that no sure basis for the highest object of human pursuit was obtained in the *Vedas* with their subsidiary branches of knowledge—that (loud proclamation) has issued forth merely from the faith of those who have never smelt the sentences of the *Vedas* and never considered the host of their elaborations and principles of interpretation. It has been stated that the criticism of the fire sacrifice before sunrise in the statement, "Those who make the *agnihotra* sacrifice before sunrise, they utter lies morning after morning" (*Ait. Br.* V. 31. 6), is intended for the praise of the fire sacrifice after sunrise. In the context of the *Bhūmavidyā* (*Chhānd. Up.* VII.), in the passage which begins with, "Reverend sir, I have studied the *Rigveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda*, the *Atharvaṇa* as the fourth, and fifthly the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 2), enumerates all the sources of knowledge and ends with "I, being such a person, reverend sir, am only a knower of Vedic texts and not the knower of the *Ātman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 3), it is stated by Nārada that there was no gaining of the knowledge of the *Ātman* in all the branches of knowledge other than the *Bhūmavidyā*: this is intended to praise the *Bhūmavidyā* to be expounded thereafter. Or else this argument of Nārada is with reference to his failure to attain that Supreme Reality, which is taught in the *Vedas* with their subsidiary branches of study. It is made out by the mention later on of the Reality, the Supreme *Brahman* who is called *Vāsudeva* and is to be known from the

*Vedānta*, that similar is the case with Śaṇḍilya. It is stated in the *Parama Samhitā* that the Pāñcharātra scripture is begun for easy understanding of the meaning of the *Vedas*, on account of its being difficult to understand: "Sir, the *Vedas* with their subsidiary branches of study and with the auxiliaries of these latter and with elaborations have been studied. The auxiliaries, with logical arguments, have been heard by me (from a teacher.) And in all these, I do not see anywhere as free from doubt any path to perfection by which success will be attained" (?). And also: "In the manner in which the auspicious Lord Hari, who is full of knowledge, seized the essence from the *Vedāntas* and out of compassion for the devotees summarized them so as to make them easy...". (?)

Therefore He (i.e., the well known) auspicious Lord, Vāsudeva, who is to be known solely from the *Vedas*,<sup>969</sup> who has the name of the Supreme *Brahman*, who is the opposite of all that is evil and the sole seat of auspiciousness, who is infinite, who is an ocean of immeasurable generous qualities like knowledge and bliss, and who wills the truth,—(He) observed the devotees arranged according to the system of the four castes and the four stages of life and desiring the objectives of human pursuit known as virtue, wealth, enjoyment and final release; being the shoreless ocean of mercy, condescension and motherly affection, He understood that the *Vedas*, which teach the truth regarding His nature, His glory and His worship and its fruits, which are divided into the *Rik*, the *Yajus*, the *Sāman* and the *Atharvan*

969. Rāmānuja has in mind a possible argument that the *Pāñcharātra*, even if composed by the Supreme Lord, may be meant to deceive and delude, like the Buddhist teachings. The answer is that the Lord's intention now is to save His devotees by presenting them

with the teachings of the *Veda* in an easily intelligible form, and not to punish the opponents of the *Veda*. His qualities are auspicious; and the *Veda*, the only source of knowledge about Him, declares Him to be free of all evil.



divisions, which contain innumerable branches, and which are in the form of commandments, panegyrics and hymns—are difficult to understand by all other than Himself, be they gods or men; He himself (therefore) created the Pāñcharātra scripture which teaches the truth about their (i.e., the *Vedas*’) teachings. Thus it (i.e., the Pāñcharātra) is faultless.

It has been explained by others (like Śaṅkara) that these four aphorisms relate to the denial of the authoritativeness of a part (of the Pāñcharātra doctrine) opposed (to the *Vedas*); that (explanation) is not in conformity with the words of the aphorism, and is also opposed to the opinion of the author of the *Sūtras* (i.e., Vyāsa). After writing the aphorisms dealing with the principles of the *Vedānta*, it has been stated by the author of the *Sūtras* in the section relating to knowledge in the *Mokṣadharmā* (a portion of the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* expounding the conduct leading to final release), while composing the compilation of the *Bhārata* consisting of a hundred thousand (verses) for the sake of elaborating the *Veda*: “The householder, the student, one leading a retired life in the forest and the mendicant (ascetic)—if he (i.e., any of these) desires to attain perfection, which deity should he worship?” (*M. B. XII. 342. 1*).<sup>970</sup> Beginning thus, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) expounds the scheme of the Pāñcharātra system by means of a long section, and declares thus: “This has been extracted from the long story of the *Bhārata*, running to a hundred thousand (stanzas), by using the mind as a churn, even as ghee is extracted from curds, as butter from curds, as the Brāhmaṇa from bipeds, as the *Āraṇyaka* from the *Vedas*,

970. The question is asked of Bhishma by Yudhisṭhira. In answer thereto, Bhishma tells many legends and stories embodying traditional teachings. This is followed by similar instruction from Vaiśampāyana

to Janamejaya. At the centre of them all is the *Sāttvata* or *Pancharatra* system, which is commended in various ways. The quotations from the *M.B.* reveal variations in readings.

as nectar from medicinal herbs" (M. B. XII. 353. 11-12); "This is a great *Upanishad*. It is connected with the four *Vedas* along with the settled doctrines of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga. It is called the Pāñcharātra" (M. B. XII. 348. 62); "This is prosperity, this is the sacred text, this is the highest good." (M. B. XII. 343. 33); "It is consistent with the *Rigveda*, the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda* as well as with the hymns of the *Atharvaveda*" (M. B. XII. 343. 41); and "It will become an authority, indeed this is the law" (M. B. XII. 343. 45). By the terms, 'Sāṅkhya' and 'Yoga', *jñānayoga* and *karmayoga* are meant, as stated in "the *jñānayoga* of the Sāṅkhyas and the *karmayoga* of the Yogins" (B. G. III. 3). In the *Bhīṣma-parvan* also (it is stated): 'Mādhava (i.e., the Lord), who has been sung by Saṅkarshaṇa, is to be worshipped, served and honoured according to the rules of the Sāttvatas by Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras well known through their qualities" (M. B. VI. 66. 39-40). How can Bādarāyaṇa, who speaks this, and is the foremost among the knowers of the *Veda*, speak against the authoritativeness of the Sāttvata (i.e., the Pāñcharātra) system, which is devoted to an exposition of meditation, worship and such other things in regard to Vāsudeva, who is the Supreme *Brahman* to be known from the *Vedānta*?

But in passages like "The Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pāñcharātra, the *Vedas*, the Pāśupata also.....do these teach the same thing, O sage, or do they teach differently?" (M. B. XII. 359. 1-2), it is stated that the Sāṅkhya and others deserve to be accepted. But in the Science of the Embodied (i.e., the *Vedānta-Sūtras*) the Sāṅkhya and others are condemned. It may be said that therefore this system also is equivalent to them. It is replied, "No". There, too, this principle stated in the Science of the Embodied is applied. The meaning of the question, "Do these teach the same thing, or do they teach differently?" is this. Are the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pāśupata, the *Veda* and the Pāñcharātra devoted to

the exposition of one and the same reality, or do they relate to the exposition of different entities? If they are devoted to the exposition of one reality, what is that single reality? When they are devoted to the exposition of different entities, then, because of their being devoted to the exposition of principles conflicting with one another, and because it is impossible for any ambiguity to arise in regard to the reality, only one authority deserves acceptance. What is that one (authority)? 971

Giving a reply to this, he begins, "O, royal sage, learn these systems of knowledge, these many creeds. The teacher of the Sāṅkhya is Kapila" (M. B. XII. 359. 64-5). He then shows that the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, and the Pāśupata are due to individual authors, because of their having been taught by Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha and Paśupati. He declares the *Vedas* to have been composed by no embodied self: "He, the teacher of the *Veda*, is called Avāntaratapas" (M. B. XII. 359. 66);<sup>972</sup> and then he declares that Nārāyaṇa Himself is the teacher of the Pāñcharātra thus: "Nārāyaṇa Himself is the teacher of the whole of the Pāñcharātra" (M. B. XII. 359. 68).

This is the intention of him (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) who says thus. It is difficult to concede authority, in respect of reality as it is, to systems of individual origin, on account of their arguments about principles conflicting with one another and on account of their stand against the reality which is to be known only from the *Vedas*, which are free from the slightest trace of all imperfections

971. The truth is only one in spite of the varied views of the different systems. Different views are tenable only in regard to ritual or worship, but not in regard to the Ultimate Reality. So, the *Veda* being the sole authority for knowledge about this Reality, whatever is uncontradicted by the *Veda* is acceptable in every

system. No principle or teaching of the *Pāñcharātra* is contradicted by the *Veda*, and so it is wholly accepted.

972. In M. B. (XII. 359), Nārāyaṇa's word is said to have incarnated as Apantaratamas—there is a slight variation in this name—who arranged the *Vedas* and later re-incarnated as Vyasa.

like carelessness etc., on account of their superhuman origin ; Nārāyaṇa, who is the Supreme *Brahman*, is to be known from the *Veda* ; hence the reality of every principle taught in the various systems, such as the *pradhāna*, the *puruṣa* and Paśupati, is based on their having for their self Nārāyaṇa, who is the Supreme *Brahman* to be known from the *Vedas*.

Hence (he) says this also : “ In all these systems, O best of kings, according to the scripture and according to the reasoning adopted, the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, is seen to be the firm basis” (*M. B.* XII. 359. 68-9). The meaning of “ according to the scripture and according to the reasoning adopted ” is that to one who examines carefully the reality expounded by every scripture according to the method of reasoning adopted therein, Nārāyaṇa is seen to be the firm basis of all such realities ; and that to one who believes that everything has the *Brahman* for its Self on the basis of such (Vedic) statements as, “ All this indeed is the *Brahman*” (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1), and “ Nārāyaṇa is all ” (?), Nārāyaṇa alone will appear as the firm basis of all the entities that are mentioned by the various systems without reference to the *Brahman* being their Self.

Therefore, when Nārāyaṇa, who is to be known from the *Vedānta* and is the Supreme *Brahman*, is Himself the author of the entire Pāñcharātra, none can find in it (i.e., this system) any similarity with other systems, because it teaches His nature and His worship and is His system.

Hence there alone it is said : “ The Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the *Vedāraṇyaka* are members of one another : together they are said to become one in the Pāñcharātra ” (*M. B.* XII. 358. 81). The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga are the Sāṅkhya-Yoga ; and the *Vedas* and the *Araṇyakas* are the *Vedāraṇyaka*. These are members of one another ; having become one by being devoted to the exposition of the same truth ; they are said to be unified as the Pāñcharātra.

What is said amounts to this. The *Āraṇyakas* (or the *Upanishads*) accept the twentyfive principles enunciated by the Sāṅkhya, the (path of) meditation and mental concentration (i.e., *yoga*) consisting of (eight stages such as) self-control, religious observances etc. mentioned by the Yoga system, and the kinds of rites mentioned by the *Veda*; they then go on to expound the nature of the *Brahman*, declaring that the principles (of the Sāṅkhya) have the *Brahman* for their Self, that the Yoga is the mode of worship of the *Brahman*, and that the rites (mentioned by the *Vedas*) are of the form of His worship. All this indeed has been made clear by Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme *Brahman* Himself, in the system of Pāñcharātra.

In the Science of the Embodied, what is negated is the principles of the Sāṅkhya not having the *Brahman* for their Self, and not the nature of these (principles). In the Yoga and the Pāśupata (systems), the Lord being merely the instrumental cause of the world, the postulation of superior and inferior entities as the opposites of what they are and conduct prohibited by the *Vedas* have been rejected, and not the nature of the Yoga, nor the nature of Pāśupatī. Hence it has been stated: "The Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pāñcharātra, the *Veda* and similarly the Pāśupata are based on the *Atman* and cannot be destroyed by logical arguments". (?)

Accordingly, what has been stated by each of them in regard to the nature of each entity is acceptable to that extent. It is not stated that everything (in these systems) is to be repudiated, as is the case with the philosophies expounded by Jina and Buddha. This is so because the above-quoted text has oneness of meaning with: "The Lord, Nārāyaṇa, is (seen to be) the firm basis, according to the scripture and according to the reasoning adopted" (M. B. XII. 359. 68).

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PART III  
ADHIKARANA I  
VIYADADHIKARANA

न विद्यदभ्युतेः

**Sūtra 1.** *Na viyadaśruteḥ*

(217)

The spatial ether (or *ākāśa*) is not (created), because there are no scriptural declarations to that effect.

It has been stated above that the Sāṅkhya and the other systems which are all outside the pale of the *Veda*, are inconsistent, on account of their being based on erroneous reasoning and also because of self-contradiction. Now, with the object of showing the absence of even the smallest trace of self-contradiction and other errors in relation to his (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*'s) views, the manner in which the world, consisting of intelligent and non-intelligent things and accepted as the effect produced by the *Brahman* (as the cause), is the effect, is taken up for examination in particular.<sup>973</sup>

Here the doubt is raised whether the spatial ether is created or not. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That the spatial ether is not created. Why? "Because there are no scriptural declarations to that effect." Indeed, it is only about an actually existing thing

973. The first three *pādas* of Chapter II of the *Ved. Sūt.* deal respectively with (i) replies to criticisms about the *Brahman* being the cause of the world, (ii) criticisms of theories positing other things than the *Brahman* as such cause, and (iii) replies to criticisms about the world not

being an effect of the *Brahman*. In the third *pada*, the *pūrvapakṣa* assails the causality of the *Brahman* by claiming that some thing or other is not the effect of the *Brahman*. In the first *adhiḥkāraṇa*, the objector is the Naiyāyika.

that it is possible to have a scriptural statement. But in the case of such things as the creation of the skyflower and of the spatial ether, both of which are not really possible, it is not possible to express it by means of Vedic words. Surely, it is not possible to determine that the spatial ether, which, like the *ātman* (i.e., the individual self), has no parts and is all-pervading, has origination.

For this very reason, it is only in regard to *tejas* (i.e., the element of light and heat) that origination is declared to exist in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* in the section relating to creation, as in the following passage:—"It 'saw' (i.e., thought), 'I will become many and be born'; it 'saw' *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3). There is (no doubt) the declaration that the spatial ether was created, in the following passages of the *Taittirīyas* and the *Ātharvaṇikas* and other similar passages: "From that same *Ātman* the spatial ether was produced" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); and "From Him were produced the principal vital air, the internal organ of the mind and all the senses, the spatial ether, the elements of air, light and water" (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 3); (but this declaration) is stultified on account of its being opposed in meaning to facts.<sup>974</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is replied to as follows:—

अस्ति तु

Sūtra 2. *Asti tu*

(218)

But\* there is (origination in relation to the spatial ether according to the *Veda*).<sup>975</sup>

974. The *Veda* does not deal with (i) what is established by other means of knowledge and (ii) what is contradicted by these other means. If the *Veda* makes a statement under either of these heads, it has to be interpreted harmoniously with the spirit of the *Veda*. Under the next *Sūtra*, Ramanuja replies that

the statement about the creation of the spatial ether is a fit subject for the *Veda* to speak about.

975. In *V.S.*, Ramanuja takes the *Sūtra* to mean that there is certainly a Vedic declaration about the creation of the spatial ether.

But there is origination in relation to the spatial ether. Indeed, the scripture, which deals with supersensuous things, is certainly capable of declaring origination in relation to the spatial ether (at the outset of creation), even though that (origination) is not made out by the other means of knowledge (like perception and inference).

Moreover, in regard to a thing that is taught by the scripture (like the origination of the spatial ether), no inferential argument about its non-origination, which is opposed to that (scripture) and which is based upon its having no parts and such other reasons, is capable of ever coming into existence.<sup>976</sup> It will be explained later on that the non-origination of even the individual self is not due to its being devoid of parts.

He (i.e., the opponent) again raises the following objections :

### गौण्यसम्भवाच्छब्दाच्च

**Sūtra 3.** *Gauṇyasambhavāchchhabdāchcha* (219)

It (i.e. the scriptural passage relating to the origination of the spatial ether) has a figurative sense, because that (origination) cannot possibly happen, and because also there is a scriptural passage (negating that origination).<sup>977</sup>

It is possible to assume that the scriptural passage relating to the origination of the spatial ether and beginning

976. The Naiyayikas' inference about the *ākāśa* may be thus stated: (i) Sound, being a quality like form, has for its substratum a substance other than the eight already recognised. (This is claimed to prove the existence of the *ākāśa*). (ii) The *ākāśa* is eternal, because it has no parts, or because it is omnipresent, like the self.

977. Śaṅkara starts a new Sūtra with *Śabdachcha*. Ś. P. explains that one Sūtra will do, because the two reasons deal with a matter that has cropped up in the middle and not with the main proposition under this *adhikaraṇa*.



with "From that same *Ātman*, indeed, the spatial ether was produced (*sambhūta*)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), has a figurative sense; because, according to the passage—"It created *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3)—out of the *Brahman* who is desirous of creating the world *tejas* is first created, and owing to the creation of *tejas* as the first, it is not possible to declare origination in respect of the spatial ether (which, had it been created, would have been mentioned earlier); and because also the scriptural passage—"The air and the spatial ether are immortal" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 3)—declares that the spatial ether is immortal.

It may, however, be asked how the word, '*sambhūta*', which is used only once in the context, is used in its figurative sense with regard to the spatial ether, and in its primary significance in regard to the element of fire (*tejas*) etc.<sup>978</sup> If it be so asked, it is replied as follows:—

### स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत्

**Sūtra 4.** *Syāchchaikasya brahmaśabdavat* (220)

And one and the same (word, '*sambhūta*') has (two meanings), like the word '*brahman*' (in another similar context).

In the passage—"From that same *Ātman*, indeed, the spatial ether was produced (*sambhūta*)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1)—the word, '*sambhūta*,' cannot possibly have its primary significance; in the passage—"From air, fire (was produced)" (*Ibid.*)—that word, through its connection, is repeated to supply the ellipsis, and has

978. The relevant passage in the *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1) runs thus: "From that same *Ātman*, indeed, the spatial ether was produced; from the spatial ether, air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from

water, the earth; from the earth, herbs; from herbs, food; from food, the body; that same body indeed is made up of the essence of food."

certainly its primary significance. "Like the word, 'brahman'." For instance, the word, 'brahman', is used in its figurative sense to denote the *pradhāna* in the following passage—"From Him proceeds the undifferentiated creation (*brahman*), as also the world of matter and soul (*anna*) characterised by name and form" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9). In that very same context, in the passage—"The *Brahman* grows by means of *tapas*; *anna* (undifferentiated creation) is born out of Him" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9)—that (word 'brahman') is used in its primary significance to denote the *Brahman*. Just so is the case (with the word, 'sambhūta'). And in the case of a word supplying an ellipsis in a connected context, as it is in the case of the repetition of a word, there certainly is repetition (only) of what is named (or indicated) by the word: this is the meaning.<sup>979</sup>

He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) refutes (the above view) :

### प्रतिज्ञाहानिरव्यतिरेकात्

**Sūtra 5.** *Pratijñāhāniravyatirekāṭ*

(221)

There is no failure of the proposition (that by knowing one thing all things become known), because it (i.e., the spatial ether) is not distinct (from the *Brahman* on account of being the effect of the *Brahman*).

It is not proper to assume in accordance with the passage (VI. 2. 3) of the *Chhāndogya* (*Upaniṣad*) that the other scriptural passages which declare origination in

979. Here the *pūrvapakṣa* reply is given to a possible objection that, while in the *Taitt. Up.* the word, 'sambhūta', is not repeated, but has to be understood as present subsequently to its use at the beginning, in the *Muṇḍ. Up.*, the word, 'brahman', is actually repeated. The answer is that use by repetition and elliptical use do not differ.

In either case, the word is used more than once, and on each occasion its sense can be different. When a word is used once, and is again elliptically indicated, what is repeated is the barest denotation of the word, common to both its figurative and primary significance.

regard to the spatial ether have a figurative significance ; because origination in relation to the spatial ether has been accepted by a passage of the *Chhāndogya* (*Upanishad*) itself, because by means of the passage beginning with, “ (Did you ask about that Controller) by (knowing) whom what is not heard becomes heard ” (VI. 1. 2-3), the proposition is given that through the knowledge of the *Brahman*, the knowledge of all other things is produced. That proposition, indeed, does not fail, only because of the spatial ether also, by reason of being an effect of the *Brahman*, not being distinct (as an effect) from Him.<sup>980</sup>

शब्देभ्यः

**Sūtra 6.** *Sābdebhyaḥ*

(222)

Because there are scriptural texts (declaring origination in relation to the spatial ether).<sup>981</sup>

For the following reason also, origination in relation to the spatial ether is made out from the *Chhāndogya* (*Upanishad*), because, by reason of being the effect (of the *Brahman*), it (i.e., the spatial ether) is made out to be non-distinct from the *Brahman* from the text which emphasises the existence of One only prior to creation and which is to the effect, “ Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second ” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1), and from other texts such as, “ All this has that (*Brahman*) for its Self ” (*Ibid.* VI. 8. 7). And the passage, “ It ‘ saw ’ *tejas* ” (*Ibid.* VI. 2. 3), which speaks of the origination of *tejas* does not deny origination in relation to the spatial ether. The primacy

980. The proposition in the aphorism is here proved on the basis that the world is an effect of which the *Brahman* is the material cause. There are other methods of proof also.

981. Sāṅkara reads *Sūtras* 5 and 6 together as one. The *Ś.P.*

explains that the division into two *Sūtras* is based on the principle that two different reasons for proving the main proposition of the *Adhikaraṇa* deserve separate aphorisms, when the reasons are not compounded together in a single word.

made out in favour of *tejas* merely from the absence of mention of the origination of spatial ether is not capable of negating that origination of the spatial ether which is taught in other scriptural passages.<sup>982</sup>

### यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत्

**Sūtra 7.** *Yāvadvikāraṇtu vibhāgo lokavat*

(223)

Also, wherever there is modification, there is differentiation, as is the case in the world.

The word, 'tu' (which often means 'but'), is used here in the sense of 'and'. By means of scriptural passages such as, "All this has that (*Brahman*) for its Self" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7), the spatial ether is declared to be a modification (i.e., an effect); by which what is assuredly stated is the differentiation, that is, the production of that spatial ether from the *Brahman*. "As is the case in the world." In the world, after it is said, "All these are the sons of Devadatta," by means of the statement that some of them took their birth from him, the birth of all from him comes to be stated. It (i.e., the case of the spatial ether) is similar. And if this be so, the statement, "The air and the spatial ether are immortal" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 3), means that they exist for a long time like the gods (who are also called immortal).<sup>983</sup>

982. The oneness of "Existence" prior to creation (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1) refers to the subtle causal state where the *Brahman*, the *prakṛiti* and the individual self cannot be distinguished from one another. In *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 8. 7), "all this" means "this world, which is all effects taken together"; "that" refers to "the *Brahman*" who has been already mentioned as the cause. In other words, the text means that the *Brahman* who is the Self

in the subtle causal state is also the Self in the gross effected state. The primacy accorded to *tejas* in the order of creation in VI. 2. 3 is not absolute, but relatively to its own effect.

983. The quoted text places the elements of air and spatial ether on an equal footing. This is a serious disadvantage to the *pūrvapaksha* which regards ether as eternal and air as non-eternal.

एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः

**Sūtra 8.** *Etena mātariśvā vyākhyātah* (224)

By means of this (reasoning), the element, air, is explained (as having an origin).

By means of this reasoning, origination in relation to *mātariśvan* (or what moves in the atmosphere), that is, the element of air, is also explained. The composition of separate aphorisms in regard to the spatial ether and the element, air, is intended to call to mind the element, air, in the aphorism, "The element of *tejas* is produced out of it (i.e., the element of air), because it (i.e., the scripture) says so" (*Ved. Sūt. II. 8. 10*).<sup>984</sup>

असम्भवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः

**Sūtra 9.** *Asambhavastu sato 'nupapattēh* (225)

The *Sat* alone has no origination, because (otherwise) there will be inappropriateness.

The word 'tu' (rendered as 'alone') lays emphasis; 'asambhava' (rendered as 'no origination') means 'non-origination'. 'Sat' means the *Brahman* Himself. There is no non-origination in relation to all things other than Him; because (otherwise) there will be inappropriateness. What is said is this:—The declaration of origination in regard to the elements of the spatial ether and air is merely illustrative. There can be no origination in regard to the *Sat* only, who is the Supreme Cause and is the Supreme *Brahman* Himself. The whole world, which is other than Him and which consists of the

984. This *Sūtra* does not solve any additional doubt like *Ved. Sūt. (II. 1. 3)*, to which it is similar in form.

principles beginning with the *avyakta*, the *mahat*, the *śhaṅkāra*, the rudimentary elements, the senses, and the elements of spatial ether and air, is known through the proposition that by knowing a certain one thing (i.e., the *Brahman*) all things become known; and non-origination in their case is inappropriate.

## ADHIKARANA II

### TEJO'DHIKARANA

#### तेजोऽतस्तथाशाह

**Sūtra 10.** *Tejo'tastathāhyāha*

(226)

The element of *tejas* is produced out of it (i.e., out of the element of air); indeed it (i.e., the scripture) says so.

It has been stated above that all that is other than the *Brahman* is the effect produced by the *Brahman* (as the cause). Now the question that is taken up for consideration is whether, among the intermediate produced effects, the origination of each such effect is due merely to that thing which is its immediate cause, or whether it is due to the *Brahman* Himself who has assumed the form of such cause (i.e., has such cause for His body). What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it is due merely to each such thing. Why? Surely, *tejas* is produced out of it, that is, out of air. Indeed, the scriptural statement, "From air, fire (was produced)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), says so.<sup>985</sup>

985. All things have been shown to be the effects of the *Brahman* under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 4. 23-28). But the Naiyāyikas object that the infinitesimal atoms, the spatial ether and the

*manas* are unproduced and eternal. The atomic theory has been refuted in II. 2. 10-16. The ether has been shown to be an effect in the previous section, and the *manas* also must be

आपः

**Sūtra 11.** *Āpaḥ*

(227)

The element of water (is produced from that element of *tejas*).

The element of water also is certainly produced 'out of it', that is, out of the element of *tejas*. Indeed, the scriptural statements—"From fire, water (was produced)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), and "It (i.e., *tejas*) created water" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3)—say so.<sup>986</sup>

पृथिवी

**Sūtra 12.** *Prithivī*

(228)

The element of earth (is produced from water).<sup>987</sup>

The (element of) earth is produced from water. (The scriptural texts), "From water, the element of earth (was produced)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1) and "It (i.e., the element of water) created *anna* (i.e., the element of earth)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 4), say so.

deemed to be no different from the ether in this respect. Granted that all things without exception are the effects of the *Brahman*. Is He the direct cause of each thing, or of spatial ether only? In the latter case, other things in the order of creation may be derived, each from its immediately preceding cause. Thus, the *Chhāndogya* statement, "It created water", means: "*Tejas* created water". The other view is that every effect is produced from the *Brahman* having its causal substance as His body. For

example, the *Brahman* having *tejas* for His body created water. It is this view which is accepted by the *Ved. Sūt.* (*Sūtras* 10 to 17, comprising one section according to *Rāmānuja*, are divided by *Śaṅkara* into 7 sections, each consisting of one *Sūtra*.)

<sup>986.</sup> In *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 2. 3), "It" stands for "the *Brahman*" according to the *Vedāntin*.

<sup>987.</sup> *Śaṅkara* reads together *Sūtras* 12 and 13 as one *Sūtra* which constitutes an *Adhikaraṇa* by itself.

It may however be asked how the element of earth is denoted by the word 'anna' (which ordinarily means 'food'). To this question, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

### अधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरेभ्यः

**Sūtra 13.** *Adhikārarūpaśabdāntarebhyaḥ*

(229)

(That the word 'anna' denotes the element of earth is made out) from the connected context, from the colour (of the earth) and from other scriptural passages.

That the element of earth itself is denoted by the word 'anna' is made out from the context relating to (the description of) the creation of the great external elements. All that is capable of being eaten as food is a modification of the element of earth; hence the word denoting the effect (namely, 'anna') is used to denote the cause (i.e., the element of earth). Similarly, in the complementary passage here, the description of the colours of the external elements is given thus: "That which is the red colour of fire, that is the colour of the (untripartitioned) *tejas*; that which is the white (colour of fire), that is the colour of the (untripartitioned) element of water; that which is the black (colour of fire), that is the colour of *anna*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 4. 1). Herein, that which is denoted by the word 'anna' is made out to be a thing of the same kind as the elements of water and *tejas*. And there are other scriptural passages in a similar context, thus: "From fire, water (was produced); from water, the earth" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1). Therefore, the element of earth itself is denoted by the word 'anna,' and hence the element of earth is produced out of the element of water. *Tejas* and the other examples given are intended (merely) to be illustrative.



The *mahat* and other such principles are produced solely out of those things, which immediately precede them in the order of creation, because there is nothing against accepting whatever is stated in the scripture. Such passages are in harmony even with the *Brahman* being the indirect (or remote) cause (of all created things): "From Him are produced the principal vital air, the internal organ of the mind and all the senses, the elements of spatial ether, air, *tejas*, water and earth which is the support of all" (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 3); "From Him proceeds this *brahman* (or undifferentiated creation), as also *anra* (or the world of matter and soul) differentiated by name and form" (*Ibid.* I. 1. 9); "From that same Self itself, the spatial ether was produced" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); and "It created *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3), etc.

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply:—

तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात्सः

**Sūtra 14.** *Tadabhidhyānadeva tu talliṅgāt saḥ* (230)

But He (is the creator), because of His characteristic which consists of that willing (in the form of becoming manifold).

By means of the particle, 'but', the (previous) view is excluded. In regard also to the principles of *mahat* etc., which are all produced effects, the cause is "He" Himself, the Supreme Person, who has for His body all those things which are the immediately preceding (causes thereof). Why? "Because of His characteristic which consists of that willing (in the form of becoming manifold)." "Willing" is the act of volition to the effect, "May I become many". There are the following passages:—"That *tejas* thought (lit. saw), 'May I become many and be born'" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3); and "Those waters thought (lit. saw), 'May we become manifold and be born'" (*Ibid.* VI. 2. 4); herein is declared the "seeing" which consists

of each (of these) willing to become many ; therefore, in the case of the *mahat*, the *ahaṅkāra* and other such causes also, their creation of their effects is made out to be based upon thinking (lit. seeing) of that kind (as is given above). And such a kind of 'seeing' is appropriate only in regard to the Supreme *Brahman*, who has each such thing as His body. And in the *Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa* (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7) it is revealed that the Supreme *Brahman* is the Self of all things through having all things as His body in the following and other statements : "He who dwelling in the earth," "He who dwelling in the water," "He who dwelling in the *tejas*," "He who dwelling in the air" and "He who dwelling in the spatial ether" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3-5, 7, 12). In the *Subālopanishad* also, beginning with the statement, "He whose body is the earth," it is declared, "He whose body is the *ahaṅkāra*," "He whose body is the *buddhi*," "He whose body is the *avyakta*" (*Sub. Up.* VII), etc.

It has been already stated above (by the *pūrvapakshin*) that, as declared in the following among other passages—"From Him are produced the principal vital air, the internal organ of the mind and all the senses" (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 3), the creation by the *Brahman* of the principal vital air and other things appropriately fits in (in His case) even when (it is taken to be) indirect. To this objection the answer is given :—

विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च

**Sūtra 15.** *Viparyayeṇa tu kramo'ṭa upapadyate cha*  
(231)

And the order (of creation) in a contrary manner is appropriate only as proceeding (directly) from Him.

The particle '*tu*' (rendered as 'indeed') is used in the sense of emphasis. Contrary to the creation in order of the *avyakta*, the *mahat*, the *ahaṅkāra*, the spatial ether, etc., there is, in regard to all produced effects, an order

which consists in having Him as their immediate cause, and this is made out from, "From Him is produced the principal vital air" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 3), and from other such passages. And this order appropriately fits solely with the origination of each particular effect out of the *Brahman* having each particular thing (i.e., cause) as His body. In the case of (His) being the indirect cause, the declaration of His immediateness (as cause) would be contradicted. Therefore, the passages such as, "From Him are produced (the principal vital air, the mind...)" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 3), uphold the direct production of all things by the *Brahman*.

अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिङ्गादिति चेन्नाविशेषात्

**Sūtra 16.** *Antarā vijñānamanasi krameṇa  
tallīṅgāditchennāviśeṣāt* (232)

If it be held that the both the *vijñāna* and the *manas*, (mentioned) between (the *prāṇa* and the elements) are in the right order (of creation), because of inferential marks in this regard, it is not so, because there is no distinction in that respect (among all things mentioned).

The senses are called *vijñāna* (or 'knowledge'), because they are the means of knowledge. It has been stated above that in the passage beginning with, "From Him are produced (the principal vital air, the mind...)" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 3), it is declared that all things are the immediate effects of the *Brahman* (who is their immediate cause); and therefore by means of this passage that origination of all things directly from the *Brahman* which is made out by means of His characteristic of willing (to become manifold) is taught. It is not appropriate to say so, because that passage deals with a particular order of creation, and because here also there is the perception of an order in relation to all things. Surely, in relation to the elements of spatial ether etc., that order of creation

which is established in other scriptural passages is made out to exist in this passage also. Through the mark of being read together with them, it is made out that between the external elements and the principal vital air, both the *viññāna* and the mind are also produced in order. Therefore, that passage cannot uphold the origination of all things directly from the *Brahman* Himself.<sup>988</sup>

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so; “because there is no distinction (in that respect)”, because from the passage—“From Him are produced the principal vital air,.....” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 3)—it is found that no distinction exists between the *viññāna* and the mind on the one side and the external elements of spatial ether etc., on the other (in the matter of their creation). By means of the passage beginning with—“From Him are produced (the principal vital air, the mind.....)—what is denoted is the relationship of direct production (from the *Brahman*); and this is not different in regard to all things, beginning with the principal vital air and ending with the element of earth; therefore that very (relationship) is laid down here, but not any order of creation. And because there is contradiction of the order of creation as established in other scriptural passages, this (passage) does not deal with any order of creation; for from the passage,

988. Here the *Muṇḍaka* text (II. 1. 3), quoted in full on p. 103, is claimed to prove indirect creation by the *Brahman*. It mentions in order the principal vital air, the *manas*, all the senses, and the five elements of spatial ether, air, *tejas*, water and earth as having been produced from the *Brahman*. Creation is hence said to start with the production of the vital air from the *Brahman*: the rest are then produced, each from its predecessor in the chain. Other scriptural texts agree with the order as from *manas*, whose production from the vital air is

here taught. The reply is that the chain fails with the vital air and *manas*. The vital air is a modification of the element, air, and cannot come earlier than *manas*. Moreover, all things are said to be produced from the *Brahman*, and not from one another. All bear the same relation to the *Brahman*, being His produced effects. In V. S. and V. D., Rāmaṇuja suggests that this sameness of relationship arises from the grammatical relation between the words denoting them and that denoting the *Brahman*. Either way, the *pūrvapakṣa* is disproved.

beginning with, "The element of earth is absorbed into the element of water," and ending with—"The *tamas* becomes one with the Supreme Lord" (Sub. Up. II.), a different order of creation is made out to exist. Therefore, the origination of all produced effects is from the Supreme *Brahman* Himself, who has the *avyakta* etc. as His body. The words, '*tejas*' etc., denote the *Brahman* Himself who is the Self of that *tejas* etc.

It may, however, be said that, if in this manner all the words denote the *Brahman*, then the denotation of each particular thing by means of each particular word, as established in learning the meanings of words, will be contradicted. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

चराचरव्यपश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वात्

**Sūtra 17.** *Charācharavyapāśrayastu  
syāttadvyapadeśo bhāktastadbhāvabhāvitvāt*  
(233)

But the words denoting them and relating to movable and immovable things is (non-secondary or) primary in signifying (the *Brahman*), because it (i.e., their expressive power) rests on (the) existence (of all things) being due to the penetration of that (*Brahman*) (within them).

The word 'but' is intended to remove the doubt raised by the objection. The denotation of each particular word is dependent upon all movable and immovable things and has a secondary significance ; the meaning is that it is assigned to a portion of the thing denoted by it. Because the *Brahman* who possesses all things as His modes does not fall within the range of the other means of apprehending the things which are His modes, and therefore before learning the *Vedānta* the

Possessor of the modes is not known, and because their final reach is dependent on the rise of the knowledge about the Possessor of the the modes, each particular word in the world is broken up and again broken up into denoting merely each particular thing, which is a part of what is (truly) denoted by it.

Or the doubt here may be raised thus: by means of the words 'tejas' etc., which are ordinarily learnt as denoting each of those particular things only, the denotation of the *Brahman* becomes figurative, that is, secondary. (This aphorism) beginning with, "But what relates to movable and immovable things.....", is given in answer to that objection. The denotation of each word, that is, the word denoting each particular thing, is dependent upon all movable and immovable things; the words denoting movable and immovable things are non-figurative (or *abhākta*), that is, are used in their primary significance with reference to the *Brahman*. Why? The expressive power of all words rests on the existence (of all things) being due to the penetration (lit. existence) of the *Brahman* (within them). This has indeed been made out to be so, from the scriptural passage which deals with the differentiation of names and forms (of things).<sup>989</sup>

### ADHIKARANA III

#### ATMĀDHIKARANA

नात्माश्रुतेः नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः.

**Sūtra 18.** *Nātmā śruternityatvāchcha tābhyah* (234)

<sup>989</sup>. All words denote the *Brahman* primarily and only secondarily the things which they are usually regarded as denoting and which are all His modes. This is a well known view of Rāmanuja which is referred to in the *Śrībhāṣya* (e.g., Vol. I, p. 199) and at somewhat greater length in the

*Vedārthasaṅgraha*. Sūtra 18 may be taken to point out either where the denotation is secondary or where it is primary. The latter view, preferred by Rāmanuja and adopted in V.S. and V.D., requires 'abhākta' to follow 'tadvyapadeśa' in the Sūtra. The other view takes this word to be 'bhākta'.

The individual self has no (origination), because there are scriptural statements (to that effect), and because also that it is eternal is made out from them (i.e., the scriptures).<sup>990</sup>

That all things beginning with the spatial ether have their origination out of the Supreme *Brahman* has been explained above. Now, the doubt is raised whether or not the individual self also has origination. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it has origination. Why? Because in that case the proposition that, by knowing a certain one thing, all (other) things become known, is appropriately demonstrated, and because also before the creation of the world only one entity is emphatically declared to exist. And just as it is the case with the spatial ether, so in the case of the individual self also, there are scriptural passages which declare origination thus —“(He) from whom the mother of the world (i.e. the *prakṛiti*) was born, (He) created on the earth all the individual selves, along with water (and the other elements)” (*M. Nār.* I. 4); —“*Prajāpati* created the (embodied) creatures” (*Taitt. Br.* I. 1. 10); —“All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *Sat* (i.e., the Existent One), have their abode in the *Sat*, are established (during *pralaya*) in the *Sat*” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 4 & 6); and —“From whom indeed all these beings are born” (*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1). In this manner, as there are declarations of origination in regard to the world along with its intelligent beings (i.e., the individual selves), it is made out that even the individual self has origination.

It should not, however, be urged that, inasmuch as the *Brahman* is eternal and inasmuch as the individual self also is known to be the *Brahman* in such passages as “That thou art” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7), the individual

990. Rāmanuja splits '*Natma śruteḥ*', into '*Na ātma śruteḥ*'. Sāṅkara and others analyse thus: '*Na ātma śruteḥ*'.

self is eternal. For from such passages as the following—“All this has that (*Brahman*) for its Self” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7); and “All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*” (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1)—it would follow that as the spatial ether and such other things are known to be the *Brahman*, they also would be eternal. Therefore, like the spatial ether etc., the individual self also is created.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : “The self is not created, because there are scriptural statements (to that effect).....” (*Ved. Sū.* II. 3: 18). The individual self is not created. Why? Because there are scriptural statements (to that effect). There are the following and other similar passages : “The (potentially) omniscient one (i.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor does it die” (*Kāth. Up.* II. 18); and “The two unborn, the Intelligent (*Brahman*) and the ignorant (individual self) ..” (*Svet. Up.* I. 9). Indeed, in these passages the negation of origination in relation to the individual self is declared. That the individual self is eternal is made out from them, that is, from those scriptural statements themselves ; thus there are here the following among other similar passages : “The Eternal among the eternal, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfills the desires of the many” (*Svet. Up.* VI. 13); and “It is unborn, immortal, everlasting and ancient ; it is not killed when the body is killed” (*Kāth. Up.* II. 18). And therefore it is that the individual self is not created.

If so, it may then be asked how the proposition, that by knowing a certain one thing all things are known, can be appropriately demonstrated. It can be appropriately demonstrated thus : Because the individual self also is a produced effect (of the *Brahman*) and because also there is thus identity between cause and effect.

If so, it may be said that, as in the case of the spatial ether, the condition of having origination will have to be



accepted (in the case of the individual self also). It is replied that it is not so. To be a produced effect, indeed, it is well known, is for a substance to attain a different state (from its previous state), and this (character of being a produced effect) certainly exists in the case of the individual self also. There is, however, this much of distinction. Whatever kind of change of state belongs to the non-intelligent spatial ether etc., that kind (of change of state) does not belong to the individual self. The change of state in the case of the individual self has the characteristic of the contraction and expansion of its knowledge, but in the case of the spatial ether etc., it is characterised by the change of its essential nature. Origination characterised by such change of state in regard to essential nature is denied (by the *Veda*) in relation to the individual self.

What is said is this. In the context here, the object of enjoyment, the enjoyer and the Controller of all are (first) declared to possess distinct natures; then origination etc., which belong to the object of enjoyment, are denied in relation to the enjoyer; then it is declared that he (the enjoyer) is eternal; then origination and other conditions which belong to the object of enjoyment, and the conditions such as that of being the abode of wrong aims of life etc., which belong to the enjoyer, are denied in relation to the Controller; then it is declared that He is eternal, is free from all that is evil, and is always omniscient, and that He wills the truth, is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (i.e., the individual self) and is the Lord of the universe; then it is declared that the intelligent and non-intelligent things in all conditions are His body and that He is (their) Self.

Therefore, through the intelligent and non-intelligent things always forming His body, the *Brahman* has them (both) as His modes. He sometimes remains, having as His body the intelligent and non-intelligent things which have attained the subtle condition that does not deserve

to be mentioned as distinct from Him. This is the *Brahman* in His causal state. And sometimes He has as His body the intelligent and the non-intelligent things that have names and forms differentiating them from Him, and this is He in the condition of the produced effect.

It being so, when He who is in the causal state attains the condition of the produced effect, that part (of Him), which is non-intelligent and is in the causal condition, is devoid of the qualities of sound etc. (which are the properties of evolved *prakṛiti*)—(that part) undergoes, for the purpose of being an object of enjoyment (to the individual self), that modification which consists in the change of its essential nature through becoming possessed of such qualities as sound. And in the case of that part which is intelligent, for the purpose of being the enjoyer of particular results of *karma*, there is that modification, which consists in the contraction and expansion of knowledge, so as to be consistent with those results (of *karma*). As regards that part which is that of the Controller and which is characterised by both (the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His) modes, there is that modification which consists in His being characterised by the two modes in those (two different) conditions. The modification of the causal condition which consists in its attaining a different condition is the same, both in the case of the two modes and in the case of the Possessor of the modes.<sup>991</sup>

For this very reason, having regard to the modification which consists of one and the same thing undergoing a

991. The organic unity consisting of the *Brahman*, the individual selves and non-intelligent matter, changes alternately from a subtle to a gross state and *vice versa*. The former is the state of *pralaya*, and the latter that of creation. What happens during the change of state is here explained. In regard to non-intelligent matter, there is a

change in essential nature. So far as the individual self is concerned, knowledge expands or contracts. As regards the *Brahman*, His modes are in a subtle condition in one state and in a gross condition in another state. This view is central to Rāmānuja's thinking. It helps him to account for a changing world having the unchanging *Brahman* as its Self.

change of state, the passage—which begins with, “(Do you know that Controller) by (knowing) whom what is not heard becomes heard?” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3)—lays down the proposition that by knowing a certain one thing all becomes known; and then the illustrative examples of the lump of clay etc.—which are stated in the passage beginning with, “My dear child, just as by (knowing) one (lump of clay, all that is made of clay becomes known)” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4)—are given by way of demonstrating that (proposition).<sup>992</sup>

There are the following and other similar scriptural passages:—“Prajāpati created the (embodied) creatures” (*Taitt. Br.* I. 1. 10); these which declare origination and death in relation to the individual self refer to its association with and disassociation from several particular bodies so as to cause this kind of contraction and expansion of its knowledge (which has been mentioned above). There are again the following among other similar scriptural passages:—“It (i.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor does it die” (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 18); and “He is the Eternal among the eternal” (*Svet. Up.* VI. 13). These passages which deny origination and which also declare eternity mean (in relation to the individual self) the absence of the change of essential nature as in the case of the non-intelligent part.

Further, there are the following and other similar scriptural passages: “This aforesaid Person is indeed the Great Self who is free from birth, free from old age, free from death, and is immortal (i.e., beyond the *samsāra*). . . . (He is) the *Brahman*” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 25); and “He is

992. The example of the lump of clay from the *Upanishad* is intended only to be a similitude to the change of state in a substance having many attributes. That the clay lacks intelligence, or that it is solid earth is irrelevant and not to the point. Thus the example does

not in any way obscure or distort the truth that the *Brahman* has for His attributes both non-intelligent matter and intelligent individual selves and that He is free from any change in His essential nature. This is indeed what is illustrated. (*Ś. P.*)

the Eternal among the eternal" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 13). These passages, which deal with the Supreme Being, mean that (with reference to Him) there is the absence of the two kinds of undesirable modifications, which consist in the change of essential nature and in the contraction and expansion of knowledge. It is in this manner that, in regard to the *Brahman* who is always associated with the intelligent and the non-intelligent things, clear determination of oneness before the creation of the world appropriately fits in, owing to the absence (then) of the differentiation of names and forms. There are the scriptural passages such as the following: "Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has now been differentiated by names and forms" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7). These declare indeed manifoldness and oneness (in regard to the *Brahman*), owing to the existence and non-existence respectively of the differentiation of names and forms.

Those, however, who (like Śaṅkara) uphold the theory that the condition of the individual self is due to the limiting condition of ignorance; those, again, who (like Bhāskara) maintain that it (i.e., that condition) is due to real limiting adjuncts; and those again who (like Yādavaprakāśa) hold that the *Brahman* whose essential nature is pure existence is Himself existent in the three conditions of the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and (their) Controller—all these state that, although the power of ignorance, the power of the limiting conditions and the powers of the enjoyer, of the object of enjoyment and of the Controller are existent even during the time of (the) dissolution (of the universe), even then the determination of the oneness (of the *Brahman*) is certainly due to the absence of differentiation by names and forms.

There is the further reason also that both the distinction among the individual selves and the stream of their *karmas* are admitted to be beginningless (by the *Sūtrakāra*) under the aphorisms: "There is no partiality or merelessness (in Him), because it (i.e., creation) is

dependent (on *karma*)....." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 34) ; and " If it be said that there is no *karma* (or results of work before creation) because (of the declaration in the scriptures) of non-distinction (between the individual selves and the *Brahman* prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so ; because they (i.e., both the individual selves and the stream of *karma*) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non-distinction) is appropriate, and it (i.e., the beginninglessness of the souls) is also declared in the scriptures " (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 35).

There is, however, this much of distinction. In the case of one school (i.e., that of Śaṅkara), through the influence of the beginningless ignorance the *Brahman* Himself (of His own accord) becomes ignorant. In the case of another school (i.e., that of Bhāskara), under the influence of the real and beginningless limiting conditions, the essential nature itself of the *Brahman* becomes subject to bondage, because there is no entity other than the *Brahman* and the limiting conditions. In the case of yet another school (i.e., that of Yādavaprakāśa), the *Brahman* Himself undergoes changes in various forms and enjoys the undesirable fruits of *karmas*. It is true that that part (of the *Brahman*) which is the Controller, does not have the condition of the enjoyer ; but being omniscient He regards the enjoyer (i.e., the individual self) as non-different from Himself, and hence He Himself enjoys (the pleasures and pains of the individual self).

In our case, however, the *Brahman*, who has for His body both the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, exists in the states of both cause and effect. Yet, He is always free from even the smallest trace of all that is evil, and is one whose innumerable noble qualities like that of willing the truth constitute an ocean. The wrong aims of life and the changes relating to essential nature belong respectively to the intelligent and the non-intelligent things which are His modes. Everything becomes harmonious and consistent in this manner.

## ADHIKARANA IV

## JNĀDHIKARANA

## ज्ञोऽत एव

Sūtra 19. *Jñō'ta eva*

(235)

It (i.e., the individual self) is the knower itself, because of them (i.e., because of there being scriptural statements to that effect).

It has been stated above that, unlike the spatial ether, the individual self is not created. Incidentally to this, the essential nature of the individual self is determined. Is the essential nature of the (individual) self merely intelligence itself as accepted by the Buddhists and by Kapila; is it, as accepted by Kaṇāda, of the nature of a non-intelligent thing itself which in its essence resembles a stone and has intelligence as an adventitious quality; or is its essential (eternal) nature to be the knower itself? 993

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it is mere intelligence (as claimed by the Sāṅkhyas). Why? Because there are scriptural statements to that effect. Indeed, in the *Antaryāmi-Brahmaṇa*, the Kāṇvas read, "He who, standing within the *viññāna* (or

993. The five sections which still remain in this *pada* are incidental in the sense that they do not deal directly with the main theme, namely, that all things in the world are the effects of the *Brahman*. They answer doubts about the nature of the individual self and its relations with the *Brahman*. The present section arises from an implied objection to the conclu-

sion that the individual self is an effect, because it suffers a change in the expansion and contraction of knowledge. It is objected that this is not possible, as knowledge is not an attribute of the self, but its essential nature. In answering this, the views of the Buddhists, the *Advaitins* and the *Sāṅkhyas* about the nature of the self are examined by Rāmaṇuja.

intelligence)....." (*Kāṇva Brīh. Up.* III. 7. 22), in the place of the corresponding text of the *Mādhyandinas*, "He who, standing within the individual self....." (*Mādhyandina Brīh. Up.* III. 7. 22). Again, in the passage—"The *viññāna* performs sacrifice and it also performs religious works" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1), the essential nature of the individual self who is the doer of actions is declared to be intelligence itself. In the *Smṛitis* also, in such passages as the following—".....Him who has (for His body the individual self who has) the essential nature of intelligence, entirely pure in reality" (*V. P. I. 2. 6*)—the individual self is made out to have the essential nature of intelligence.<sup>994</sup>

Another, however, (i.e., *Kaṇāda*, takes the following view). Intelligence is not its (i.e., the individual self's) essential nature, nor is the quality of being the knower (its essential nature); its intelligence is merely adventitious; because, if the character of being 'intelligence and the character of being the knower are admitted to exist in relation to the individual self, then the result is that, it (i.e., the self) being all-pervading, it will have to be perceived as existing always and everywhere; because also the senses will be useless, and because, although the individual self is existent in the conditions of dreamless sleep, swoon etc., its intelligence is not then perceived, and when it is awake, provided the requisite things are available, knowledge is seen to be produced. That the individual self is all-pervading has also necessarily to be accepted, because everywhere there is the perception of the effects (of all-pervasiveness, namely, pains, pleasures etc.), and because also, by accepting the presence of the

994. The stanza quoted from *V.P.* is translated according to *Sāṅkara* on Vol. I, p. 25, and explained from *Rāmaṇuja's* point of view in pp. 117-8 of the same volume. It deals with the *Brahman* in His relations with the world and may be thus rendered: "(Bowing to Him)

who has (for His body) the individual self which is of the nature of intelligence, which is absolutely pure (or free from misery and ignorance in its essential nature) and which is seen as various objects by reason of an illusory view (taking the body for the self)."

individual self everywhere, the effects thereof (such as pleasure and pain) are produced through the movement of the body itself; it being so, there is no criterion of truth available for assuming any motion (on the part of the self).<sup>995</sup>

The scripture also declares the absence of intelligence at the time of dreamless sleep, as in the following passage:—"Lo, he (i.e., the sleeping individual self) does not know himself in this manner, 'That I am now,' nor does he know these beings" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 11. 1). In the same manner it (i.e., the scripture) declares the absence of intelligence in the condition of final beatitude, as in the following passage: "There is no consciousness after death (in the final body)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4.12 & IV. 5. 13). The usage however that obtains here in such statements as the following, "....the individual self) which has the essential nature of intelligence" (*V. P.* I. 2. 6), has a figurative significance owing to intelligence being its (i.e., the self's) peculiar quality.

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply: "It (i.e., the individual self) is the knower itself because of them (i.e., because of there being scriptural statements to that effect)" (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 3. 19). "It is the knower itself". This individual self has certainly the essential nature of the knower itself; it is not mere intelligence, it is not also of the nature of non-intelligent things. "Because of them". The meaning is that it is because of there being scriptural statements themselves to that effect. The expression, "scriptural statements", which was mentioned in the context under the aphorism, "The

995. The argument here seeks to prove the individual self to be all-pervading mainly on the ground that it experiences and enjoys things produced in distant countries. The *adṛishṭa* of the self brings about their production, and this

is possible only if the self in which the *adṛishṭa* inheres is omnipresent. Moreover, as against this one assumption, two are required to account for the movement of the self from one place to another—that it is atomic and that it moves.



individual self is not created because there are scriptural statements (to that effect)" (*Ved. Sūt.* II, 3. 18), is referred to by the expression, 'because of them' (in this aphorism, "It is the knower itself because of them").<sup>996</sup>

Accordingly, in the *Chhāndogya*, in the passage attributed to Prajāpati, declarations are made in regard to both the released and the bound souls, and the following passages are given in that connection: "Now, he who knows, 'I smell this', he is the (bound individual) self" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 4); "He (i.e., the released self) enjoys these desires (or pleasures), 'seeing' them through the mind (or his own essential divine knowledge)—these which are in the world which is the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 5-6); "He (i.e., the released self) desires the truth and wills the truth" (*Ibid.* VIII. 7. 1); and "He (i.e., the released self) does not remember this body which has had birth" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 3). Elsewhere also, there is the statement—"The seer (of the *Brahman*) does not see death" (*Ibid.* VII. 26. 2). There are similar statements in the Vājasaneyaka scripture thus: After (King Janaka) asking the question—"Who is the self?" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 7), the following statement is made (by Yājñavalkya): "He consists largely of knowledge, exists in the, *prāṇas* (i.e., the sense organs and the principal vital air), and is the internal light in the heart" (*Ibid.* IV. 3. 7). Similarly, there are these statements, namely:—"My dear one, by what should one know the knower?" (*Ibid.* II. 4. 14 & IV. 5. 5); and "This person knows indeed" (?). Again, there are the following statements to the same effect:—"Indeed, he, this person, is the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, knower, doer, he consists of knowledge" (*Pr. Up.* IV. 9); and "In this way, these sixteen instruments (lit. parts) of this seer (or knowing self)....." (*Ibid.* VI. 5)<sup>997</sup>

996. 'Atah' in the *Sūtra* refers back to 'śruteḥ' in the previous *Sūtra*. But the scriptural

texts envisaged in the two aphorisms are different.

997. For the 16 *kalas* of the self, see *Pr. Up.* (VI. 4).

It has been stated above that if the quality of being the knower is natural to the individual self, it being all-pervading, room will be given to its being perceived always and everywhere. To this objection, the following reply is given :—

### उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम्

**Sūtra 20.** *Utkrāntigatyāgatīnām*

(238)

Because the departure from the body, movement out of it and return to it (are known in relation to the individual self from the scripture).

This is not all-pervading, but atomic in size is this individual self. Why? Because departure from the body, movements out of it and return to it are known from the scripture (in relation to it). Surely, departure from the body is declared in the following passage :—“This individual self departs (at the time of death from this body) with the help of that light (i.e., the lighted edge of the heart) through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2). Its movement also out of it is given in the following passage : “There are some who go out of this world, all of them go surely to the moon” (*Kaush. Up.* I. 2). Its return to the body also is declared in the following passage :—“From that world he comes again to this world for doing work” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 6). Indeed, if it were all-pervading, these, namely, departure from the body, etc., would not be appropriate to it.<sup>998</sup>

### स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः

**Sūtra 21.** *Svātmanā chottarayoh*

(237)

998. With this *Sūtra*, Śāṅkara starts a new *Adhikaraṇa*, which comprises all the succeeding aphorisms till the *Kartrādhi-*

*karāṇa*. The *Kaushītaki* text which is quoted here is explained at greater length under *Ved. Sūt.* (III. 1. 12 et. seq.)

(That the individual self is atomic is confirmed by the effecting) of the latter two (i.e., movement and return) by one's own self itself.

The word, '*cha*' (rendered as 'itself'), denotes emphasis. No doubt, owing to its being of the nature of separation from the body, departure from the body, somehow or other, is appropriate to the individual self, even if it is stationary ; but movement and return cannot in any manner appropriately fit into it. Therefore, they have to be effected solely through one's own self itself.

नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात्

**Sūtra 22.** *Nāṇuratachchhruteriti chennetarādhikārat*  
(238)

If it be said that it (i.e., the individual self) is not atomic in size because there is a scriptural text to the contrary, it is not so, because the context relates to the other (i.e., the *Brahman*).

The scriptural context herewith introduces the individual self as its subject matter in the following passage, "He (i.e., the individual self) consists largely of knowledge, exists in the *prāṇas*....." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 7), and says in following passage—"This, indeed, is that great unborn Self" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 25)—that he is great ; therefore the individual self is not atomic in size. If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so. "Because the context relates to the other", that is to say, because the context relates to the omniscient Lord who is other than the individual self. No doubt, in the beginning of the context here, the individual self was introduced as the subject matter ; nevertheless, in the middle of the context the Supreme Being is dealt with in the passage—"To whom (i.e., the individual self), the  
III S.B.—16

omniscient Self is the object of worship" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 13);<sup>999</sup> therefore the greatness (i.e., the all-pervasiveness) relates to Him and not to the individual self.

### स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्याञ्च

**Sūtra 23.** *Svaśabdōnmānābhyañcha*

(239)

Through the word denoting it (i.e., the atomic size) itself and through the comparative size given (the individual self is made out to be atomic in size).

The word 'atom' is itself declared in the scripture (in relation to the individual self), as in the following passage—"This (released) individual self is an atom; it has to be known through the (purified) mind; into it the fivefold *prāṇa* had entered" (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 9). Comparative size means size in comparison with a standard of measurement. Picking up a thing which resembles an atom, its (i.e., the self's) size is declared in the scripture, as in the following passages:—"A hundredth part of the point of a hair is divided into a hundred parts, and one part (of the latter) is understood (to be the size) of the individual self" (*Svet. Up.* V. 8); and "The inferior one (i.e., the individual self) also is seen to be of the size of the point of a goad" (*Ibid.* V. 9). Therefore this individual self is indeed of the size of an atom.

Again, the following objection may be raised here. If the individual self be of the size of an atom, then it is not appropriate for (pain and pleasure to) be felt all over the

<sup>999</sup>. The rendering of *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 13) is according to S. P. Rāṅgāraṁaṇuja interprets

in a slightly different way in his commentary on the *Upanishad*.

body. This objection is set aside through the views of another school thus :

अविरोधश्चन्दनवत्

**Sūtra 24.** *Avirodhaśchandanavat* (240)

There is no contradiction, as in the case of the sandal (paste).

Just as a drop of the yellow sandal paste, although it is in a part of the body, produces pleasure that pervades the whole body, so also, the individual self, existing in a part of the body, experiences the pain (and pleasure) extending over all the parts of the body.

अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धि हि

**Sūtra 25.** *Avasthitivaiśeṣhyāditi  
chennābhyupagamāddhīdi hi* (241)

If it be said that it (i.e., the case of the sandal drop) is accounted for by its particular position, it is not so ; because it (i.e., the individual self) is admitted (to have its location) in the heart.

The drop of the yellow sandal paste and other such things have that character (of producing a pleasure extending over the whole body), because of being placed in a particular part of the body ; but this (particular position) does not exist in the case of the individual self. If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so, because in the case of the individual self also, its existence in a particular part of the body is admitted. Indeed, in that part of the body which is known as the heart, the existence of the individual self is declared in the following passage—"Indeed, this individual self is in the heart, a hundred and one blood vessels are there" (*Pr. Up.* III. 6. 2). To the same effect, after beginning with the question, "Who is the individual self?" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 7), the following passage is given: "He who consists largely of knowledge, exists in the *prāṇas* and is the internal light in

the heart" (*Ibid.* IV. 3. 7). The illustrative example of the sandal was given for the purpose of making known the existence of the individual self in a particular place ; but the sandal does not stand in need of any particular (sensitive) place (for its effects being felt).

In regard to that thing (i.e., the individual self) which exists in a particular place, the manner in which, according to his (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*'s) opinion, it is capable of producing effects that pervade the whole body, is given thus :—

### गुणाद्वालोकवत्

**Sūtra 26.** *Guṇādvālokaḥ*

(242)

Through the quality (of knowledge), however, (the individual self pervades the whole body) as is the case with (the quality of) light (which, starting from a single source, pervades many places).

The word, 'however', is intended to exclude the opinion of the other school. The individual self, through its quality of knowledge, remains pervading the whole body. "As is the case with light." Just as the light of gems, of the sun and of other luminous objects, which are existent in a particular place, is seen to pervade many places ; similarly, the knowledge of the individual self, which is in the heart, remains pervading the whole body. The knowledge of the knower is in the position of the light ; it is appropriate for it, like light, to function elsewhere than in its own substratum ; this has been established under the first aphorism (i.e., *Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 1).<sup>1000</sup>

1000. The example of the sandal paste accounts for the atomic individual self, located in the heart, sensing whatever happens in any part of the body. But the question remains : how about a self animating many

bodies as in Saubhari's case? The example of light is given by the *Sūtrakāra* to cover this case also. (*S.P.*) The similitude is explained at some length in Vol. I, pp. 69-71.

It has however been stated above (under *Sūtra* 19 by the Sāṅkhyas as well as the *Advaitins*) that the individual self is mere intelligence ; the question is therefore asked how it can be maintained that that (intelligence) has the nature of a quality that is distinct from the essential nature (of the self itself). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

### व्यतिरेको गन्धवत्तथा च दर्शयति

**Sūtra 27.** *Vyatireko gandhavattathā cha darśayati* (243)

As is the case with smell (and the element of earth), so also there is distinction (between intelligence as quality and intelligence as essential nature), and it (i.e., the scripture) declares so.<sup>1001</sup>

Just as smell, which is perceived as the quality of the eternal element of earth, is distinct from that (earth), so also, according to the experience, 'I know', knowledge which is perceived as the quality of the knower, is established as distinct from the individual self which is the knower. To the same effect, the scripture has the following declaration : " This person knows indeed " (?).

### पृथगुपदेशात्

**Sūtra 28.** *Prithagupadeśāt* (244)

It (i.e., intelligence) is (expressly) taught to be separate (from the individual self).

By means of the word denoting itself, intelligence (or *viññāna*) is taught to be separate from the knower (or possessor of intelligence), as in the following passage :— " There is not destruction of the (intelligence or) knowledge of the knower " (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 30).

1001. Śaṅkara splits *Sūtra* 27 into two *Sūtras*, starting the second with 'tathā cha'.

Again, it has been stated above (under *Sūtra* 19) that (intelligence or) knowledge itself is taught to be the individual self in the following among other similar passages: "He who standing within the *viññāna* (or intelligence)" (*Kāṇva Brh. Up.* III. 7. 22); "The *viññāna* performs the sacrifice" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1); and "(.....the individual self) who has the essential nature of knowledge, is entirely pure" (*V. P.* II. 2. 6). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:—

तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्

**Sūtra 29.** *Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ*  
*prājñavat* (245)

The denotation (of the individual self) by that (i.e., the word '*viññāna*') is, however, due to its having that quality (of *viññāna*) as its essence, as is the case with the omniscient Lord.

The word 'however' sets aside the objection. Due to its having that quality as its essence, that is, due to its having the quality of *viññāna* (or intelligence) as its essence, the individual self is denoted as '*viññāna*'. Knowledge itself is its (i.e., the self's) essential quality. For instance, the essential quality of the omniscient Lord is bliss, and the omniscient Lord is therefore denoted by the word "bliss", as in following passages: "If this *Akāśa* (i.e., the *Brahman*) be not bliss....." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1); and "Let him know the *Ānanda* (or Bliss) to be the *Brahman*" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1). Indeed, that bliss is the essential quality of the omniscient Lord is given in the following passages:—"That is the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman*" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1); and "Whoever knows the bliss of the *Brahman*, he is not afraid of anything" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 4. 1). Alternatively, in the passage—"The *Brahman* is existence, knowledge, infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1)—the omniscient Lord is denoted by the word



'*Brahman*'. From the following and other such passages—"Along with the omniscient *Brahman*, he enjoys bliss" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); and "He understands all" (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 9)—knowledge is known to be the essential quality of the omniscient Lord.

यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तद्दर्शनात्

**Sūtra 30.** *Yāvadātmabhāvitvāchcha na*

*doshastaddarśanāt* (246)

And because also it (i.e., the quality of intelligence) exists as long as the individual self exists, it is nothing wrong (to denote it by the word '*viññāna*'), as such (instances) are seen (in the world).

*Viññāna* (or intelligence) is an attribute which exists as long as the individual self exists; therefore, it is nothing wrong to denote that (self) by that word ('*viññāna*'). In this manner, (even) the broken-horned (oxen) etc. are seen to be denoted by the word 'ox' by reason of the attributes of 'ox-ness' etc., which exist as long as the essential nature of the ox exists therein. It is because they are of the nature of attributes that are denotative of the essential nature; this is the meaning.

Through the word, 'also', what is added here is this. Like knowledge which is an (attribute), the individual self is also self-luminous (in its essential nature); and it is therefore nothing wrong to denote that (self) by the word '*viññāna*'.<sup>1002</sup>

Further, it has been stated above (by the followers of Kaṇāda under *Sūtra* 19) that, as intelligence is non-existent during dreamless sleep etc., it cannot be an

<sup>1002</sup> The point here is that it is proper to denote anything by a word denoting an attribute

which is denotative of the essential nature of that thing.

attribute attached to the essential nature (of the self). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer.

### पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात्

**Sūtra 31.** *Pumstvādivāttvasya sato'bhivyaktiyogāt* (247)

Because, like masculinity etc., however, it (i.e., intelligence) is existent (even when it is not manifest), and is capable of manifestation.

The word, 'however', is intended to denote the dispelling of the doubt raised by the objection. In regard to 'it', namely, intelligence, which is existent in the conditions of dreamless sleep etc., there is manifestation in the conditions of waking etc.; hence there is appropriateness in its being an attribute attached to the essential nature (of the self). (It is) like masculinity etc. For instance, the primary fluids peculiarly characteristic of masculinity etc., although existent in boyhood, are not manifest, and become manifest in youth; and the possession thereof by man is never limited to any particular period. Indeed, being possessed of seven primary fluids is linked up with the essential nature of the body, as declared in the following passage: "It (i.e., the body) has seven primary fluids, three secretions, two sources, and is a mass of four kinds of food" (*Garbha Uṇ. I*); herein is thus taught the essential nature of the body.<sup>1003</sup>

That the thing 'I' is luminous in the conditions of dreamless sleep etc. has been already stated. In relation

1003. The seven primary fluids (or *dhatu*s) are usually listed as chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen; the three secretions (or *malas*) are the 'humours', bile, 'wind' and

phlegm; the two sources are the two parents; and the four types of food are those that are licked, sucked, drunk and eaten.

to that knowledge which is really existent, the perception of external objects is experienced in the condition of waking, (dreaming) and such conditions. And these attributes of being the knower etc., which belong to the individual self, have already been explained. Therefore, the quality of being the knower is itself the essential nature of the individual self.<sup>1004</sup>

And this individual self has the size of an atom. In the passage—"There is no consciousness after death" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12 & IV. 5. 13)—it is not stated that a released self has no knowledge; but what is stated is this, that birth and death etc., which are seen to exist in the condition of *samsāra*, and arise from subjection to the great external elements—they do not exist in relation to the released self, as declared in the passage:—"Rising up from these external elements, it (i.e., the individual self) perishes after them" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12 & IV. 5. 13). Because that passage has oneness of meaning with the following, among other similar passages: "He who sees Him does not see death, nor disease, nor misery. Indeed, the seer sees all and attains all in all places" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2); "He does not remember this body which has had birth" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 3); and "He (i.e., the released self) enjoys these pleasures, seeing them through the mind (or his own essential divine knowledge)" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 5).

Now, in regard to it (i.e., the individual self) being all-pervading according to the theory of those who (like the Sāṅkhyas) hold that intelligence is the self, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) points out the fallacy as follows:—

नित्योपलब्धनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वान्यथा

Sūtra 32. *Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo  
nyataraniyamo vānyathā* (248)

1004. The references are to discussions under *Ved. Sū.* (I. 1. 1). For the self as the knower generally, see Vol. I,

pp. 68-90. The condition of the self, in relation to deep sleep, is explained in Vol. I, pp. 83-86.

Otherwise it will lead to eternal perception or eternal non-perception (in regard to the individual self), or it will be restricted to either of them.

“Otherwise”, that is, according to the view which holds that it is all-pervading and also according to the view which holds that it is mere knowledge, both perception and non-perception of it will surely happen together eternally. “Or it will be restricted to either of them”; either the perception itself will be eternal, or the non-perception (itself will be eternal).

What is said is this:—The cause of the perception and non-perception of the self, which are both found to exist in the world, is this self which is (intelligence or) knowledge and all-pervading. It is the cause either solely of perception or solely of non-perception. If it is the cause of both of them, both will happen to exist always and everywhere. If it be (the cause) only of perception, there will be no non-perception of all things at all times and in all places; or if it be (the cause) only of non-perception, then there will be no perception at all times and in all places.<sup>1005</sup> The conclusion established according to our view is this—that inasmuch as the individual self is really existent within the body, in that (body) itself there is perception of it, and nowhere else.

In the case also of (the Vaiśeṣika view of) perception being dependent upon instruments (or sense organs), the fallacy pointed out in regard to the other view is equally applicable; because all the individual selves are all-pervading and are therefore associated with all the instruments of knowledge (i.e., all the sense organs) at all times; and in consequence there is no restriction of

1005. The self alone is the cause of perception of non-perception, and of both simulta-

neously, because there is no other cause. The Sāṅkhya view is here attacked.

*adṛiṣṭas* to particular selves arising out of particular *karmas* so as to produce perception or non-perception.<sup>1006</sup>

## ADHIKARANA V

### KARTRADHIKARANA

#### कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वान्

**Sūtra 33.** *Kartā śāstrārthavattvāt*

(249)

The agent of actions is (the individual self) because the *śāstras* have to be purposive.

It has been stated above that this individual self is the knower and that it has the size of an atom. Now the question that is taken up for consideration is whether that (self) itself is the agent of actions, or whether, itself being no agent of actions, it transfers to itself through illusion (as claimed by the Sāṅkhyas) that agentship of actions which belongs to the non-intelligent qualities (i.e., the *guṇas* of the *prakṛiti*).

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning here? That the individual self is not surely the agent of actions. Why? Because in the *śāstras* dealing with the self, it is declared that the self has no agentship of actions and that the *guṇas* (of the *prakṛiti*) themselves possess the power of being the agents of actions.

Indeed, it comes out thus. In the passages of the *Kaṭha-vallī*, as for instance in the following passage beginning with—"It (i.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor does it die" (*Kaṭh. Up. II. 18*)—birth, old age,

<sup>1006.</sup> Here too the three alternatives mentioned in the previous paragraph are implied—perception alone, non-

perception alone and both of them at the same time. See V.S. under this *Sūtra*.

death and all other attributes of the *prakṛiti* are denied in relation to the individual self; then the power of being the agent of the action of killing etc. is denied (in relation to it) as in the following passage: "If he who kills thinks that he (himself) is the killer; if he who is killed thinks that he is killed—both of them do not know (the self); he neither kills nor is he killed". (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 19). The meaning is this: he who knows the self as the killer does not know the self. To the same effect it is declared by the Divine Lord Himself that the essential nature of the individual self is not to be the agent of actions, but that its misconception as the agent of actions is (due to) ignorance, as in the following passages: "Everywhere the actions are performed by the *guṇas* of the *prakṛiti*; he whose mind is stupefied through egotism thinks that he is the agent of those actions" (*B. G.* III. 27); and "When the seer sees none other than the *guṇas* as the agent of actions, (he sees)" (*B. G.* XIV. 19); and thus also: "With regard to being the agent of actions giving rise to the chain of effects and causes, the *prakṛiti* (or material Nature) is declared to be the cause; with regard to the enjoyership of pains and pleasures, the *puruṣa* (or the individual self) is declared to be the cause" (*B. G.* XIII. 20). Therefore, only the state of being the enjoyer belongs to the individual self, while that of being the agent of actions belongs only to the *prakṛiti*.<sup>1007</sup>

1007. The objector here is the Sāṅkhya. He takes *Kaṭh. Up.* (II. 19) as showing that the self cannot be related to any action at all either as the agent or the object. Killing is referred to only by way of illustration. Rāmanuja's reply, given below, is that the intention of the *Upaniṣad* is to teach the immortality of the self, and not to deny that it can be an agent. In *B. G.* (XIII. 20), the Sāṅkhya takes '*karya*' (or 'effect') to be the five elements and the five rudimentary elements; the term

'*karana*' (or 'cause') refers to the *maḥat*, the *ahaṅkāra*, the *manas*, the five organs of sense and the five organs of action. The primordial *prakṛiti* has evolved them and is also responsible for their changes moment by moment; hence it is the cause. (See the *Tatparyachandrika* on this verse). Rāmanuja takes '*karya*' to be the body and '*karana*' to be the eleven organs of sense and action. The *prakṛiti* presided over by the *puruṣa* is the cause of their activity.

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply:—  
 “The agent of actions is (the individual self) because the *śāstras* have to be purposive” (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 33). The individual self itself is the agent of actions, and the *guṇas* (of the *prakṛiti*) are not (such agents). Why? “Because the *śāstras* have to be purposive.” Indeed, there are the following *śāstraic* passages: “One who is desirous of *Svarga* (i.e., the celestial world of enjoyment) should perform the sacrifice” (?); and “One who is desirous of salvation should worship the *Brahman*” (?). These and such other passages direct the very enjoyer of the fruits of actions, namely, *Svarga* and salvation, to be the agent of the actions. Indeed, if the non-intelligent thing (i.e., the *prakṛiti*) were the agent of actions, that which is other (i.e., the intelligent being) cannot be directed (to be such agent). And the *śāstra* is so called because it gives commandments, and commandments impel activity, and the power of the *śāstras* to impel activity arises through the production of knowledge, and it is not possible to cause the non-intelligent *prakṛiti* to obtain knowledge. The purposiveness of the *śāstras* will be fulfilled, only when the intelligent enjoyer himself (i.e., the individual self) is the agent of actions. To this effect is the following statement made—“The fruit of the *śāstra* falls to the lot of one who performs actions in obedience to it” (*Pūr. Mīm.* III. 7. 18).

It has been stated that by means of the passage beginning with, “If the killer thinks that he kills.....” (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 18), it is declared that the individual self is not the agent with regard to the action of killing. This statement is made because the individual self is eternal and is therefore not subject to being killed. And there is the statement made above that the agentship of actions is given in the *Smṛiti* as belonging to the *guṇas* (of the *prakṛiti*) in the passage: “.....(actions) are performed by the *guṇas* of the *prakṛiti*” (*B. G.* III. 27). This statement has been made to the effect that the agentship of actions belongs

only to the *guṇas* of the *prakṛiti* through the discrimination of positive and negative facts, because in the activities in the state of *samsāra*, his (i.e., the individual self's) agentship of actions is due to his association with the *guṇas* (of the *prakṛiti*), namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, but it is not due to his essential nature. And to the same effect it is declared therein alone (i.e., in that very *Smṛiti*) in the following passage: "In regard to his births in good and bad wombs, the cause is his association with the *guṇas* of the *prakṛiti*" (B. G. XIII. 21). Therein alone (i.e., in that very *Smṛiti*), the agentship of actions in regard to the individual self is admitted, and it is stated as follows: "It being so (i.e., the individual self being the agent under the control of the Supreme Self), he who sees the individual self alone as the agent of actions, he is perverse, owing to his intellect being unrefined" (B. G. XVIII. 16). There is the passage: "For doing work there are required the substratum (i.e., the body), and so also, the agent, the various kinds of auxiliary instruments and the various kinds of activities, and as the fifth (requirement), Providence" (B. G. XVIII. 14). Here the agentship of actions desiderates the five elements beginning with the substratum (i.e., the body) and ending with Providence; it being so, he who perceives the individual self alone as the agent of actions, he does not see; this is the meaning.<sup>1008</sup>

### उपादानाद्विहारोपदेशाच्च

**Sūtra 34.** *Upadanādvihāropadeśācchca*

(250)

1008. Rāmānuja here shows that the texts quoted above do not support the Sākhya. Five causes for every action are listed in B.G. (XVIII. 14), and one of them is the self. (The various kinds of activities mentioned there are explained as those of the five vital airs.) The *guṇas* are described as agents, because, in the state of *samsāra*,

the self acts only as influenced by them. The positive fact is that all actions are impelled by the contact of the self with the *guṇas*, and the negative fact is that no actions arise from the essential nature of the self. But all this does not mean that the B.G. teaches that the self is not the agent.



(The individual self is the agent of actions) because of (its doing) the act of seizing (as taught), and because also the act of sporting is taught (in relation to it).

After introducing the subject matter of the context in the passage—"He (i.e., the individual self in the dreaming state), just as a great king (seizes enjoyable things in his kingdom and moves about freely in his kingdom)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 1. 18)—the following passage is then given: "In this very manner he, after seizing these sense organs, moves in sport in his own body just as he pleases" (*Ibid.*); here agentship of the action of seizing the sense organs and of sporting with them is taught (in relation to the individual self).<sup>1009</sup>

व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निरदेशविपर्ययः

**Sūtra 35.** *Vyapadeśāchcha kriyāyām na  
chennirdeśaviṣayayaḥ*

(251)

In relation to actions (the individual self is the agent), because it is so taught; if it were not so, then there would have been a change in the grammatical case (of the word denoting 'knowledge' in the context).

It (namely, the individual self) is the agent of actions, because its agentship in regard to both worldly and *Vedic* actions is taught in the following passage:—"The *viññāna* performs the sacrifice and it also performs religious works" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1). It may be held that it is not the individual self that is denoted by the word '*viññāna*' here, but that it is the internal organ of intellect that is

<sup>1009</sup>. Sūtra 44 is split into two by Śaṅkara, the first being '*Vihirōpadeśāt*' and the second, '*Upādānāt*'. The *Bṛih. Up.* text

quoted by Rāmānuja shows that the self is declared to be the agent in actions other than killing.

denoted by it. If so, there would be a change in the grammatical case of the word '*viññānā*'; because intellect is an auxiliary instrument of knowledge and therefore its denotation would have to be through the instrumental case by '*viññānena*' (i.e., 'by means of the *viññāna*').

### उपलब्धिवदनियमः

**Sūtra 36.** *Upalabdhivadanīyamah*

(252)

There would be no restriction (in regard to being the enjoyer), just as in the case of perception.

The errors that would arise, if the individual self were not taken to be the agent of actions, are stated here. Just as, if the individual self were admitted to be all-pervading, the absence of restriction has been pointed out under the aphorism beginning with—"It will lead to eternal perception or eternal non-perception....." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 32)—similarly, if the individual self is not the agent of actions and if the *prakṛiti* were the agent of actions, then, inasmuch as it (i.e., the *prakṛiti*) is common to all individual selves, all actions would be for the enjoyment of all, or they would not be for the enjoyment of any one individual self.

Through admitting that the individual selves are all-pervading, their places of rest are also admitted as not characterised by any distinction. For this very reason, the restriction also in regard to the internal organs etc. (so that each self has a different organ) does not appropriately come to pass, whereby there may be a fixed arrangement (in regard to the activities of those organs and the enjoyment of results by the selves).<sup>1010</sup>

1010. The argument here is similar to that under *Sūtra* 32. The *prakṛiti* must be deemed to be the cause both of the enjoyment or the absence of enjoyment of the selves, because there is no other cause. If it is said that the cause is not the

*prakṛiti* which is in contact with all the selves but one of its evolutes, the internal organ, which varies from self to self, the reply is given that all selves should be in contact with all the internal organs.

### शक्तिविपर्ययात्

**Sūtra 37.** *S'aktiviparyayāt*

(253)

Because (in relation to the self) there would be the loss of power (to enjoy).

If the intellect (which is material) were accepted as the agent (of actions), then another agent cannot appropriately be the enjoyer; and therefore the power of being the enjoyer would belong to that (intellect) itself; and consequently, the power of being the enjoyer would be lost to the individual self.

For the reason that the power of being the enjoyer belongs as an attainment solely to the intellect, there would be no means of knowledge to prove the true existence of the individual self. Indeed, the accepted conclusion of those (who uphold the intellect as the agent of actions) is given thus:—"The *purusha* (or the individual self) exists because there must be an experiencing subject" (S. *Kār.* 17).

### समाध्यभावाच्च

**Sūtra 38.** *Samādhyabhavāchcha*

(254)

Because also there can be no concentrated meditation (on the part of the intellect).

If the intellect were accepted as the agent of actions, then it itself would be the agent even in respect of the action of concentrated meditation which forms the means of attaining salvation. And that concentrated meditation is of this nature: 'I (the meditator) am different from the *prakṛiti*'. The *prakṛiti* is incapable of concentrating so

as to say: 'I am different from the *prakṛiti*'. Hence it is the self who is the agent.<sup>1011</sup>

It may, however, be said that if the agentship of actions be accepted in relation to the individual self, there will be no cessation of its agentship of actions at any time. To this objection, he (i.e., *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:—

### यथा च तक्षोभयधा

**Sūtra 39.** *Yathā cha takshobhayadhā*

(255)

There will be both (cessation and non-cessation of being the agent), as is the case with a carpenter (only in case the self is the agent).

Although the individual self is furnished with speech and other auxiliary instruments, he does actions (only) when he desires, but whenever he does not desire, he does not then do actions. For instance, a carpenter, although he is possessed of axes and other auxiliary instruments, does actions or does not do actions, just as it suits his desires. If, however, the intellect, which is material, is taken to be the agent of actions, then, inasmuch as there is no cause that restricts its desire to enjoy etc., there will be agentship of actions to it at all times.<sup>1012</sup>

1011. In *S. Kṛ.* (64), the knowledge which, according to the Sāṅkhyas, leads to final release, is stated to be of the form, "I am not", Not mine", and "Not I". Vāchaspati Miśra explains that these mean respectively, "I am the self and not the *prakṛiti*", "I have no

possessions", and "I am not the agent of any action".

1012. Action follows desiring and willing, and the intellect, which is material, cannot desire or will. If it is regarded as the agent, it has to be acting always. (Sāṅkara takes this *Sūtra* to form a separate *Adhikaraṇa* by itself.)

## ADHIKARANA VI

## PARĀYATTĀDHIKARANA

परात् तच्छ्रुतेः

Sūtra 40. *Parāttu tachchhruteh*

(256)

That (i.e., the power of being the agent possessed by the individual self) is, however, from the Supreme Being, because the scripture says so.

The question here is whether this power of being the agent of actions which belongs to the individual self, is due to and dependent upon itself, or whether it is dependent upon the Supreme Self.

What is it that is arrived at by reasoning? That it is due to and dependent upon itself. Indeed, if it were dependent upon the Supreme Self, that will lead to the mandatory and prohibitory *śāstras* becoming purposeless. In fact, whoever through his own intellect is capable of undertaking and refraining from actions, he alone is fit to be the person to be commanded. Therefore, its (i.e., the individual self's) power of being the agent of actions is due to and dependent upon itself.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows:—"That is, however, from the Supreme Being" (*Ved. Sūt. II. 3. 40*). The word, 'however,' sets aside the other view. "That", the power of being the agent of actions, comes to the individual self "from the Supreme Being"; it comes from the Supreme Self Himself as its source. Why? "Because the scripture says so."

There are here the following scriptural passages: "He who has entered within, who is the Ruler of all things that are born and who is the Self of all" (*Taitt.*

Ār. III. 21); and "He who, dwelling within the individual self, is within the individual self, whom the individual self does not know, whose body is the individual self, who controls the individual self from within, He is your Internal Ruler and immortal Self" (*Mādh. Br̥h. Up.* III. 7. 22). The *Smṛiti*, also, (says the same thing) in the following passages: "And I am also seated in heart of all beings, and from Me proceed memory, knowledge and forgetfulness" (*B. G.* XV. 15); and "The Lord, O Arjuna, exists in the region of the heart of all beings, and (from there) by means of the *māyā* (i.e., the *prakṛiti* with its *guṇas*), He causes the revolutions of all beings that are mounted upon the mechanism (of the body)" (*B. G.* XVIII. 61).

It was, however, stated above that, in that case, it would lead to the *śāstras* becoming purposeless. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विदितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः

**Sūtra 41.** *Kṛitaprayatnāpekshastu  
vihitapratishiddhāvaiyarthyaḍibhyaḥ*  
(257)

But He requires the efforts made (by the individual self) for the reason among others that mandates and prohibitions (in the *śāstras*) should not become purposeless.

In regard to all actions, the Supreme Self, who is the Internal Ruler of all things, first requires the efforts, that is, activities, undertaken by the individual self, and then, by giving His consent thereto, directs him to proceed with it. Without the consent of the Supreme Self, no activity of that (individual self) can appropriately proceed : this is the meaning.

Why is this so? "For the reason, among others, that mandates and prohibitions (in the *śāstras*) should not become purposeless." By the expression, 'among others' (or '*ādi*'), favour, disfavour etc. are denoted. For instance, in the case of a common fund belonging to two persons, it is not possible for one of them to make it the property of a stranger, without the consent of the other. Nevertheless, even so, because the consent of the other is brought about by him alone, the fruit thereof accrues to him only.<sup>1013</sup>

That in regard to Him who is capable of preventing sinful acts, His being a consenting party does not bring on Him mercilessness—(this) has been dealt with in the course of the definite discussions bearing upon the system of the Sāṅkhyas (under *Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 3). While this is so, it is stated in the following passage: "Indeed, He of Himself induces him whom He wishes to lead beyond these worlds to do work which is good; He of Himself induces him whom He wishes to lead downwards to do work which is not good" (*Kaush. Up.* III. 9). That is to say, with the object of leading them upwards as with the object of leading them downwards, He himself causes men

1013. Rāmānuja's attempt to reconcile the reality of moral choice with the *Brahman* being the cause of all things has led to differences of opinion among his followers. Vātsyā Varada (circa 1250) in his *Tattvasāra* (48) appears to state that the Lord is neutral in regard to the initial effort of the self in regard to any action and that He assents to later efforts therein. This is irrespective of the goodness or badness of the action. His pupil, Sudarśana Bhṛṅga, in the *S.P.*, elaborates the position. The Lord is the common cause of all actions of all selves in the sense that He gives the selves bodies, organs of sense etc. They use these as they please,

just as the sons deal with paternal gifts of property according to their desires. The involvement of the Lord from the beginning in the activities of the particularly good or the particularly wicked is based on their previous *karmas*. Vedānta Desika, whose preceptor had studied under Vātsyā Varada, takes a different view. He argues against the Lord's indifference during the initial effort. The Lord is the common cause of all actions like the soil and water for all plants. The selves are the particular causes, like seeds. The careful student, he says, must understand Rāmānuja's teaching in this sense. (*Adhik.* 236-243).

to do good and bad works : this cannot appropriately happen.

To this objection the following reply is given. This (i.e., the Supreme Self inducing the performance of good and evil work) is not applicable to all individual selves. He, however, who has decidedly placed himself in a position exceedingly favourable to the Supreme Person and then does actions, him the Divine Lord favours, and He Himself produces in him a taste for only those highly auspicious actions which are the means of attaining Him. And he who has decidedly placed himself in a position exceedingly hostile to Him and acts (accordingly)—him He disfavors and He produces in him a taste for actions which are the means of leading him to the downward path and which are hostile to His attainment.<sup>1014</sup>

To the same effect it has been declared by the Divine Lord Himself, beginning with the following passages :—"I am the source of all, everything proceeds from Me. Knowing thus, wise men who are associated with devoted minds worship Me" (B. G. X. 8). It is then stated : "To those who are desirous of an eternal union (with Me), and accordingly worship Me, I give with love that faculty of understanding by which they come unto Me. Out of pity for them indeed, I remain in their mental structure (as the subject of their thoughts) and destroy, by means of the shining light of (the) knowledge (relating to Me), the darkness born of ignorance" (*Ibid.* X. 10, 11). Similarly there is the passage beginning with : "They (i.e., those of demoniacal disposition) say that the world is unreal, without support and without the Lord" (*Ibid.*

1014. There are some variant readings in the text of the *Śrī-bhāṣya* in this paragraph. 'Vyavasthitah', rendered as 'who has decidedly placed himself in a position' is alternative to 'vyavasitah' or 'he who is resolved on being'.

Instead of 'ruchim janayati' (or 'produces a taste for'), when the phrase is repeated, there is 'sajjayati' or 'makes him attached to'. There is a slight deviation in the *Kaushītaki* text as quoted and as in the *Upanishad*.



XVI. 8), and ending with : "They are envious of Me and hate Me (as existent) in the bodies both of themselves and of others" (*Ibid.* XVI. 18). After stating this, it is further declared thus : "I continually throw into the repeated cycles of births and deaths, (and there) into demoniacal wombs, all those cruel and evil ones, the worst of men who hate Me" (*Ibid.* XVI. 19).

## ADHIKARANA VII

### AMŚĀDHIKARANA

अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके

**Sūtra 42.** *Amśo nānāvyaṇṇapadeśadanyathā chāpi  
dāśakitavāditvamadhīyata eke* (258)

It (viz., the individual self) is a part (of the *Brahman*), because distinction (of it from the *Brahman*) is taught and what is otherwise (i.e., because non-distinction also is taught). Moreover, some schools declare in their scriptures that He (i.e., the *Brahman*) is fishermen, gamblers etc.

It has been stated above that the power of being the agent of actions which belongs to the individual self is dependent upon the Supreme Being. Now the doubt is raised whether this individual self is entirely distinct from the Supreme Being (as the Naiyāyikas believe), or whether it is the *Brahman* Himself that is subject to illusion (as Sāṅkara teaches), or whether it is the *Brahman* Himself that is characterised by limiting adjuncts (as Bhāskara holds), or whether it is a part (or *amśa*) of the *Brahman*. From the contradiction among scriptural passages, this doubt arises.

It may, however, be asked whether this subject was not conclusively dealt with under the following aphorisms : "The identity of the world with Him is made out from the passage marked by the word, '*ārambhāṇa*,' and other like passages" (*Ved. Sū.* II. 1. 15); and "(The *Brahman*) is, however, other (than the individual self), on account of the difference (between them) which is taught (in the scriptures)" (*Ibid.* II. 1. 22). True (i.e., it was so determined). That very conclusion is questioned through the contradiction among scriptural passages in regard to distinction and oneness (between the individual self and the *Brahman*); and it is specifically settled here by declaring that the individual self is a part of the *Brahman*.<sup>1015</sup> Indeed, so long as it is not decided that the individual self is a part of the *Brahman*, so long the propositions that the individual self is not distinct from the *Brahman* and that the *Brahman* is other than that (individual self) are not established.

What is it that is properly arrived at through reasoning? That it (namely, the individual self) is entirely distinct (from the *Brahman*). Why? Because distinction between them is taught in the following among other such scriptural passages: "The two unborn, who are the Intelligent and the ignorant, are the Lord and non-Lord" (*Svet. Up.* I. 9). The scriptural passages which speak of non-distinction between the Intelligent and ignorant beings have a figurative significance, because they denote contradictory meanings like the sentence, "One should sprinkle (water) with fire".

1015. Under *Ved. Sū.* (II. 1. 15), non-distinction has been proved by assuming that the words denotative of the body also reach up to the denotation of the self animating the body. Under II. 1. 22, non-distinction has been proved on the basis of the same assumption. Now this assumption is being questioned. The distinction and non-distinction taught in the scriptures

as existing between the *Brahman* and the self may be explained in other ways. Here it is shown that both the teachings cannot be understood as primarily significant except on the basis of the self being an *amśa* of the *Brahman*. The term, '*amśa*,' loosely rendered as 'part', is better on clearly defined as being a mode which cannot exist apart from the possessor of the mode.

This proposition also, that the individual self is a part of the *Brahman*, does not hold good at all. Indeed, the word, 'part' (or 'amśa'), denotes a portion (or division) of a thing. If the individual self is a portion of the *Brahman*, then the evils appertaining to it will attach to the *Brahman*. Nor can the theory that the individual self is a bit cut off from the *Brahman* appropriately bring out its being a part, because the *Brahman* is incapable of being cut up, and because also that will lead to the errors stated above (namely, the imperfections of the individual self getting attached to the *Brahman*). Therefore, in the case of that (individual self) which is entirely distinct from Him, it is impossible to demonstrate that it is a part of Him.

Or again it may be said (as by Śaṅkara) that the *Brahman* that is subject to illusion is the individual self. Why? Because the *Brahman* is taught to be the individual self in the following and other such scriptural passages: "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7); and "This self is the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 5). The scriptural passages which speak of distinctions, however, restate things established by perception and the other means of knowledge; hence, it is declared that, like perception etc., they (i.e., such passages) are included in ignorance—(declared, that is) by means of scriptural passages which deal with non-dualism that cannot be established otherwise (and is self-established).<sup>1016</sup>

1016. Under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1.1), at the commencement of the *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* (or 'the Great Objection'). Ramanuja sets out how, according to the *Advaitins*, the cessation of distinctions, which is contrary to perception, arises out of knowledge derived from the scripture. The argument runs: "When there is contradiction between two means of knowledge, then, that one happens

to be stultified the logical outcome of which it is possible to realise otherwise; while that other happens to be the stultifier (the logical result of) which cannot be otherwise established, and is, moreover singular and undoubted." (Vol. I. p. 30) What cannot be established by other means is self-established, and at the same time it sublates what is established by other means.

Or again it may be said (as by Bhāskara) that the *Brahman* Himself who is limited by beginningless limiting conditions is the individual self. Why? Because it is taught that by reason of this alone the *Brahman* becomes the individual self. And it is not possible to say that these limiting conditions are manufactured by illusion, because then definite fixity with regard to bondage and final release etc. will not appropriately result.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows: that it (viz., the individual self) is a part of the *Brahman*. Why? Because distinction (of it from the *Brahman*) is taught; as also what is otherwise (than distinction), that is, because of the teaching of oneness (with the *Brahman*). Indeed, this twofold teaching is seen declared (in the scripture). Surely, the teaching relating to distinctions between the *Brahman* and the individual self, is seen declared by means of the following among other relations between them: the relation of the creator and the created, of the controller and the controlled, of the omniscient and the ignorant, of independence and dependence, of purity and impurity, of being the inexhaustible mine of auspicious qualities and its opposite, of Lord and liege etc. "And what is otherwise." That is, the teaching regarding non-distinction also is seen declared in the following and other such passages:— "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7); and "This self is the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 5). "Moreover, some schools declare (in their scriptures) that He is fishermen, gamblers etc." In the following passage—"The fishermen are the *Brahman*, the slaves are the *Brahman*, the gamblers are the *Brahman*" (*Samhitopanishad*)—the *Ātharvaṇikas* declare also that the *Brahman* is fishermen, gamblers etc. And therefore non-distinction is taught there as extending to all individual selves; this is the meaning. In this manner, in order that both distinction and non-distinction may be established in their primary significance, it has to be admitted that this individual self is a part of the *Brahman*.

Again, it should not be said that the teachings relating to distinctions deal with things which are established by perception etc., and are therefore of the nature of (mere restatements of) what is established otherwise (than through such declarations). (For) there are the following characteristics of the individual self: that it is created by the *Brahman*, is controlled by Him, forms His body, is His liege, has Him as its support, is protected by Him, is absorbed by Him, is His worshipper, attains the aims of life which are duty, wealth, desire and final release and which are all obtained through His favour: the distinctions between the individual self and the *Brahman* are due to those (characteristics). Owing to these (i.e., the characteristics of the self and the distinctions based on them between it and the *Brahman*) not falling within the range of perception etc., they are not established by other means of knowledge. Therefore, scriptural passages which relate to the creation of the world etc. cannot (be said to) be concerned with teaching false doctrines because of restating the distinctions established by other means of knowledge.

It cannot be that delusion is taught to the *Brahman*, whose essential nature is pure intelligence, that is indivisible and uniform, doing the following actions: constant meditation to the effect that He is other than Himself; creation of the spatial ether etc. after willing to become manifold; entering therein as the individual self; differentiation of the wonderful and varied names and forms; attaining pains and pleasures due to the experience of endless objects of sense caused by those (differentiations); being seated in those (selves) without Himself becoming the enjoyer, becoming their internal ruler through controlling them; Himself having become the individual self, constant meditation on it as the causal *Brahman*; getting finally released from (the bondage of) *samsāra*; and promulgating the *śāstras* that teach that (final release). If it were so, then that

(teaching) will come to be the confused talk of a mad man.<sup>1017</sup>

This view also, that the *Brahman* characterised by limiting conditions is the individual self, does not hold good at all, because surely there will then be stultification of the relations of the controller and the controlled etc., that have been already described above. Indeed, in regard to persons like Devadatta, who is one only, there is no establishment (in himself) of the roles of the controller and controlled etc. through the limiting conditions of possessing houses etc. Therefore, for the sake of appropriately fitting in both the teachings, this individual self has to be accepted as a part of the *Brahman*.

### मन्त्रवर्णित्

**Sūtra 43.** *Mantravarṇāt*

(259)

(The individual self is a part of the *Brahman*) because a word in a Vedic text says so.

There is the Vedic passage :—"His one foot are all beings: His three immortal feet are in (the highest) heaven" (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 10). "Because a word in this Vedic text says so," the individual self is a part of the *Brahman*. Indeed, the word, 'foot' (or '*pāda*'), here denotes a part (or *aṁśa*). In this Vedic text, the plural number—"all beings"—is used, because the individual selves are many. In the aphorism also, the word '*aṁśa*' is intended to denote the whole class (of individual selves). In (the aphorism), "The individual self has no origination because there are scriptural statements to that effect....."

1017. Rāmanuja's reply to the argument that non-distinction is proved because it is not established by other means is twofold. First, the distinction between the individual self and the *Brahman* also cannot be established by other means. Secondly, it is conceded that the

Vedic teaching about the creation of the world etc. cannot be established by other means. But it is also a delusion from the point of view of the highest order of reality. So the *Veda*, which is supposed to remove error, must be regarded as teaching delusion.

(*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 18), the singular number (of the word 'self') is intended to denote the whole class (of the selves), because in the following among other passages, "The Eternal among the eternal, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfills the desires of the many" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 13), what is stated is the distinction from the Lord as well as the manifoldness and eternity of the individual selves.

The manifoldness of the individual selves, which are eternal, being in this manner founded upon authority, even though all the individual selves, owing to their having the essential nature of intelligence, have one and the same nature, the form which differentiates them from one another is understood by those who are capable of knowing the true nature of the individual self. He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) speaks surely of the manifoldness of the individual selves immediately hereafter (under the aphorism), "There is also no confusion (among the individual selves in regard to their experiences), because of the absence of (infinite) extension (on the part of each one of them)" (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 48).<sup>1018</sup>

### अपि स्मर्यते

**Sūtra 44.** *Api smaryate*

(260)

It is also declared in the *Smṛiti* (that the individual self is a part of the *Brahman*).

In the following passage—"My own eternal part which has become the individual self in the world of living beings" (*B. G.* XV. 7)—it is laid down in the *Smṛiti* (i.e.,

1018. 'Pada' in the *mantra* is equated with 'amśa' in the *Sūtra*. The self is now shown to be an amśa of the *Brahman* by a specific Vedic text, while the previous *Sūtra* relied on the general purport of the *Vedas*. Śaṅkara cites here *Chhīnd. Up.*

(III. 12. 6), which deviates little from the *Taitt. Ār.* text quoted by Ramanuja. Śaṅkara also reads a 'cha' at the end of the *Sūtra*. The distinction among selves persists at all times—even in *moksha*—because the subject-object division continues.

in the *Bhagavadgītā*) that the individual self is a part of the Supreme Person. For this reason also, it (viz., the individual self) is an *aṁśa* (of the *Brahman*).<sup>1019</sup>

If the individual self is, indeed, a part of the *Brahman*, the doubt is raised that, because of its being a division of the *Brahman*, the evils attached to the individual self belong to the *Brahman* Himself. To this doubt, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

प्रकाशादिवत् नैवं परः

**Sūtra 45.** *Prakāśādivattu naivam Paraḥ* (261)

(It, i.e., the individual self, is, however, a part of the *Brahman*) like light (being a part of the source of light) and so on. (As is the individual self) the Supreme Being is not so.

The word, 'however,' sets aside the objection raised. "Like light and so on": the individual self is a part of the Supreme Self—just as light which has the nature of luminosity is a part of the shining fire, sun etc., just as in regard to the ox, the horse and white and black colours, which are qualified by oxness etc., the attributes of oxness etc., are parts, or just as the body of any god, man etc., is a part of the embodied; similarly thereto is the case here. Indeed, an '*aṁśa*' is that which is a part of any one thing. The attribute of any one thing that is qualified by attributes is undoubtedly an *aṁśa* thereof. Accordingly, those who have the power of discrimination teach in relation to a thing qualified by attributes that the part made up of attributes is such and such and that the part made up of the object qualified is such and such. Although there is the relation of part and whole between

1019. S'āṅkara reads a '*cha*' between '*api*' and '*smāryate*'. Rāmaṇuja describes the self as an *aṁśa* of Puruṣottama (or the Supreme Person) to recall the

teaching in *B. G.* (XV), where the Lord is described as the Supreme Self and distinguished from both the bound and emancipated selves.



the attribute and the object qualified, distinctions are seen to exist between their characteristics. In this manner, the relation of part and whole and distinction in their characteristics can be appropriately proved to exist between the individual self and the Supreme Self, which are attribute and object qualified.<sup>1020</sup>

This same thing is declared in the statement—"The Supreme Being is not so." Of whatever nature is the individual self, not of that nature is the Supreme Self. Indeed, just as the possessor of light is a distinct entity from light; similarly, the Supreme Self who is the *amśin* (or whole) is a distinct entity from the individual self which is His own *amśa* (or part) and which takes the place of light (in the simile here); this is the meaning. In this manner, depending upon that distinction of characteristics between the individual self and the Supreme Self, which is due to the relation between them of the attribute and the thing qualified by attributes, statements relating to the distinction between them are promulgated (by the scripture). But the statements regarding the absence of distinction between them are dependent upon the attributes which are incapable of separate existence from the objects qualified by them, and which extend up to and include in their denotation the objects so qualified, and so are appropriately proved as having been used in their primary significance. In such passages as—"That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7) and "This self is the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 5)—the words, "thou" and "this self", also are used like (i.e., in the same sense as) the word 'that' and like the word '*Brahman*'. (This is)

1020. The examples given are of attributes which cannot exist apart from the objects they qualify. The body is cited as such an attribute of the self. Attributes of this kind are parts of the qualified whole: they are *amśas*. In this sense, the self is an *amśa* of the *Brahman*. Note

that the doubt at the beginning of the *Sūtra* rests on the basis that the *amśa* is a part of the object qualified. It is cleared by showing that the *amśa* is a part as a qualifying attribute. (Sāṅkara reads the *Sūtra* without 'tu'.)

because they denote the *Brahman* having the individual selves as His body and thus express oneness of meaning. This topic has been extensively dealt with already (under *Ved. Sūtr.* I. 1. 1 etc.)<sup>1021</sup>

### स्मरन्ति च

**Sūtra 46.** *Smaranti cha*

(262)

It is declared by the authors of the *Smṛitis* also.

The relation of part and whole between the individual self and the *Brahman* exists in this manner on the similitude of the relation between light and the possessor of light, on the relation between power and the possessor of power, and on the relation between the body and the soul (or the possessor of the body); and Parāśara and others declare in their *Smṛitis* the existence of this relation, as in the following passages: "The whole of this world (of bound and freed selves) is the manifestation of the power of the Supreme *Brahman* (i.e., is an attribute incapable of separate existence from Him), in the same way in which spreading light is (the manifestation) of the fire located in a particular spot" (*V. P. I. 22. 56*); and "Whatever thing is created by whatsoever beings, in regard to the producing cause of that created thing, all that, indeed, is the body of Hari' (i.e., the Lord)" (*V. P. I. 22. 38*); and so on. The Vedic scriptures are also meant by the word, 'also', as, for instance, the passages beginning with—"He whose body is the self (He is your internal Ruler and immortal Self)" (*Mādh. Brīh. Up. III. 7. 22*). What is stated is that they declare the relations of part and whole to exist through the relation of body and soul (between the world and the *Brahman*).<sup>1022</sup>

1021. See Vol. I, pp. 198-199.

1022. Both *Sūtras* 44 and 46 aver that the *Smṛitis* support the view that the self is an *aṁśa* of the *Brahman*. In the former, the reference is to a text which

merely states that the self is an *aṁśa* of the *Brahman*. Now the reference is to passages which describe the self as a part of the *Brahman* in the sense of being an inseparable attribute.

Here this doubt is raised. While the character of being a part of the *Brahman*, the character of being incited to do actions by the *Brahman* and the character of the knower are common to all individual selves, in the case of some, permission to study the *Veda* and to practise its teachings is given ; in the case of some others, prohibition thereof is directed ; in the case of some permission is given to see and to touch them, while in the case of others prohibition thereof is directed. How can all this be appropriate in the *śāstras*? To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसम्बन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत्

Sūtra 47. *Anujñāparihārau*

*dehasambandhāj्jyotirādivat* (263)

Permission and prohibition are due to association with the body as is the case with fire etc.

Although all the individual selves have the same nature through (each of them) being a part of the *Brahman*, through (each of them) being a knower etc., yet permission and prohibition (to study and to avoid the study of the *Veda* etc.) are based upon the relationship with pure and impure bodies which consist of (those of) the Brahmin, the Kshattriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra, and of other bodies. "As is the case with fire etc." For instance, although (all) fires have the same nature as possessing the generic properties of fire, yet fire is brought for use out of the house of a person learned in the *Vedas*, but the fire of a burning ground is prohibited from being brought out. For instance, again, food etc. are permitted to be brought for use from a person learned in the *Veda* etc., while they are prohibited from being brought out from the house of a sinner.

### असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः

**Sūtra 48.** *Asantateśchāvvyatikarah*

(264)

There is no confusion (among the individual selves in regard to their experiences) because also of the absence of infinite extension (in respect of each of them).

Although, owing to their being the parts of the *Brahman*, they have the same nature, yet the individual selves are mutually distinct, and, owing to their having each the size of an atom, are distinct in each body; and therefore there will be no confusion of their experiences. According to the theory (of the *Advaitins*) that the individual self is the *Brahman* Himself who is subject to illusions, and according also to the theory (of *Bhāskara*) that the *Brahman* who is subject to (real) limiting conditions is the individual self, there are all the difficulties such as the confusion of experiences between the individual self and the Supreme Self, and also among the individual selves themselves. Having this in mind, the absence of any (such) confusion of experiences according to his view was declared (by the *Sūtrakāra*).<sup>1023</sup>

It may, however, be said that in the case of the theory that the *Brahman* who is subject to illusions is the individual self, there are such things as separation in respect of the experiences (of different selves) on account of that distinction among the limiting conditions which is

<sup>1023</sup>. 'Tati' is taken to be 'extension'; 'santati' means 'infinite extension', and its absence is indicated by 'asantati'. The 'cha' in the aphorism points to an additional reason not explicitly mentioned. This is taken to be the mutual

distinction among the individual selves. Such distinction is based on the fact that each self feels individually, 'I am happy,' 'I am sorry,' and so on; the experiences of other selves are not felt by any self.

brought about by ignorance. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:—

### आभासा एव च

**Sūtra 49.** *Ābhāsā eva cha*

(265)

It (i.e., the reasoning in support of the view that the *Brahman* when subject to illusion is the individual self) is undoubtedly fallacious besides.

As regards Him whose essential nature is pure intelligence, (which is) indivisible and uniform, the reason, which proves that distinction among limiting conditions which is due to ignorance and which is preceded by the concealment of His essential nature (by ignorance), is undoubtedly fallacious. It has already been demonstrated (under *Ved. Sūt. I. 1. 1.*) that the concealment of intelligence as regards Him whose essential nature consists only of intelligence is undoubtedly the destruction of intelligence.

Or the reading of the aphorism is—"They are undoubtedly fallacious." If so, it means the reasons are all fallacious.

From the word *cha* (or 'besides') contradiction with the following and other such scriptural passages is made out here:—"Knowing the individual self and the Impeller to be different" (*Svet. Up. I. 6*); "The two who are the intelligent and the ignorant" (*Svet. Up. I. 9*); and "One of the two eats the sweet *pippala* fruit" (*Svet. Up. IV. 6*)

Although there may be that distinction among the limiting conditions which is manufactured by ignorance, oneness is admitted to exist in regard to Him whose essential nature is conditioned by all the limiting adjuncts,

and therefore the confusion of experiences remains in the same state itself.<sup>1024</sup>

This doubt is raised here that, even according to the theory that the individual self is the *Brahman* conditioned by limiting adjuncts which are really existent, through the influence of the beginningless *adṛishṭa* which is the cause of the distinctions among limiting adjuncts, there will be separation (in regard to the experiences of individual selves). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

### अदृष्टानियमात्

**Sūtra 50.** *Adṛishṭānīyamāt* (266)

There is no cause regulative of the *adṛishṭa* (of the individual selves).

Even the *adṛishṭa* which is the indirect cause of limiting conditions has the essential nature of the *Brahman* (who is one only) as its abode, and there being no cause that is regulative of it, there is indeed confusion (in regard to the *adṛishṭa*); because it is not possible to divide the essential nature of the *Brahman* by means of limiting conditions as well as by means of the *adṛishṭas* through their own contact (with the *Brahman*).<sup>1025</sup>

### अभिसन्ध्यादिष्वपि चैवम्

**Sūtra 51.** *Abhisandhyādishvapi chaivam* (267)

<sup>1024</sup>. The obscuration of the essential nature of the *Brahman* as luminous knowledge is the destruction of His essential nature. (See Vol. I, p. 142). Even assuming that this hypothesis is admissible, the confusion among the experiences of the individual selves is unavoidable on its basis.

<sup>1025</sup>. The substratum of the limiting conditions is one only; and it cannot be divided into bits. The separation of the experiences of the individual selves cannot therefore be established on the basis of the *adṛishṭas* brought into being by limiting conditions.

The case is undoubtedly the same with regard to mental resolves and other connected acts (of physical exertion).

Even as regards mental resolves and the other connected acts of physical exertion which are the cause of the *adṛishta*, for the very reason that has been given (namely, that the *Brahman* is one and cannot be divided into bits), there is undoubtedly no regulation.<sup>1026</sup>

### प्रदेशभेदादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात्

**Sūtra 52.** *Pradeśabhedāditi chennāntarbhāvāt* (268)

If it be said that because the part (of the *Brahman* associated with limiting conditions) is distinct (from the part not so associated) and there is separation (among the experiences of the individual selves), it is not so, because all parts are included in all the limiting conditions.

It may, however, be said thus (by Bhāskara): No doubt, the essential nature of the *Brahman* is one only; it is incapable of division and is associated with limiting conditions of many kinds. Nevertheless, through the distinction (of the unconditioned part) from that part of the *Brahman* which is associated with limiting conditions, the separation (with regard to the experiences of individual selves) becomes undoubtedly established. If it be so said, it is replied that it is not right to say so; because the limiting conditions move from place to place, all parts of the *Brahman* are included in all the limiting conditions, and hence the confusion of the experiences of the individual selves remains assuredly in that same condition (as before). Although the association of limiting conditions

1026. 'Cha' in the aphorism indicates emphasis and has been rendered as 'undoubtedly'.

is separately with parts of the *Brahman*, all things are parts of the *Brahman*, and miseries associated with each particular part accrue to the *Brahman* Himself.<sup>1027</sup>

Under the two earlier aphorisms, namely, "Otherwise, it will lead to eternal perception or eternal non-perception (on the part of the individual self), or it will be restricted to either of them" (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 3. 32), and "There would be no restriction (in regard to being the enjoyer) just as in the case of perception" (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 3. 36), the errors pertaining to those who, remaining outside the pale of the *Veda*, uphold the theory that the individual self is all-pervading, have been explained. Here, however, under the aphorisms beginning with—"It (i.e., the reasoning in support of the view that the deluded *Brahman* is the individual self) is also undoubtedly fallacious" (*Ved. Sūtr.* II. 3. 49)—the errors pertaining to those who, while upholding the authority of the *Veda*, maintain that there is only one Self, are explained.<sup>1028</sup>

1027. Confusion among the the experiences of the individual selves and between the experiences of the *Brahman* and those of the selves is pointed out here as arising from the theories criticised.

1028. S'ankara has taken the aphorisms here as refuting the Sāṅkhya. Rāmaṇuja is of the view that the Sāṅkhya theory has been refuted in earlier aphorisms ending with II. 3. 36.



PART IV  
ADHIKARANA I

PRĀNOTPATTYADHIKARANA

तथा प्राणाः

**Sūtra 1.** *Tathā prāṇāḥ*

(269)

Similarly, the *prāṇas* (or the senses are not created).

It has been stated above that the spatial ether and all other things which are other than the *Brahman* have origination, owing to their being the produced effects (of the *Brahman* who is their cause). It being so, the individual self is also a produced effect, but (in regard to it) origination as having the characteristic of a change of its essential nature was contradicted. Incidentally to this, the essential nature of the individual self was examined in particular. Now, the manner of the origination etc. of the senses which are the auxiliary instruments of the individual self, and of (the origination etc. of) the *prāṇas* are taken up for special examination.

The question for consideration here is whether that condition of being produced effects which belongs to the senses resembles that of the individual self, or whether it resembles that of the spatial ether etc. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? The upholder of the *prima facie* view says that it resembles undoubtedly that of the individual self: "Similarly, the *prāṇas* (or the senses are not created)" (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 4. 1).<sup>1029</sup> The word, '*prāṇas*', means 'the senses'. Just as the

<sup>1029</sup>. Rāmaṇuja regards the *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 4. 1) as setting out the *pūrvapakṣa*. Compare also *V. S.* and *V. D.*

individual self has no origination, similarly the senses also have no origination.

Why? Because the scripture says so. Just as the non-origination of the individual self is made out from the scripture, so also the non-origination of the senses is made out from the scripture itself. In this (aphorism), "Similarly the *prāṇas* (or the senses are not created)" (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 4. 1), the scriptural authority (for the non-origination of the self) is given an extended application.

What then is the scriptural authority here? There are the following passages: "Non-existence, indeed, was this in the beginning; they asked what was it that then existed: the non-existence was those *rishis*, indeed; they asked who those *rishis* were; the *prāṇas* indeed were those *rishis*" (*Sat. Br.* VI. 1. 1). The existence of the senses before the creation of the world is declared here in the scripture. From the plural number of the word, '*prāṇas*', it is definitely determined that it denotes the senses themselves. And it is not possible that this scriptural passage could be transformed (in interpretation) so as to mean existence for a long time, as the following passages have been so transformed:—"The element of air and the element of the spatial ether, that (which consists of these) is eternal" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 3) and "This deity mentioned above has not disappeared—this which is, indeed, the element of air" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 5. 22). Because in the passage, "Non-existence, indeed, was this in the beginning" (*Sat. Br.* VI. 1. 1), it is declared that they (i.e., the *prāṇas*) exist during the dissolution of the whole universe. The passages which speak of the origination of the senses have to be interpreted in the same manner in which the passages speaking of the origination of the individual self have been interpreted.<sup>1030</sup>

1030. The word '*rishi*' is derived from '*dṛiś*' (to see) or '*rish*' (to pierce). The *pūrvapakṣa* understands the term to mean the senses which are the

instruments of perception. According to the *Vedānta*, the term means here one who sees, namely, the Supreme Self.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows. The *prāṇas* also have origination in the same manner in which the spatial ether etc. have. Why? Because, from the following among other such passages—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning one only" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1), and "The Self alone, this was in the beginning one only" (*Ait. Up.* I. 1.)—oneness (of the *Brahman*) is made out to exist before creation. Because also in the passage, "From Him the principal vital air (*prāṇa*), the mind and all the senses are born" (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 3), origination is declared to exist in relation to the senses, and therefore it is not possible for them to exist before creation. Moreover, it is not possible to transform (by interpretation) the statements (in the scripture) which deal with the origination of the senses, as (it is possible) in the case of the meaning of the statements which deal with the origination of the individual self; because there are not *seen* scriptural passages which, as in the case of the individual self, deny origination and also scriptural passages which speak of eternity. Even in the passage beginning with—"Non-existence indeed was this in the beginning" (*Sat. Br.* VI. 1. 1)—it is the Supreme Self Himself that is denoted by the word '*prāṇa*'. The word '*prāṇa*' is well known to denote the Supreme Self, as in the following passage: "All these beings, certainly, enter into the *prāṇa* (to be absorbed into it); they are evolved out of the *prāṇa*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 11. 5). In the passage which says: "The *prāṇas*, indeed, were those *īśhis*" (*Sat. Br.* VI. 1. 1), the word, '*īśhi*', is used to denote Him (i.e., the Supreme Self) Himself who is omniscient, and not the non-intelligent senses.

It may, however, be asked how the scriptural passage containing (the nouns in) the plural number—'*īśhis*' and '*prāṇas*'—can appropriately fit in here. If it be so asked, he (i.e. the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:—

गौयसम्भवत्प्राक्छुतेश्च

Sūtra 2. Gaṇyasambhavātpṛākśruteścha

(270)

III S.B.—21

It (i.e., the plural number) is used figuratively, because of the impossibility (of its denoting many), as there is indeed a scriptural declaration in regard to Him (i.e., to His existence) before creation.

The scriptural passage containing the plural number is used figuratively, because many things cannot possibly exist (before creation). For the very reason that the scriptural text here declares that He, the Supreme Self Himself, is alone existent before creation.

### तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्वाचः

**Sūtra 3.** *Tatpūrvakatvādvāchah* (271)

Because the sense of speech is preceded by that (i.e., by creation, it does not exist before creation).

For the following reason also, the word 'prāṇa' denotes the Supreme Self. Because the sense of speech, that is, the naming of objects other than the Supreme Self, is preceded by the creation of the spatial ether etc., which are the objects of the sense of speech etc. According to the passage—"Indeed, this was then undifferentiated: it has now been differentiated by names and forms" (*Bṛih. Up. I. 4. 7*)—there are no things possessing names and forms (before creation), and also then there are no effects (like pronunciation etc.) produced by the sense of speech, etc.; hence they (i.e., the senses) do not exist: this is the meaning.<sup>1031</sup>

1031. Here the reply is given to a possible argument that the senses should be assumed to exist prior to creation, even as the individual selves are. In the latter case, from the effects

of *karma*, the assumption is reasonably made. (See *Ved. Sūt. II. 1. 35*). But there are no effects of the senses which oblige us to make such an assumption in regard to the senses.

## ADHIKARANA II

### SAPTAGATYADHIKARANA

#### सप्त गतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च

Sūtra 4. *Sapta gaterviśeshitatvāchcha.*

(272)

They (i.e., the senses), are seven, because of the movement (along with the individual self being attributed only to seven), and because also they are so specified.

The question that is taken up for consideration here is whether those senses (already shown to be created effects) are only seven, or whether they are eleven. The doubt as to the number here is due to contradictory scriptural passages.

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That "they are only seven". Why? "Because of the movement (along with the individual self being attributed to seven only), and because also they are so specified." Surely, movement, which consists of moving through the worlds along with the individual self, both when it is born and when it is dead, is declared in the scripture to belong only to the seven senses as in the following passages: "These worlds are seven; in them (during wakefulness) move the *prāṇas* placed (in their various positions); (during deep sleep) they rest in the cave of the heart; they are seven, seven only" (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 8). The repetition (of the word 'seven') is intended to denote the differences among the individual selves. And these *prāṇas*, which are endowed with motion, have been specified through their essential nature in the following passage: "When the five instruments of knowledge stand still along with the mind, and the intellect has ceased to do its function,

that condition, they say, is the greatest movement" (*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 10). The greatest movement is their movement for the purpose of attaining salvation, after giving up their movement within the body. In this manner, only seven (senses) are declared to have movement along with the individual self during its conditions of birth and death; and in the condition of *yoga* they are specified as instruments of knowledge; hence the instruments of the individual self are made out to be only these seven, namely, the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste, smell, intellection (*buddhi*) and attention (*manas*).

In the following and other similar passages: "There are the eight (senses) which seize (the self)" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 2. 1) and "Seven, indeed, are the *prāṇas* connected with the head, two are placed downwards" (*Taitt. Sam.* V. 3. 2. 5), which deal with the *prāṇas*, those other senses, however, as apprehending objects, are made out (along with the previously mentioned seven) to extend up to fourteen—these being the sense of speech, the (two) hands, the (two) legs, the organ of excretion and the organ of generation; they are not declared to move along with the individual self, and therefore their denotation by the word '*prāṇa*' is figurative, owing to their being merely helpful, in ever so little a degree, to the individual self.<sup>1032</sup>

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows:—

हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम्

**Sūtra 5.** *Hastādayastu sthite' to naivam*

(273)

But the hand (i.e., the sense of grasping) and the other senses exist therefore during the existence of the individual soul in the body; therefore it (i.e., that the senses are only seven) is not so.

1032. The eight *grahas* mentioned in *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 2. 1) are the five senses, the *manas*, the organ of speech and the

hands. The nine *prāṇas* include the organ of speech, the mind, and the organs of excretion and generation.

The senses are not at all seven, but eleven, because hands and other senses also, when the individual is in the body, form the auxiliary instruments of its (i.e., the self's) enjoyment, and because also they have distinct functions. Indeed, as is the case with the senses of hearing etc., so also in the case of the hands etc., distinct functions such as that of grasping are seen to exist; therefore they also certainly exist. "Therefore, it (i.e., that the senses are only seven) is not so". "Therefore" means that it should not be thought thus, that hands etc. do not exist. Through the differentiation of its functions into determination, self-conceit and reflection, the mind itself is denoted by the words '*buddhi*' (or will), '*ahaṅkāra*' (or egoism) and '*chitta*' (or the thinking principle) respectively; thus the senses are eleven in number. Hence in the passage, "These ten *prāṇas* are in the *puruṣa*, the *ātman* is the eleventh" (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 9. 4), by the word, '*ātman*', the mind is denoted.

Therefore, the number of the senses is fixed as established by the (above) scriptural and following *Smṛiti* passages:—"The senses are eleven and five are the objects of the senses" (*B. G.* XIII. 5); and "The senses are (all) *taijasa*, the ten senses are called *vaikārika*, and the eleventh is the mind here" (*V. P.* I. 2. 47). The statements regarding a greater number (than eleven) are intended to denote the distinctions in regard to the functions of the mind; and the statements relating to their number being smaller (than eleven) are due to the particular actions of moving etc., which are intended to be spoken of in relation to several particular contexts.<sup>1033</sup>

1033. In this aphorism, the word, '*ataḥ*', meaning 'therefore' or 'because of', is taken as having been used twice. The hands etc. exist during the existence of the self in the body, because of their being the instruments for the experience of the self; therefore it cannot be said that the senses are seven only. In *V. P.* (I. 2. 47), quoted

in the commentary, two theories about the creation of the sense organs are mentioned. The first view is that they are evolved from the *taijasa* or the *rājasa* variety of the *ahaṅkāra*. The other view, accepted by the author of the *V. P.*, is that they are from the *vaikārika* or the *sattvika* variety of the *ahaṅkāra*.

## ADHIKARANA III

## PRĀṆĀNUTVĀDHIKARANA

## अणवश्च

Sūtra 6. *Aṇavaścha*

(274)

They (i.e., the senses) are also atomic in size.

It may be said as follows. In the following passage—  
 “All these above-mentioned ones are surely equivalent  
 (in all bodies), all are infinite” (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 5. 13)—owing  
 to their being declared to possess infinity, infinity is the  
 size of the *prāṇas*. To this objection, the reply is given as  
 follows. In the passage: “All the *prāṇas* (or the senses)  
 depart from the body following the *prāṇa* (or the principal  
 vital air), which departs from the body after (the self)”  
 (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2), declaration is made of their departure  
 from the body, and therefore it is established that their  
 size is limited. It being so, by those are by the side at the  
 time of their departure from the body, they are not  
 perceived, and therefore the *prāṇas* are also atomic in  
 size. In the following passage which speaks of the infinite  
 size of the *prāṇas*, “those who indeed worship the  
 infinite ones” (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 5. 13), their worship is  
 declared, and that passage is intended to refer to the  
 multitude of effects which form the attributes of the  
*prāṇas*.<sup>1034</sup>

1034. The multitudinousness of the 'effects' is given as the explanation of the infinity of the *prāṇas* mentioned in *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 5. 13). Rāṅgarāmanuja suggests that this may refer to the activities of hearing, meditating etc., involved in the worship.

Alternatively he suggests that the *prāṇas* are infinite, because they exist for a long time, and also because they are separate in countless living creatures. The effects may also refer to the results of such worship.



श्रेष्ठ

**Sūtra 7.** *Sreshthaścha*

(275)

It (i.e., principal vital air), which is also the most excellent (is created).

Here the doubt is raised thus. In the context relating to the *prāṇas* (in *Chhānd. Up.* V. 1) the principal *prāṇa* (vital air) has been determined to be the most excellent, owing to its being the cause of the maintenance of the body.

Because in the passage—"That one with its own power and without air breathed" (*R. V. X. 129. 2*), the existence of the life-giving breath, which is the action of that (principal vital air, *prāṇa*) itself at the time of the great dissolution (of the universe) is declared, and because also, in the passage—"From Him are produced" (*Munḍ. Up.* II. 1. 3)—there is the declaration of its (i.e., the *prāṇa*'s) origination, and this (origination) can be appropriately proved to exist in the same manner in which the declaration of the origination of the individual self is proved; therefore it (i.e., the principal vital air) is not created.

Then this doubt is thus dispelled:—That the most excellent thing, *prāṇa*, (i.e., the principal vital air) is also created is what is stated here; because (otherwise) there will be contradiction of the determination of the oneness (of the *Brahman*) before creation; because also in the passage—"From Him are born the *prāṇa*..." (*Munḍ. Up.* II. 1. 3)—it is declared to have an origination that is similar to that of the element of earth etc.; and because again there is no negation of its having origination. The scriptural statement—"That one (Supreme Being) with the *praktiti* and without air breathed" (*R. V. X. 129. 2*)—is not made with reference to the *prāṇa* that is associated

with the individual self ; but what is signified is that it is only the Supreme *Brahman* that is found to exist before creation ; for that is declared in that very passage by the expression, “ without air ”.<sup>1035</sup>

Although the reasoning adopted here is the same as in the preceding *adhikaraṇas*, the composition of (this as a separate aphorism (in a separate *adhikaraṇa*) is required for the sake of the considerations that arise later on.

## ADHIKARANA IV

### VĀYUKRIYĀDHIKARANA

#### न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात्

**Sūtra 8.** *Na vāyukriye pṛithaguṇadeśāt*

(276)

It (i.e., the principal vital air) is not mere air or its action ; because it is taught to be different.

Here the doubt is raised whether this most excellent *prāṇa* is the mere great second physical element of air, or whether it is the activity of vibration (or motion) belonging to that (element), or whether it is the element of air itself which has assumed a particular condition. It being so, it is arrived at that it is merely the element of air, because it is so taught in the passage—“ That which is the *prāṇa* is the element of air ” (?) Or because the quality of the *prāṇa* is not well known to be in the mere element of air, and because also the word ‘*prāṇa*’ is well known to denote the actions of the element of air which consist of breathing out and breathing in, it denotes the action itself of that (air).

1035. S'ankara has a separate *adhikaraṇa* for this *Sūtra*. Rāmānuja feels that the theme is the same as in *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 4. 1) and that even a separate

aphorism has been composed only in order to be of use in respect of II. 4. 8. Note that R. V. (X. 129. 2) is understood incorrectly by the *pūrvapakṣa*.

If it be so arrived at, it is replied that it (i.e., the *prāṇa*) is not the mere element of air, nor is it its action. Why? Because it is taught to be different in the passage: "From Him are produced the *prāṇa*, the mind and all the senses, the spatial ether and the element of air." (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 3). From that same teaching of difference, the *prāṇa* is not the action of the element of air. Indeed, the action of the element of *tejas* etc. is not taught along with them as being a distinct substance. The passage, "That which is the element of air, is the *prāṇa*" (?), is however intended to teach that the *prāṇa* is the air itself that has assumed another (changed) condition, but that it is not, like the elements of *tejas* etc., a different principle. In the actions of breathing out and breathing in etc. also, there is the usage—"The *prāṇa* vibrates": hence the word, '*prāṇa*', is well known to denote a substance that is possessed of action and it does not denote mere action.<sup>1036</sup>

It may be asked whether this *prāṇa*, being as it is a modification of the element of air, is not a distinct external element like fire (which is a modification of the element of air). It is replied that it is not so, thus :

चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः

**Sūtra 9.** *Chakshurādivattu tatsahśiṣṭyādibhyah*

(277)

It (i.e., the *prāṇa*) resembles the eye etc. (in being an instrument of the self), because of the teachings (about it) mainly in association with them.

<sup>1036</sup>. In the order of evolution of the material elements, from *vyū* (or air) the *rūpa-tanmatra* (or the rudimentary element characterised by colour) is produced; and from this in turn *tejas* (or the element of fire) is produced. Thus fire is a modifi-

cation of the element of air: but it is something different from air. The point here is that the principal *prāṇa* is a modification of the element of air, which still continues to be of the nature of that element.

This (*prāṇa*) is not a particular external element, but it is a particular auxiliary instrument of the individual self like the eye etc. That it is such a particular auxiliary instrument is made out from its being taught in association with the sense organs which are also such auxiliary instruments. This *prāṇa* is taught in association with the eye etc., in the passage relating to *prāṇa* and in other passages. Indeed, it is only when it is of the same kind as the eye etc., that it is appropriate to teach it in association with those (viz., the eye etc.). Among the organs that are chiefly denoted by the word '*prāṇa*', its particular mention is made out from the word '*ādi*' (rendered as 'mainly'); because its particular mention is made in the following and other similar passages: "Now, indeed, this itself is the principal *prāṇa*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 2. 7) and "This itself is the (principal) *prāṇa* which is in the middle (of the body)" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 5. 21).<sup>1037</sup>

It may, however, be said as follows: If this (*prāṇa*) also is an organ like the eye etc., then, like them, it has also to be associated with a particular action that is useful to the individual self; such an action is not seen to exist. Therefore, it does not deserve to resemble the eye etc. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:—

अकरणत्वाच्च न दोषस्तथा हि दर्शयति

**Sūtra** 10. *Akaraṇatvāchcha na doṣastathā hi darśayati*

(278)

That defect, which is due to not having an action, does not exist; indeed, the scripture declares so.

1037. The plural in 'teachings' may indicate several Vedic texts. Alternatively, it may point forward to additional factors like the helpfulness of the principal *prāṇa* as an auxiliary instrument of the self, to be discussed in the next aphorism.

Compare *V. S.* (II. 4. 9). The word, '*ādi*', in the aphorism implies another kind of teaching besides the teaching in association. This is taken to be the particular description of the vital air as the principal *prāṇa*.

'*Karaṇa*' here means an action. That defect which was raised because it has no action, that is, because this *prāṇa* is devoid of that action which is of particular use to the individual self, (that defect) does not exist. Because the scripture declares (in relation to the principal vital air) that it is possessed of the action which consists in maintaining the body and the senses and which has thus a particular use. For it (i.e., the scriptural context here) first states :—"On whose departure from the body, this body appears as if it were very evil, that itself is the most excellent thing among you" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 1. 7*) ; then it points out that even if speech etc. depart (from this body), the body and the senses remain in their own state ; and it states that if the *prāṇa* departs (from the body), the body and the senses undergo dissolution. Therefore, this *prāṇa* which exists in a fivefold condition as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*, is useful to the individual self through maintaining the body and the senses, and so on. Therefore it is, like the eye etc., an auxiliary instrument (of the individual self).

It may, however, be said that owing to their having distinct names and owing also to their actions being distinct, the *prāṇa*, *apāna* etc. become different principles. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

### पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते

**Sūtra 11.** *Panchavṛttirmanovadvya padīśyate* (279)

That it (i.e., the *prāṇa*) has five functions is taught, as in the case of the mind.

Although there are different functions of the mind, like desire etc., and although they have different ways of operation, desire etc. are not distinct principles from the mind, because there is the following scriptural statement to that effect :—"Desire, resolution, doubt, faith, absence

of faith, liking, dislike, shyness, reasoning, fear, all this is the mind itself" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 5. 3). Similarly, there is the following scriptural statement in regard to the *prāṇa*: "*Prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna*, all these are the *prāṇa* itself" (*Ibid.*). Therefore, it is made out that *apāna* etc. are also particular functions of the *prāṇa* and are not distinct principles.<sup>1038</sup>

## ADHIKARANA V

### ŚRESHṬHĀṆUTVĀDHIKARAṆA

अणुश्च

**Sūtra 12.** *Aṇuścha*

(280)

It (i.e., the principal *prāṇa*) is also atomic in size.

This (principal *prāṇa*) is also atomic in size, because departure from the the body is declared to exist in relation to it, as (in relation to other things mentioned) before, in the following and other such passages:—"He (i.e., the self) departing from the body, the *prāṇa* departs therefrom immediately afterwards" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2).

There is, however, an additional doubt thus: there are the following scriptural declarations in relation to the *prāṇa*: "It is equal to these three worlds. It is equal to all this" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 22); "Everything is established in the *prāṇa*" (?); and "Indeed, all this has been enveloped by the *prāṇa*" (?). From this, it is made out that it is of great (i.e., infinite) size. The removal, however, of this doubt is thus effected: that it is of a limited size is definitely determined through the declaration relating to its action of departure from the body etc. Yet, inasmuch

<sup>1038</sup>. See Note 338 of Vol. I for the different activities of the five vital airs.

as the whole collection of living beings has its existence dependent upon the *prāṇa*, the statement relating to its being of an infinite size is quite appropriate.<sup>1039</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VI

### JYOTIRĀDYADHISHṬHĀNĀDHIKARANA

ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्प्राणवता शब्दान्

**Sūtra 13.** *Jyotirādyadhisṭhānam tu tadāmananāt  
prāṇavatā śabdāt* (281)

The control, however, by the god of fire etc., along with the individual self (over the senses), is due to His (i.e., the *Brahman's*) resolution, because the scripture says so.

The origin of the *prāṇas* (or the senses) along with the *śreṣṭha* (or the vital air) from the *Brahman*, their number and size have all been stated above. That those *prāṇas* are presided over by the god of fire and other gods has already been incidentally demonstrated under this aphorism, namely: “(Where non-intelligent things are mentioned as possessing consciousness) it is however the presiding deities that are taught; it is made out to be so by means of the qualifying attributes and of the movement (of those deities) subsequent (to creation)” (*Ved. Sū. II. 1. 5*). That those *prāṇas*, which are the means of enjoyment for the individual self, are presided over by the self is well established in the scriptural passages, as in the following:—“In this manner this above-mentioned

1039. The doubt in this *Sūtra* is different from those in II. 4. 6-7. Under *Sūtra* 6, the infinity attributed to the *indriyas* is explained as meant for the purpose of meditation and worship. In the next aphorism, the principal vital air is claimed

to have existed at the time of the dissolution of the universe. This is shown to be wrong. Now scriptural passages describing it as infinite are pointed out. Such description is, however, meant only for praise and glorification.

self (in the state of dreaming), after seizing the *prāṇas* (from their places) at this time, moves in its body as it likes" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 1. 18). Now, the doubt is whether this act of presiding over, which, in relation to the *prāṇas*, belongs to the individual self, as well as to the god of fire and other gods, is dependent upon themselves, or whether it is dependent upon the Supreme Self. It being so, it is dependent on themselves (says the objector here), because they (i.e., the self and the gods) do not stand in need of any one else in this behalf.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :— "The control by the god of fire and so on" (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 4. 13). Along with the possessor of the *prāṇas*, that is, along with the individual self, the control by *vyotis* etc., that is, by the god of fire and other gods, over the *prāṇas* is due to His thought; that is, it is due to the thought of the Supreme Self. Thought means directed thinking. The meaning is that it is due only to the resolution of the Supreme Self. Why? Because the scripture says so; that is, because in regard to the actions of the senses with the presiding gods and (those) of the individual self, the *śāstra* says that those (actions) are dependent upon the resolution of the Supreme Self.<sup>1040</sup>

For instance, in the *Antaryāmi-Brahmaṇa*, (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7) there are the following and other passages to that effect :—"He who, dwelling in the fire, is within the fire, whom the fire does not know, whose body is the fire, who controls the fire from within, He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self.....He who, dwelling within the air.....He who dwelling within the sun.....He who dwelling within the individual self.....He who dwelling within the eye....." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 5, 7, 9, 22 & 18).

1040. The control of the activities of the individual self by the *Brahman* has already been established in the *Parāyatādhikaraṇa*, comprising *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 3. 40-41). As in the case

of the self, so in the case of the gods also, even though they may be more powerful than other selves, control by the *Brahman* has to be accepted.



To the same effect the following passage is given :—  
 "Through fear of Him the wind blows, through (that) fear the sun rises, through fear of Him fire and Indra (perform their duties), and Death runs as the fifth." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1); as also the following passage :  
 "Indeed, under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, the sun and the moon, O Gārgī, stand well supported" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9); and so on.

### तस्य च नित्यत्वात्

**Sūtra 14.** *Tasya cha nityatvāt*

(282)

Because also that (i.e., the control by the *Brahman*) is eternal.

For the reason that the condition possessed by all things of being controlled by the Supreme Self is eternal, and because also it (i.e., that condition) is invariably associated with Him through its being firmly attached to His essential nature, in the case of these (i.e., the god of fire etc.), their act of presiding over (the *prāṇas*) is due solely to His (i.e., the *Brahman's*) resolution. In the passage beginning with—"Having created it, He entered into it; having entered into it, He became the *sat* and the *tyat*" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1)—it is declared that the entrance of the Supreme Person, by virtue of (His) being the Controller, into all the intelligent and non-intelligent things is firmly connected with His essential nature. This is also declared in the following passage of the *Smṛiti* : "I stand supporting the whole of this world through a part of Myself (i.e., through a part of My power)" (*B. G. X.* 42).

## ADHIKARANA VII

### INDRIYĀDHIKARANA

त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात्

**Sūtra 15.** *Ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadeśādanyatra śreṣṭhāt*

(283)

Other than the most excellent (*prāṇa*), they (i.e., those that are denoted by the word, '*prāṇa*') are the senses, because of the mention (of these) as such (senses).

There being a doubt as to whether all the things denoted by the word, '*prāṇa*', are the senses, or whether they only (are the senses) which are other than the most excellent *prāṇa*, it is stated (by the objector) that, inasmuch as they are all denotable by the word, '*prāṇa*', and inasmuch as they are the instruments (of the self), all things (so denoted) are indeed the senses.<sup>1041</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is replied as follows :—Those *prāṇas* which are altogether distinct from the most excellent *prāṇa* are the senses. Why? Because of the mention as such (senses) only of those *prāṇas* which are other than the most excellent (*prāṇa*). In the passage, "The senses are eleven while the objects of the senses are five" (B. G. XIII. 5), and in other similar passages, it is taught that the word 'sense' (or '*indriya*') denotes only the eye etc., together with the mind.

### भेदश्रुतेर्वैलक्षण्याच्च

**Sūtra 16.** *Bhedaśrutervaitakṣaṇyāchcha.*

(284)

Because also the scripture declares distinction (between the senses and the principal *prāṇa*), as there is distinction (as to their functions etc.)

In the following and other such passages, "From Him are born the *prāṇa*, the mind and all the senses"

1041. The sense organs, according to the *Vedānta*, are evolved from the *sattvika* variety of the *ahaṅkāra*, while the element of air has to be traced back to the *tīmasa* variety thereof. The principal *prāṇa* is only a modification of the element of

air, a modification which still retains the nature of that element. Thus the senses are distinct from the principal *prāṇa*. But they are called *prāṇas*, because, like the principal *prāṇa*, they are the instruments of the self.

(*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 3), the *prāṇa* is declared to be distinct from the senses; therefore, the character of being the senses is made out to belong only to those that are other than the *prāṇa*. Even though the mind is declared to be distinct from the senses, its inclusion among the senses is taught elsewhere, as in the following among other such passages: "The senses have the mind as the sixth of them" (*B. G.* XV. 7).

And the distinction of the most excellent *prāṇa* from the eye and other senses is perceived to exist. Indeed, in the condition of dreamless sleep, the function of the *prāṇa* is perceived to exist, but the function of the eye and the other senses is not perceived to exist. Moreover, the work of the eye etc., together with the mind, is to be the means of accomplishing of knowledge and action, but that of the *prāṇa* is the maintenance of the body and the senses. The denotation of the senses by the word '*prāṇa*' is due to their maintenance being dependent upon the *prāṇa*. To this effect is the following scriptural passage:—"They all (i.e., speech etc.) became the forms of this (*prāṇa*); therefore they are denoted by this (name of *prāṇa*)" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 5. 21). 'Became its forms' means 'became its bodies'; the meaning is that they were such as had their functions dependent upon it.

## ADHIKARANA VIII

### SAMJÑĀMŪRTIKLIPTYADHIKARANA

संज्ञामूर्तिकल्पिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्

Sūtra 17. Samjñāmūrtikṛiptistu

trivṛtkurvata upadeśāt (285)

The creation of names and forms, however, is taught as proceeding from the Maker of Tripartition.

The collective creation of the great external elements and the senses, etc. and the agentship of action which

belongs to the individual selves, have been stated earlier (in the *Ved. Sūt.* II. 3 & 4) as proceeding from the Supreme *Brahman*. For the purpose of confirming this it has been immediately afterwards brought to mind (in *Ved. Sūt.* II. 4. 13 & 14) that the control by the individual selves over their own senses is also dependent upon the Supreme Being.

Now the question that is taken up for consideration is this: There is this individual creation of the world which is well known to consist of differentiation by names and forms; it is asked whether this (individual creation) is indeed the work only of (the four-faced creator) Hiraṇyagarbha, who is (one with) the collective individual self, or whether it is the work of the Supreme *Brahman* having Hiraṇyagarbha as His body, just as the creation of water etc. is the work of the Supreme Being who has *tejas* etc. as His body.

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it is the work of him who is (one with) the collective individual self. Why? Because it is declared in the scripture to be due to the agency of the individual self, as in the following passage: "Entering by this individual self which is (a part of) Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2). Indeed, the Supreme Deity did not see (that is, think) thus: "I will evolve the differentiation of names and forms by My own form"; but "by the individual self" which is a part of Itself; because there is the scriptural statement: "By this individual self, which is (a part of) Myself".<sup>1042</sup>

1042. Creation proceeds in two stages: (i) the so called collective creation (or *samashṭi-sṛishṭi*), when the various modifications are evolved from the undifferentiated *prakṛiti* in its subtlest form; and (ii) the individual or particular creation (or *vyashṭi-sṛishṭi*), where the individual souls are united with bodies made up of the evolutes

of the *prakṛiti*. Granting that the collective creation is the work of the *Brahman*, the objector here argues that the individual creation is performed by Hiraṇyagarbha (or *Brahma* the creator). He is said to be one with the collective individual self. On this, see Note 527 of Vol. II.

It may, however, be said that in that case, it (i.e., the scriptural statement) will resemble the sentence—“Entering the enemy's army by the spy, I will seize it”; and the first person employed in the sentence, ‘I will evolve the differentiation’, and also the word ‘entering’, which is the verb attached to the agent (of that action of differentiation) will have a figurative significance. It is replied that it is not so. In the case of that (analogous) sentence, there is distinction between the king and the spy, as regards the essential nature, and therefore the significance is figurative. Here, in the case of the scriptural statement, however, the individual self, being a part of Him, is of His essential nature itself; entrance in that form (into things) and (their) differentiation belong only to the individual self (as its acts), and hence there is no room for any figurative significance.

The instrumental case (of the word ‘*jīvena*’) does not possess the characteristics of a secondary significance in association with another word, because, when in the case of a word its grammatical case termination can have the primary significance, it is contrary to reason to accept for that word a case termination having a secondary significance in association with another word. This instrumental case (of ‘*jīvena*’) does not signify the instrument; because the acts of entrance into things and of evolving the differentiation (of their names and forms) have the *Brahman* as their agent, and in relation to them the individual self is not the best instrument of accomplishing actions. Moreover, it is not possible to say that the agentship of the individual self terminates with its mere entrance into things, but that the differentiation of names and forms belongs solely to the *Brahman* Himself; because by means of the suffix of the past participle ‘*ktvā*’, in the word ‘*anupraviśya*’, it is made out that those (two acts, i.e., entrance and differentiation) are done by the same agent. The individual self, being His own part, is of His own essential nature; but for the purpose of (its) differentiation from the essential nature of the Supreme Being, in the

expression, 'by this individual self', there is reference (to the individual self) as something external.<sup>1043</sup>

Therefore this act of differentiating names and forms is due to the agency of Hiranyagarbha. For this very reason, in the *Smritis* it is in the context relating to creation by the four-faced creator that the differentiation of names and forms is described at length, as in the following among other similar passages: "He created only from the words of the *Veda* the names and forms of the gods etc., as well as their functions" (V. P. I. 5. 63).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows; "The creation of names and forms, however, (is taught as proceeding from the Maker of Tripartition)" (*Ved. Sūt.* II 4. 17). The word "however" sets aside the above view (about Hiranyagarbha). The creation of names and forms means the differentiation of names and forms. That function belongs to the Highest *Brahman* Himself, who is "the Maker of Tripartition", because that act of differentiation of names and forms is taught to be His only. Indeed, the act of differentiating names and forms is taught as proceeding only from the Maker of Tripartition; because in the passage: "This aforesaid Deity saw (i.e., thought), 'Indeed, entering those three deities as the individual self which is Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms; I will make each of these tripartite, tripartite'" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2 & 3)—they (i.e., entrance and differentiation) are made out to be due to one and the same agent. Tripartition, however, cannot possibly be the act of the four-faced creator, who is within the eggshaped universe. Indeed, the eggshaped

1043. The discussion on the instrumental case of the word, 'jīvena', is based on *Pāṇini* (II. 3. 18-19). The instrumental case can denote the agent, or an instrument of the agent (as defined in I. 4. 54), or association in a secondary sense with some one or some thing else. It is

argued that the individual self here cannot be the agent, nor the instrument of another agent, the *Brahman*, nor a secondary associate of the *Brahman*. As regards the *ktva* suffix of *anupraviṣya*, the rule in *Pāṇini* (III. 4. 21) is borne in mind.

universe is produced by the elements, *tejas*, water and earth, which have all been tripartitioned. The birth of the four-faced creator as within the eggshaped universe is taught in the *Smṛiti* in the following passage :—"Brahmā (the four-faced creator), who is the grandfather of all the worlds, was born in that eggshaped universe" (*Manu*, I. 9.). Therefore, it is known that tripartition is the act of the Supreme *Brahman* Himself; and that act of the differentiation of names and forms which is performed by the same agent as that (tripartition) is surely His alone.

If it be so, it is then asked how the statement—"Entering as this individual self, which is Myself, I evolve the the differentiation of names and forms" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2)—can be consistent. There is the grammatical equation, '*ātmanā jīvena*' (i.e., 'as this individual self, as Myself'). Therefore the Supreme Self Himself who has the individual self as His body is denoted by the word '*jīva*' (meaning 'the individual self'). For instance, the Supreme Self who has *tejas* etc. as His body is denoted by the words, '*tejas*' etc., as in the following passages :—"That *tejas* saw (i.e. thought), it created the waters; those waters saw (i.e., thought), they created *anna* (or the element of earth)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3). Therefore, the act of differentiation of names and forms is the act of the Supreme *Brahman* Himself, who has as His body *Hiraṇyagarbha*, who has become (one with) the collective individual self.

And in this manner the first person in 'I evolve' and the verb, 'entering', as given in the passage—"Entering (them), I evolve the differentiation of names and forms" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2)—indicate easily their primary significance. The sameness of agency in regard to both the acts of entrance and differentiation becomes appropriate. Because the wonderful and varied creation of gods etc. is the act of the Supreme Self Himself who has the four-faced creator as His body, in the context relating to creation under the agency of the four-faced creator the

teaching relating to the differentiation of names and forms is appropriate.

Therefore, the meaning of the passage beginning with—"This aforesaid deity (*saw*)"—is this : These, namely, the three deities known as *tejas*, water and earth; as this individual self, that is, as Myself qualified by the collective individual self (as body); entering; I evolve the differentiation of names and forms, that is, I make the wonderful and varied creation of gods, etc., as well as their names. These, namely, *tejas*, water and the earth, have not attained mutual contact for the purpose of that (creation etc.) and are not capable of particular creation; and for the purpose of making them attain that capability, I make each of them tripartite.<sup>1044</sup>

Consequently, this differentiation of names and forms is the act of the Supreme *Brahman* Himself.

Again, it may be said as follows : It is not possible to say that, because the act of differentiation of names and forms is done by the same agent as tripartition, it (i.e., the act of differentiation) is due to the agency of the Supreme Self; for it is possible for the act of tripartition to be due to the agency of the individual self. Indeed, it is subsequently to the creation of the eggshaped universe that the manner of tripartition is taught in relation to the individual selves created by the four-faced creator, as in

1044. By the word, 'deities', only the elements are meant. The grammatical equation between '*jīvena*' and '*ātmanā*' in the *Upanishad* text is carefully investigated by Raṅga-rāmaṇuja in *B. P.* and in his commentary on the *Chhând. Up.* He draws attention to some slightly varying interpretations in the *Śrībhāṣya* itself. See Vol. I, pp. 175, 192 & 204, and Vol. II, p. 381. It is suggested that '*ātmanā*' means not 'as

Myself' (or '*mayā*') but 'as essential nature' (or '*svarūpeṇā*'). Vedānta Deśika in his *Adhik.* states that the essential nature, as qualified by the individual self, is the instrument of the *Brahman* in the act of *anupraveśa*. The interpretation in Vol. II, p. 381, to the effect that the entrance is by virtue of the *Brahman* being the self, suggests the use of the instrumental case to indicate a cause under *Pāṇini* (II. 3. 23).



the following and other passages: "Now, my dear child, know from me how these three deities, indeed, after attaining (i.e., being used by) the individual self, become tripartite each" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 4. 7); and "Food that has been eaten is divided into three parts; that part of it, which is gross, it becomes the excreta; that part of it which is intermediate, it becomes the flesh; that part of it which is subtle, it becomes the mind" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 1). To the same effect is the earlier passage beginning with: "That which is the red colour of fire, it is the colour of *tejas*; that which is white, it is the colour of water; that which is black, it is the colour of the earth" (*Ibid.* VI. 4. 1); here the tripartition in the case of fire, the sun, the moon and lightning, which are all created by the four-faced creator (Brahmā); is well pointed out. Tripartition is declared in the scripture as taking place subsequent to the differentiation of names and forms as in the following passage: "This aforesaid Deity, entering these three deities as the individual self which is the Self, evolved the differentiation of names and forms; It made each of them tripartite, tripartite" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 3).<sup>1045</sup>

To this (objection), he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the reply as follows:—

मांसादि भौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश्च

**Sūtra 18.** *Māmsādi bhaumam*

*yathāśabdāmitarayoścha*

(286)

1045. As regards tripartition, see Note 166 of Vol. I. To the objection here that tripartition is subsequent to differentiation by names and forms, the answer is given below. In *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 2. 3 & 4), there are two references to tripartition. First, it forms the subject of the resolution of the Supreme Deity. Here the Deity has in view the differentiation by names and

forms, and tripartition is properly mentioned subsequently as the means towards that end. But the second reference to tripartition refers to the act itself. Here the mention of tripartition after differentiation cannot be understood as indicating tripartition to be later in time. The threefold nature of *anna* etc. has nothing to do with this tripartition.

The flesh etc. are (taught to be) earthy; according to the scripture, (so is it) in the case of the other two also (namely, water and *tejas*).

It has been stated above that this tripartition which has been taught in the passage, “(The Supreme Deity) made each of them tripartite” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 3), relates to the gods etc., created by the four-faced creator (Brahmā), subsequent to the creation of the eggshaped universe. This is not appropriate, because in the passage, “Food that has been eaten is divided into three parts” (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 1), both the flesh and the mind are taught to be more subtle and still more subtle than the excreta; and at least because these two have to be in conformity to their causes, it will make those two (i.e., the flesh and the mind) attain the character of water and of *tejas* respectively; and because also even in the passage—“The water that has been drunk (is divided into three parts)” (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 2), both urine and the *prāṇa* (or the vital air), which are in their nature gross and subtle respectively, will come to attain the character of the element of earth and of the element of *tejas* respectively. And it cannot be accepted thus. Indeed, the flesh etc. are accepted as being earthy; like the excreta, both the flesh and mind are also accepted as *bhāuma*, that is, as earthy, because the context is begun with the passage—“Food that has been eaten is divided into three parts” (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 1).

“According to the scripture, (so is it) in the case of the other two” (*Ved. Sūl.* II. 4. 18). With regard to the other two also (namely, water and *tejas*), in corresponding passages, namely, “The water that has been drunk” (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 2) and “The *tejas* that has been eaten” (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 3), modifications are accepted according to the scripture. Thus, from the passage, “The water that has been drunk is divided into three parts” (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 2), it is made out from the scripture that water has a three-fold modification. Similarly, according to this statement

also—"The *tejas* which has been eaten is divided into three parts" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 3)—it is made out from the scripture that *tejas* has a threefold modification.

Therefore, it has to be clearly understood that the excreta, flesh and mind are the modifications of the element of earth; urine, blood and vital airs are the modifications of the element of water; and bone, marrow and speech are the modifications of *tejas*. It has to be so understood for this reason also, that there may be no contradiction of the supplementary passage—"My dear child, the mind, indeed, consists of *anna* (i.e., the element of earth); the *prāṇa* (or principal vital air) consists of the element of water; speech consists of the element of *tejas*" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 4).

Therefore, the manner of tripartition as stated in the passage—"It made each of them tripartite" (*Ibid.* VI. 3. 3)—is not illustrated in the passage beginning with: "Food that has been eaten (is divided into three parts)" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 1). If it were so, then, owing to the mind, *prāṇa* and speech being extremely subtle, they will be of the nature of the element of *tejas*; and hence there will arise contradiction with the passage beginning with—"My dear child, the mind consists of *anna* (i.e., the element of earth)" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 4).

The elements of earth etc., which have been tripartitioned before and which have reached (i.e., been used by) the individual selves, are each stated to have a threefold modification in the passage beginning with: "Food that has been eaten is divided into three parts" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 1). The elements of *tejas*, water and earth should have undergone tripartition even before the creation of the eggshaped universe; because, if they were not so tripartitioned, they would be incapable of producing any effect. Indeed, the capability to produce effects belongs only to those (elements) which are associated with

one another, and this (mutual association) itself is tripartition.<sup>1046</sup>

To the same effect the following passage is given in the *Smṛiti*:—"(Things with) powers (i.e., the properties of fluidity, solidity etc.), which are various, are separate from one another; therefore, without combination among themselves, and without all of them coming together in close contact, they are incapable of creating (the world and) the creatures. After mutually coming into contact, and becoming mutually dependent.....they produce the eggshaped universe, beginning with the *mahat* and ending with the *viśeṣas* (or things with specific properties)." (V. P. I. 2. 52-4).<sup>1047</sup>

1046. The threefold evolution of food, water and *tejas* is not the tripartition at the commencement of creation. In *Chhând. Up.* (VI. 5) the former is described. It has to be noted that the mind, the *prâṇa* and speech are not literally modifications of food, water and *tejas*. What is meant is that the subtle modifications of food, water and *tejas* (or edible fats) help or strengthen the mind, the *prâṇa* and speech respectively. Moreover, each one of these three—food, water and *tejas*—strengthens in some measure or other the mind, the *prâṇa* and speech. This is because food, water and *tejas* have all been tripartitioned: and whatever is eaten or drunk is made up of these three components in varying proportions.

1047. The description of creation in V.P. (I. 2) refers to the pure elements, *tanmātras* etc. as devoid of *viśeṣas*. This is explained as meaning that they are not 'calm', nor 'fierce', nor 'inert'. These are qualities arising from the three *guṇas* of *prakṛiti*. The elements etc. then

blend with one another. While the *Upanishad* mentions the blending of three elements, the V.P. elaborates it and speaks of blending among five elements. The result is the production of the elements as we know them. Each of them is now made up preponderantly of one element and in smaller proportions of others. The pure ether is inert, the pure fire and the pure air are 'fierce', and the pure water and the pure earth are 'calm'. After the blending, all are 'calm', 'fierce' and inert. The constituent elements of the world are then brought together in loose combination or intimate union; their varied properties of extreme fluidity, extreme hardness etc. get modified in the new set-up and help in the creation of the world. The individual souls also play an important role, according to their *karmas*. It is thus that the cosmic principles starting from the *mahat* and ending with the 'impure' elements etc. with the specific properties of calmness etc. build up the world in the state of creation. See verses 45 to 54.

There is the passage:—"Entering as this individual self, which is the Self, It evolved the differentiation of names and forms ; It made each of them tripartite, tripartite" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 3). The order of succession (of the mention of tripartition and differentiation) in the text is opposed to the determination of the order by the sense of the passage. The illustrations in regard to the tripartition of the element of fire, the sun etc., which are all within the eggshaped universe, were shown (in *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 4) to the disciple, Śvetaketu, as being within the eggshaped universe ; because in his case it was not possible to illustrate tripartition out of things outside (that universe), it was done with respect to fire, the sun etc., which are among the produced effects of those things that were tripartitioned.<sup>1048</sup>

It may, however, be said as follows: Let that be so. According to the scriptural statements, "Food that has been eaten", "Water that has been drunk", and "Tejas that has been eaten" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 1-3), the elements of earth etc., which are tripartitioned, are each of them possessed of three forms as being made up of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth ; and it may be asked how the teaching that each of them is called 'earth', 'water' or 'tejas,' with reference to a single form, can be appropriately given. To this (objection), he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

वैशेष्यानु तद्वादस्तद्वादः

**Sūtra 19.** *Vaiśeṣhyāntu tadvādestadvādah* (287)

From the distinctive peculiarity of each of them arises that description, that description.

1048. Tripartition is illustrated with reference to fire, the sun, the moon and lightning in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 4). In each case it is stated that the red colour therein is that of *tejas*, the white colour that of water and the black colour that of earth. What is meant is that

these colours point to the pure untripartitioned elements. After tripartition we see the pure elements in this way. The objector here misunderstands the passage, taking it to mean that tripartition is subsequent to creation.

‘Distinctive peculiarity’ is the condition of being peculiar in a distinctive way. Although through tripartition it (i.e., each element) possesses a triple form, yet owing to the preponderance of (one or other of) the element of earth etc. in each of them over the other two, in each case there is the description as the earth or any other similar element.

The repetition (in the aphorism of the phrase, ‘that description’) is intended to show the end of the Chapter.

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## CHAPTER III

### PART I

## ADHIKARANA I

### TADANTARAPRATIPATTYADHIKARANA

तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति सम्परिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम्

**Sūtra 1.** *Tadantrapratipattau ramhati  
samparishvaktah praśnanirūpaṇābhyām* (288)

While going to another than that (i.e., than this body), it (i.e., the individual self) goes associated (with the subtle elements), because it is so made out from the question and its examination (given in the context of the *Pañcāgnividyā*).

By means of the two previous Chapters, what have been established, along with arguments which in relation to them are difficult to assail, are as follows :—(First, in Chapter I) this very substantial truth, namely, that the *Vedānta* texts establish the Supreme *Brahman* as the object of worship by those who are desirous of attaining salvation—that Supreme *Brahman*, who is the sole cause (both material and instrumental) of the whole world, who is devoid of even the smallest trace of all that is evil, whose ocean of noble qualities is immeasurable and who is entirely distinct from all other things; then (in II. 1) replies to (alleged) contradictions (by the *Vedānta*) to both the *Smṛiti* and reasoning; and the refuting of all hostile views (in II. ii); and that careful examination (in II. 3 & 4) of the essential nature of produced effects which consists of reconciling the (apparent) mutual contradictions in various *Vedānta* passages. Thus, by means of those two Chapters, it is the essential nature of the *Brahman* that has been established. Now, by means of the later

two Chapters, it is intended to consider, along with the several means of attaining Him, the various aspects of the attainment of the *Brahman*.

It being so, in the third Chapter, the consideration that is taken up relates to the worship which is the means of attaining Him. And the indispensable and most suitable means for undertaking worship are the absence of the desire for things other than the object of attainment, and the presence of the desire for the object of attainment. For achieving these, what is established in the first and second parts of this Chapter are (first) the evils which befall to the individual self in its condition of movement in other worlds during waking, of dreaming, of having dreamless sleep, and of swoons; and (secondly) the *Brahman's* character of being free from those evils and of His being the inexhaustible mine of auspicious qualities.<sup>1049</sup>

Now the consideration that is taken up here is whether this individual self, while moving from one body to another, moves associated with the elements which are in their subtle condition and which are the causes of producing another body for it, or whether it does not so move. It being so, it is arrived at through reasoning that inasmuch as, wherever the individual self goes, in all those places the elements in their subtle condition are easily available, it moves out without being associated with them. Later on, also, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) will explain argumentatively the seeds (i.e., the foundations) of the opponent's *prima facie* view and will then repel them (by counter-arguments).

1049. (i) The *B. P.* draws attention to the fact that the correct reading is 'pratipadyate' (rendered above as 'what is established is'). Some editions read 'pratipadyante' in plural. (ii) The movement of the self in other worlds is to be connected with the condition of wakeful-

ness. (iii) '*Svapatah*' indicates the self in the state of dreaming. (iv) '*Sushuptasya*', though formed from a past participle, indicates not the self who had slept in the past, but the self who is sleeping. This usage is based on the scriptures.



It being so, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) states the established conclusion thus: "While going to another than that, it goes associated" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 1. 1). In the aphorism beginning with "The creation of names and forms....." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 17), by the word, 'forms', the body was introduced as the subject-matter; and that (body) is here referred to by the word, 'tat' (or 'that'). "While going to another than that", that is, while going to another body, the individual self goes—*ramhati*—associated with the elements in their subtle condition: this is the meaning. Why? "Because it is so made out from the question and its examination," that is, because there are (in the context here) both the question and (its) answer.

In connection with the *Pañchāgnividyā*, the relative question and its answer are declared in the scriptures. It is well known that Pravāhaṇa of the Pāñchāla country questioned Śvetaketu, the son of the son of Aruṇa, whether he knew about the place to be attained by those who perform religious deeds with the expectation of reward, about the manner of their return to this world, about the distinguishing features of both the path of the gods and the path of the manes, and about him who does not attain the next world; and he then questioned him in this wise: "Do you know how those waters offered in the fifth oblation are called '*puruṣa*' (or the embodied self)?" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 3. 3).

Then, in the course of giving the reply to this last question, he (i.e., Pravāhaṇa) figuratively described the world of heaven as fire, and said:—"In this above-mentioned (celestial world of) fire, the *devas* (or the principal vital air and the senses) offer *śraddhā* (or the elements in the subtle state forming the subtle body) as an oblation. Out of that oblation arises Soma the King" (*Ibid.* V. 4. 2), and so on. That is to say, the *prāṇas* of the individual self which are called *devas*, throw the thing known as *śraddhā* into the celestial world which is described as fire, and that *śraddhā* is transformed into

the form of the ambrosial body called 'Soma the King'; and those very *prāṇas* throw that ambrosial body into the rain-cloud, which is figuratively described as fire, and that body thrown into that fire becomes rains; and those very *prāṇas* throw those rains on the earth, which is figuratively described as fire, and they (i.e., the rains) thrown on the earth become food; and those *prāṇas* themselves throw that food into the *purusha* (i.e., the embodied male), who is figuratively described as fire; and it (i.e., that food) becomes semen there (i.e., in that *purusha*); and those very *prāṇas* throw that semen into the (womb of the) woman who is figuratively described as fire, and it (i.e., that semen) becomes the foetus in that (woman).

Having said this, he further stated in reply: "In this manner, indeed, the waters sacrificed in the fifth oblation become those who are called *purushas*" (*Ibid.* V. 9. 1). The meaning is that in this way the waters become expressed by the word, '*purusha*', when the fifth oblation has been offered. If it be so stated, then, what is said is that the waters which in their subtle condition have continued to exist in the previous oblations have now assumed the form of the *purusha*. For this very reason, it is made out from the question and answer here that it (i.e., the individual self) goes (from body to body) from place to place in association with the subtle elements which are the causes of the body.<sup>1050</sup>

1050. The "science of the five fires" is taught by King Pravaṇa to the son of Aruṇa. The latter's son is first questioned about it by the king; and on his failure, he is sent away as uneducated. The father now comes to seek the answers and gets them after a time. Pravaṇa traces the course of a soul from the time it ascends to the heavenly world after death in a mortal body. It takes with it the sense organs and the material elements in a subtle state. In the heavenly world, it

gets from them a suitable body to enjoy the experiences there. On its good *karma* getting exhausted, the heavenly body dissolves. The soul then enters a raincloud, comes down to earth during rains, gets united with food plants, enters a man's body through food, gets united with his semen, enters a woman's womb and there gets another human body. The cycle may then repeat itself. At every stage, the subtle elements, here called 'the waters', undergo accordant transformations.

It may, however, be said that from the statement, "The waters become those who are called '*purusha*'" (*Ibid.* V. 1. 1.), what is made out is the transformation of the waters into the form of the *purusha* and therefore it is the association of these (waters) alone with the moving individual self that is so made out; hence it is asked how there can be the association of all the subtle elements (with the self). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the reply as follows :—

### व्यात्मकत्वात्तु भूयस्त्वात्

**Sūtra 2.** *Tryātmakatvāttu bhūyastvāt* (289)

But (there is association of all the subtle elements with the self) because they (i.e., these waters) are made up of three (elements); (they are called waters) owing to the preponderance (of the element of water in them).

The word, 'but', sets aside the objection. The waters which have to produce the body cannot by themselves alone possibly produce the body. Indeed, it is for producing the body that tripartition (of water and other elements) takes place, as stated in the passage :—" (I make) each of these tripartite, tripartite" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 3). But the mention of mere waters (as the cause of the body) is due to the preponderance of the element of water (in that cause). And it is owing to the abundance of blood etc. in the body that, among the causes which produce the body, preponderance is made out to belong to the waters.

### प्राणगतेश्च

**Sūtra 3.** *Prāṇagatēścha* (290)

Because, also, there is movement of the *prāṇas* (the individual self goes associated with the subtle elements when going from one body to another).

For the following reason also, the movement of the self is made out as in association with the elements in their subtle condition. When the self departs from the body, then the ensuing departure of the *prāṇas* from the body along with the self is declared to take place in the scripture, as in the following passage: "The *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) departs from the body following that departing (self); all the *prāṇas* (or the senses) depart from the body, following the departing *prāṇa* (or principal vital air)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2). To the same effect, it is declared in the *Smṛiti* also in the following passage: "The lord (i.e., the individual self) drags along with him the senses which, with the mind, are six in number and are attached to the body; whatever body he attains and whatever body he departs from, he takes hold of those (senses) and then moves about, just as the wind takes hold of smells from their abodes and moves away" (*B. G.* XV. 7-8). Those things which have no supporting basis cannot appropriately have movement; therefore it has to be accepted that the elements in their subtle condition also, which are the support of those (senses), have movement (along with that self).

### अग्न्यादिगतिश्रुतेरिति चेन्न भाक्तत्वात्

**Sūtra 4.** *Agnyādigatiśruteriti chenna bhāktatvāt* (291)

If it be said that, inasmuch as they (i.e., the sense of speech etc.) are declared in the scripture to move towards fire etc. (only to be absorbed into them, they do not move along with the individual self), it is not so; because of the figurative significance (of the words, 'speech' etc., in the context).

It may be objected here thus: By means of the passage beginning with, "Where the dead man's speech is absorbed into fire, (his) principal vital air into the element of air, (his) eye into the sun" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 2. 13), it is

declared in the scripture that at the time of the death of (the embodiment of) the individual self, the absorption of his senses into the fire etc. takes place; and therefore the movements of those (senses) in association with the individual self does not come to pass, and hence the scriptural passage relating to their movement has to be interpreted in a different way.

If it be so held, "it is not so, because of the figurative significance (of the words, 'speech' etc. in the context)." If it be asked how the declaration of the absorption (of speech etc.) into the fire etc. can have a figurative significance, it is replied that it is because they are mentioned together with hair etc., which are not absorbed at all, as in the passage: "The hairs of the body (enter) the medicinal plants, the hair of the head the great forest trees" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 2. 13). Therefore, the scriptural passage dealing with the absorption of the eye etc. into the sun etc. relates to the going away of the deities presiding over them.<sup>1051</sup>

प्रथमेऽश्रवणादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः

**Sūtra 5.** *Prathame 'śravanaditichenna  
ta eva hyupapatteḥ* (292)

1051. In *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 2. 13), Ārtaḥga asks Yājñavalkya: "When the speech of this dead man enters (or is absorbed) into fire, *prāṇa* into air, eye into the sun, mind into the moon, ear into the quarters of space, body into the earth, self into the ether of space, hairs of the body into the medicinal herbs and the hair of the head into the big forest trees; and semen and blood are deposited in the waters: where does the embodied self find support then?" It is explained here that the entering or dissolution of the various parts of the body into various things in the world outside has to be understood figuratively. For

atleast in regard to hairs of the body and hair of the head, what is stated is not seen to take place. The general principle of the figurative interpretation is that the presiding deities are to be understood by the parts of the body mentioned here. But the interpretation has to be modified suitably in each case. The god of fire has to be understood as merely ceasing to preside over the dead man's sense of speech; the gods presiding over hairs of the body and the hair of the head give up their functions in regard to them and remain merely as those connected with medicinal herbs and forest trees respectively; and so on.

If it be said that, as they (i.e., the waters) are not mentioned at (the) first (oblation), (they do not move in association with the individual self); it is not so; those (waters) themselves (move as such), on account of necessary consistency (between the question and its answer here).

What has been stated above to the effect that it is made out from the question and (its) answer (here) that the individual self moves in association with the waters in their subtle condition as combined with the other (subtle) elements, that is not appropriate; because in the first sacrifice, which relates to the fire figuratively described as the heavenly world, the waters are not declared to be the thing offered as oblation. In the passage—"In that above-mentioned fire, the *devas* offer *śraddhā* as oblation" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 4. 2*)—*śraddhā* is itself declared to be the thing that is offered as the oblation. '*Śraddhā*' is well known as being a particular function of the mind of the individual self (namely, faith); hence the waters are not offered as oblation to that (fire).

If it be so said, it is replied that it is not right to say so, because they, that is, those waters themselves, are denoted there by the word, '*śraddhā*'. Why? Because of necessary consistency between the question and (its) answer (here). Indeed, at the very commencement of the answer to the question—"Do you know how the waters offered in the fifth oblation are called '*puruṣa*' (or the individual self)?" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 3. 3*)—*śraddhā* is declared to be the oblation offered to the fire figuratively described as the heavenly world. If the waters are not denoted by the word, '*śraddhā*', then the question will be one and the answer another: hence there would be inconsistency.

The conclusion of the reply given in the statement—"In this manner, indeed, the waters offered in the fifth

oblation become those who are called 'purushas' (Ibid. V. 9. 1)—also indicates that *śraddhā* is water. Indeed, the form of the question is this—"Do you know how the waters in the fifth oblation are called 'purusha'?" (Ibid. V. 3. 3); in the reply it is quoted with the word, 'iti' (rendered as "in this manner"), thus: "In this manner, indeed, in the fifth oblation....." (Ibid. V. 9. 1). The transformation of the waters into the forms of *śraddhā*, Soma the King, rains, food, semen, and the foetus is first stated, and then indeed it is concluded that the waters become those who are called *purushas*. Moreover, the word, 'śraddhā', is seen used in the *Veda* to denote waters thus: "He brings the waters; *śraddhā* (i.e., faith) indeed is the waters" (Taitt. Sam. I. 6. 8. 1). There is the statement: "(The *devas*) offer *śraddhā* as an oblation. Out of that oblation arises Soma the King" (Ibid. V. 4. 2); here transformation into the form of Soma appropriately happens only in regard to the waters.<sup>1052</sup>

Therefore, it is appropriately demonstrated that the individual self moves (from body to body, place to place) in association with the waters which are themselves combined with other elements.

अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतेः

Sūtra 6. *Aśrutatvāditi chenneshṭādikāriṇām*

*pratīteḥ* (293)

If it be said that, inasmuch as there is no declaration in the scripture (about the individual self moving in association with the waters, the self does not so move), it is not so; because it is learnt to be so, in regard to those who perform religious and other (secular) works (of a meritorious nature).

1052. The point is that a state of mind like faith cannot be transformed into any kind of body.

What has been stated above to the effect that from this passage this meaning is made out, namely, that the individual self moves (from place to place) in association with the waters, that is not appropriate to say; because there is no mention of the individual self in this passage. If it be argued that here *śraddhā* etc., which are themselves particular modifications of water etc., have been declared to be the objects offered as oblations, but not the individual self in association with them, it is replied it is not right to say so, "because it is learnt to be so in regard to those who perform religious and (other secular) works (of a meritorious nature)". In this very context, indeed, later on, it is stated that those who perform religious and secular works of a meritorious nature and the giving of gifts and who are devoid of the knowledge of the *Brahman*, they, after attaining the heavenly world as the reward of their works, become possessed of ambrosial bodies, and at the end of their meritorious *karma*, they return (to this world) and go to the womb. This is stated in the passage which begins with, "Then those who, remaining in the village, perform *Vedic* and secular works of a meritorious nature and the giving of gifts, they reach (the deity presiding over) smoke (in the path of the manes)"; and proceeds to state: "They move from the world of the manes to the skyey expanse, and from the skyey expanse to the moon; this (self) becomes possessed of a divine body; he becomes the food of the gods; the gods eat him up. Residing there as long as (ripened) *karmas* last, they return to this same path (by which they effected their ascent to the heavenly world).....Whoever eats food, whoever sprinkles semen, he (i.e., the returning self) becomes associated therewith" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 3-6). Here also there is oneness of meaning with the statement, that in the fire which is (metaphorically) the celestial world, "they offer *śraddhā* as an oblation; out of that oblation springs Soma the King" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 3. 3). Therefore, it is made out that this statement has been made, namely, that he who is associated with the body in



the condition of *śraddhā* becomes associated with the body which is ambrosial. The word denoting the body, which is solely of the nature of an attribute of the individual self, extends to denoting the individual self which is qualified by that attribute.<sup>1053</sup>

Therefore it can be appropriately stated that the individual self moves (from place to place) in association (with the waters).

It may, however, be said that in the statement, "The gods eat him up" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 4), he (i.e., the individual self) is stated as being eaten; and therefore the individual self is not denoted by expression 'Soma the King', because the individual self is not capable of being eaten. To this (objection), he (i.e., *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus.

भाक्तं वाऽनात्मविश्वासया हि दर्शयति

**Sūtra 7.** *Bhāktam vānātmavittvāttathā hi darsayati* (294)

But it (i.e., the statement relating to the gods eating the individual self) has a figurative significance because of its relating to one devoid of the knowledge of the Self. Indeed, the scripture declares so.

The word, 'but' (or 'वर्'), sets aside the above objection. He who performs *Vedic* and other (secular) works (of a meritorious kind) is devoid of the knowledge of the Self; and therefore he exists both here and in the next world as an auxiliary instrument of enjoyment to the

1053. (i) There is a reference to Soma the King later on in the context—in *Chhand. Up.* (V. 10. 4). It occurs in a passage describing the passage of the self through various places. From this the earlier reference to Soma the King has also to be understood as connected with the self. So, in the earlier passage, *śraddhā* and its successive transfor-

mations have to be understood as referring to the embodied self characterised by *śraddhā* etc. as its bodies. (ii) The terms, '*iṣṭā*' and '*pūrta*', in the *Upanishad* text mean respectively sacrifices and other Vedic rituals, and meritorious acts of pious liberality like digging tanks and wells, planting groves etc.

gods. In this world, he proves useful by performing their worship through *Vedic* and other (secular) works (of a meritorious nature). After attaining the next world, which is granted to him by the gods, who are pleased with his worship of them, he has equal enjoyments with them, and he becomes their auxiliary instrument of enjoyment. In the passage—"As is a beast to men, so is he to the gods" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 10)—the scripture declares that he who has no knowledge of the Self is an auxiliary instrument of the gods. The *Smṛiti* also points out that those who know the Self attain the *Brahman* and those who have no knowledge of the *Brahman* are fit to be enjoyed by the gods, as in the following passage: "Those who worship the gods go to the gods, and those who worship Me go even unto Me" (*B. G.* VII. 23). The statement about the individual self as being eaten as food by the gods is intended to mean that he is an auxiliary instrument of their enjoyments. Therefore, that (statement) has a figurative significance. It is declared in the scripture that satisfaction through him (i.e., the individual self) is their eating him, as in the following passage: "Indeed, the gods do not eat, do not drink; seeing this nectar alone, they are satisfied" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 6. 1).<sup>1054</sup>

Therefore it is an established conclusion that the individual self moves (from place to place) in association with the elements in their subtle condition.

## ADHIKARANA II

### KṚTĀTYAYĀDHIKARANA

कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान्दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवं च

**Sūtra 8.** *Kṛtātyaye'nuśayavāṇḍṛṣṭasmṛitibhyām*  
*yathetamanevaṃ cha* (295)

<sup>1054</sup>. The eating of the self with the ambrosial body by the gods merely means that they use him for their service. They enjoy seeing him serve them.

At the end of (the experience of the effects of) the past deeds, he (i.e., the individual self) (returns) with the balance of *karmas* (after enjoyment), because it is so declared in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*, both through the same path as of going (from here) and also otherwise.

That those who merely perform Vedic and secular works of a meritorious nature and offer gifts go up through the path of the manes, which begins with (the section where the souls are guided by the deity presiding over) smoke, and come back to this world at the end of the fruits of their *karmas* has been declared in the following scriptural passage : "Residing there (in the heavenly world) as long as (ripened) *karmas* last, they then return to this same path (by which they effected their ascent to the world of the gods)" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 5). Here the doubt is raised whether the individual self who descends from there (i.e., the world of the gods) returns possessed of the *karmas* that remain (after the ripened *karmas* are enjoyed), or whether he does not so return.<sup>1055</sup>

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? It is concluded that he (i.e., the returning self) is not possessed of any *anuśaya* (or *karmas* that remain after the enjoyment of ripened *karmas*), since all *karmas* have been enjoyed. 'Anuśaya', indeed, is that *karma* which remains over after that which is enjoyed; and that does not survive after the enjoyment of the whole of its fruits. From the statement, "Residing (there in the heavenly world) as long as the *karmas* last (or 'yāvat

1055. The word, 'sāmpatā', in the scriptural text quoted is taken in the *pūrvapakṣa* to mean all *karmas*. The correct view is that it refers only to those *karmas* which have begun to yield fruits. *Svarga* is attained

and enjoyed as a result of these *karmas*. When they are exhausted, the self descends to this world with other *karmas* tending to give results in this world. This is the *anuśaya*.

*sampātam* ')...' (*Ibid.*), the enjoyment of all the *karmas* is known to take place. The word, '*sampāta*', here means that through which they (i.e., those who perform worship) fly (i.e., ascend) to the world of *Svarga*; and that is called *karma*. There is another scriptural passage to the same effect, and it is this: "Whatever little (*karma*) he does, having reached the end of the (same) *karma*, he comes back to this world from that world for doing *karma*" (*Bṛh. Up.* IV. 4. 6).

If it be so arrived at, it is replied that he (i.e., the returning self) descends, possessed of the *karmas* that remain (after the ripened *karmas* are enjoyed). Why? Because it is so declared in the *Dṛiṣṭa* and *Smṛiti*: the meaning is that it is so declared in the *Sruti*s and the *Smṛiti*s. Surely, in relation to those who descend from the world of the gods into this world, the scripture declares in the following passage:—"Those who come back here, with (a balance of) good *karmas*, they will get into good wombs, the womb of the Brahmin, or the womb of the Kshatriya, or the womb of the Vaiśya; again, those who come back into this world, with (a balance of) bad *karmas*, they will get into bad wombs, the womb of a dog, or the womb of a pig, or the womb of an outcaste" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 7). The scriptures show the association of the returning selves with good and bad *karmas* in that (they state that) among the selves returning from the other world, those with good *karmas* attain good wombs like that of the Brahmin etc., and those with evil *karmas*, that is, with hateful *karmas*, attain hateful wombs like those of the dog, the pig, the outcaste etc.

The *Smṛiti* also says the same thing as in the passage—"The (men in various) *varṇas* and the (men in various) *āśramas* who are devoted to their works after death enjoy the fruits of their *karmas*, and then, out of the remainder of those (*karmas*), attain undoubtedly the birth associated with a superior caste, family, beauty, life, learning, wealth,

character, joy, and health ; those who are different, being of a hostile nature, are destroyed" (*G. Dh. S. XI. 31*). To the same effect is the following:—"Then (after enjoying bliss in the celestial world), coming back (into this world) with the remainder of the fruits of their *karmas*, they get (good) birth, beauty, complexion, strength, intellect, knowledge of the past, present and future, wealth, and the practice of *dharma* (which leads them again to bliss in the celestial world); and this (movement to and fro), like a wheel, is always associated with pleasure in both the worlds" (*Āp. D. S. II. 1. 2. 3*). The expression, "as long as the *sampāta* lasts" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 10. 5*), denotes the particular *karma* that has begun to give its fruits.

The expression—"Whatever little (*karma*) he does in this world" (*Bṛih. Up. V. 4. 6*)—also denotes that very same *karma*. It is moreover inappropriate that there should be destruction of those *karmas* whose fruits have not yet been enjoyed and those *karmas* in regard to which no expiatory ceremony has been performed, through the enjoyment of the fruits of other *karmas*. Therefore, those who have gone to the next world (i.e., of the gods), return with the balance of unexperienced *karmas* to the same path as of going (from here) and also otherwise. The meaning is that they return to this world by the path of their ascent and also by another path. Indeed, the ascent is in the order of (meeting with the deities ruling) smoke, night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern course of the sun, the world of the manes, the sky and the moon. But the descent is from the position of the moon in the order of the sky, air, smoke, water, cloud and raining cloud. Here the descent being to the sky (from the moon), it is the same path as of going (from here); on account of reaching the air etc. and not reaching the world of the manes etc., it is otherwise (than by the path of ascent).

### चरणादिति चेन्न तदुपलक्षणाथेति कार्ष्णजिनिः

**Sūtra 9.** *Charaṇāditi chenna*

*tadupalakṣaṇārthethi Kārṣṇājiniḥ* (296)

If it be said that it (i.e., birth etc.,) is due to *charaṇa* (or good conduct), it is not so; that word has a figurative significance. That is the opinion of Kārṣṇājini.

By the word '*charaṇa*' occurring in the expressions, '*ramaṇīya-charaṇa*' and '*kapūya-charaṇa*' (in *Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 7, which have been rendered as 'those with a balance of good *karmas*' and 'those with a balance of bad *karmas*'), the *karmas* consisting of merit and demerit are denoted, because the word, '*charaṇa*' is well known to denote conduct both in the *Veda* and in the world. Indeed, men of the world approve that the words '*charaṇa*', '*āchāra*', '*śīla*' and '*ṽṛitta*' are synonymous. In the *Veda* also, the words, '*charaṇa*' and '*karma*', are taught to be distinct from each other as in the following passage :—"Those *karmas* (i.e., works or actions) which are free from blame, they should be adopted ... Those which are our *sucharitas* (or *charaṇa* or good conduct), they should be accepted by you" (*Taitt. Up.* I. 11. 2). Therefore, it is out of *charaṇa*, that is, out of good conduct (or *śīla*), there is the attainment of particular wombs, and not out of the balance of *karmas*.<sup>1056</sup>

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so. The scriptural text relating to *charaṇa* has a figurative significance. The teacher Kārṣṇājini is, indeed, of that opinion, because through good conduct (or *āchāra*) alone it is impossible to attain pain and pleasure. Indeed, pleasure and pain are the fruits of *karmas* which consist of merit and demerit.

<sup>1056</sup>. According to the *pūrvapakṣa*, 'those *karmas* which are free from blame' are sacrifices

etc. The '*sucharitas*' refer to '*achara*'.

### आनर्थक्यमिति चेन्न तदपेक्षत्वात्

**Sūtra 10.** *Ānarthakyaṃiti chenna  
tadapekshatvāt* (297)

If it be said that there is uselessness (for the *āchāra* enjoined), it is not so, because there is need for it.

If so, it may be said that inasmuch as the *āchāra* (or good conduct) enjoined by the *Smṛiti* is fruitless, it of no use whatever. It is replied that it is not right to say so, because meritorious *karmas* are in need of that (*āchāra*). It is only a person who is possessed of *āchāra* that is qualified for doing meritorious *karmas*; this is made out from the following passages:—"He who does not carry out the twilight prayers, is unclean always and is unfit for doing all *karmas*" (*Manu*. II. 103); and "The *Vedas* do not purify one who is devoid of *āchāra*". (?)

### सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु बादरिः

**Sūtra 11.** *Sukṛitadushkṛite eveti tu Bādariḥ* (298)

But good *karmas* and bad *karmas* alone (are denoted by the word, '*charaṇa*'); Bādari says so.

The word, '*charati*', is used in following sentence: "He performs (or *ācharati*) good *karmas*; he performs (or *ācharati*) bad *karmas*". And the distinct mention (of '*karma*' from '*āchāra*') is due to the matters denoted by them being (respectively) established by an existent scriptural text and proved by a scriptural text (which does not now exist and) whose existence (at one time) is inferred from *āchāra*; and such mention is appropriate according to the maxim of the cattle and the bull.

Therefore, and because also, when the primary significance (of a word) is possible, it is contrary to reason to accept (for it) a secondary significance, the teacher, Bādari, is of opinion that it is only good and bad deeds that are denoted by the word 'charana' in the context. Here the opinion of Bādari is itself his opinion (i.e., the opinion of the *Sūtrakāra*). The fruit of the twilight prayers etc., which are enjoined by *Vedic* texts whose existence is inferred from *āchāra*, is the gaining of qualification for the performance of other *karmas*; this indeed is accepted.<sup>1057</sup>

Therefore, they (i.e., the individual selves) descend (into this world) only with the balance of *karmas* left over after enjoyment.

## ADHIKARAṆA III

### ANISHTĀDIKARYADHIKARAṆA

#### अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम्

**Sūtra 12.** *Anishtādikāriṇāmapi cha śrutam* (299)

It is declared in the scripture about those also who do not perform religious works etc. (that they go to the moon).

1057. According to Bādari, "those *karmas* which are free from blame" refer to *karmas* enjoined by existent scriptural texts. The "*sucharitas*" refer to "*karmas* which are based on texts to be inferred from *āchāra*." Thus there is no need to assume any figurative significance, as suggested by Kārshñājini. The use of '*karma*' and '*charana*' is compared to that of '*go*' (cattle) and '*balīvarda*' (bull). The bull is

included among cattle, but its special mention along with cattle restricts the meaning of the latter to cattle other than bulls. Hence the mention of *charana* along with *karma* restricts the meaning of the latter to *karmas* enjoined by existent scriptural texts. Though Kārshñājini is thus refuted, his view about *āchāra* being necessary for qualifying a person to do other *karmas* is accepted.



It has been stated above that those who perform mere religious works, secular works of a meritorious nature and charitable works go to the moon and then return to this world with the balance of *karmas* left over after enjoyment. Now the question that is taken up for consideration is whether those also who do not perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature) go to the moon or not. Those who do not perform what is enjoined and those who perform what is prohibited, both these are indeed performers of sinful deeds, and they are those who do not perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature).

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they also go to the moon. Why? Because there is the scriptural passage:—"There are some indeed who go out of this world ; all of them indeed go to the moon itself" (*Kaush. Up. I. 2* ) : here the movement towards the moon is declared in relation to all without distinction.<sup>1058</sup>

It may be said that, if it be so, then, those who do good deeds and those who do bad deeds, both these also will have movement towards the moon without distinction. To this objection it is replied that it is not right to say so, thus :

संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरेषामारोहावरोहौ तद्गतिदर्शनात्

**Sūtra 13.** *Samyamane tvanubhūyetare-  
shāmārohāvarohau tadgatidarśanāt* (300)

The ascent and descent of others, however, take place after they enjoy (the results of their works) in *Samyamana* (i.e., hell presided over by the god, Yama), because (their) going to it is declared in scriptures.

1058. The *Kaushītaki* text refers by "all of them" only to the knowers of the *Brahman* and those who perform religious and

secular works of a meritorious nature, and not to all, sinners included. But the *pūrvapakṣa* takes the latter, incorrect view.

The word, 'however', sets aside the objection. The ascent to and the descent from the moon take place in the cases of 'others', that is, of those who do not perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature), only after experiencing in *Samyamana*, that is, under the command of Yama, the god of death, the pains inflicted by him, and not otherwise. Why? "Because (their) going to it is declared in the scriptures". The sinners, indeed, owing to their being under his control, are declared to go thither in the following and other similar passages:—"There is neither this world nor the next": so thinking, the conceited man gets under my control again and again" (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 6); and "Him, Yama the king, the son of Vivasvān (the sun-god), and the destination of (sinful) men" (*R. V. X.* 14. 1).<sup>1059</sup>

### स्मरन्ति च

**Sūtra 14.** *Smaranti cha*

(301)

They (i.e., the sages) declare (to the same effect) in the *Smritis*.

Parāśara and other sages declare in their *Smritis* that all get under the control of the god, Yama, in such passages as the following: "O revered sir, and all these (sinners) get, indeed, under the control of the god, Yama" (*V. P.* III. 7. 5).

### अपि सप्त

**Sūtra 15.** *Api sapta*

(302)

The seven (hells) also (are declared in the *Smritis*).

1059. (i) The *Upanishad* text quoted here usually has a slightly different reading. The god of death is speaking of conceited men, and in the other version he says that they believe in this world only, and not the

next. (ii) The succeeding aphorism becomes necessary because the scriptural texts quoted do not expressly refer to the experience of the effects of sinful deeds.

They also in their *Smṛitis* declare the seven hells beginning with the *Raurava*, as the places to which those who perform sinful deeds have to go.

To the objection, how those who move in the seven worlds (of hell) can attain the abode of the god Yama, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

तत्रापि तद्व्यापारादि रोधः

**Sūtra 16.** *Tatrāpi tadvyāpārādavirodhaḥ* (303)

Even there (i.e., in the seven hells), owing to the activity of (control by) the god Yama, there is no contradiction.

Even in regard to those seven (hells), owing to the movement thereto (of sinners) being solely under the command of the god Yama, there is no contradiction (in relation to his control).

Therefore, even in the case of those who do not perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature), going to the world of the god, Yama, experiencing sufferings such as are suited to their *karmas* and then ascent and descent to and from the moon take place.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :—

विद्याकर्मणोरिति तु प्रकृतत्वात्

**Sūtra 17.** *Vidyākarmaṇoriti tu prakṛitatvāt* (304)

But (there is no going to the moon on the part of those who do not perform religious and other works of a meritorious nature) because they (i.e., the two paths to the moon, the path of the gods and the path of the manes) are the results of knowledge and (meritorious) works (respectively), as they are so introduced as the subject matter.

The word, 'but', is intended to set aside the (above) view. It is not appropriate to say that there is going to the moon even on the part of those who do not perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature). Why? "Because they (i.e., the path of the gods and the path of the manes) are the results of knowledge and works (respectively)." The path of the gods and the path of the manes are intended for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of knowledge and works (respectively).

What is said is this. In the case of those who do not perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature), just as, owing to their being devoid of knowledge, the movement through the path of the gods does not take place, similarly, inasmuch as they are empty of the performance of religious works, secular works of a meritorious nature and charitable works, movement to the moon through the path of the manes also does not take place. If it be asked how it is made out that the path of the gods is related to knowledge and the path of the manes is related to works of merit, it is replied that they are so made out, because they are introduced as the subject matter in the context.

Indeed, knowledge is the subject matter introduced as regards the path of the gods, and (meritorious) works as regards the path of the manes. Because in relation to the path of the gods, there is the scriptural passage which first states thus, "Those who know it (i.e., the essential nature of the individual self) thus (i.e., as set out in the *Pañchāgnividyā*) and those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith", and then goes on to make the statement beginning with: "They go to (the deity ruling over) the rays of light, and from (the deity ruling over) the rays of light to (the deity of) the day-light" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 1-2); and because also in relation to the path of the manes, there is the scriptural passage, which first states thus, "Then those who, remaining in the village, perform *Vedic* and secular works of a meritorious

nature and the giving of gifts," and then goes on to make the statement beginning with, "They go to (the deity presiding over) smoke" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 3). There is the passage:—"There are some indeed who go out of this world ; all of them indeed go to the moon itself" (*Kaush. Up.* I. 2). This statement also has to be interpreted as meaning that 'all of them' means 'those who perform religious and other (secular) works (of a meritorious nature)'.

It may, however, be said as follows. If those who perform sinful deeds do not go to the moon, then, owing to the impossibility of the existence of the fifth oblation in their case, the production of the body itself cannot appropriately take place. Indeed, the production of the body is declared in the scripture thus:—"The waters sacrificed in the fifth oblation become those who are called 'purusha'" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 9. 1). And that oblation has been shown to be preceded by the reaching of the moon (by the self). Therefore, solely for the purpose of producing bodies, in their case also it has necessarily to be admitted that there are ascent to and descent from the moon. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakara*) gives the answer as follows.

### न तृतीये तथोपलब्धेः

**Sūtra 18.** *Na tṛtīye tathopalabdheḥ*

(305)

There is no (need for going to the moon and the fifth oblation for producing the body) in connection with the third place ; because it is so made out.

In regard to the third place, for producing the body, there is no need for the fifth oblation. Why? "Because it is so made out". By the expression, 'third place', 'those who perform only sinful works' are denoted. In their case, for producing the body, the absence of the

need for the fifth oblation is made out thus. To the question, "Do you know why and by whom that (i.e., the next) world is not filled up?" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 3. 3), the following answer is given:—"Now, these very insignificant beings, which return (to this world) very often, do not go by either of the two paths (of the gods and the manes). To be born and to die again and again, such is the third place; by that (third place, that is, the sinful creatures) the next world is not filled up" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 8); here the third place has no ascent to or descent from the heavenly world, and hence there is the statement about the heavenly world not being filled up; and hence for the purpose of producing the body for this third place, there is no need for the fifth oblation. The statement beginning with "In the fifth oblation....." (*Ibid.* V. 9. 1), declares that the contact of the waters with the fifth fire is merely the cause of those waters becoming those who are called 'purusha'; it does not deny any other (cause for the body) because there is nothing declared in that passage by way of exclusive emphasis.<sup>1060</sup>

### स्मर्यतेऽपि च लोके

**Sūtra 19.** *Smaryate'pi cha loka*

(306)

In the world also, even this is known (that there is no need for the fifth oblation for producing the body in the case of some virtuous persons).

It is known in the world that even in the case of some who have performed works of merit, like Draupadi and

1060. There is a slight difference in reading in regard to the *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 10. 8). As set out by Ramanuja, it indicates that those who are denoted by the expression, 'the third place', do not reach the other world. What has been rendered as "to be born and to die again and

again" consists of two verbs in the imperative mood, which literally mean "Be born and die". These commands may be supposed to be given by God to creatures constituting the third place, or some such rendering as given here may be adopted.

Dhṛiṣṭadyumna and others, that their bodies have been produced without the need for the fifth oblation.<sup>1061</sup>

### दर्शनाच्च

Sūtra 20. *Darśanāchcha* (307)

Because also it is (so) revealed in the scripture (that there is no need for the fifth oblation in regard to the production of some bodies).

In the scripture also it is revealed that, in the case of some, the body is produced without any need for the fifth oblation; as in the following passage :—" Indeed, there are only three seeds (i.e., *tejas*, water and earth) in the case of those above-mentioned beings, consisting of the egg-born (like birds and snakes), those born from (the wombs of) living organisms (like men and animals) and the sprout-born (i.e., plants)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 1). Among these, the origination of those born out of sprouting (i.e., plants) and those born out of warm vapour (like insects and germs) is seen to take place without the aid of the fifth oblation.

It may be said here that there is no mention of those that are born out of warm vapour in the statement which says that "there are only three seeds" (*Ibid.*). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

### तृतीयशब्दावरोधस्संशोकजस्य

Sūtra 21. *Tṛtīyaśabdāvarodhassamśokajasya* (308)

The third word (i.e., the seed-born) includes those born from warm vapour.

<sup>1061</sup>. Draupadi and Dhṛiṣṭadyumna are the daughter and son respectively of King Drupada of the Pañchālas in

*M.B.* She is born from the fire-altar of a sacrifice and her brother from the sacrificial fire itself. See *M.B.* (I. 149).

In the statement, “(Those above-mentioned beings consisting of) the egg-born, those born from living organisms and the sprout-born” (*Ibid.*), by the third word, ‘sprout-born’, there is the *avarodha*, or inclusion, of those born from warm vapour also : this is the meaning.

Consequently, the attaining of the moon does not happen in the case of those who perform only sinful deeds.

## ADHIKARANA IV

### TATSVĀBHĀVYĀPATTYADHIKARANA

#### तत्स्वाभाव्यापत्तिरुपपत्तेः

**Sūtra 22.** *Tatsvābhāvyāpattirupapattēḥ* (309)

He (namely, the self returning from the moon) attains indistinguishable likeness with that (through which he returns), because it is appropriate for him (not to have the enjoyment of pain and pleasure here).

It has been stated above that those who perform religious and other works (of a meritorious nature) return to this world, in association with the subtle elements and also in association with the balance of *karmas* left over after enjoyment. The course of descent was also stated be, “through the path as of going (from here) and also otherwise” (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 1. 8), because there is the following scriptural statement here : “They then return to this same path as of going (from here)—(return) to the ether of space, from the ether of space to the air ; after becoming the air, he (i.e., the returning self) becomes smoke ; after becoming smoke, he becomes a water-carrying cloud ; after becoming a water-carrying cloud, he becomes a rain-cloud ; after becoming a rain-cloud, he rains (i.e., comes down to the world with rain)” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 5-6). Here the doubt is raised whether, in reaching



the ether of space, etc., he (i.e., the returning self) attains the nature of the ether of space etc., just as he attains the nature of gods, men etc., or whether he attains only indistinguishable likeness with them; here it may be said that (with reference to the self) becoming the ether of space is like becoming (King) Soma on the part of him who is in the state of *śraddhā* (i.e., the self in association with subtle elements), because there is no distinction (between the two cases).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply that what happens is only that "he attains indistinguishable likeness with that (through which he passes)". The expression, '*tatsvābhāvvyāpatti*' (which usually means 'the attainment of the nature of that') here means that he attains indistinguishable likeness with those things. Why is it so? "Because it is appropriate for him (not to have the enjoyment of pain and pleasure there)". Indeed, in attaining the state of Soma, the state of man etc., such state is required for the enjoyment of pleasure and pain. But here in the case of the ether of space etc., there is no enjoyment of pleasure and pain, and therefore it is not appropriate for him to attain the states of those things, (i.e., to have those things as bodies), and therefore the statement that he attains it (i.e., their nature) is intended to mean the attainment of indistinguishable likeness with them which is due to contact with them.<sup>1062</sup>

1062. The true purport of *Chhand. Up.* (V. 10. 5-6) is discussed here. Describing the return journey of the self to this world from the celestial world, the passage states that the return is along the same path as the original ascent until the moon is reached. Then the self goes from the moon to the ether of space and from the ether of space to air. Here it is not stated that the self 'becomes' the ether of space. Still what is said later about air etc. must be taken to apply here also. In all these

cases, the self and the ether or air or any of the other things mentioned are identified for the reason that the self for a time attains a likeness with each of these in turn. During the time such likeness lasts there is no possibility of distinguishing the two. The self does not have the ether etc. as its bodies, because it does not enjoy pleasure or pain when associated with them. (Śāṅkara appears to read *sabhāvvyāpattiḥ* in the place of *svābhāvvyāpattiḥ* in the *Sūtra*.)

## ADHIKARANA V

## NĀTICHIRĀDHIKARANA

## नातिचिरेण विशेषात्

Sūtra 23. *Nātichireṇa viśeṣhāt*

(310)

He does not stay long, because it is so specified.

The doubt is here raised whether from the point of reaching the ether of space up to reaching the paddy-stalk, he stays long in each of those places, or whether there is no restriction (as to the length of his stay there); here it may be said that there being no cause restrictive (of the length of the stay), there is no restriction as to the length of such stay.

If it be so arrived, at it is stated in reply:—"He does not stay long". Why? "Because it is so specified". Later on in the context, in regard to reaching the paddy-stalk etc., it is stated specially that he gets out of them with great difficulty, as in the passage:—"Then, indeed, it is very difficult, (i.e., it takes a very long time) to get out of them" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up. V. 10. 6*). From this, indeed, it is made out that previously in the context in regard to reaching the ether of space etc., departure therefrom does not take a long time.

In the word, '*durnishprapataram*', it being a Vedic form, the syllable '*ta*' has disappeared; it ought to be '*durnishprapatataram*', which means that departure therefrom is very difficult.<sup>1063</sup>

1063. '*Dushniprapatara*' is explained as an irregular comparative form of the adjective, '*dushniprapata*'. The regular form is by the addition of the suffix, '*tarap*', which

would make it '*dushniprapātata*'. A syllable, '*ta*', has been omitted. See the B.P. for a discussion on the grammar involved here.

## ADHIKARANA VI

## ANYĀDHISHTHTĀDHIKARANA

## अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदभिलाषात्

**Sūtra 24.** *Anyādhisṭhite pūrvavadabhilāpāt* (311)

With things (such as paddy etc.) which are presided over by other individual selves (there is mere close contact of the descending self), because the expressions used in the context are similar to those used in the case of the former (i.e., the ether of space etc.).

It is declared in the scripture that the descending individual selves are born as having the nature of paddy-stalks etc., as in the passage :—" After becoming the rain-cloud, he rains; they are born here as paddy, barley, medicinal plants, big forest trees, sesamum, pulse" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 10. 6*). Here the doubt is raised whether those descending selves come into close contact with paddy etc., presided over by other enjoyers (or selves) having paddy etc. as their bodies, or whether they are born as enjoyers having paddy etc. as their bodies; here it may be said that, as it is stated that they "are born", as in the statements, "A god is born" and "A man is born", they are, indeed, born having paddy etc. as their bodies.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :—" With things which are presided over by other individual selves (there is mere close contact)" (*Ved. Sū. III. 1. 24*). That is, with bodies such as paddy etc., which are presided over by other individual selves, those descending selves have nothing other than mere close contact. Why? "Because the expressions used in the context are similar

to those used in the case of the former (i.e., the ether of space etc.).” That is, because the expression in the context denoting merely their nature is like that about those beginning with the ether of space and ending with the rain-cloud.

Indeed, wherever the state of being the enjoyer is intended to be meant, there the *karma* which is the means of attaining such a state is expressed, as (for instance) thus: “Those with (a balance of) good *karmas*.....those with (a balance of) bad *karmas*” (*Chhānd. Up. V. 10. 7*). Here, as in the case of the ether of space etc., there is no reference to *karma*; because the *karma* of the religious and other works (of a meritorious nature) which have begun to yield its fruits and whose fruits have to be enjoyed in *Svarga* (or the celestial world of enjoyments), has come to an end solely through enjoyment in *Svarga*; because, also, those *karmas*, which have not yet begun to yield their fruits, are later on referred to in “those with (a balance of) good *karmas*.....those with (a balance of) bad *karmas*” (*Ibid.*); because, again, in the middle of the context here, there are (mentioned) no other *karmas*.<sup>1064</sup>

Consequently, like the statement which relates to the descending souls having the nature of the ether of space etc., the statement regarding birth as paddy etc. has only a figurative significance.

### अशुद्धमिति चेन्न शब्दात्

**Sūtra 25.** *Aśuddhamitichenna śabdāt*

(312)

1064. The point to note is that the association of the returning self with the ether of space etc. is mentioned by itself and not as intended for experiencing the effects of any particular *karma* during such association. It must

therefore be taken that the *karma* which leads to birth in a human body impels the self from the moon downwards, but until the human body is acquired the results of that *karma* are not experienced.

If it be said that in regard to the descending self there is impure (*karma*) (in the form of the effects of previously performed animal sacrifices which is the cause of birth as plants), it is not so, because the scripture says so.

This does not hold good that, with the bodies such as the paddy etc., which are presided over by other individual selves, there is mere contact only (of the descending individual selves), and that, owing to there being no cause producing the state of being the enjoyer of pain and pleasure, they have no birth as (having) paddy etc. (as their bodies); because the cause that produces the state of being the enjoyer of pains and pleasures exists. Religious and other works (of a meritorious nature) whose fruits are capable of being enjoyed in *Svarga* are impure, that is, are mixed with sin. Because they are associated with killing (the victim) in connection with the *Agnishomīya* sacrifice, and killing is certainly sin as it is prohibited by the scripture in the passage: "One should not kill any being" (?)

It should not be said that the maxim of the general and the particular has any scope here, as in the case of the sacrifices in the *pada* and *āhavanīya* etc., because both (killing and non-killing) are related to two distinct matters. Indeed, the injunction relating to killing animals in connection with the *Agnishomīya* sacrifice teaches that killing is helpful for the performance of the sacrifice; but the injunction, "One should not kill", teaches that killing results in sin.<sup>1065</sup>

1065. The Bhaṭṭas and Advaitins look upon sacrificial killing as an exception to the general mandate not to kill any living creature. The analogy given is that of the general injunction that sacrificial offerings should be made in the *āhavanīya* fire, confronted with the special direction to make the

offering in the *pada* (or hoof-mark) in a particular case. To this view, Ramanuja replies by pointing out that the mandate not to kill and the injunction to kill the sacrificial victim apply to two different matters and therefore cannot attract the maxim about a general rule and an exception.

Again, it may be said as follows. As the *Agnishomīya* and other sacrifices are undertaken according to positive (scriptural) injunctions, their province is not occupied by the negative injunction (not to kill), because that (prohibition) falls within the range of objects sought (lit : reached) by desire. It is not right to say so; because here also (in the case of these sacrifices) in regard to (the purpose being) the attainment of desires, there is no distinction. Indeed, in the *Vedic* injunction :—"One who desires *Svarga* should sacrifice" (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 5. 5. 4) and so on, sacrifices etc. are taught as being obligatory to one who is desirous (of their fruits); therefore knowing that sacrifices etc. are the means of attaining *Svarga* etc., one undertakes to perform sacrifices solely out of the desire to attain their fruits. As regards (killings in animal) sacrifices like the *Agnishomīya* etc. also, knowing from the *śāstras* that they are helpful for the performance of sacrifices etc., which are the means of attaining the desired fruits, one undertakes their performance out of the desire for their fruits. In the case of killing as it obtains in the world, knowing through some means of knowledge or other that killing is the means of attaining one's desire, one undertakes to do it out of the desire for its fruit; thus there is no distinction whatever. Similarly, with regard to the daily obligatory *karmas*, there are statements such as this: "If all the castes practised their own *dharma*s, there would be supreme, immeasurable bliss" (*Ap. D. S.* II. 1. 2. 2): from these it is made out that they are the means of attaining fruits, and they too are undertaken with desire: hence these *karmas* also are associated with impurity.<sup>1066</sup>

Therefore, in the case of those who, through performing religious and other works (of a meritorious nature), are associated with impurity, those fruits which have to be enjoyed in *Svarga* are enjoyed in *Svarga*, and

1066. The view that what is done out of desire is impure is attributed to the Prābhakaras. The Sāṅkhyas' criticism is here

outlined. In the end Rāmānuja denies that sacrificial killing is *himsā* and quotes a passage from the *Taitt. Br.* in support.

the fruit which belongs to the part (of their works) which consists of killing is enjoyed in the condition of immovable things like paddy etc. They (i.e., the sages) teach in their *Smṛitis* that the condition of immovable things is the result of sins, as in the following passage: "A man becomes an immovable thing through the evils of sins arising out of the body" (*Manu*, II. 9). Therefore, those who are associated with the balance of *karmas* left over after enjoyment are born in the condition of paddy etc., for the purpose of experiencing (the results of sins).

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so. Why? "Because the scripture says so". Because the sacrificing of an animal, as prescribed in the *Agnishomīya* sacrifice etc., is the means of (its) attaining the world known as *Svarga*, there is, therefore, scriptural authority for its not being sinful killing. The *Vedas*, in the following and other similar passages, make the statement which declares that the attainment of the world of *Svarga* by the sacrificial victim is due, indeed, to its being killed in the sacrifice: "With a golden body, it attains the world of *Svarga* above" (*Ait. Br.* VII. 4). That activity which confers excessive prosperity, although it may cause a little pain, is not killing; on the other hand, it is protection itself. To the same effect are the words of the *mantra* thus:—"Indeed, now you are not dead, you are not killed, you will reach the gods by the blissful paths. To the place to which those who perform good *karmas* go, but not those who perform bad *karmas*—may the god, Savitṛi, bear you there" (*Taitt. Br.* III. 7. 92). He who practises surgery, although he causes a little pain at the time—those who know him say that he is a protector and honour him.

### रेतस्सिग्योगोऽथ

Sūtra 26. *Retassigyogo'tha*

(313)

For him who is associated with food, there arises subsequently connection with one who sprinkles semen.

For the following reason also, the statement about birth as paddy etc. has a figurative significance. Subsequently to the statement relating to the attainment of the condition of paddy etc., the following passage is given in the context here: "Whoever eats food, whoever sprinkles semen, he becomes again that (sprinkler of semen)" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 6); here the declaration of the condition of being the sprinkler of semen in relation to those who are possessed of a balance of *karmas* left over after enjoyment, explains merely their association with them (i.e., those who sprinkle semen). Similar is the case with the condition of becoming paddy etc.; this is the meaning.

### योनेश्शरीरम्

**Sūtra 27.** *Yoneśśarīram*

(314)

The body is obtained from (i.e., after descent into) the womb.

Those who are associated with the balance of *karmas* left over after enjoyment attain their body only subsequent to their reaching the womb (of a woman), because it is there (in that body) itself that the enjoyment of pleasure and pain takes place. Before this, from the time that it (i.e., the descending self) reaches the ether of space, etc., there is mere contact of it with the ether of space and others (which therefore do not form its bodies).

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## PART II

### ADHIKARANA I

#### SANDHYĀDHIKARANA

#### सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हि

**Sūtra 1.** *Sandhye sṛishtirāha hi*

(315)

During the twilight state of dreams, there is creation (of dream objects) (by the individual self); because it (i.e., the scripture) says so.

It has been declared above that in this manner through its association with going out (of the body), returning (to the world) and birth, in accordance with *karma*, the individual self in the condition of waking suffers miseries. Now its condition of dreams is taken up for careful consideration. Touching dreams, it is declared in the scripture as follows:—"No chariots are there (in the dream-world), nor horses, nor roads. So then he creates chariots, horses, roads. No joys are there, nor possessive pleasures, nor enjoyments. So then he creates joys, possessive pleasures, enjoyments. No ponds are there, nor wells, nor rivers. So then he creates ponds, wells, rivers: indeed, he is the creator (of all of them)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 10).<sup>1067</sup> Here the doubt arises whether this creation of chariots etc. is accomplished by the

<sup>1067</sup>. The state of dreams is called *sandhya*, a twilight state, one born of the junction of two other states. In *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 3. 9.), the dream-state is called the third place for the self, the other two being this world and the next world. It is explained

there that in dreams the self can perceive both this world and the next. Of dream objects it is then said that they do not exist: that is, they do not exist so as to be experienced during wakefulness.

individual self itself, or whether it is accomplished by the Lord.

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That the creation (of chariots etc.) in dreams is accomplished by the individual self. Why? *Sandhya* is called the state of dreams, according to the scriptural statement: "*Sandhya* is the third state" (*Ibid.* IV. 3. 9). That (creation in dreams) is effected by the individual self itself: "He creates.....he is the creator" (*Ibid.* IV. 3. 10): because it, (i.e., the scripture) says so. Here it is made out that the perceiver of dreams is the individual self itself.

### निर्मातरं चैके पुत्रादयश्च

**Sūtra 2.** *Nirmātāram chaike putrādayaścha* (316)

Some schools are of opinion that it (i.e., the individual self) is the creator (of desired things seen in dreams); and that sons etc. (are denoted by the word '*kāma*' in the context).

Moreover, some schools declare that this individual self is the creator of desired things in dreams, as in the following passage: "This person who is among the sleeping creates all desired things (*kāma*) out of his own will" (*Kāth. Up.* V. 8). And sons etc. are denoted by the word, '*kāma*', as they are the things desired there, and not mere desire alone. Indeed, earlier (in the same context) in the passages, "Pray as you please for all *kāmas*" (*Ibid.* I. 25) and "Ask for the boon of having sons and grandsons that live for a hundred years" (*Ibid.* I. 23), only sons etc. are the *kāmas* that have been introduced as the subject-matter of the context. Therefore, it is the individual self that creates chariots etc., in the condition of dreams. That the individual self can will the truth is declared in the passage attributed to Prajāpati (i.e., *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1). Therefore, even in the absence of auxiliary

instruments it is appropriate for creation (by the individual self) to take place.<sup>1068</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :—

मायामात्रन्तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिद्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्

**Sūtra 3.** *Māyāmātrantu*  
*kārtsnyenānabhidhyaktasvarūpatvāt* (317)

That (creation in the condition of dreams) is, however, nothing but a marvel (i.e., the result of the wonderful power of the Supreme Lord), because it (viz., the individual self's power of willing the truth) is not entirely manifest in its essential form (in the condition of *samsāra*).

The word, 'however', sets aside the objection here. The totality of things, which in the condition of dreams consists of chariots, wells etc., is nothing but a marvel. The meaning is that they are all created by the Supreme Person. Indeed, the word, 'māyā', denotes wonder, because it is so seen in such passages as the following :— "She (i.e., Sītā) who was born in the family of Janaka, is the māyā (or wonderful power) of the Lord which has assumed a body, as it were" (*Rām.* I. 1. 25).

Here also the meaning of the passage, "No chariots are there (in the dream-world), nor horses, nor roads" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 10), is that they are not capable of being experienced by all other persons (than the particular person who is in the condition of dreams). The passage, "So then he creates chariots, horses, roads" (*Ibid.*)—

1068. The *pūrvapakshin* here tries to answer a possible objection that *Kāth. Up.* (V. 8) refers to the creation of dream objects (or *kāma*) by the Supreme Person. It is interpreted so as to uphold the theory of creation by the

individual self. Properly rendered, it states : "He who is awake when these (individual selves) sleep—(namely, the Supreme Person)—He creates (all desired things) after resolving and resolving." '*Kamam*' is a verbal participle.

means that it is undoubtedly wonderful that as the objects of experience to the perceiver of dreams He creates those things which exist only during that time.<sup>1069</sup> This kind of wonderful creation appropriately belongs only to the Supreme Person who wills the truth, but not to the individual self. Although he (i.e., the individual self) is associated with the power of willing the truth etc., he has not his essential nature entirely manifest in the condition of *samsāra*, and therefore such a wonderful creation does not appropriately belong to the individual self.

The sentence, "This Person creates (all desired things) after resolving and resolving" (*Kāth. Up.* V. 8), speaks of the Supreme Person Himself as the creator. Because from the passages which are given at the beginning and the end of the context, namely, "He who is awake when these (individual selves) are asleep," and "He alone is the giver of light, He is the *Brahman*; He is alone called (naturally and unconditionally) immortal; in Him all the worlds are contained; none indeed can surpass Him" (*Kāth. Up.* V. 8), the uncommon character of the Supreme Person is made out. This passage also—"So then he creates ponds, wells, rivers; he is the creator (of all of them)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 10)—has to have oneness

1069. The *Upanishad* says that the chariots etc. seen in dreams "are not", *na bhavanti*. This may be taken to mean (as by Śaṅkara) that such things are unreal, like the illusion of silver in the oyster-shell. Rāmanuja's interpretation of the scriptural text is based on the following among other considerations. (i) To declare that the dream-objects did not exist in the past or that they are different from the objects of waking experience is to say nothing new. The scripture is not expected to re-state common experience. (ii) The verb, "are not", is in the present indicative, and it

cannot be taken to deny the real existence of dream-objects during dreams. (iii) The word, '*srijate*' (which means 'creates'), is meaningless, if it is held to refer to the creation of false or illusory things. (iv) Thus, the dream-objects are taught here to be not existent, only in the sense that they cannot be experienced by others than the dreaming person, nor even by the dreaming person except during his dreams. This view makes the scripture purposive and justifies the present tense and the declaration about creation (§.P.).

of meaning with that (above-quoted) passage, and it therefore denotes the Supreme Person alone as the creator (of dream-objects).

To the question how, if the qualities of being free from sin, (of willing the truth) etc., are natural to the individual self, they are not manifest, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

परामिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततोह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ

**Sūtra 4.** *Parābhidhyānāttu tirohitam  
tato hyasya bandhaviṣayayau* (318)

It is obscured, however, through the resolve of the Supreme Being; through that (resolve) itself arise its (i.e., the individual self's) bondage and its opposite (i.e., emancipation).

The word, 'however,' sets aside the objection raised. '*Parābhidhyānāt*,' that is, through the resolve of the Supreme Person, the natural form of the individual self is obscured. Indeed, the Supreme Person causes the concealment of the natural auspicious form of that (individual self), which has committed sins through an uninterrupted, beginningless series of *karman*s; through that, that is, through His resolve, indeed, both the condition of bondage and its opposite (i.e., final release) are declared by the scripture to accrue to it, that is, to the individual self, as in the following and other passages: "Indeed, whenever he obtains fearless support in that which is invisible, incorporeal, indefinable and homeless, then he becomes fearless. For whenever he causes the smallest interruption in the meditation that is based on Him, then indeed there is fear for him" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1); "For He Himself causes bliss" (*Ibid.*); and "Through fear of Him the wind blows" (*Ibid.* II. 8. 1).

## देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि

**Sūtra 5.** *Dehayogādvā so'pi*

(319)

And that (i.e., the obscuration of the individual self's nature) arises either out of (his) association with the body (during the state of creation) or (in another way during the state of dissolution).

And that, namely, obscuration, occurs either through (the individual self's) association with the body, or through (his) association with the non-intelligent matter in a subtle state which is an inseparable attribute (of the *Brahman*); at the time of creation it arises out of the conjunction with the non-intelligent thing which has assumed the condition of the body, at the time of dissolution it arises out of the conjunction with the non-intelligent thing which is in an extremely subtle state and which is incapable of differentiation through names and forms.<sup>1070</sup> Therefore, inasmuch as his nature is not manifest in the condition of dreams, the individual self is not capable of creating chariots etc., merely through (his power of) willing (the truth). In the passage, "In Him all the worlds are contained, none indeed can surpass it" (*Kaṣh. Up.* V. 8), what is stated is that the qualities of being awake when all these (individual selves) are asleep, of being the support of all the worlds, and so on, belong solely to the Supreme Person. Therefore, with the object that the individual selves should enjoy the fruits suited to very insignificant *karmas*, He (the Supreme Self) creates objects which exist only during the time of dreams and which are capable of being enjoyed only by the particular dreaming self.

<sup>1070</sup>. This *Sūtra* answers a possible doubt that, if the powers of the individual self are obscured in the state of *samsara*, that is due to association with the *prakṛiti* brought on by the force of *karma*. It is explained that even

this takes place in accordance with the will of the *Brahman*. The obscuration takes place in one way during the state of creation and in another and different way during the state of dissolution.

सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः

Sūtra 6. *Sūchakaścha hi śruterāchakshate  
cha tadvidah* (320)

Indeed, dreams are indicative (of both good and evil), because it is so made out from the scripture, and those who know what they (i.e., dreams) are say so.

For this reason also <sup>1071</sup> the objects seen in dreams are not derived from the individual self's will (to create), because it is made out from the scripture that dreams are indicative of both prosperity and adversity, as in the following passage: "When during the performance of rituals undertaken for achieving desired objects one sees a woman in a dream, one should know that there is prosperity; it (i.e., the prosperity or success of the enterprise) is proved by the dream" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 2. 9*); and also from such passages as: "Now in dreams when one sees a black man having black teeth, then he (i.e., the man seen in the dream) kills him (i.e., the dreamer)"(?).

Those who know the scriptural passages which give the teaching relating to dreams also say that dreams are indicative of both good and evil. Being an indicator does not appropriately belong to what is dependent upon one's own power of willing the truth. Should this be so, inasmuch as what is evil is not desirable, one would create only what is indicative of good and see it.

Consequently, creation in the condition of dreams is effected only by the Lord Himself.

1071. It may be argued that the power to will the truth becomes available to the individual self during dreams only. The answer to this is now given.

## ADHIKARANA II

## TADABHĀVĀDHIKARANA

तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च

**Sūtra 7.** *Tadabhāvo nādishu tachchhruterātmani cha* (321)

(Dreamless sleep which is) the absence of that (i.e., of dreams) takes place in the veins, because it is so declared in the scripture, (takes place) in the Supreme Self, and also in the pericardium.

Now the place where dreamless sleep takes place is taken up for examination. It is revealed in the scriptures as follows: "Now when he sleeps this (sleep), has his senses drawn in, is calm, and does not know dreams, then he has entered into these veins" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6. 3). Again: "Then (after dreaming), when he gets into the condition of dreamless sleep, he does not know anything; then veins known as *hitas*, which are 72,000 in number, spread out from the heart to the pericardium; moving out through them, he sleeps in the pericardium" (*Bṛih. Up.* II 1. 19). Similarly: "When this person is in the condition of dreamless sleep, then, indeed, my dear child, he becomes united with the *Sat*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 1).<sup>1072</sup> In this manner, the veins, the pericardium and the *Brahman* are declared in the scripture to be the seat of dreamless sleep.

1072. (i) The opening words of *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 6. 1) as quoted in the *Srībhāṣya* in many editions are: "atha yatraitat...". The *Upanishad* text reads: "tadyatraitat...". The *B.P.* however adopts the latter reading in the quotation. (ii) The terms, '*nāḍī*' and '*purīṭat*', have been rendered as 'vein'

and 'pericardium'. Rāṅga-rāmānuja in the commentary on *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 4. 19) locates the *purīṭat* within the heart. The *Ś.P.* however says that the self during sleep comes out of the heart and sleeps in the *purīṭat*, which may in this view be identified with the pericardium.



Here the doubt is raised whether these are alternative or to be taken together ; in regard to this doubt it is replied that they are all alternative, because it is made out that all the three are independent of one another ; because also it is impossible for him (i.e., the individual self whose size is atomic) to exist simultaneously in more than one place.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : "The absence of that.....". The absence of that, namely, the absence of dreams, namely, dreamless sleep, takes place in the veins, pericardium and the *Brahman* ; the meaning is that these places are to be taken together. Why ? "Because it is so declared in the scripture ;" that is to say, all the three are declared in the scriptures to be the seat (of dreamless sleep). Moreover, when through a distinction of functions it is possible (for them) to be taken together, it is contrary to reason to accept them as alternatives which involve the rejection of some (in each case).<sup>1073</sup> There is distinction of functions among the veins, pericardium and the *Brahman*, as in the case of the palace, cot and bed (i.e., the bed being upon a cot in a palace) ; of these, the veins and the pericardium take the place of the palace and the cot ; but the *Brahman* takes the place of the bed ; therefore, the *Brahman* Himself is directly the seat of dreamless sleep.

अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात्

Sūtra 8. *Ataḥ prabodho'smāt*

(322)

For that very reason, waking is from Him.

<sup>1073</sup>. Whenever two scriptural injunctions are treated as alternatives, many difficulties arise. When one text is taken as applicable, the other text is rejected as laying down the means to a desired end, its injunction is not followed in

practice, and the *apūrva* to be created by it and the fruit to be obtained by it are rejected. Hence in the *Pūrva Mīmamsā*, such treatment of scriptural injunctions is disfavoured. Here similar defects are pointed out in taking texts as alternatives.

Because the *Brahman* Himself is the place of dreamless sleep, therefore, the declaration made in the scriptures that the waking up of the individual selves is from Him, that is, from the *Brahman*, can appropriately fit in, as in the following and other such passages:—  
 “Returning from the *Sat*, they do not know, ‘We return from the *Sat*’” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 10. 2).

### ADHIKARANA III

KARMĀNUSMṚITIŚABDAVIDHYĀDHIKARANA

स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः

**Sūtra 9.** *Sa eva tu karmānusmṛtiśabda-  
vidhibhyaḥ* (323)

But he himself (awakes who is in the condition of dreamless sleep), because it is so made out from his *karmas*, from (his) recollection of himself (after awaking), from scriptural statements (to that effect) and from the injunctions (relating to final release).

Here the doubt is raised whether it is that person himself who is in the condition of dreamless sleep that rises at the time of waking up, or whether it is some other person; the reply given is this: this person in the condition of dreamless sleep is free from all limiting conditions, has attained the *Brahman*; and not being distinct from any soul which has attained final release, he has no contact with his former body and senses etc.; therefore it is some other person (than the person in the condition of dreamless sleep that rises up on awaking).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows: The word, ‘but’, sets aside the above view. It is he himself (who is in the condition of dreamless sleep) that rises up (at the time of waking). Why? “Because it is so

made out from his *karmas*, from his recollection of himself (after waking,) from scriptural statements (to that effect) and from the injunctions (relating to final release)."

Surely, the *karmas* which consist of merit and demerit have been done earlier (i.e., in his previous births) by the person in the condition of dreamless sleep; they have to be enjoyed by that person himself before the rise of the knowledge of truth in him. His recollection of himself is in this wise: "That same myself who was in the condition of dreamless sleep, that same myself has risen from dreamless sleep."

The scriptural statements also show that it is that one and the same person who is both asleep and awake, as in the following passage: "Now the creatures here, of whatever body they are (prior to sleeping), whether as tiger or lion or wolf or boar or insect or firefly or gadfly or mosquito--(after waking) they are of that same form (or body)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 10. 2).

And injunctions which are intended for the attainment of final release will be meaningless, if the person in the condition of dreamless sleep is in the condition of final release. And this person in the condition of dreamless sleep is not free from all limiting conditions and has not his own true form made manifest; because the context relating to the person in the condition of dreams is introduced in the passage, "Then when he sleeps this (dreamless sleep)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 11. 2); and it is then stated, "Indeed, he himself, the aforesaid person denoted in this manner, does not know now the self thus: 'I am that same person, nor do I know these beings; I am as it were absorbed in destruction; I do not see here any object of enjoyment'" (*Ibid.*). The qualities of omniscience etc. are declared in the scripture in respect of the self in the condition of final release, as in the following passages: "After attaining the Supreme Light he

becomes manifest in his own true nature" (*Ibid.* VIII. 3. 4); "He moves about there (in the Highest Heaven), eating, playing, enjoying" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 3); "He is his own ruler, he is free to move as he likes in all the worlds" (*Ibid.* VII. 25. 2); and "Indeed, the seer sees all and attains all in all places" (*Ibid.* VII. 26. 2).<sup>1074</sup> Consequently, the person in deep sleep, while still in the condition of *samsāra* itself, has become tired in all his organs and incapable of knowledge and enjoyment etc.; attaining the Supreme Self as the abode of rest, he is refreshed, and rises up for enjoying things again.

## ADHIKARANA IV

### MUGDHĀDHIKARANA

#### मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात्

**Sūtra 10.** *Mugdhe'rdhasampattiḥ pariśeṣāt* (324)

In regard to a person in the condition of swoon, it is a half-way state (towards death), because this is made out by means of the argument by exhaustion.

1074. The distinction between the self in dreamless sleep and in the state of final release is brought out here. *Sushupti* is described in *Chhand. Up.* (VIII 6. 3) in the same words as in VIII. 11. 1, quoted above. The earlier text, however, then goes on to state: "It (i.e., the self) has then come into the veins; no evil (or sin) touches it; it indeed becomes united with *Tejas* (i.e., the Bright One or the *Brahman*)."<sup>1074</sup> This lends support to the *pūrvapakṣa* view that the self is then freed of all limitations. The *Vedānta*, however, takes the view that the limitations

continue to exist, though in a latent form. Temporarily, they are not allowed to operate. The self then is free from the disturbance caused by pleasure and pain, and free from the necessity to work and experience the effects of *karma*. It also seeks rest with the *Brahman*. In this state, it rests in the *Brahman* exercising only its superintendence over the body and the senses, and without being capable of any other activity whatsoever. Such a state is obviously radically different from *mokṣa*.

The question that is here taken up for consideration relates to the condition of swoon. The doubt is raised here whether the condition of swoon is one among the conditions of dreamless sleep etc., or whether it is a different condition; here it may be said that it is one condition among them, because the word, 'swoon', is well known to denote rightly only one among those conditions which are called dreamless sleep etc., and because there is no means of knowledge available for assuming it to denote a different condition.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :  
 "In regard to a person in the condition of swoon, it is a half-way state (towards death)" (*Ved. Sūt. III. 2. 10*). That which is the condition of a person in swoon, that (condition) is a half-way state (towards death). Why?  
 "Because this is made out by means of the argument by exhaustion." Thus, surely it is not the condition of dreams and the condition of waking; because there is no consciousness (i.e., in the condition of swoon); it is not the condition of dreamless sleep and the condition of death, because there are difference in the causes (leading to those states) and difference of appearance (through the expression of the face in those states). Indeed, the causes of swoon are powerful blows etc. Through this alone remaining, the condition of swoon is made out to be a half-way state towards the death. Indeed, in the condition of death, there is complete cessation of all connection (of the self) with the body and with all the vital airs. The condition of swoon is the state (of the self) in contact with the body and with the vital airs in their subtle condition.<sup>1075</sup>

1075. The swoon is taken to indicate a state of partial separation from the *prāṇas*, while death means a complete separation. The swoon is a half-way state towards death because the partial separation mentioned

above will lead to complete separation, in the absence of other causes adverse thereto. In other words, the swoon is a state preliminary to death, though death does not ensue in all cases of swoon.

## ADHIKARANA V

## UBHAYALINGĀDHIKARANA

न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि

**Sūtra 11.** *Na sthānato'pi parasyobhayalingam  
sarvatra hi* (325)

Not even on account of place (do evils appertain) unto the Supreme (*Brahman*); for He is described everywhere as possessing both the attributes (i.e., of being free from all evil and of being possessed of all auspicious qualities).

With the object of producing dispassion through showing evils, the particular conditions (of dreams etc.) relating to the individual self have been described above. Now, with the object of generating the desire for the attainment of the *Brahman*, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) proceeds to establish that the *Brahman*, who is the object of attainment, is free from all that is evil and possessed of auspicious qualities. It being so, those evils which, in the conditions of waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep, swoon and departure from the body at death, accrue to the individual self in each of those particular conditions—whether or not those (evils) accrue also to the Supreme *Brahman*, who is the Internal Controller of that (individual self) and who exists in the individual self in every condition; this is the question taken up for enquiry here.

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? They (i.e., the evils) do accrue to Him. Why? Because He exists in the bodies which are subject to those particular conditions. It may, however, be said that it has been stated that the Supreme Being, owing to His not being subject to the influence of *karma*, has no evils,

under the following and other aphorisms : "If it be said that (owing to His association with the heart which is a part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied that it cannot be so, because that (which gives rise to such association) is different (from mere corporeal association)" (*Ved. Sūt. I. 2. 8*), and "On account of the (mere) existence and (also) on account of the eating (of the fruits of *karma*, which are both predicated in the context here, the abode of the heaven, of the earth etc. is the Supreme *Brahman*)" (*Ved. Sūt. I. 3. 6*); and it may therefore be asked how it may be said that through the association with those particular conditions, evils can accrue unto the Supreme *Brahman* who is not subject to the influence of *karma*. It is thus stated by way of reply : under the aphorism, "And that (i.e., the obscuration of the individual self's nature) arises either out of (his) association with the body (during the state of creation) or (in another way during the state of dissolution)" (*Ved. Sūt. III. 2. 5*), it has been stated that even *karmanas*, (only by) bringing about association with the body, give rise to wrong aims of life, and that (i.e., the production of evils by *karmanas*) arises by reason of the association with the body being a wrong aim. Otherwise, *karmanas* themselves will produce miseries, and what is the use of association with the body?

Therefore, although (in regard to the *Brahman*) there is no subjection to the influence of *karma*, association with the body, which is beset with various kinds of impurities, is undoubtedly a wrong aim. Therefore, although the entry (of the *Brahman*) into it (i.e., the body) for the purpose of controlling it is of His own accord, the connection with the wrong aims is unavoidable. Indeed, the act of getting soaked in the pus, blood etc. (of the body), although it is done out of His own accord, is undoubtedly a wrong aim. Therefore, although the *Brahman* is the sole cause of the world and is the inexhaustible mine of all auspicious qualities such as

omniscience etc., yet in accordance with the scriptural statements, "He who dwelling within the earth.....He who dwelling within the individual self.....He who dwelling within the eye...He who dwelling within the semen" • (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3, 23), He is existent in each particular thing; and so, He has wrong aims, which consist of the association with those things.<sup>1076</sup>

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply : "Not even on account of place (do evils appertain) unto the Supreme *Brahman*....." (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 2. 11). Even through contact with "places" such as the element of earth etc., there does not accrue unto the Supreme *Brahman* even the trace of any wrong aims. Why? "For He is described as possessing both the attributes everywhere." That is to say, because "everywhere", that is, in all the *Vedas* and the *Smritis*, the Supreme *Brahman* "is described as possessing both the attributes"; that is, He is declared as having both the characteristics. The meaning is that He is associated with the characteristics of being devoid of all evil and of being the inexhaustible mine of all auspicious qualities.

Indeed, the *Brahman* is made out to possess both the (above-mentioned) characteristics from the following and such other passages given in the *Vedas* and the *Smritis* : "He is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst ; He

1076. The *pūrvapakṣa* makes no difference between the *Brahman* and the individual self, so far as freedom from evil and possession of auspicious qualities are concerned. The self's essential nature is obscured by *karma*, and it leads to association with physical embodiments. The *Brahman* may be free from the taint of *karma*, but when He too becomes associated with

physical embodiments, even if it be from choice, evils and imperfections cannot but accrue to Him. The reply to this argument is that the scripture, when referring to the *Brahman*'s association with matter and the individual selves, expressly declares that His auspicious qualities and freedom from evil are not affected thereby in any way.



desires the truth and wills the truth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5); "He is possessed of all auspicious qualities as His nature; through a small part of His power, He has lifted up (i.e., supports) the totality of created beings" (*V. P.* VI. 5. 84);<sup>1077</sup> "He is the one mass of the qualities of splendour, strength, sovereignty, great knowledge, excellent heroism and power; He is higher than the highest. In that Lord of all others that are high and low, none of the afflictions (like *avidyā*) etc. do exist" (*V. P.* VI. 5.84-5); and "The highest abode called Vishṇu is free of all evil". (*V. P.* I. 22. 53).

### भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्

**Sūtra 12.** *Bhedāditichenna pratyekam  
atadvachanāt* (326)

If it be said that it (viz., the accrual of evil to the *Brahman*) is due to the distinctions (relating to the conditions of beings with whom He is associated), it is not so, because there is a statement to the contrary in each case (in the context).

It may be said thus. Just as, although in the case of the individual self he is made out from the passage attributed to Prajāpati (i.e., *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1) as having also both those characteristics, yet there is association with the wrong aims of life which are due to the distinctions of conditions which consist of association with the embodiments of the gods etc.; in the same manner, in the case of the Supreme Being also, who is the

1077. The *V.P.* text in some editions reads differently from the quotation in the *Śrībhāṣya* here. In the place of "svas'aktileś'oddhṛtabhūtasargah" we have the *Purāṇa* reading,

"svas'aktileś'āvṛtabhūtavargah," meaning, "Through a small fraction of His power, He has pervaded (all) classes of beings."

Internal Controller and who is possessed of both the characteristics of being devoid of sin etc., it is not possible to avoid association with wrong aims, owing to the distinctions of conditions which consist of association with the embodiments of the gods etc.

If it be so said, it is replied that it is not right to say so. "Because there is a statement to the contrary in each case (in the context)." In passages such as, "He who dwelling within the earth.....He who dwelling within the individual self" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3, 23), at every step, this statement about His immortality is given: "He is your Internal Ruler and immortal Self". By this, it is clearly denied in relation to Him who according to His own desire exercises control over each particular thing that He has any wrong aims due to His connection with those things. But in regard to the individual self, it has been stated above under the aphorism, "Through the resolve of the Supreme Being, however,....." (*Ved. Sūtr.* III. 2. 4), that the essential form mentioned above is concealed by the will of the Supreme Being.

It has, however, been stated above that even in regard to Him who of His own will exercises control, it is difficult to avoid contact with the wrong aims which are dependent upon the characteristics of each particular thing. It is not proper to say so. Indeed, even a non-intelligent thing has not naturally the characteristic of being a wrong aim of life (or undesirable). But, as regards those, however, who are subject to the influence of *karma*, in the manner that is suited to their *karmas*, one and the same thing, through the resolve of the Supreme Person, makes for pleasure and for pain at different times and with different persons. If, however, that condition (of being the cause of pleasure and pain) were inherent in the objects themselves, then everything would at all times to all (men) make either for pleasure itself or for pain itself; and this condition of objects is not so seen to exist.

To the same effect the following passages are given :—  
 “O best of the twice-born, sin and merit have the (figurative) names of hell and heaven. Because one and the same object produces pain and pleasure, brings about jealousy and causes anger, therefore, how can an object have (its) essential nature (as a sole producer of pain or a sole producer of pleasure) in the object itself? Because it itself produces pleasure and then causes pain, it itself causes anger and favour, therefore there is no object whatsoever which is (by itself) conducive to pain or conducive to pleasure.” (V. P. II. 6. 46-8). Therefore, inasmuch as the individual self is under the influence of *karmas*, wrong aims of life consist merely of contact with various particular objects in the manner suited to various *karmas*. In the case, however, of the Supreme *Brahman*, who is independent, that very contact produces the pleasure of mere play, which consists in the exercise of control over each particular thing.<sup>1078</sup>

### अपि चैवमेके

**Sūtra 13.** *Api chaivameke*

(327)

Also some (i.e., the followers of a branch of the *Vēdu*) say so.

Also some, that is, the followers of a branch (of the *Veda*), declare through their text that, in the contact

1078. The argument here is twofold. First, the scriptural texts which declare the auspicious qualities of the Lord are not modified by other texts as in the case of the individual self: the latter is declared to possess auspicious qualities in some texts and to be dependent on the Lord and subject to *karma* in others. So the scriptural texts declaring 'the double characteristic' of the Lord have full force. Secondly, nothing is good or

bad by itself so that we can say association with it is *per se* desirable or undesirable. The *Ś. P.* cites the example of fire, whose warmth is pleasant in winter and unwanted in summer; so, too, a store of foodgrains gives joy to one when it is one's own, but not when it belongs to another. Association with things gives joy or sorrow according to one's own *karma*; and it is brought about by the Lord.

with one and the same body, the individual self has wrong aims of life, but that the Supreme Being has no such (aims), and has association with that splendour which is dependent upon the sovereignty that has the characteristic of controlling every thing. There is the following passage here: "Two birds which possess similar characteristics and are inseparable companions, cling to the same tree. One of these eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all" (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 1).<sup>1079</sup>

It may, however, be said as follows. In the passage, "Entering as this individual self which is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2), differentiation of names and forms is stated as being preceded by the entry of the individual self which has the *Brahman* for its Self. Therefore, the *Brahman* also, who is the Self of that (self), has the forms of gods and men etc., and possesses also names and forms; and therefore He comes within the purview of the positive and negative commandments such as, "The *Brāhmaṇa* shall perform the sacrifice" (2) etc., and hence it is difficult (for Him) to avoid subjection to the influence of *karmas*. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्

**Sūtra 14.** *Arūpavadeva hi tatpradhānatvāt* (328)

Indeed, He has no form, because He is the chief.

<sup>1079</sup>. The passage about the Internal Ruler, quoted under the previous *Sūtra*, describes Him as immortal; and from this His 'double characteristic' has to be inferred. Now a *Mundaka* text which is explicit about the

*Brahman* not being affected by contact with the world is cited. (The tree is the body, the two birds are the individual self and the Supreme Self, and the *pippala* is the fruit of *karma*.)

In entering the forms of the gods etc., although in association with those forms, He, that is, the *Brahman*, has no form ; that is, He is undoubtedly the same as that which has no form. The meaning is that the condition of being subject to the influence of *karmas* does not exist in His case, as it exists in the case of the individual self. Why? "Because He is the chief", owing to His being the evolver of the differentiation of names and forms. In the passage, "Indeed, the *Ākāśa* is the differentiator of name and form and what is between those (viz., name and form). That is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1), it is declared that, although the *Brahman* enters into all things, yet without being affected by the effects of the differentiation of names and forms, He is undoubtedly the differentiator of names and forms.<sup>1080</sup>

It may, however, be asked how, if He is the internal controller of a thing, owing to His having that thing as His body, it can be said that He has no form, being the same as the thing which has no form. It is replied that it is thus. Just as the individual self, owing to its enjoying the pleasures and pains produced by each particular thing, has connection with the form of that particular thing, in that way, owing to its absence (i.e., of the enjoyment of pleasures and pains), the Supreme Being has no form. Even the positive and negative commandments of the *sāstras* are meant only for him (i.e., the individual self) who is subject to the influence of *karmas*. Therefore, the Supreme *Brahman* is the same as that which has no form.

1080. The question is raised whether the *Brahman* Himself is not, like the self, subject to *karma*, as He is involved, like the self, in the differentiation of names and forms. The answer is that the roles of the two are different. The *Brahman* is the differentiator of names and forms, but He is not involved in the effects of differentiation, namely, pain and pleasure. The

names and forms pertain to the selves. Even though every word ultimately comprehends the *Brahman* also in its meaning, when any word refers to a bound soul in the bound state, it cannot thereby attribute bondage to the *Brahman*. The bondage to *karma* belongs to the self, who is an attribute of the *Brahman* and not to Him.

Consequently, although the *Brahman* is existent as the Internal Controller, yet He is undoubtedly possessed of the double characteristic, which consists of being devoid of all imperfection and of being the inexhaustible mine of all auspicious qualities.

Again, it may be said (by the *Advaitins*) as follows. From such passages as the following, "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), the *Brahman* is made out to be devoid of attributes and to have the sole essential nature of luminousness; but all else (by way of predication) that consists of being omniscient, of willing the truth, of being the cause of the world, of being the Self having all things as His body, of desiring the truth, and so on, is, by means of such passages as, "Not so, not so" (*Brih. Up.* II. 3. 6), denied (in relation to Him), and has therefore to be understood as unreal; and therefore how can the *Brahman* have the double characteristic of being the inexhaustible mine of auspicious qualities and of being free from all that is evil? To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows.

### प्रकाशवच्चावेयर्थान्

**Sūtra 15.** *Prakāśavachchāvaiyarthāt*

(329)

Just as is the case with luminousness, (so also is it the case with the qualities of being omniscient etc.) because they (i.e., the passages relating to them) should not be meaningless.

Just as the *Brahman* is admitted to have the essential nature of luminousness, because passages such as "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), cannot be meaningless; so also the *Brahman* is undoubtedly possessed of the double characteristic, because the texts declaring auspicious qualities such as willing the truth, being omniscient, being the cause of

the world and having all things as His body, and declaring also His being free from all that is evil like ignorance etc., cannot be meaningless.<sup>1081</sup>

### आह च तन्मात्रं

Sūtra 16. *Āha cha tanmātram* (330)

It (namely, the scriptural passage, "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity") declares only so much (as this, that His essential nature is luminousness, and does not deny other qualities).

Passages such as, "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), declare merely that the *Brahman* has the essential nature of luminousness, but they do not deny (in relation to Him) the qualities of willing the truth etc., which are ascertained from other passages. It will be stated immediately what the subject is of the negation in the passage, "Not so, not so" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6).<sup>1082</sup>

### दर्शयति चाथो ऽपि स्मर्यते

Sūtra 17. *Darśayati chātho api smaryate* (331)

It (i.e., the whole collection of *Vedānta* texts) reveals (His double characteristic); and it (i.e., the double characteristic) is also given in the *Smṛitis*.

<sup>1081</sup>. The *Advaita* point of view here rests on two scriptural texts, the *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1. 1) statement that the *Brahman* is knowledge and the negation in *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 3. 6), "Not so, not so." Being Himself knowledge, He cannot be the substratum of knowledge and cannot have knowledge as an attribute. That He has no attributes is made clear in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text. The answer to this is that the negation in the

scriptural text has to be reconciled with other declarations about the *Brahman's* varied attributes. Moreover, it is only the *dharmabhūtājñāna*, knowledge as an attribute, which cannot be the substratum of knowledge. The self which is knowledge as substratum can be qualified by knowledge as attribute.

<sup>1082</sup>. The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text is explained under Sūtra 21.

The whole collection of the *Vedānta* texts declares (in relation to the *Brahman*) that He is the inexhaustible mine of auspicious qualities and is free from all that is evil. There are here the following among other similar passages : “ (May we know) Him who is the Highest Lord, being the greatest of lords, who is the Highest Deity among deities ” (*Svet. Up.* VI. 7) ; “ He is the cause, is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (i.e., the individual self) ; He has no progenitor and no superior ” (*Ibid.* VI. 9) ; “ He has neither body nor senses ; and there is seen neither His equal nor His superior ; His supreme power is indeed revealed as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, strength and action ” (*Ibid.* VI. 8) ; “ He knows all and understands all, and His *tapas* consists of knowledge ” (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 9) ; “ Through fear of Him the wind blows ; through fear of Him the sun rises ” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1) ; “ That is the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman* ” (*Ibid.*) ; “ From Him, without being able to attain Him, speech returns along with the mind ” (*Ibid.* II. 9. 1) ; “ Whoever knows the bliss of the *Brahman*, he is not afraid of anything ” (*Ibid.*) ; and “ He is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults (i.e., *karma*) and without taint (i.e., the fruits of *karma*) ” (*Svet. Up.* VI. 19).

The following passages are also given in the *Smṛiti* : “ Whoever knows Me as the unborn, as beginningless and as the great Lord of the world ” (*B. G.* X. 2) ; “ I stand supporting the whole world by a fraction (of My power) ” (*Ibid.* X. 42) ; “ The *prakṛiti*, presided over (and thought over) by Me, gives birth to all the movable and immovable things. Indeed, for this reason it is, O son of Kuntī, the world goes on undergoing transformations ” (*Ibid.* IX. 10) ; “ The Highest Person is another ; and He is called the Supreme Self, who having entered the three worlds (of matter, bound selves and emancipated selves) as the Imperishable Lord, supports (them) ” (*Ibid.* XV. 17) ; “ He knows all, creates all, is all-powerful,



s possessed of knowledge, power and prosperity; He is without decrease, without increase, independent, beginningless and the controller (of all); He is not associated with weariness, laziness, fear, desire etc.; He is free from all evil; He is beyond attainment; He is without (i.e., needs no) support, is indestructible and has great unobstructed energy" (V.P. V. 1. 47-9). 1083

Therefore, even though the *Brahman* is existent in all things everywhere, He has the double characteristic mentioned above, and hence the evils due to the association with various places do not touch the Supreme *Brahman*.

### अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्

**Sūtra 18.** *Ata eva chopamā sūryakādivat*

(332)

For that very reason, the simile of the reflection of the sun (in water) etc. is given (in relation to Him).

Because even though He exists in various places, the Supreme *Brahman* does not possess the evils attached and due to those places, for that very reason, the Supreme Self, who resembles the sun reflected in water, mirrors etc., even though existent in those several things, is free from all evil; to this effect is the simile set forth in the *Sāstras*: "Just as the spatial ether, which is indeed only one, becomes distinct in pots and other things; so the Self who is one only exists in many places, like the sun in several reservoirs of water". (*Yājñavalkya Smṛiti*, III. 144); "The Self of beings who is one only exists in every being. He is seen to be one or many like the moon reflected in water" (*Brahmabindu Up.* 12).

1083. The V. P. text has variant readings—'sarvavit' and 'sarvadrik' for 'sarvakṛit' rendered as "creates all", and 'sarvasaktijñānabalardhimān' for

'sarvasaktirjñānabalardhimān' as quoted in the *Śrībhāṣya*. 'Krama' in the verses has been translated as 'has great, unobstructed energy'.

Here an objection is raised as follows :—

अम्बुवदग्रहणानु न तथात्वम्

**Sūtra 19.** *Ambuvaḍagrahaṇāntū na tathātvam* (333)

But because there is no apprehension (of the *Brahman*) as (of the sun) in water, (in His case) there is no such state of things (of being untouched by the evils of the places wherein He exists).

The word, 'but', points out the objection. In 'ambuvat' (i.e. 'as in water') the suffix 'vat' is used over the case termination of the locative. Just as the sun, face etc., are apprehended in water, mirrors etc., in that manner the Supreme Self is not apprehended in the earth and other places. The sun etc. are indeed apprehended through illusion as existing in water and other places, and not as existing in reality in those places. Here, however, according to such passages as, "He who dwelling within the earth.....He who dwelling within the water.....He who dwelling within the individual self" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3, 4, 22), the Supreme Self is apprehended as really existing in the earth etc. Therefore, in regard to the sun etc., the absence of association with evils due to water, mirrors etc. is solely due to their not being (really) present in those particular things. Hence "there is no such state of things"; the meaning is that the thing illustrated is not similar to the thing given in illustration.

He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) sets aside the objection thus :

वृद्धिर्हासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् दर्शनाच्च

**Sūtra 20.** *Vṛddhihrāsabhāktvamantarbhāvād-  
ubhayasāmañjasyādevam darśanāchcha* (334)

To undergo increase or decrease on account of His being within them (is not true of Him) ; it is so because both (the illustrative examples) are appropriate and consistent ; and there are seen (similar examples in the world).

In relation to the Supreme *Brahman*, who has occupied places like the earth etc., what is denied by the illustrative examples of the sun etc., is merely this, that, because of (His being apprehended as) being within the earth and such other places, He undergoes increase and decrease both in respect of His essential nature and in respect of His qualities. How is this made out? "It is so because both are appropriate and consistent;" that is to say, it is definitely determined to be so through both the examples being appropriate and consistent. In the passages—"Just as the spatial ether, which is indeed only one, becomes distinct in pots and other things" (*Yājñavalkya Smṛiti*, III. 144) and "Like the sun in various reservoirs of water" (*Ibid.*)—the illustrative examples are given of the spatial ether which exists in reality in many objects possessed of evils and of the sun which does not in reality exist in them: they become appropriate and consistent, when they declare in relation to the Supreme Self the mere negation of the possession of the evils belonging to the earth etc. Just as the spatial ether which, though separately in union with pots, water-jars and other things that undergo increase and decrease, is not touched by the evils of increase and decrease etc., just as also the sun, who is seen in reservoirs of water which are unequal, is not touched by the evils of increase and decrease etc. which belong to them—similarly, this Supreme Self who exists in the earth and other non-intelligent things that have various forms, and who exists also in intelligent things, is untouched by the evils of increase and decrease etc. that belong to each of those things; although He is only one, He exists everywhere in all things; undoubtedly He is not touched even by the smallest trace of evils and is the inexhaustible mine of auspicious qualities.

What is said is this. Just as in the case of the sun who is not really existent in the water etc. owing to the absence of the cause (therefor), there is no contact with the evils of the water etc., similarly in the case of the

Supreme Self also, who is existent in the earth etc., owing to His having the nature that is hostile to all that is evil, there is no cause productive of evil, and therefore there is no contact (of Him) with evil.

“And there are seen (such examples in the world).” In this manner the adoption of the illustrative examples in such statements as, “The student is like the lion”, is seen, although there is no similarity in entirety, because of similarity in regard to the part that is intended to be illustrated.<sup>1084</sup>

Therefore, in regard to Him (i.e., the *Brahman*), who is by nature devoid of even the smallest trace of all evils like ignorance and who is the inexhaustible mine of all auspicious qualities, there is no possibility of the occurrence of any evil even from (His) places to abide in like the earth etc.

It may, however, be said (by the *Advaitins*) as follows. The subject-matter of the context has been introduced in the passage: “Indeed, there are two forms of the *Brahman*, corporeal and incorporeal” (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 1): then the world in its gross and subtle forms is referred to as the form of the *Brahman*; then in the passage beginning with, “Indeed, the form of this Person who is mentioned above is just like that of the saffron cloth” (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6), His particular form (which is essentially unreal) is mentioned: then in the passage, “Then

1084. The simile of the ether of space fails, if the presence of the *Brahman* is unreal; in case it is real, the simile of the reflected image of the sun fails. The common element is immunity from evil. This can be secured by distance in space, remoteness in time, or separation in essential nature. In the case of the reflected sun, there is distance in space; the essential nature of the ether of space saves it from being modi-

fied or acted on by pots etc. The *Brahman* is immune from the imperfections of the things in which He is present by virtue of His essential nature. Both illustrations show that the imperfections of one thing cannot infect another, if the two things are separated in space, time or essential nature. The similes are not intended to demonstrate the unreality of the world. (*Ś.P.*)

hence is the definition, 'Not so, not so'. Beyond this 'Not so, so', there is nothing else (to define the *Brahman*)" (*Ibid.*), the whole subject matter introduced here, which is the modes of the *Brahman*, is referred to by the word 'so', and then it (viz., the context here) denies the existence of all that; and then it declares that the *Brahman* is pure existence only, which is the substratum of all attributes, but that the attributes have been manufactured by the *Brahman* who does not know His own essential nature to be of this kind; hence it is asked how the *Brahman* can have the double characteristic (stated above). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus.

प्रकृतैतावस्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः

Sūtra 21. *Prakṛitaitāvattvam hi pratishedhati tato bravīti cha bhūyaḥ* (335)

Because it (i.e., the context) denies (in relation to the *Brahman* His) being only of that measure which is introduced in the context; later on, it declares (His qualities) abundantly.

This (objection) cannot appropriately prevail, namely, that the sentence, "Not so", denies in relation to the *Brahman* His having the qualities mentioned in the context; for, were it so, it would be the idle talk of a person who is under illusions. Indeed, none who is not mad will teach as His attributes all things which cannot be known by other sources of knowledge as the attributes of the *Brahman*, and then deny the same (in relation to Him). No doubt, among those things which are specifically mentioned (here), some are well known to exist through other means of knowledge; nevertheless, it is undoubtedly not known that they are of the nature of the modes of the *Brahman*; but in the case of other things, (both) their essential nature and their being the modes of the *Brahman* are not known. Therefore, as

there is no possibility here of the repetition of those things (by way of reference or explanation of what has been previously known through other means of knowledge), they are all taught here in this context itself; hence their denial is not appropriate.

Because this is so, therefore this context "denies (in relation to the *Brahman* His) being only of that measure which is introduced in the context" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 2. 21); that is, whatever attributes of the *Brahman* have been introduced in the context, the *Brahman* being made out to be (only) so much as is by being associated with them is denied by "Not so, not so". "Not so, not so" means "not in this way, not in this way"; that is to say, the *Brahman* is not merely what is qualified by the modes as above stated; in the context, the *Brahman* has been introduced as being so much as is qualified by the above-mentioned modes; that (i.e., His being so much only) is referred to by the word, 'so'; this is the meaning. Because also the context immediately after the above denial speaks of an abundant collection of the attributes of the *Brahman*, therefore also it denies the *Brahman* is merely associated with the qualities introduced at the beginning.

It (i.e., the context) speaks indeed of an abundant collection of qualities in the passage: "What has indeed been described as 'Not so', greater than It there is nothing. Now (Its) name is the Real of the real (or the Unchanging among the unchanging), as the *prāṇas* (or the individual selves) are real (or unchanging), and It is the Real (or Unchanging) among them" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6). The meaning is this. The *Brahman* who has been described by the expression, "Not so"—there is no other thing higher than Him who has been mentioned above. What is meant is that there is nothing else than the *Brahman* which is superior (to Him) both in respect of essential nature and in respect of qualities.

The name of that *Brahman* is 'the Unchanging among the unchanging'. The explanation of that name is

given thus: "The *prāṇas* are unchanging; It is the Unchanging among them" (*Ibid.*). By the word, '*prāṇas*', the individual selves are referred to, owing to their invariable association with the *prāṇas* (or 'vital airs'). They surely are unchanging, because they do not, like the ether of space etc., undergo such modification as consists in a change of essential nature. "He is the Unchanging among them"; the Supreme Person is unchanging even more than they. In the case of individual selves, according to their *karmas*, both contraction and expansion of knowledge take place, but in the case of the Supreme Person, who is devoid of all sins, those two conditions (of contraction and expansion of knowledge) are not found.

Therefore, inasmuch as He is in association with the collection of qualities which are given in the supplementary passage, the expression, "Not so, not so", does not negative the *Brahman* being associated with qualities; but (it negatives) (His being of) that particular measure only that has been introduced earlier in the context.<sup>1085</sup>

Therefore, the Supreme *Brahman* is undoubtedly possessed of the double characteristic mentioned above.

The *Brahman* is not the object of any other means of knowledge than the scripture, and hence the corporeal

1085. The *Advaita* view is that the modes of the *Brahman* described earlier are denied by the phrase, "Not so, not so", and that the *Brahman* is taught to be Pure Existence without attributes. He is described as the Real of the real, in order to show the transcendental reality of the *Brahman* as opposed to the empirical reality of the world. According to Rāmanuja, the modes of the *Brahman* are being taught here as they cannot be known otherwise. Their negation, immediately after they are taught, cannot arise. The *Brahman* is the Real of the real,

in the sense that He is absolutely unchanging, while the selves experience contraction and expansion of knowledge. So what is taught by 'Not so, not so' is only the apprehension of the *Brahman* as being completely described by the previously mentioned modes. The *Ś. P.* points out that if the *Sūtra* had used the word, '*etavat*' (or 'so many'), it would have supported the *Advaita* view; but '*etavatvam*' refers to a particular measure or extent, and favours the interpretation given by Rāmanuja.

and incorporeal forms etc., as related to Him, cannot be referred to by way of repetition or of explanation of things previously known; and thereby there cannot arise any denial of their existence; and therefore only the negation of that particular measure that had been introduced in the context in the very beginning was declared in relation to the *Brahman*. He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) confirms this very characteristic of not being the object of any other means of knowledge thus:—

तदव्यक्तमाह हि

**Sūtra 22.** *Tadavyaktamāha hi*

(336)

That (i.e., the *Brahman*) is unmanifest; indeed, it (namely, the scripture) says so.

‘That’, namely, the *Brahman*, is not made manifest by any other means of knowledge (than the scripture). Indeed, the scripture says so, as in the following among other such passages:—“His form does not stand before the eye, none sees Him with the eye” (*Kāth. Up.* VI. 9); “He is not apprehended either by the eye, nor even by speech” (*Munḍ. Up.* III. 1. 8).

He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives another reason (thus):

अपि संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्

**Sūtra 23.** *Api samrādhane*

*pratyakshānumānābhyām*

(337)

Moreover, in worship (He is apprehended), because the *Veda* and the *Smṛiti* say so.

And “moreover, in worship”, that is, in properly pleasing Him, that is, only in steady meditation which has attained the condition of loving devotion, there results the direct perception of Him, and not in any other condition; this is made out from the *Veda* and the *Smṛiti*.



The scriptural passages here are the following : " This Self is not reached by reflection or by steady meditation or by largely 'hearing' the scriptures. Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached. To him this Self reveals His own form" (*Munḍ. Up.* III. 2. 3); "Meditating on Him as without parts, he (i.e., the worshipper) has his mind purified by the grace of the Lord (or *Jñāna*) ; and then he sees Him" (*Ibid.* III. 1. 8).

And the *Smṛiti* passages are these : " It is not possible that I (can be seen) with the help of the *Vedas*, through the practice of religious austerities, through the giving of gifts, or through sacrifices" (*B. G.* XI. 53); and "O Arjuna, destroyer of foes, it is possible really to know, to see and to enter into Me, such as I am now, exclusively by means of devotion (or *bhakti*)" (*Ibid.* XI. 54). Worship which has attained the condition of devotion is *saṃrādhana*, and this is pleasing Him, as has already been explained. Therefore the scriptural passage beginning with, "Indeed, there are two forms of the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 1), which teaches the essential nature of the *Brahman* for the purpose of resorting to steady meditation, is not capable of repeating by way of explanation or reference what has not been established already by other means of knowledge, namely, that the *Brahman* is characterised by two forms, corporeal and incorporeal.

### प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात्

**Sūtra 24.** *Prakāśādivachchāvaiśeshyam*  
*prakāśaścha karmaṇyabhyāsāt* (338)

The direct perception (of the *Brahman*) is obtained through practice in the religious work (of worship and meditation) ; (in such direct perception) it (i.e., the association of the *Brahman* with the corporeal and incorporeal forms) is like (His association with) luminousness (or knowledge) and is not distinct (therefrom).

For this reason also, it (namely, the scriptural passage under reference here) denies the particular measure (of the *Brahman*) that was introduced in the beginning of the context here, but it does not deny His being characterised by corporeal and incorporeal forms etc. That is because, in the direct perception of (the *Brahman*) of Vāmadeva and other (sages) who have directly realised the essential nature of the Supreme *Brahman*, it is made out that to be associated with the world consisting of corporeal and incorporeal forms is also not different from an attribute of the *Brahman*, like the essential nature consisting of knowledge and bliss. (This is seen) from the passage beginning with:—"Indeed, after perceiving this (*Brahman*), indeed, the sage, Vāmadeva, experienced, 'I became Manu and the sun'" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 10). To those (sages), Vāmadeva and others, there is the realisation of luminousness (or knowledge), bliss etc., which constitute the essential nature of the *Brahman*, through the practice of the religious work that consists of worship. In the same manner, the characterisation of the *Brahman* by the corporeal and incorporeal forms etc., is known without distinction (from His bliss etc.) to those sages who have practised worship.<sup>1086</sup>

He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) sums up the position that the *Brahman* has the above-mentioned double characteristic thus :—

अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम्

**Sūtra 25.** *Āto'nantena tathā hi liṅgam*

(339)

1086. The essential nature of the *Brahman* as knowledge and bliss is realised in loving meditation; His corporeal and incorporeal forms also are realised in such meditation.

The vision of meditation which proves the basic reality of the former, proves also the latter, which cannot be dismissed as phenomenal and illusory. (*Ś. P.*)

Therefore there is association (of the *Brahman*) with an infinity (of qualities). Consequently, (in regard to Him) there is the (double) characteristic (given above).

“Therefore”, that is, for the reasons already given above, it is established that the *Brahman* is qualified by an infinity of auspicious qualities; it being so, that the *Brahman* has the double characteristic is capable of appropriate demonstration.<sup>1087</sup>

## ADHIKARĀṆA VI

### AHIKUṆḌALĀDHIKARĀṆA

#### उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्

**Sūtra 26.** *Ubhayavyapadeśāttvahikuṇḍalavat* (340)

Because both (i.e., oneness and manifoldness) are undoubtedly taught (in relation to the *Brahman*, He is the non-intelligent world also), just as in the case of the serpent which assumes the form of coils.

In the passage beginning with, “Indeed, there are two forms of the *Brahman*” (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 1), it is taught that the world of non-intelligent things which consists of corporeal and incorporeal things<sup>1088</sup> is a form of the

1087. In view of the digressions, the author of the *Sūtra* reverts at the end of the *Adhikarāṇa* to the main topic, that the *Brahman* has the double characteristic. This *Sūtra* therefore is inconvenient to those who hold that the possession of the double characteristic by the *Brahman* is a *prima facie* view to be set out only to be refuted. (S. P.)

1088. Of the two characteristics of the *Brahman* described in the previous section, that which consists in His being free from all evil is further elaborated now by showing that He is not tainted by the imperfections of non-intelligent matter. In view of this context, the world of non-intelligent matter alone is referred to here as consisting of corporeal and incorporeal

*Brahman*. In the passage, "Now the teaching is therefore given, 'Not so, not so'" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6), that particular measure of the *Brahman*, which comprises His having the form of corporeal and incorporeal non-intelligent things, is denied. In the passage, "What has indeed been described as 'Not so', greater than It there is nothing" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6), it has been declared that there is indeed nothing else which is superior to the *Brahman*. In demonstration of this, the passage has been given, "Now (Its) name is the Unchanging among the unchanging, as the *prāṇas* (or the individual selves) are unchanging and It is the Unchanging among them" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6); it is stated here that more than all the intelligent things which are denoted by the word, '*prāṇa*', He is unchanging, because there is no contraction of His knowledge at any time. This truth is also made out from the following scriptural passages: "He is the Lord of the *prakṛiti* (or material Nature) and of the individual self and is the regulator of the qualities" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 19); "He is the Lord of the universe and the Lord of the individual selves" (*M. Nār.* XI. 3); "The Eternal among the eternal, the Intelligent among the intelligent" (*Kāth. Up.* V. 13 & *Svet. Up.* VI. 13.)

With the object of establishing that the *Brahman* is free from all that is evil, now the question that is taken up for consideration is the manner in which the non-intelligent thing is the form of the *Brahman*. It is asked whether this non-intelligent thing being the form of the

things and as being a form of the *Brahman*. The *Upanishad* lists the corporeal things as the earth, water and *tejas*, and the incorporeal as the air and the ether of space. In the body, the principal vital air and the ether within the heart are incorporeal, all other things being corporeal. The enumeration of the corporeal and

incorporeal forms of the *Brahman* has to be taken to include the intelligent selves also. Here the world of non-intelligent matter is referred to as being a form of the *Brahman* even as the intelligent selves. The other scriptural quotations here show that to be a form of the *Brahman* is equivalent to being ruled by Him.

*Brahman* is based upon the argument derived from the maxim of the serpent and its coils; whether it is due to their being associated with each other under the same genus, as it is in the case of the rays of light and the possessor of light; or whether it is due to the relation of *amśa* (or part) and *amśin* (or whole), which is due to their having the relation of the attribute and the possessor of the attribute as it is in the case of the individual self (being the form of the *Brahman*). Accepting the relation of the attribute and the possessor of the attribute, which will be established here under this aphorism, it was stated under the aphorisms—"(*The Brahman*) is also the material cause, because (in the context) there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it" (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 23) and "The identity (of the world) with Him is made out from the passages beginning with the words '*ārambhaṇa*' etc." (*Ibid.* II. 1. 15)—that the *Brahman* who is associated with the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross condition originates from and is identical with that *Brahman* who is associated with the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their subtle condition.

What is appropriate here? "As in the case of the serpent which assumes the form of coils." Why? "Because both (viz., oneness and manifoldness) are undoubtedly taught (in relation to the *Brahman*)": that is, because oneness is taught in the following passages, "The *Brahman* alone is all this" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 1) and "The Self alone is all this" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 2.); because also distinction (or manifoldness) is taught in passages such as the following: "Indeed, entering these three 'deities' (i.e., the elements of *tejas*, water and earth) as the individual self which is Myself (qualified by it as body) (I evolve the differentiation of names and forms)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2). Just as the serpent has the form of coils and also the form of being straight (while remaining unchanged in its essential nature), the

non-intelligent things are the particular configurations themselves of that same *Brahman*.<sup>1089</sup>

### प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात्

**Sūtra 27.** *Prakāśāśrayavadvā tejastvāt*

(341)

Or it may be like the relation between (the rays of) light and the source (of the rays of light), because of (both of them belonging to) the (same) genus of *tejas*.

The word, 'or', is intended to set aside the above views (based on the analogy of the serpent and its coils or of part and whole). If the essential nature of the *Brahman* Himself exists in the form of non-intelligent things, the scriptural passages which speak of distinction (between the *Brahman* and the world) and those which say that the *Brahman* does not undergo modifications will suffer contradiction. Therefore, just as there is oneness between light and its source, although they are distinct from each other, because they belong to the same genus of *tejas*, in the same manner the non-intelligent world is the form of the *Brahman*: this is the meaning.<sup>1090</sup>

1089. The example of the serpent and its coils points to a single substance in two states. That of the rays of light and their source refers to two things of the same genus or class. If it is understood as referring to a substance and its qualities, it will be as acceptable as the third view, which speaks of the attribute and the possessor of the attribute. The intelligent self having been shown as a part of the *Brahman* which cannot exist independently of Him, in *Ved. Sūt. II. 7. 42-52*,

the world of non-intelligent matter is also now shown to be a part of the *Brahman* in a similar sense.

1090. The example of the rays of light and the source of light is now claimed to be in conformity with the teaching of the *Vedas*. It shows the difference between the *Brahman* and the world. It also indicates that, while the *Brahman* is unchangeable like the source, the world, which is like the rays, can undergo modifications.

पूर्ववद्वा

Sūtra 28. Pūrvavadvā

(342)

Or it may be as stated before (in the case of the individual self).

The word, 'or', is intended to set aside both the above views. Although one and the same substance can be associated with particular changes of state, yet if (it is held that) the essential nature of the *Brahman* Himself assumes the form of the non-intelligent thing, there will be no freedom from the difficulties already stated (under the previous aphorism). Again, it may be said that, as is the case with light and its source, there is between the non-intelligent thing and the *Brahman* mere association under the genus, '*Brahman-ness*'. If so, then, as is the case with horseness and oxness, so also *Brahman-ness* will be a common generic property, which continues in the Lord and the intelligent and non-intelligent things, and there will be contradiction of all Vedic and *Smṛiti* declarations.<sup>1091</sup>

It is, indeed, as stated earlier (in regard to the individual self). The non-intelligent thing is an *aṁśa* (or part) of the *Brahman* owing to its being an attribute of the *Brahman* that is incapable of existing apart from Him, like the individual self, as shown under the aphorisms, "It (viz., the individual self) is a part (of the *Brahman*), because distinction (of it from the *Brahman*) is taught..."

1091. The expression, '*Brahmatvajāti*' in the text has been rendered as 'the genus, *Brahman-ness*'. The *Ś.P.* refers to a variant reading, '*Brahmajāti*'. Thus there arise two views about the genus under reference here. (i) *Brahman-ness* may be present as a generic character in matter, the

individual selves, the Lord and the *Brahman*. In this view, the Lord cannot be spoken of as being one with the world. (ii) The individual selves, matter and the Lord constitute the genus, *Brahman*. Here the Lord cannot be the cause of the world etc.

(*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 42) and “(It, i.e., the individual self, is, however, a part of the *Brahman*) like light (being a part of the source of light) and so on; (as is the individual self) the Supreme Being is not so” (*Ibid.* II. 3. 45). Owing to it (i.e., non-intelligent matter) being a part of a thing characterised by attributes (i.e., the *Brahman*), the declaration of non-distinction has a primary significance; the practical realisation of distinction between the attribute and the possessor of the attribute has a primary significance, on account of the distinction relating to their essential natures and characteristics; and that the *Brahman* is free from all that is evil has been well defended (and established).

In the same manner, just as light, genus, quality and body are *aṃśas* through their being attributes that have the character of being incapable of separate existence from gems, individuals, the possessor of qualities and the individual self respectively, similarly, here also, the individual self and the non-intelligent thing are the *aṃśas* of the *Brahman*.

### प्रतिषेधाच्च

**Sūtra 29.** *Pratishedhāchcha*

(343)

(It is so) because also those (i.e., the properties of the non-intelligent thing) are negated (in relation to Him).

In the following and similar passages, “This aforesaid Person is, indeed, the Great Self, who is free from birth, free from old age, and free from death” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 25) and “He does not become old through its (i.e., of the body) old age” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5), the properties of the non-intelligent thing are negated in relation to Him; and therefore the relation of part and whole (between the non-intelligent thing and *Brahman*) exists only through their being the



attribute and the possessor of the attribute ; this is the meaning.

Hence, the *Brahman*, which in association with the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their subtle condition is the cause, is the *Brahman*, which in association with the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross condition is the effect ; thus there is identity of the effect with the cause ; from the knowledge of the *Brahman* who is the cause, the effect is capable of being known ; all this and similar things become rightly demonstrated ; and the *Brahman's* freedom from all that is evil is also safeguarded. Through His being free from all that is evil and being an inexhaustible mine of all auspicious qualities, His possession of the double characteristic is also established.

## ADHIKARANA VII

### PARĀDHIKARANA

परमतस्सेतृन्मानसम्बन्धमेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः

Sūtra 30. *Paramatassetūnmānasambandhabhedavyapadeśebhyaḥ* (344)

There is a higher being than Him, because it is so taught by the descriptions (in relation to Him) of (being) a bridge, a measure of size, a relationship (of being the means to something higher) and difference (from the Highest).

Now, the doubt is raised with the help of some erroneous reasons, whether there is also any higher entity than this Supreme *Brahman*, who is Supreme, and who is the supreme material and instrumental cause of the world ; and this doubt is then dispelled with the object of preserving, in relation to this Object of Worship, the double character of (His) being free from all that is evil

and of (His) being a mine of innumerable auspicious qualities which are unsurpassed in excellence.<sup>1092</sup>

Here the doubt is this. There is this Supreme *Brahman* who is possessed of a double characteristic; there is also an entity which is higher than this Supreme Cause of the world. How? Because in the passage, "Now, He who is the Self is the bridge and the support" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 4. 1.), this Supreme Being is taught to be the bridge. The word, 'bridge' (or 'setu'), is well known in the world to denote the means of reaching the other shore, and therefore it is made out that there is another entity than this (*Brahman*) as the object of attainment. Similarly, in the following passage, "After crossing this bridge, he who is blind becomes one who is not blind" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 4. 2.), it is stated that this (*Brahman*) has to be crossed over, and therefore also there is another object of attainment.

Because also a measure of size is taught (in relation to Him); this Supreme *Brahman* has been measured, that is, is of a limited size, for there is the teaching of a measure of size (in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 5-8) in the statements that the *Brahman* has four feet and that He has sixteen parts. And this teaching relating to His measurement, coupled with that bridge, points out the existence of an immeasurable entity, which is the object of attainment. Similarly, the teaching about the relationship between the bridge and the possessor of the bridge is seen as having the character of that about the means of attainment and the object of attainment, as in the following passages: "He is the highest bridge towards immortality and is like the

<sup>1092</sup>, The qualification of the *Brahman* here by the epithet 'supreme' and His further description as the Supreme Being do not lead to tautology. The latter may refer to the supremacy mentioned in *Sūtra* II above of being free

from the evils of the places where He abides; or it may refer to His being the supreme goal of attainment. The former may refer to His being the final cause or His being superior to His effects. (*S. P.*)

fire that has consumed fuel" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 19) and "He is the bridge of immortality" (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 5). Therefore, also, there is a being higher than the Highest.

This being, who is higher than the Highest, is taught as distinct in the following passages: "He (i.e., the wise man) attains the (Divine) Person who is higher than the Highest" (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 8) and "He is higher than the highest, greater than the great" (*M. Nār.* I. 5). Similarly also, there is the passage, "The whole of this universe is filled by that Person completely. Whatever is higher than Him has no form or name" (*Svet. Up.* III. 9. 10). Thus, for these reasons, it is made out that there is a being higher than the Supreme Person.<sup>1093</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows.

### सामान्यात्

**Sūtra 31. Sāmānyāttu**

(345)

But because of likeness (to a dam).

The word, 'but,' sets aside the above view. Surely, what has been stated above to the effect that there is something higher than the Highest, because of (His) description as a bridge, that is not appropriate to say. Indeed, here this (*Brahman*) is not called 'bridge' in relation to anything that has to be attained, because in the passage, "So that these worlds may not get into confusion" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 4. 1), the scripture points out there is no bringing about of the confused mixture of

1093. The statement about the *Brahman* having four feet may be a quotation from *Chhānd. Up.* (III. 18. 2). The expression, 'śhoḍaśakalam', occurs in *Pr. Up.* (VI. 1). But there appears to be here only a reference to the gist of the teaching given to Satyakama Jābala in *Chhānd. Up.*

(IV. 5-8). He is there taught that the *Brahman* has four feet (or parts or aspects) and that each of these has four parts. For instance, the quarters, east, west, south and north, are the four parts making up one foot of the *Brahman*.

all the worlds, in that there is resemblance (of Him) to a dam. The word, 'setu', is derived from 'sinoti', which means binding together in Himself without confusion the totality of the intelligent and non-intelligent things. The expression, 'crossing', occurring in, 'After crossing this bridge', also denotes attainment, as, for instance, when it is used in the sentence, "He crosses over the *Vedānta*."<sup>1094</sup>

### बुद्ध्यर्थः पादवत्

**Sūtra 32.** *Budhyarthah pādavat*

(346)

It (i.e., the description of measure) is for the purpose of worship, like the use of the word, '*pādā*', elsewhere.

According to the passages, "The *Brahman* has four feet" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 18. 2), "He has sixteen parts" (*Pr. Up.* VI. 1) and "His one foot is all beings" (*R.* V. X. 90. 3), whatever description of measure is given (in relation to the *Brahman*), that is intended for comprehending Him, that is, for His worship; because from such passages as the following, "The *Brahman* is existence, knowledge, infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1), it is ascertained that the *Brahman*, who is the cause of world, is unlimited and therefore it is impossible for Him to be Himself measureable. It is declared in the scripture that He indeed is the cause of the world, as in the following passages: "From this aforementioned Self, indeed, the ether of space was produced" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); and "He desired, 'May I become many and be born'" (*Ibid.* II. 6. 1). Similarly, in the following passage, "Speech is one foot, the *prāṇa* is one foot, the eye is one foot, the ear is one foot" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 18. 2), the teaching about speech etc. being a foot (of the *Brahman*) is

<sup>1094</sup>. See also the discussion about the meaning of the word, 'setu', in Vol. II, p. 84 and in Note 490 on that page.

intended to relate to the worship of the *Brahman*. This (teaching) here also is in the same position<sup>1095</sup>

It may, however, be asked how, in regard to Him who is Himself immeasurable, there can possibly be a measurable size (even) for purposes of worship.\* To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:—

### स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत्

**Sūtra 33.** *Sthānaviśeṣhāt prakāśādivat*

(347)

That worship is appropriate through (the association of the *Brahman* with) particular places, as is the case with light etc.

Through the distinction of limiting conditions which are ascertained as speech and other particular places, there arises meditation on a measurable size as associated therewith (in regard to the *Brahman*), just as the all-pervading light, the ether of space etc., through the distinction of places like windows, pots etc., are regarded in the mind as limited; this is the meaning.

### उपपत्तेश्च

**Sūtra 34.** *Upapatteścha*

(348)

Because it is appropriate (to say that the Object of attainment is itself the means of attainment).

It has been stated above that in the passage, "He is the bridge to immortality" (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 5), the teaching is given about the relation of the object of attainment and the means of attainment, and that therefore

1095. (i) The *Purusha-sūkta* statement that all beings constitute His one foot must be taken really to refer to the true glory of the Lord and not to a conceptual construction for the

sake of meditation. (ii) In the place of "The ear is one foot", most editions of the *Srībhāṣya* read: "The mind is one foot" But the *Upanishad* text is clear.

there is something higher than the means of attainment. It is not right to say so ; because it is appropriate for the Supreme Person, who is the object of attainment, to be Himself the means of attaining Him. For, according to the passage, " This Self is not attained either by reflection, or by steady meditation, or by largely 'hearing' the scriptures ; whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached ; to him this Self reveals His own form " (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 3), the scripture declares that none else can be the means (of attaining Him than He Himself).<sup>1096</sup>

### तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात्

**Sūtra 35.** *Tathānyapratishedhāt*

(349)

Because, similarly another being than the *Brahman* is negatived.

Again, it has been stated above to the effect that in the following and other similar passages, " Whatever is higher than Him " (*Svet. Up.* III. 10), " The (Divine) Person who is higher than the highest " (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 8), and " He is higher than what is beyond the *akshara* " (*Ibid.* II. 1. 2), the teaching is given about the difference (between the *Brahman* and something higher) and that therefore there is a being higher than the highest *Brahman*; that is not appropriate to say because there itself (in the *Svet. Up.* where such difference appears to be taught) a being who is higher than that *Brahman* is negatived thus : " There is none else higher than Him, there is no one who is subtler or greater than Him " (*Svet. Up.* III. 9). Than Him another higher being does not exist ; the meaning is that in any form whatsoever there is no higher

<sup>1096</sup>. Compare the interpretation of *Mund. Up.* (III. 2. 3) given here with that on Vol. I, p. 18. The Lord is now described as the way as well as the goal, the means as well as the

end. It is implied that redemption is solely through His grace. This is also the basis of the doctrine of *prapatti*, of absolute faith in and complete self-surrender to the Lord.

being (than the *Brahman*). Elsewhere also it is similarly stated: "What has indeed been described as 'Not so', greater than It there is nothing else" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 6); thus the meaning is that there is none other higher than that *Brahman* who has been (previously) described as 'Not so'. Similarly, we have the passage: "There is no one who rules over Him: His fame is well known to be great" (*M. Nār.* I. 10). That (*Brahman*), indeed, is referred to as the material cause of the world immediately afterwards in the passage beginning with: "All the moments were born out of the Person who has the lustre of lightning...He created water (and the other elements) and both these (worlds, the upper and the lower)" (*Ibid.* I. 8, 10). The statement also, "(The passage beginning with) 'It (i.e., the world) is born from the waters' (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 13. 1) (and) the eight (*ṛiks*) beginning with 'Hiraṇyagarbha' (*R. V. X.* 121. 1-8) (have to be read here)" (*M. Nār.* I. 12), recognises this Person as the cause of the world.<sup>1097</sup>

It may, however, be asked why the statement, "Whatever is higher than Him" (*Svet. Up.* III. 10), is made; it is replied as follows. In the preceding passage, namely, "I know this great Person of sunlike lustre who is beyond *tamas* (or the *prakṛiti*); knowing Him alone, one transcends death; there is no other path for the attainment of final release" (*Svet. Up.* III. 8), it is taught that only the knowledge of the Supreme *Brahman*, who is the Great Person, is the means of attaining immortality, and that there is no other path for the attainment of immortality; to demonstrate this, the following passage is given: "There is none else higher than Him, there is no one who is subtler or greater than Him; He remains like

1097. *Ś.P.* points out that the use of the two words, '*param*' and '*aparam*', in *Śvet. Up.* (III. 9) is intended to show that the *Brahman* has neither an equal, nor a superior. The *Taitt. Ār.* passage referred to in *M. Nār.*

(I. 12) describes the glory of *Nārāyaṇa*. The other reference there is to the famous hymn to 'the Unknown God', who is here identified with the Supreme *Brahman*. He is the *Hiraṇyagarbha* in the hymn.

a tree (erect and steady) in the Highest Heaven; by that Person the whole of this universe is filled completely" (*Śvet. Up.* III. 9); wherein it is declared that the Person is the Supreme Being and that any being distinct from Him cannot possibly be the Supreme Being; then there is the passage: "Therefore that Being which is higher than all others has no form (or body brought into existence by *karma*) and no imperfection (or suffering from *karma*); those who know this (Being), they become immortal, while those others (who do not know Him) attain misery itself" (*Śvet. Up.* III. 10), which concludes the previous teaching with reasons. That entity, the Person, that is higher than all others, that very entity has no form (or body) and no imperfection; because this is so, therefore those who know this entity, the Person, they alone become immortal, while those others (who do not know It) attain misery itself. If it (i.e., the meaning) were otherwise, there would be contradiction of the passage given at the commencement (which says there is no other path for the attainment of final release); there would also be contradiction of the statement immediately afterwards (to the effect that there is nothing else which is higher than the *Brahman*).

Previous to the passage, "He (i.e., the wise man) attains the (Divine) Person who is higher than the Highest" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 8), the following passage is given in the context: "He is higher than what is higher than the *akshara*" (*Ibid.* II. 1. 2); that is to say, that which is higher than the *akshara*, or the undifferentiated *prakṛiti*, is the collective individual self, and He who is higher than that collective individual self is the Supreme Person who is possessed of the qualities of being invisible etc. and who is omniscient; He alone is here also stated to be higher than the collective individual self in the statement that He is higher than the Highest.<sup>1098</sup>

1098. The *pūrvapakṣa* takes 'tato' in *Śvet. Up.* (III. 10) as 'than Him'. According to Rāmaṇuja, the meaning is 'therefore'. As

regards *Muṇḍ. Up.* (II. 1. 2), it is discussed at some length in Vol. II, pp. 51-64.



अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः

Sūtra 36. *Anena sarvagatatvamāyāmaśabdādibhyah* (350)

That all things are pervaded by Him<sup>•</sup> is made out by such texts as those relating to His all-pervasiveness (whence it follows that there is none else higher).

By Him, that is, by the *Brahman*, that all things are entered into, that is, that the whole world is pervaded, is made out by the texts relating to His *āyāma*, that is, the texts denoting His all-pervasiveness; which (all-pervasiveness) makes known that there is none higher than Him. Indeed, the texts relating to His all-pervasiveness are: "By that Person the whole of this universe is filled completely" (*Svet. Up.* III. 9); "Whatever thing there is in this world either seen or heard, Nārāyaṇa pervades all that within and without and so remains for ever" (*M. Nār.* XI. 5); "That which the wise perceive as the source of all beings is the eternal, the sovereign, the all-pervading, the extremely subtle and the Imperishable One" (*Mund. Up.* I. 6). By the expression 'ādi' (in the Sūtra, rendered as 'such as'), the following and other such texts are accepted: "All this indeed is the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 5) and "The Self alone is all this" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 9).<sup>1099</sup>

Therefore, this Supreme *Brahman* Himself is higher than all (else).

1099. While the previous aphorism refers to scriptural texts disproving the *pūrvapakṣa* view that there is an entity higher than the *Brahman*, this has in view texts supporting the author of the *Sūtras*. Pervasion is here taken to imply sovereign control. Similar texts may include those denying

entities other than the *Brahman*, those describing Him as supporting and ruling, along with pervading, the world, and those equating Him with the world. All these become concordant and clear when the *Brahman* is perceived to be the soul and the world as the body.

## ADHIKARANA VIII

## PHALĀDHIKARANA

## फलमत उपपत्तेः

Sūtra 37. *Phalamata upapattēḥ*

(351)

From Him are produced (all) the results because it is appropriate.

With the object of producing the desire for worshipping the *Brahman*, it has been stated above that the individual self in all its conditions is full of evils, that the Supreme Person who is the object of attainment is free from all that is evil, is the inexhaustible mine of all auspicious qualities and is higher than all (else). After this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*), having in view the teaching about (the) worship (of the *Brahman*), declares that for those worshippers the result of worship—the result known as salvation which consists in attaining Him—is given by that same Supreme Person. Through parity of reasoning, the fruits which are taught (as pertaining to the rituals) in the *Sāstras* and which belong both to this world and to the next, result from Him alone; that is, they result from the Supreme Person. So the expression, ‘results from Him’ is used as common to both.

Why is this so? “Because it is appropriate.” Indeed, that very same (*Brahman*), who is omniscient, who is all-powerful, who is very greatly noble and generous, when He is worshipped by sacrifices, gifts, oblations and the like and also by loving meditation, desires to give (to His worshippers) the totality of the enjoyments of both this world and the next, and also desires to give final beatitude which consists in attaining His own essential nature. Indeed, *karmas* (i.e., actions or rituals), which are non-intelligent and which perish in a moment, are

incapable of being the means of attaining the fruit that comes into existence at a later time.<sup>1100</sup>

### श्रुतत्वाच्च

Sūtra 38. *S'rutatvāchcha*

(352)

Because also it is so declared in the scriptures.

Indeed, it is declared in the scriptures that He (the *Brahman*) Himself gives the fruits consisting of enjoyment here and of final beatitude, as in the following passages :—  
“ Indeed, that same great unborn Self is the giver of food, the giver of wealth ” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 24); and “ He Himself gives bliss ” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7.1).

Now he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) states the *prima facie* view of the opponent here thus :—

### धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव

Sūtra 39. *Dharmam Jaiminirata eva*

(353)

For the very same reason, Jaimini considers *dharmā* (or religious actions themselves as producing the fruits).

For the very same reason, that is, because it is appropriate to say so, and because also it is so declared in the scriptures, the teacher, Jaimini, is of opinion that religious actions themselves, namely, sacrifices, gifts, oblations and the worship through loving meditation,

1100. In the aphorism, the expression “results” is used and not ‘final release’. This implies that all rituals are of the form of the worship of the *Brahman*, that He grants all the fruits thereof, and that even one desirous of final release should think of Him

in this light. The *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, dealing with rituals, has concluded that their fruits are attained mediately by means of something else. This is determined to be the *Brahman* here.

yield (their) fruits. Indeed, in the world, the activity of agriculture and the activity of massaging the body are themselves seen, directly (in the second case) or indirectly (in the former), to give their fruits. Similarly, in the *Vedas* also, even though sacrifices, gifts and oblations are not directly the means of attaining any fruits (thereof), indirectly, through producing the *apūrva*, it is appropriate for them to be the means of producing the fruits thereof. Accordingly, the following and other such scriptural passages, "He who is desirous of *Svarga* should sacrifice" (*Taitt. Br.* I. 5. 11. 2), declare that sacrifices have to be performed for attaining *Svarga*, which is the object sought to be attained, and at the same time they show that, owing to the failure of accounting for it in any other manner, they are the means of attaining the fruits through the medium of the *apūrva*.<sup>1101</sup>

पूर्वन्तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् •

**Sūtra 40.** *Pūrvantu Bādarāyaṇo hetuvyapadeśāt* (354)

Bādarāyaṇa, however, is of opinion that the former view is correct, because it is taught with reason (that He is the giver of fruits).

The word, 'however', sets aside the above *prima facie* view. The venerable Bādarāyaṇa is opinion that, as previously stated, the power of giving fruits belongs solely to the Supreme Person. Why? "Because it is taught with reason (that He is the giver of fruits)." That is, because the word, 'yāga', is derived from the root, 'yaj', which refers to the worship of the gods; and the gods of fire, air etc., who are the objects of worship through sacrifices etc., which are the means of worshipping the gods, are themselves taught in the passages respectively relating to them as being the givers of particular fruits, as in the following and other similar passages: "One who is

<sup>1101</sup>. Jaimini's view, as set out here, is refuted in the next *sūtra*. Here it is claimed that

the concept of *apūrva* is necessary and is not inconsistent with the scriptures.

desirous of prosperity must sacrifice a white animal as sacred to Vāyu (or the god of air). Indeed, Vāyu is the quickest moving deity; him, with the portion due to him, does he (i.e., the sacrificer) approach; he himself (i.e., Vāyu) causes him to attain prosperity" (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 1. 1. 1).

In the case of one who is desirous of fruits, the teaching given about the mode of their (i.e., of such sacrifices etc.) being the means of attaining fruits which are the objects sought to be attained, is undoubtedly dependent upon the injunctions, and therefore there need be no doubt that the teaching is not related to those (injunctions). And because the mode of the means of attaining fruits, which is thus dependent, is ascertained from the scripture itself, those who rely on authoritative proof do not tolerate abandoning this (namely, the view that the gods are the givers of fruits) and assuming the *apūrva* which is not dealt with in the scriptures. The imperative verbs etc. denote that which is established at the time of learning the meanings of words and which is also proved by the science of grammar, namely, that in regard to the sacrifice etc., which are the means of worshipping the gods the primary meanings (of the words signifying them) as signified by their grammatical bases, are capable of being accomplished through the activity of the agents (of actions like sacrifices); anything else which is supersensuous (like the *apūrva*), they do not denote; this has been already explained (in the first *Adhikaraṇa* of Chapter I).<sup>1102</sup>

In this very manner, from the scriptural passage, "Indeed, Vāyu is the quickest moving deity" (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 1. 1. 1), it is made out that Vāyu etc. are also

<sup>1102</sup>. That *mantras* and *artha-vadas* need not be taken to mean what they say is a well-known doctrine of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. They argue that only the injunctions to perform rituals have significance. This is refuted here, and the refutation in Vol. I, pp. 224-5, is also re-

called. The root, 'yaj' (to sacrifice) implies, not a bare commandment, nor a commandment together with an assurance about the creation of *apūrva* by its performance, but propitiation of a particular god or gods directly and of the Supreme *Brahman* indirectly.

givers of fruits. That the Supreme Person Himself, in the form of Vāyu etc., is the object of worship and is the giver of fruits is declared in the scriptures thus: "He who is the support (lit. navel) of the universe accepts (as worship) all rituals which consist of sacrifices etc. (enjoined in the *Vedas*) and secular charitable actions (like digging wells), both those already performed and to be performed in many ways. He (i.e., the *Brahman*) Himself is Agni, He Himself is Vāyu, He Himself is the moon-god" (*M. Nār.* I. 6-7). In the *Āntaryāmi-Brahmaṇa* (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7), it is declared—"He who dwelling in Vāyu (is within Vāyu).... He who dwelling in Agni...He who dwelling in the sun..." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7, 5, 9).

This is also stated in the following passages from the *Smṛiti* :—"Whatever loving devotee desires to worship with faith whichever form (of a god, which is really a form of Myself), to each such person, I give firm faith in respect of that form. He, possessing that faith, desires the worship thereof, and obtains therefrom his desires as prescribed only by Myself" (*B. G.* VII. 21); and "I am also indeed the enjoyer as well as the Lord of all sacrifices" (*Ibid.* IX. 24). The word, 'Lord', means that He is the giver of fruits. Also there are these passages: "Those who worship the gods go to the gods; and those who are My loving devotees come to Me" (*Ibid.* VII. 23); "And those who worship Me go to Me" (*Ibid.* IX. 25).

In the world through agriculture etc. people obtain particular objects of varied kinds; then they honour the king directly or through (his) servants with those things; and the king so honoured is seen giving fruits suited to each particular kind of homage.<sup>1103</sup> The *Vedānta* texts,

1103. The king corresponds to the *Brahman*, his subjects to the worshippers. Honouring the king through his servants is like the indirect worship of the

*Brahman* through the propitiation of the gods. Directly honouring the king offers a parallel to directly worshipping the *Brahman*.

however, deal first with the Supreme Person, who has transcended the fitness for being the object of all other sources of knowledge (than the scripture), who is devoid of even the smallest trace of all that is evil like ignorance, and who is an ocean of innumerable noble qualities which are natural to Him and are unsurpassed in excellence; they then speak of the forms of His worship comprising sacrifices, gifts and oblations, and of (direct) acts of worship consisting of prayer, obeisance, adoration through narration (of His glory), singing, paying homage (to His images) and meditation; and (they speak) of worldly enjoyments and final beatitude proceeding from the Supreme Person so worshipped; thus all things (in the *Vedas*) are consistent.

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PART III

ADHIKARANA I

SARVAVEDĀNTAPRATYAYĀDHIKARANA

सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात्

**Sātra 1.** *Sarvavedāntapratyayam*

*chodanādyaviśeṣāt*

(355)

That (meditation) which is known from all the *Vedānta* texts (is one only) because there is no distinction in regard to the injunction etc. (relating to it in all the *Vedānta* texts).

Whatever has to be stated for producing the desire to worship the *Brahman* has been stated above up to the power of the *Brahman* as the giver of all fruits. Now, with the object of determining the difference and identity among the qualities (of the *Brahman* which are meditated on) in various forms of meditation on the *Brahman*, the considerable question of the distinction and non-distinction among those forms of worship is started at the very beginning here. At first, however, the question that is taken up for consideration is whether the forms of worship which are known as the *Vaiśvānara* etc., which (in regard to names and fruits) are one only, and which are related in many branches (of the *Veda*), are one and the same form of meditation, or whether there is a distinct form of worship in each branch. It is properly arrived at by reasoning that the form of meditation is distinct in each branch; because its repetition without distinction is also its occurrence in different contexts, serves to



distinguish it; because also these two features cannot be avoided in the case of different branches.<sup>1104</sup>

For this very reason (i.e., the difference of meditations) the rule is appropriate which restricts the teaching of the meditation only to those followers of the the Atharva branch who have carried out the *śirovrata* ceremony as stated in this passage: "One should teach the meditation on the *Brahman* only to those by whom the ceremony of *śirovrata* (which requires carrying on the head a vessel containing burning charcoal) has been performed according to the *śāstras*" (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 10). Indeed, if the forms of meditation were one and the same, then the ceremony of *śirovrata*, which is the preliminary to adopting that form of meditation, has to be adopted by the followers of all the other branches, and in consequence, the restrictive rule (given above) will have been inappropriate.<sup>1105</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus: "That (meditation) which is known from all the *Vedānta* texts is one only". Why? "Because there is no distinction in regard to the injunction etc. (relating to it in all the branches)". '*Chodana*', surely, is the injunction which is the particular meaning of verbal roots and which is of the kind that is expressed in *Vedic* sentences by such words as '*upāsita*' '*vidyāt*' etc. (each of which means a command to worship). By the expression, 'etc.', occurring in the aphorism here, what are denoted are the connection with

1104. Scripture is believed to be free from tautology, and if a text is repeated in the same context or elsewhere, it is taken to have a new or additional significance. Hence repetition implies difference.

1105. This section makes use of the conclusion established in a section of the *Pūr. Mīm.* (in II. 4.). Since Rāmanuja holds

the *Pūr. Mīm.* and the *Vedānta* to be one *śāstra*, he points out an additional doubt justifying this section. This relates to the restrictive rule of the *Ātharvaṇikas*, confining the teaching of the *Brahma-vidyā* to those who have performed the *śirovrata*. The answer is that what is restricted is not the worship of the *Brahman*, but the study of *Veda*.

results, form and name, which are given under the aphorism (in the *Pūr. Mīm.*) which belongs to the section that relates to different branches (of the *Veda*) and which runs in this wise:—“(In all the branches) it (i.e., the ceremony known as *agnihotra* etc.) is one only, because there is no distinction about it as regards connection with the result, its form (characterised by the material offered and the deity invoked), its injunction and its name” (*Pūr. Mīm.* II. 4. 9). As these injunctions etc. are not distinct, the same meditation is recognised in another branch of the *Veda*.<sup>1106</sup>

Accordingly, the injunction to the effect, “One should worship the *Vaiśvānara*” in the *Chhāndogya* and *Vājasaneyaka* texts surely is one and the same; the form of meditation which is a synonym of knowledge and whose essential nature is determined solely by the object of worship is not different, because the *Vaiśvānara* who is the object of worship is identical (in both), and therefore their forms are not distinct; the name, also, that it is meditation on the *Vaiśvānara*, is not distinct; and the connection also with the fruit in the form of the attainment of the *Brahman* is not distinct in both. There is identity of the form of meditation (in different branches), inasmuch as it is recognised as one and the same in a different branch by the above (marks).

It has been stated above that owing to its repetition without distinction in different branches, and owing to the different contexts in which it occurs, there is distinction in regard to the matter that is taught in the injunction and that therefore there is no identity of meditation. This objection is reiterated and then refuted thus.

<sup>1106</sup>. *Pūr. Mīm.* (II. 4. 9) refutes the view that the *agnihotra* etc. are different in different branches of the *Veda*. The criteria are here laid down for deciding whether a particular ritual is identical

with or different from another. These are here sought to be applied to the forms of meditation taught in the *Upanishads*. For the additional doubt here, see the previous Note.

भेदान्नेतिचेदेकस्यामपि

Sūtra 2. *Bhedannetichedekasyāmapi*

(356)

If it be said that, owing to distinction (due to repetition), there is no (identity among the forms of meditation) (it is not so); even in regard to one and the same form of meditation (repetition is possible on account of the distinction of persons learning it).

It may be said that, owing to repetition in all the branches without distinction, and owing also to the different contexts in which it occurs, there is distinction in regard to the matter that is taught in the injunction, and therefore there is no identity of the form of meditation. If it be so held, it is replied thus: Even in the case of one and the same form of meditation, repetition without distinction and the different contexts appropriately fit in.

Indeed, there is distinction in regard to the thing enjoined, and thence distinction in meditation, wherever repetition and different contexts are found in regard to one and the same learner, because it is impossible to account for it otherwise; but where learners are different, repetition etc. are appropriate for their learning, and hence a different subject-matter for the injunctions is not possible.

It has been stated that, since a restrictive rule is found about the teaching of the meditation only to those Ātharvaṇikas who have performed the *śirovrata* ceremony, distinction is seen in regard to the forms of meditation. To this (objection), he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies thus:

स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वे हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च  
सवचं तन्नियमः

Sūtra 3. *Śvādhyāyasya tathātve hi Samāchāre  
'dhikārāchcha savavachha tanniyamaḥ* (357)

That restrictive rule indeed is in regard to the study of the *Veda* being so, because there is an extended application (of this rule) in the (work called) *Samāchāra*; it (i.e., the restrictive rule) is as in the case of the *sava* oblations.

This cannot be, namely, that the perception of the restriction connected with the *śirovrata* in regard to teaching shows distinction in regard to the forms of meditation—because the *śirovrata* is not preliminary to a form of meditation. “The restrictive rule indeed is in regard to the study of the *Veda* being so;” that is, for the sake of the study of the *Veda* being established to be so. The restriction connected with the *śirovrata* in regard to teaching is indeed for the purpose of establishing that (on the part of students) there should be the possession of the refinement produced by it (i.e., the ceremony): it (i.e., the restriction) does not apply to the meditation.

Why is this so? Because, as stated in the passage, “One who has not performed the ceremony (of the *śirovrata*) should not study (it)” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 10), it (i.e., the ceremony) is associated with the study of the *Veda*. “Because there is an extended application (of this rule) in the *Samāchāra*”; because it is extended in the work known as the *Samāchāra* thus: “This, also, (in addition to the *śirovrata*) is explained as a ceremony relating to the *Veda*” (?).<sup>1107</sup> In the sentence, “One should teach the *Brahma-vidyā* only to them” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 10), the reference is to the study of the *Veda*. That restrictive

1107. B. P. points out that in the quotation from the *Samāchāra*, while Rāmaṇuja reads ‘*Vedavratena*’, Śaṅkara appears to read ‘*Vedavratatvena*’. The former is said to be according to Bodhayana’s *Vṛitti*. The *Samāchāra* first deals with the *śirovrata* as a ceremony con-

nected with the study of the *Vedas*. Then, taking up another ceremony, it applies to it the principles of interpretation already used in connection with the *śirovrata*, and states that this latter ceremony has to be explained as a *Vedavrata*.

rule is, as in the case of the *sava* sacrifices. For instance, the oblations called '*sava*', from the ritual of the seven suns etc. to the *śatodana*, are connected with the only one fire of the Ātharvaṇikas and are offered in that fire alone, and not in the three fires.<sup>1108</sup>

## दर्शयति च

**Sūtra 4.** *Darśayati cha*

(358)

It (i.e., the scripture) also shows (all meditations to be one).

The scripture also shows that the (same) meditation is to be known from all the *Vedānta* texts. Accordingly, in the following passage from the *Chhāndogya*, it is stated, "What exists within that (subtle ether), that (i.e., the subtle ether and what is inside it) has to be sought after" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1); and then, preceded by the question, "What is that which is there?" (*Ibid.* VIII. 1. 2), it is declared that the Supreme Self as possessing the eight qualities of being free from sin etc. has to be worshipped within that. In the *Taittirīya* passage also, depending upon a reference back to what has been already stated, that is, on what is found in the *Chhāndogya*, it is thus stated: "There too (in the heart), what is subtle, (like) space (immeasurable) and free from sorrow (and all other imperfections)—(namely, the *Brahman*)—and what is inside Him, that has to be worshipped" (*M. Nār.* X. 23). Thus the worship of the Supreme Self as associated with the eight qualities of being free from sin etc. is stated. This can be appropriate only through the transfer of the collection of qualities (from the one

1108. The seven suns are referred to in the *Atharva Samhiti* (XIII. 3. 10) and the *Kāṭhaka Samhita* (XXVII. 9). In *Taitt. Ār.* (I. 7) they are named as *Āroga*, *Bhṛāja*, *Paṭara*,

*Paṭāṅga*, *Svarṇara*, *Jyotiṣmant* and *Vibhāsa*. For the three fires, see Note 439 in Vol. II. For the *sava* ritual and the *śatodana*, see the Glossarial Index.

context to the other), on account of the forms of meditation being identical in both (contexts).<sup>1109</sup>

Having in this manner confirmed the unity of the forms of meditation with the help of the principle established in the section (in *Pūr. Mīm.*) relating to different branches (of the *Veda*), he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) states its application thus :—

उपसंहारोऽर्थभिदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च

**Sūtra 5.** *Upasamhāro 'arthābheda-  
vidhisheshavatsamāne cha*

(359)

Even when it (i.e., the meditation) is the same (in all the *Vedānta* texts), there has to be the transfer of the constituent elements (of the meditation in one context to another context), because there is oneness of purpose, as is the case with the auxiliaries of an injunction.

In this manner, the form of meditation in all the *Vedānta* texts being the same, the constituent elements (of the meditation) given in one *Vedānta* context have to be transferred to a different *Vedānta* context. Why? "Because there is oneness of purpose, as is the case with the auxiliaries of an injunction." Just as the elements mentioned in the *Vedānta* as auxiliary to the injunction about the *Vaiśvānara*, *Dahara*, and other (*vidyās* or modes of meditation), owing to their connection with those *vidyās*, are adopted in practice with the object of

<sup>1109.</sup> In *Chhand. Up.* (VIII. 1), meditation on the subtle ether in the heart as the *Brahman* associated with the eight qualities of being free from sin etc. is taught. See the *Daharādhi-karana* in Vol. II, (pp. 120-144). A similar meditation is enjoined in *M. Nur.* (IX. 23). Here the

eight qualities mentioned in the *Chhand. Up.* are not stated. The word, '*viśoka*', meaning one who is free from sorrow, may suggest them. Rāmanuja's point is that the two *vidyās* being identical, the eight qualities are to be transferred.

accomplishing their purpose, which is to be of help to them (i.e., the *vidyās*)—so also, even that element which is mentioned in another *Vedānta* context, owing to its being related to that *vidyā* (described there), has to be transferred for use (here), because there is no difference in regard to its helpfulness (in the two contexts). The word, 'cha', (in the *Sūtra*, rendered as 'even') shows emphasis.<sup>1110</sup>

## ADHIKARANA II

### ANYATHĀTVĀDHIKARANA

#### अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात्

**Sūtra 6.** *Anyathātvam śabdādīti  
chennāvīśeshāt*

(360)

If it be said that it is otherwise (with the meditation on the *Udgītha* as taught in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Chhāndogya Upanishads*), it is replied that it is not so, because there is no distinction (between the opening passages dealing with the *vidyā* in the two *Upanishads*).

It has been stated above that there is oneness of *vidyā*, when there is absence of any distinction in relation to the injunction etc., and that if there be such oneness, the transfer of the constituent elements (from one *vidyā* to another) has to be made. Hereafter, in regard to certain *vidyās*, it is definitely determined after

1110. The constituent elements of every meditation are accepted as being helpful for its purpose. When two meditations have the same name and purpose, they are identical. In

such a case, the constituent elements of each are helpful to the other. Thus their transfer from the one to the other and subsequent combination become necessary.

careful investigation whether the injunction and the other particulars which form the means of the recognition of the identity (of those *vidyās*) exist or not.

Both the *Vājins* and the *Chhandogas* have the *Udgīthavidyā*. As regards the *Vājins*, the context begins, "The sons of Prajāpati are of two kinds, the gods and the demons" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 1); and then it proceeds thus: "Indeed, those gods said, 'O joy, we will conquer the demons through the *udgītha* in the sacrifices'" (*Ibid.*); here the proposition started is the destruction of the demons; and then it is stated that if the *udgītha* is meditated upon as certain objects which begin with speech and end with the mind, then, there results defeat at the hands of the demons; then in the passage which begins thus, "Then, indeed, they spoke to the principal *prāṇa* (or vital air)" (*Ibid.* I. 3. 7), it is stated that through meditation upon the *udgītha* as the *prāṇa* the defeat of the demons will take place; then lastly in the following passage, "He who knows thus—he becomes superior to himself; his enemy, hating (him), gets defeated" (*Ibid.*), the meditation on the *udgītha* as the *prāṇa* is enjoined for the purpose of defeating the enemy.

In the same manner, as regards the *Chhandogas* also, the context begins thus: "Indeed, where the gods and demons fought each other" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 2. 1); and it then proceeds thus: "Then, indeed, they brought the *udgītha* and said, 'We will kill them through this'" (*Ibid.*); here the proposition that is started is the defeat of the demons; then, as is the case with them (i.e., the *Vājins*), it is stated that evils will result if the *udgītha* is meditated upon as speech, etc.; then in the passage beginning with, "Now, indeed, whoever is the principal *prāṇa*, that they worshipped as the *udgītha*" (*Ibid.* I. 2. 7), it is stated that, through meditation upon the *udgītha* as the *prāṇa*, there will result defeat to the demons; and lastly, in the passage beginning with, "Just



as a lump of clay, on reaching a piece of stone, is destroyed, so also, he who desires to do evil to one who knows thus gets destroyed" (*Ibid.* I. 2. 8), meditation on the *udgītha* as the *prāṇa* is enjoined for the purpose of defeating the enemy. •

Although there is not any grammatical suffix indicative of a scriptural injunction relating to meditation, yet there is a scriptural affirmation of it (i.e., the *udgītha*) being the means of attaining fruits, and therefore an injunction relating to meditation will have to be assumed. The *Udgītha-vidyā* is for the benefit of sacrifices, and thus has as its result the eminent success of the sacrifice; yet, its (another) result, which is set out in the glorificatory passage and is not contradictory of that (first-mentioned result), has to be undoubtedly accepted: this has been established in the *Devatādhikaraṇa*.<sup>1111</sup>

Here the doubt is raised whether there is oneness of *vidyā* or not, What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That there is oneness of *vidyā*. Why? Because, in both the contexts, that *udgītha* itself, which has assumed the character of the *prāṇa*, is declared as the object of worship, and hence there is no distinction between them in respect of the injunctions etc. Surely, the connection with the result is of the nature of the defeat of the enemy and is therefore not distinct (in either case); there is oneness as regards the object of worship, which is known as the *udgītha* that has assumed the character of *prāṇa*, and hence the form is not distinct (in either case); and the commandment also, which is

1111. The *Udgītha-vidyā* (which is meditation on the *udgītha*, a feature of the *śuman*, as the syllable *Om*) leads to the eminent success of the rituals of which it is a part. At the same time, it can also bring about the defeat of the enemies, as stated in the *arthavāda* passage. See *Chhand. Up.* (I. 1. 10) and

*Ved. Sūt.* (III. 3. 41.). That the *arthavāda* passages mean what they say has been established in the *Devatādhikaraṇa* (Vol. II. pp. 147-154). Compare: "Moreover, by describing an excellence which is non-existent, there cannot arise a stimulation (for the performance of any work)". (Vol. II, p. 151).

associated with the meaning of the root, 'vid' (to know), is the same in both cases; the name also as the *Udgītha-vidyā* is not distinct.

Here, under the semblance of one who establishes a correct conclusion, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) raises objections and then refutes them thus: "If it be said that it is otherwise (with the *Udgītha-vidyā*, as taught in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Chhāndogya Upanishads*), because the scripture says so, it is replied that it is not so, because there is no distinction (between the opening passages dealing with the *vidyā* in the two *Upanishads*)" (*Ved. Sūtr.* III. 3. 6).<sup>1112</sup> What has been stated to the effect that there is oneness of *vidyā*, that is not appropriate, because there is distinction in the form. Indeed, the distinction of form is made out from the scripture itself.

For, in the *Vājasaneyaka*, there is the passage: "Then, indeed, they asked the principal *prāṇa*, 'Do you sing (songs) for us.' Agreeing to do so, this *prāṇa* sang (songs) for them" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 7); here, through the meditation as the *prāṇa* on the agent of the act of singing, the defeat of the demons is stated to take place; then, in the passage, "He who knows thus" (*Ibid.*), meditation on the agent himself as the *prāṇa* is made out by the word, 'thus'. In the *Chhāndogya*, there is the passage: "Now, indeed, whoever is the principal *prāṇa*, that they worshipped as the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 2. 7); here it is stated that the defeat of the demons takes place through the meditation as the *prāṇa* on the *udgītha*, which is the object of singing; then, in the passage, "He who desires evil to happen to one who knows thus" (*Ibid.*), by the word, 'thus', meditation as the *prāṇa*

<sup>1112</sup>. This is a *pūrvapaksha* aphorism, setting up a *prima facie* view which is refuted later. But it takes note of a possible criticism, sets it out and then

condemns it. In form, therefore, it looks like a *siddhanta* aphorism, while it is not really so.

on the *udgītha*, which is the object (of singing), is enjoined. Thus, distinction in form (between the two meditations) is clear, on account of the scriptural declaration of meditation as the *prāṇa* on the agent in one context and on account of the scriptural declaration of meditation as the *prāṇa* on the object in another context. And if there be distinction of form, then the object enjoined is also distinct; and therefore the mere non-distinction in regard to the injunctions etc. is of very little consequence; hence there is difference between the (two) *vidyās*.

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so; "because there is no distinction". Indeed, without any distinction whatsoever, in both the contexts, in the very beginning, the defeat of the enemy as being effected through the instrumentality of the *udgītha* is set forth. In the *Vājasaneyaka*, at the beginning it is thus declared: "Indeed, those gods said, 'O joy, we will conquer the demons through the *udgītha* in the sacrifices'" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 1). In the *Chhāndogya* also, it is given thus: "Then, indeed, the gods brought the *udgītha*, and said, 'We will kill them through this'" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 2. 1). Therefore, in order not to contradict the beginning of the context, in the passage, "This *prāṇa* sang (songs) for them" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 7), the *udgītha*, which has assumed the character of the *prāṇa* and is the object of (the act of) singing, is itself spoken of as the agent with a view to speak (about it) very conveniently, just as, in relation to cooking etc., the rice being cooked is spoken of as the agent (i.e., as cooking). Otherwise, the word '*udgītha*', which occurs in the beginning of the context (in 'through the *udgītha*'), would have to have an implied significance as the agent (or the singer of the *udgītha*).<sup>1113</sup> Therefore, there is oneness of the *vidyās*.

1113. The point here is that, by virtue of the opening passages in both the *Upanishads* referring to the *udgītha*, the later reference to the singer

of the *udgītha* in one *Upanishad* has to be understood in a secondary or figurative sense, so as not to contradict the opening statement.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows :—

न वा प्रकरणमेदात्परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्

**Sūtra** 7. *Na vā prakaraṇabhedāt*  
*parovarīyastvādivat* (361)

But, indeed, it is not so, because there is the distinction of contexts, as is the case with (the meditation on the *pranava* as the *Brahman* associated with) qualities like that of being better than the most excellent (which is different from another meditation on the *pranava* as the *Brahman* associated with other qualities).

The words, 'but indeed', set aside the above view. This, however, cannot be, namely, that there is oneness of the *vidyās*. Why? "Because there is distinction of contexts". In the passage, "One should meditate on the syllable, 'Om', as the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 1), the syllable, 'Om', which is the original subject of discussion and which is a component of the *udgītha*, is introduced; then, beginning with the passage, "(All) this is the explanation at length of that very syllable, indeed" (*Ibid.* I. 1. 10) and "Indeed, where the gods and the demons fought each other" (*Ibid.* I. 2. 1), the narrative proceeds to, "Now, indeed, whoever is the principal *prāṇa*, that they worshipped as the *udgītha*" (*Ibid.* I. 2. 7); here the *Chhandogas* read in their scriptures that the worship relates to the syllable, 'Om', which is a component part of the *udgītha*.

As regards the *Vājins*, however, there is no such old context, and therefore in the passage, "O joy, we will conquer the demons through the *udgītha* in the sacrifices" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 1), the *udgītha* is introduced; then they read in their scriptures the following passage, "Then, indeed, they asked the principal *prāṇa*, 'Do you sing (songs) for us'" (*Ibid.* I. 3. 7), as relating to the whole of

the *udgītha*. Therefore, owing to the distinction of contexts, there is distinction of the objects enjoined; where there is distinction of the objects enjoined, there is distinction of the *vidyās*; thus there is no oneness of the *vidyās*.<sup>1114</sup>

Moreover, in the passage, "Now, indeed, whoever is the principal *prāṇa*, that they worshipped as the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 2. 7), the syllable, 'Om', itself, which is a component part of the *udgītha*, which was earlier introduced as the subject-matter of the context, and which has assumed the character of the *prāṇa*, is the object of worship for the *Chhandogas*. But, as regards the *Vājins*, the singer (or the *udgātṛi*), who is the agent of the whole song (or the *udgītha*), has to be meditated upon as the *prāṇa*. In the passage, "Then, indeed, they asked the principal *prāṇa*, 'Do you sing (songs) for us'. Agreeing to do so, this *prāṇa* sang (songs) for them" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 7), the superimposition of the *prāṇa* upon the *udgītha* is indicated; then, in the passage, "He who knows thus" (*Ibid.*), that very *udgītha* which has assumed the character of the *prāṇa* is enjoined as the object of worship. For which reason also, there is the distinction of form between the two *vidyās*.

It should not, however, be supposed that, when the *udgītha* is enjoined as the object of worship, there is contradiction of the beginning of the story set out in the statement, "We will conquer them through the *udgītha*"

1114. The *udgītha* is the second of the five parts of a *śaman*. Its singing is begun with the chanting of the syllable, 'Om'. Thus this syllable is a part of the *udgītha*. The meditation on the *udgītha*, started in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1), is expressly concerned only with the syllable, 'Om', and not with the whole of the *udgītha*. The story given in I. 2 may be taken as an

elaboration of the glory of the meditation earlier described. ('*Upavyakhyāna*' in I. 1. 1 & 10 has been glossed as an account of glory and fruits). In *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 3), the whole of the *udgītha* and not merely the syllable, 'Om', is the theme. Thus the difference of contexts makes the two opening passages different, in spite of apparent similarity.

(*Bṛih. Up.* I. 3. 1), because, in the case of the meditation on the singer, the *udgītha* which is the object of the song is necessarily required, and therefore it is also the cause of the fruit which is described as the defeat of the enemy. Hence, there is distinction between the two *vidyās* owing to their distinction of forms: thus, even though there be no distinction in regard to the injunctions etc., there is no oneness of the *vidyās*.<sup>1115</sup>

“As is the case with qualities like that of being better than the most excellent”. Just as even in regard to one and the same branch (of the *Veda*), though there is similarity with the injunction to meditate on the syllable, ‘Om’, forming a component part of the *udgītha*, as the Supreme Self, the injunction relating to the meditation on Him as associated with qualities like that of being better than the most excellent is a different matter from the injunction to meditate on Him as the Person of golden colour.<sup>1116</sup>

### संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि

**Sūtra 8.** *Samjñātaśchettaduktamasti tu tadapi* (362)

1115. The aphorism contains the intensive particle, ‘*vā*’, rendered as ‘indeed’. To bring out its force, Rāmaṇuja points out that the very objection which was anticipated and sought to be answered in the previous aphorism remains valid and disproves the *pūrvapaksha* case. The exegetical rule that accords importance to the opening passage does not mean that anything not understood thence and mentioned later has to be rejected; it only demands that what is asserted at the beginning should not be contradicted or nullified. Here in *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 3) the later portions accept the *udgītha* mentioned earlier and

mention its singer also in addition. Hence the earlier reference must be taken to mean the *udgītha* sung by a singer. (S.P.)

1116. The analogy is with two meditations in *Chhand. Up.* (I. 6 & 9). In both these the *udgītha* is meditated on as the *Brahman*, but His attributes differ. In I. 6, He is described as the Person within the sun, with a golden beard and golden hair, and altogether golden to the very tips of His nails; in I. 9, He has to be conceived as better than the best. The *vidyās* become different on account of the difference in the attributes of the *Brahman*.

If it be argued that it (i.e., oneness of the *vidyās*) is declared on account of (oneness of) names, it (i.e., such oneness of names) exists even then (when there is distinction of *vidyās*).

If it, that is, oneness of the *vidyās*, be said to be due to oneness of names, then (it is replied that) it, that is, oneness of names, surely exists even when there is distinction as regards the objects enjoined. For instance, the name, 'agnihotra', is used in connection with the daily *agnihotra*, and also in connection with the *agnihotra* ceremony of the *Kuṇḍapāyins*.<sup>1117</sup> For instance, again, the expression, 'udgītha-vidyā', is used to denote the many *vidyās* which are given in the first chapter of the *Chhāndogya (Upanishad)*.

### व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम्

Sūtra 9. *Vyāpteścha samāñjasam* (363)

Because also it (i.e., the syllable, 'Om' forming the object of meditation) extends (to all the *vidyās* in *Chhānd. Up. 1*), there is appropriateness (in its forming the object of meditation in the *Udgītha-vidyā*).

In the first chapter of the *Chhāndogya (Upanishad)*, the syllable, 'Om', which is a component part of the *udgītha* and which has been first introduced as the subject-matter of the context, extends, as the object of worship, to all the *vidyās* given later on also; therefore, as regards the word, 'udgītha', which occurs in the middle of that

1117. The *agnihotra*, a ritual involving an oblation to Agni, is of two kinds. It may be performed every day throughout one's life. Or it may be done optionally on specific occasions. For example, in a great sacrifice

lasting for a year, the *Kuṇḍapāyins* are asked to do the *agnihotra* only for a month. (See *Taṇḍya Brahmana*, XXV. 4; *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra*, XXIII. 10. 6; and *Katyayana Śrauta Sūtra*, XXIV. 4. 21).

context in the sentence, "There, indeed, the gods brought that *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 2. 1), there is appropriateness only in its referring to the syllable, 'Om'. The collective noun is seen to denote the component part of the collection in such cases as when it is said, "The cloth is burnt" (while only a part of the cloth has been burnt). For which reason also, the syllable, 'Om' itself, which is a component part of the *udgītha*, is denoted by the word, '*udgītha*'; therefore in the *Chhāndogya (Upanishad)* that (syllable) itself has to be understood as the object of worship through the meditation (upon it) as the *prāṇa*. But, in the *Vājasaneyaka*, the word, '*udgītha*', denotes the whole of the '*udgītha*', and therefore the singer who is agent of the act of singing the *udgītha* has to be worshipped through the meditation (upon him) as the *prāṇa*; thus the diversity between the *vidyās* is established.<sup>1118</sup>

## ADHIKARĀṆA III

### SARVĀBHEDĀDHIKARĀṆA

#### सर्वभिदादन्यत्रेमे

**Sūtra 10.** *Sarvābhedādanyatreme*

(364)

Because there is no distinction among all (the three *prāṇa-vidyās* in the *Chhāndogya*, the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* and the *Kaushītaki Upanishads*), these (qualities of the first two) have to be transferred elsewhere (that is, to the third).

In the *Chhāndogya* and the *Vājasaneyaka*, the *prāṇa-vidyā* is declared in the following and other passages: "Indeed, whoever knows the eldest and the

1118. As examples of the later *dyas* to which the syllable, 'm', extends as an object of worship, the *Ś.P.* cites those in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 4. 3 & 4, I. 5. 1 and I. 5. 3).



most praiseworthy, he certainly becomes the eldest and the most praiseworthy; the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) is indeed the eldest and the most praiseworthy" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 1. 1.) This passage first declares that the *prāṇa* which has the qualities of being the eldest and the most praiseworthy is the object of worship; then, in relation to speech, eye, ear and mind (respectively), it declares the possession of the qualities known as richness, firmness, abundance and being the support and substratum; then it declares that, owing to speech etc. and the body having their existence dependent upon the *prāṇa*, and owing also to their having their functions dependent upon that (*prāṇa*), the *prāṇa* is the most praiseworthy; and then, lastly, it declares the qualities of richness etc., which have been mentioned as connected with speech etc., as related to the *prāṇa*. In this manner, in the *Chhāndogya* and the *Vājasaneyaka*, that *prāṇa*, which has the qualities of being the eldest and the most praiseworthy and is also possessed of the qualities of richness etc., is declared to be the object of worship. But, as regards the *prāṇa-vidyā* of the *Kaushitakins*, while, in the very same manner, the *prāṇa* possessing the qualities of being the eldest and the most praiseworthy has been declared to be the object of worship, the qualities of richness etc., which are associated with speech etc., have not been declared as being related to the *prāṇa*.<sup>1119</sup>

1119. The *prāṇa-vidyā* as set out in *Chhānd Up.* (V. 1), *Bṛih. Up.* (VI. 1) and *Śāṅkh. Ār.* (IX) is discussed here. The relative passages in the first two are almost identical, except for some additional and helpful matter in the *Bṛih. Up.* In both, the *prāṇa* is said to be older than and superior in qualities to the mind, eye, ear and speech. It is older because the foetus breathes before it sees or hears. Since the functioning of the mind etc. depends on the *prāṇa*, their qualities are really the qualities of the latter. They are such as make for competence in the

discharge of the functions of the mind etc. Speech is rich in the sense eloquence wins wealth. The eye is firm as it helps one to walk securely on uneven ground. The ear can receive an abundance of philosophical teaching. The mind is the substratum of desired pleasures. In *Śāṅkh. Ār.* (IX), there is a similar passage, but with an important difference. As *Kaush. Up.* forms Chapters III to VI of *Śāṅkh. Ār.*, this passage is referred to as that of the *Kaushitakins*. (Śāṅkara cites instead *Kaush. Up.* II. 14).

Here the doubt arises whether the *vidyās* are distinct or not. What is it that is arrived at by reasoning? That they are distinct. Why? Because there is distinction of forms between them. No doubt, in both the contexts (of the *Chhāndogya* and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* on the one hand and the *Kaushītaki* on the other), the object of worship is the *prāṇa* itself as possessed of the qualities of being the eldest and the most praiseworthy. Nevertheless, in the one context (of the *Chhāndogya* and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*), the object of worship is made out to be the *prāṇa* that is associated with the quality of richness etc., while, in the other context (of the *Kaushītaki*), however, the object of worship is the *prāṇa* that is devoid of those (qualities). Therefore, through the distinction of forms, there arises the distinction of the *vidyās*.

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply as follows:—  
 “Because there is no distinction among (them) all (i.e., the three *prāṇa-vidyās* in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, *Chhāndogya* and *Kaushītaki Upanishads*), these (qualities of the first two) have to be transferred elsewhere (that is, to the third).” (*Ved. Sūtr.* III. 3. 10). Here there is no distinction between the *vidyās*. “Elsewhere”, that is, in relation to the *prāṇa-vidyā* of the *Kaushītakins* also, “these”, that is, the qualities of richness etc., are to be meditated on. Why? “Because there is no distinction among (them) all.” Because there, also, there is no distinction among (them) all, that is, among the various ways of demonstrating the *prāṇa* as being the eldest and the most praiseworthy, as given in the proposition started at first.

It comes out thus. According to the *Chhāndogas* and *Vājasaneyins*, the context begins with the passages, “Indeed, the senses raised disputes in regard to who is the best among themselves” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 1. 6)<sup>120</sup> and “They raised disputes about who is the best among

<sup>120</sup>. *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 1. 6) as cited here differs from the *Upanishad* text.

themselves" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 1. 7) ; it declares the continued existence of the body and of the other senses together with the *prāṇa*, even when there is departure (from the body) of speech etc., one by one ; it also declares that their several functions continue unhindered ; then it says that, on the *prāṇa* getting out of the body, the dissolution of all the senses and their inability to carry on any functions follow ; then by reason of the senses owing their existence to the *prāṇa* and their functions being dependent upon that (*prāṇa*), it is demonstrated that the *prāṇa* is possessed of the quality of being the eldest. That dependence of the functions of the sense of speech etc. on the *prāṇa*, which has been established in the above manner, that is reiterated by the sense of speech etc., in the passage beginning with :—"Now, then, indeed, speech said to it (i.e., the *prāṇa*) : 'By whatever quality I am possessed of richness, by the same quality you are possessed of richness'" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* V. 1. 13). In the context relating to the *prāṇa-vidyā* of the *Kaushitakins*, for the purpose of establishing the *prāṇa* to be the eldest and the most praiseworthy, the qualities of being possessed of richness etc. have been declared in connection with speech etc. In the passage beginning with, "Now, indeed, these senses went to their father, Prajāpati, and asked : 'Who is indeed the most praiseworthy among us?'" (*Sāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka*, IX. 2), the quality of being the eldest is brought out in regard to the *prāṇa*, on account of the qualities appertaining to speech etc., (the organs of) speech etc. and the body being all dependent upon the *prāṇa*. But the reiteration of their dependence upon the *prāṇa* is alone not made by speech etc., so far as regards their own individual qualities of fitness etc. By this much there arises no distinction between their forms, because solely through establishing that speech etc., which are associated with the qualities of richness etc., have their functions dependent upon the *prāṇa*, it is proved that the *prāṇa* is the cause of speech etc. having the qualities of richness etc. Indeed, that which is the cause of speech

etc. having the qualities of richness etc.—that itself is the association of the *prāṇa* with the qualities of richness etc. Therefore, here also through the association with the qualities of richness etc., the *prāṇa* is understood to be the eldest; hence there is no distinction between the two *vidyās*.<sup>1121</sup>

## ADHIKARANA IV

### ĀNANDĀDYADHIKARANA

Another investigation which relates to the component parts of the *prāṇa-vidyā* will be undertaken presently. Just as, in the case of the *prāṇa*, the meditation on the qualities of being the eldest and most praiseworthy cannot appropriately come to pass without the meditation on the qualities of richness etc., and therefore there is the acceptance of the qualities of richness etc. in the *prāṇa-vidyā* of the *Kaushītakis*, even though they are not mentioned (there); similarly, without whatever qualities, the meditation on the essential nature of the *Brahman* is impossible to achieve, they have to be meditated upon, indeed, in all the meditations on the *Brahman*; this topic is dealt with thus:—

आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य

**Sūtra 11.** *Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*

(365)

The qualities of (being) bliss etc. (are to be included in all meditations, because there is no distinction throughout) in regard to the Possessor of the qualities.

Here what is enquired into is whether or not in all the meditations on the Supreme Being there is the

<sup>1121</sup>. The point is that the function depends on the *prāṇa*; capacity of speech or eye or therefore, these capacities ear or mind to discharge its belong to the *prāṇa*.

inclusion of the qualities of the essential nature of the *Brahman*. As there is no sanction for the inclusion of the qualities that are not mentioned in the contexts which are under reference (and in other parallel contexts), the inclusion can only be of those (qualities) that are declared to exist in the particular context itself.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply thus: "The qualities of (being) bliss etc. (are to be included in all meditations, because there is no distinction throughout) in regard to the Possessor of the qualities." The expression, "because there is no distinction," is continued here from the previous *Sūtra*. Because in all the meditations there is no distinction in regard to the *Pradhāna*, that is, the *Brahman* who is possessed of the qualities, and as the qualities are inseparably associated with the Possessor of the qualities everywhere (in all meditations about Him), His qualities such as (being) bliss and others have to be included.<sup>1122</sup>

It may, however, be objected as follows. If so, then, owing to inseparable association itself, the qualities of joy being the head etc., which are declared to be the qualities of the *Brahman* in the scriptural passage beginning with, "Joy is His head" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 2), will have to find a place everywhere in the meditations on Him, like the qualities of (being) bliss etc. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies in the negative thus:—

प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे

**Sūtra 12.** *Priyaśirastvādyapraṭtirupa-*

*chayūpachayau hi bhede*

(366)

<sup>1122.</sup> The qualities of the *Brahman* here under reference are being bliss, being the True (or the Real), being knowledge, purity and infinity. (See under *Sūtra* 13). They appertain to His essential nature, because there can be no knowledge of this essential nature without the

knowledge of these qualities. They are related to Him, it has been said, like radiance to a precious stone or scent to a flower. Other qualities of the *Brahman* are cognised as qualifying an essential nature already determined by the above-mentioned five qualities.

The qualities of having joy as the head (of the *Brahman*) etc. are not accepted (as qualities belonging to the *Brahman*); otherwise, bigness and smallness (will result to Him in different parts).

When the acceptance of the qualities of the essential nature of the *Brahman* (in all meditations on Him) is stated, there is no acceptance of the qualities of having joy as the head etc., as they are not the qualities of the *Brahman*; for the qualities of having joy as the head etc. fall within an anthropomorphic metaphor of the *Brahman*; otherwise, if He has the distinctions of the head, sides, tail and other parts, then bigness and smallness will accrue to the *Brahman* (so far as His parts are concerned); and it being so, it will contradict such passages as, "The *Brahman* is existence, knowledge, infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1).<sup>1123</sup>

It may, however, be objected as follows. The qualities of lordship, nobility, generosity, mercy and so on, which are certainly related to the *Brahman*, are innumerable in number; and merely because they are inseparably associated with Him, if those (qualities) which are not mentioned there are also to be included (in every meditation), then all the qualities would indeed in that

1123. (i) The reference here is to *Taitt. Up.* (II. 5), where the *Brahman*, as consisting of bliss, is described in human form. Joy is said to be His head, pleasure and satisfaction His sides and bliss His very Self. (ii) The expression, '*upachya-pachayau*', which occurs in the *Sūtra*, usually means 'increase and decrease'. But in the context here we have no change of magnitude dependent on time. There is mention of the head, sides etc. of the *Brahman*; and this evidently means that

the head and what it stands for are different in size from the sides and what they stand for, and so on. Hence the above expression has to be rendered as 'bigness and smallness'. (iii) The *Ś.P.* has pointed out that the peculiar and auspicious form of the Lord is not denied by this aphorism. (iv) In addition to *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1. 1) referred to, *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 8, 8), where the *Brahman* is said to be neither gross nor atomic, neither long nor short, may be borne in mind.

manner find a place everywhere; and (such) inclusion is impossible, owing to their being innumerable in number. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies thus :—

इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्

**Sūtra 13.** *Itare tvarthasāmānyāt* (367)

The other (qualities), however, (continue everywhere) because they are equal to the entity (they qualify).

The word, 'however', sets aside the above objection. "The other (qualities), however," that is, (being) bliss etc., continue everywhere, because they are equal to the entity (they qualify). Those qualities, indeed, which are equal to the entity—they are necessarily involved in the knowledge relating to that entity, because they are the properties that define the essential nature of the entity; they, like the essential nature of the entity, continue everywhere. And those qualities are existence, knowledge, bliss, purity and infinity. The *Brahman* who was characterised with the help of an accidental characteristic as the cause of the world in the passage, "He from whom all these beings (are born)" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 1.1), is defined through His own essential nature in the following and such other passages :—"The *Brahman* is existence, knowledge, infinity" (*Ibid.* II. 1. 1) and "The *Brahman* is bliss" (*Ibid.* III.6.1.) Therefore, for the purpose of comprehending the essential nature of the *Brahman* who is the object of meditation, the qualities of bliss etc. continue in all the *vidyās*. But those qualities of mercy etc., which are made out as belonging to the *Brahman* whose essential nature has been (already) determined, even though they remain inseparably associated with the possessor of the qualities, are not necessarily involved in the knowledge of the *Brahman*; therefore, those of them which are

declared in the scripture in any place, there they have to be included ; thus, it is all unobjectionable.<sup>1124</sup>

It may, however, be said as follows. Because they lead to (the postulation of) bigness and smallness (in the parts of the *Brahman*), if the qualities of having joy as the head etc. are intended merely for an anthropomorphic representation of the *Brahman* but are not the qualities of the *Brahman*, then it is asked with what object He who does not possess that form is metaphorically represented as having that form. There must surely be some purpose in metaphorically describing one who is not such as having that form. For instance, in the passage beginning with, "Know the (individual) self to be the rider in the chariot" (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 3), the metaphorical representation of the worshipper and his auxiliary instruments as the rider in the chariot and the chariot etc., has been stated as having been done with the object of (teaching) the control of the body and the senses etc., which are the auxiliary instruments of meditation. And here no such object whatever is seen ; thus, perforce, the qualities of having joy as the head etc. have to be admitted as the qualities of the *Brahman*. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies thus :—

### आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्

**Sūtra 14.** *Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt*

(368)

For the purpose of constant meditation (the qualities are taught) ; because there is no other use (for them).

Because it is of no other use, this teaching with the help of a figure is given for the purpose of constant

1124. A *guṇa* is an essential attribute, knowledge about which is necessary for the knowledge of the object it qualifies. In this sense the attribute is 'equal' to the object. An *upalakṣhaṇa* is a secondary or accidental attribute, which does not form a part of all the cognitions of the object it qualifies. "Indeed, all acci-

dental characteristics are seen to be the means of apprehending under a different form a thing already known in some one particular form." (Vol. I, p. 230). The *Brahman* is bliss ; He is also the cause of the world. In the former case, we have a *svarūpa-guṇa*, in the latter an *upalakṣhaṇa*. (See Vol. I, pp. 230-2).



meditation. Constant meditation is continuous thinking, which is spoken of as worship. There is the passage:—“He who knows the *Brahman* attains the highest” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); for the sake of acquiring the knowledge taught here which consists of constant meditation, the *Brahman* who consists of bliss has to be known; with that object in view, the *Brahman* who consists of bliss is divided into the form of joy, pleasure etc., and is taught through the metaphorical representation of head, sides etc. The person who consists of food, which is this body, is made to reach the intellect, through the head and sides etc., as given in the passage beginning with, “This itself is his head” (*Ibid.* II. 1. 1). Again, those (entities) consisting of the *prāṇa*, consisting of the mind and consisting of knowledge, are made to reach the intellect by means of the various parts of the *prāṇa* etc., as given in the passage beginning with, “*Prāṇa* is his head” (*Ibid.* II. 2. 3). In the same manner, even He who is a distinct entity from these, who is their Internal Self and who consists of bliss, is made to reach the intellect for the purpose of constant meditation through the parts such as joy, pleasure etc., which are metaphorically expressed as the head, sides etc. In this manner, as the qualities of having joy as the head etc. are (merely) the secondary characteristics of Him who consists of bliss, they do not always continue in the knowledge relating to Him who consists of bliss.<sup>1125</sup>

1125. To the objection that the attributes of having joy for the head etc. serve no practical purpose and must be deemed to have been mentioned as *guṇas*, the answer is given that they facilitate meditation. The first stage in an *upāsana* is the knowledge about it from the scriptures. This leaves its impress on the mind and brings about remembrance of the *Brahman* as described in the scripture. When this remembrance becomes uninterrupted and continuous, we have the developed *upāsana*. The

*Brahman* as consisting of bliss is an abstract concept. To facilitate its comprehension by the mind, we have the figurative representation of the *Brahman* in human form with several types or degrees of joy forming parts of the body. Every kind of human joy is seen to be only a part of the *Brahman's* bliss. When the mind ascends to a realisation of this illimitable bliss, the figurative representation and the qualities it implies do not any longer find a place in the meditation.

## आत्मशब्दाच्च

Sūtra 15. *Ātmaśabdāchcha*

(369)

Because the word, 'Ātman', occurs.

In the passage—"The Self within which consists of bliss is different" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1)—He who consists of bliss is pointed out by the word, 'Ātman', and the Ātman which has no parts cannot possibly have a head and sides: therefore, the qualities of having joy as the head etc. are made out to be a mere metaphorical representation for the purpose of easily understanding Him.

It may, however, be said as follows. In these passages, "The Self who consists of the *prāṇa* is different" (*Ibid.* II. 2. 1) and "The Self who consists of the mind is different" (*Ibid.* II. 3. 2), the word, 'ātman', has been earlier used to denote objects other than the Ātman, (or the Supreme Self), and it is hence asked how in the passage, "Different is the Self within who consists of bliss" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1), the word, 'Ātman', is definitely determined to denote the Self. This objection he (i. e., the *Sūtrakāra*) answers thus:

## आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्

Sūtra 16. *Ātmagṛhītiritaravaduttarāt*

(370)

The denotation of the Self resembles other cases, as is evident from the later passage in the context.

In the passage, "Different is the Ātman within, who consists of bliss" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1), by the word, 'Ātman', only the Supreme Self is denoted; it "resembles other cases". For instance, in other passages such as the following, "The Self, indeed, this was in the beginning one only;.....It saw (i.e., thought) 'May I

create the world''' (*Ait. Up.* I. 1. 1), by the word, 'Ātman', the Supreme Self Himself is denoted; it resembles those cases. Why is this so? "Because it is evident from the later passage in the context," that is, from the passage: "He desired, 'May I become manifold and be born'" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1).

### अन्वयादिति चेतस्यादवधारणात्

**Sūtra 17.** *Anvayāditi chetasyādavadhāraṇāt* (371)

If it be said (that such determination of the denotation of the 'Ātman' is not possible) because of logical connection (with the preceding passage), it is, indeed, possible, because of ascertainment.

It may be said that in the earlier passages, the word, 'ātman', is seen to have logical connection with that which consists of the *prāṇa* and other such things which are different from the *Ātman* (or the Supreme Self), and that, therefore, it is not possible definitely to determine its meaning through the later passage. If so, it is stated in reply: "It is possible, indeed, on account of ascertainment." Surely, there is that definite determination. How? "On account of ascertainment." Because in the earlier passage, also, namely, "From that Self, indeed, the spatial ether was produced" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), the Supreme Self Himself is ascertained (as the subject) by means of the intellect. At first, the idea of the Self entered into what consists of the *prāṇa* and is other than what consists of food; after that, into what consists of the mind and is other than what consists of the *prāṇa*; then into what consists of knowledge; thence the idea of the Supreme Self was taken to the Person consisting of bliss and established, because of there being no internal entity (mentioned subsequently) and owing also to the later passage, beginning with "He desired," (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1). Hence, even in the beginning, the word, 'Ātman', has logical connection with other things

than the Supreme Self through the idea of the Supreme Self entering into them ; thus it is all unobjectionable. 1126

## ADHIKARANA V

### KĀRYĀKHYĀNĀDHIKARANA

#### कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम्

**Sūtra 18.** *Kāryākhyānādāpūrvam*

(372)

The new thing (i.e., meditation on water as the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*) (is enjoined in the *brāṇa-vidyā*), because of the statement (which is characteristic of the scripture) of what is not established.

The question that is now taken up for consideration is : what are the subsidiaries of the *prāṇa-vidyā* which has already been introduced earlier ? Both in the *Chhāndogya* and the *Vājasaneyaka*, the *prāṇa*, which is the eldest and most praiseworthy, has been declared to be the object of worship ; and then water is declared to be the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*. Indeed, in the *Chhāndogya*, the following passage is given :—“ Indeed, it (i.e., the principal *prāṇa*) said : ‘ What is it that will be my wearing cloth ? ’ ‘ Water ’, they (i.e., the senses) said. Therefore, those who take food at this time, before and after taking food, clothe (the principal *prāṇa*) with water (by sipping water and meditating on it as the cloth of the *prāṇa*). He (who does this) gets the cloth, he becomes

1126. Can the later passage, *Taitt. Up.* (II. 6. 1), referred to in the previous *Sūtra*, take away the force of the earlier statements about what is made up of food etc. ? First, there is the even earlier passage about the spatial ether being derived from the *Ātman*. Secondly, even in regard to what consists of food etc., the idea of the *Ātman* is not

absent. Among these entities, each succeeding one is said to be more internal than the preceding one : and this notion of being internal is associated with the *Ātman*. Ultimately, nothing is stated to be more internal than He who consists of bliss ; and there the idea of the *Ātman* finds its completion (§.P.).

free from nakedness" (*Chhānd. Up.* V 2. 2). In the *Vājasaneyeka*, when asked by the (principal) *prāṇa*, "What is my cloth?", speech etc., said: "Water is the cloth." "Therefore, those who know (it) and are learned in the *Veda*, formally sip water when about to take food, and sip water, after taking food; in this manner they think that they make that *prāṇa* free from nakedness. Therefore, one who knows thus should formally sip water when about to eat, and sip water formally after taking food; he makes that aforementioned *prāṇa* free from nakedness" (*Mādh. Br̥ih. Up.* VI. 1. 14).<sup>1127</sup>

Here there is this doubt, namely, whether it is the sipping of water or the meditation on the water as being the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa* that is enjoined. Here in the statement, "One should formally sip water when about to eat, one should formally sip water after taking food", the suffix relating to an injunction is found; and in the statement, "In this manner, he makes that aforementioned *prāṇa* free from the nakedness," there is no suffix that denotes a Vedic injunction in regard to meditation, and therefore the recital about being free from nakedness properly fits in and has logical connection as intended for glorification; for these reasons, and seeing that sipping water formally, which is preliminary to taking food, is arrived at through the custom given in the *Smṛiti*, a different sipping of water, which is an element of the *prāṇa-vidyā*, is enjoined here, on the strength of the suffix denoting an injunction.

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply as follows: The meditation, on the waters that are sipped, as the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*, is itself enjoined here (in this context), as it is new, that is, has not been arrived at before (through any other means of knowledge). "Because of the statement (which is characteristic of the scripture) of what is not established"; that is, because of the

1127. The last sentence quoted, beginning with "Therefore, one...", is found only in the

*Mādh. Br̥ih. Up.* The earlier portions are found in the *Kaṣṭha* version also.

statement about what has not been already arrived at (though other means of knowledge). The meaning is that the scripture has a purpose, in so far as it speaks of what has not been already arrived at through other means of knowledge.

What is said is this. In these initial and concluding statements of the passage here, namely, "What is my wearing cloth?", "The wearing cloth is water", "He clothes the *prāṇa* with water," and "He makes the *prāṇa* free from nakedness", it is made out that the passage declares that water has to be meditated upon as the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*, that the formal sipping of water has been already arrived through the custom given in the *Smṛiti*, and that, therefore, after reiterating that sipping, what is enjoined is the meditation, upon the water to be sipped, as the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*. For this very reason only, the clothing (of the *prāṇa*) through water—and not the formal sipping of water—is declared in the passage in the *Chhāndogya*: "Therefore, those who take food at this time, before and after taking food, clothe (the principal *prāṇa*) with water" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 2. 2). 1128

## ADHIKARAṆA VI

### SAMĀNĀDHIKARAṆA

#### समान एवं चाभेदात्

**Sūtra 19.** *Samāna evam chābhedāt*

(373)

1128. The terms, '*apūrva*' and '*karya*', in the *Sūtra* are both taken to mean "that which is not arrived at by other means of knowledge". To save the statement in the *Sūtra* from being tautological, it is interpreted to mean that something new must be deemed to be stated, because it is characteristic of the

scripture to do so. The point here is that the formal sipping of water as an essential preliminary to eating cannot be laid down in the *prāṇa-vidyās*, for it is based on the authority of the *Smṛiti*. The new thing taught by the scripture here is the meditation on water as the dress of the *prāṇa*.

There being the same (characteristics in regard to the *Brahman* in the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā* as taught in the *Agnirahashya* and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*), (there is oneness of *vidyās*); and because, in this manner also, there is no distinction.

In the *Agnirahashya* section (i.e., *Sat. Br. X*) of the *Vājasaneyins* the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā* is declared thus: "One should meditate on the *Brahman* as Truth. Now, indeed, this person is characterised by worship" (*Sat. Br. X. 6. 3*); and then it concludes thus: "He (i.e., the worshipper) should meditate upon the Self, who is mind-made (i.e., is grasped by the pure mind), who has life for His body, who has light for His form, who wills the truth and who is like the spatial ether" (*Sat. Br. X. 6. 3*). To the same effect, the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā* again declares in the same (*Satapatha-Brahmaṇa*) in the following passage of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka (Upanishad)*: "This Person is mind-made, He is (of the form of) light, He is the (unchanging) Truth, He is within the heart, He is like a grain of rice or barley; this Person Himself is the controller of all, is the lord of all, is the Supreme Lord of all, He rules over all this, howsoever small it is" (*Mādh. Bṛih. Up. VII. 6. 1*).

Here there is this doubt, namely, whether the *vidyās* differ or not. Although there is no distinction between them in regard to connection (with fruits), injunction and name, there is distinction between them in regard to the (*Brahman's*) quality of being the controller etc., and therefore there is distinction of form, and hence there is distinction between the *vidyās*.

If it be so arrived at, it is replied:—"There being the same (characteristics in regard to the *Brahman* in the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā* as taught in the *Agnirahashya* and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*) (there is oneness of *vidyās*); and because in this manner also there is no distinction" (*Ved. Sūt. III. 3. 19*). Just as, in the *Agnirahashya* the collection of the qualities consisting of being mind-made,

having life for the body, having light for form, and willing the truth are declared in relation to Him; in the same manner, in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* also, the qualities of being mind-made etc. are the same; it being so, and the extra qualities of being the controller etc. not being distinct from the quality of willing the truth, there is no distinction of form. Therefore, there is oneness of the *vidyās*.<sup>1129</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VII

### SAMBANDHĀDHIKARANA

#### सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि

**Sūtra 20.** *Sambandhādevamanyatrāpi*

(374)

Through association (with the same object of worship) (there is oneness of the *vidyās* in the previous section); the same is the case elsewhere also (i.e., in regard to the Persons within the sun and the eye).

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, it is declared as follows. The context begins with the statement, "Truth is great" (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 4. 2), and begins (the further passage) with the statement: "He who is the Truth, He who is that Person in that orb of the sun, and He who is seen in the right eye....." (*Ibid.* V. 5. 1); it is then stated that in the orb of the sun and in the right eye the *Brahman*, who is the Truth, is to be worshipped as having the mystic syllables, 'bhūr,' 'bhuvah' and 'svar', for His body; then, in the statements, "His secret name is 'Ahar' and it is connected with the gods," and "His

1129. (i) The expression, 'sarvasya vaṣṭi', rendered as 'the controller of all', is found only in the *Madh. Bṛih. Up.*

(ii) Because the *Brahman* wills the truth, He is the controller of all. The latter quality is an effect of the former.



secret name is 'Aham', and it is connected with the self" (*Ibid.* V. 5. 2-3), two *upanishads*, that is, two secret names, are declared in the scripture as being subordinate to the object of worship.

Here the doubt is raised whether these two names are fixed as restricted to the places with which they are declared to be associated, or whether both of them are not restricted to either of both these places. It being so, the *Brahman*, who is the object of worship and has the mystic syllables for His body, is Himself associated with those two places, and therefore the object of worship is one, and hence there is no distinction of form; and also there is no distinction in regard to association with fruits etc; hence there is oneness of the *vidyās*, and accordingly those two names are not restricted; this is so arrived at by reasoning. This very same thing is stated in the aphorism, "Through association (with the same object of worship) (there is oneness of the *vidyās* in the previous section); the same is the case elsewhere also (i.e., in regard to the Persons within the sun and the eye)" (*Ved. Sū. III. 3. 20*). Just as He who is associated with the quality of being mind-made and other such qualities is one and is therefore the only object of worship, and so, there being no distinction of form, there is oneness of the *vidyās*, as also the transfer of qualities; similarly, elsewhere also, the *Brahman*, who is associated with the sun and the eye and who is the Truth, being one, there is oneness of the *vidyās*, and there is (mutual) transfer of both in both the places.

If it be so arrived at, we reply as follows :—

न वा विशेषात्

**Sūtra 21.** *Na vā viśeshāt*

(375)

Indeed it is not so, because there is distinction.

This, however, cannot be, namely, that there is the inclusion of those two (names in both the *vidyās*), owing to the oneness of the *vidyās*. Why? "Because there is distinction," that is, because there is distinction in the form of the object of worship. Although the *Brahman* is one, in the one place He is to worshipped as seated in the orb of the sun; in the other place, He is to worshipped as under the support of the eye: thus, through the distinction of being related to (different) places, there is distinction of form, and hence there is distinction of *vidyās*. The place of the object of worship of the *S'āṇḍilya-vidyā* does not differ in this way; because in both the places He is the object of worship as under the support of the heart. Therefore, those two (names) are fixed to their respective places.

### दर्शयति च

**Sūtra 22.** *Darśayati cha*

(378)

The scripture also declares to the same effect.

The scripture also declares that there should be no unrestricted use of the qualities appertaining to That which has eye as the support and That which has the sun as the support. Thus, through the passage beginning with, "That is the form of that same Being (in the eye), whichever is the form (in the sun) of this Being" (*Chhānd. Up. I. 7. 5*), there is the extended application through transfer of form etc. Where, indeed, it is not of itself arrived at, there (alone) is the need for arriving at it by means of the principle of extended application through transfer.<sup>1130</sup>

<sup>1130.</sup> *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 4) is taken to refer to a meditation on the heart. In the next section, we have the worship of the Persons in the sun and the eye. Their secret names, 'Ahar' and 'Aham', are said to mean

'light' and 'the self' respectively. In the parallel context in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 6 & 7), a transfer of the form of one to the other is enjoined; and this transfer itself is enough to prove that the *vidyās* are not identical.

## ADHIKARANA VIII

### SAMBHRITYADHIKARANA

संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः

Sūtra 23. *Sambhṛitidyuvyāptyapi chātaḥ* (377)

For that same reason (the *Brahman's* qualities of) supporting (the eldest powers) and pervading the heaven (are limited to particular meditations).

In the *Taittirīya* text and in the supplementary book of the *Rāṇyāyānīyas* there is the following passage:— “The eldest powers were supported by the *Brahman*; the *Brahman* created (lit. pervaded) in the beginning the highest heaven; He was born first among the beings; therefore, who is there that dares to compete with Him?”<sup>1131</sup> Here, in relation to the *Brahman*, the support of the eldest powers and pervading the heaven are declared in the scripture. These qualities are mentioned in the scripture without earlier mention of any particular meditation, and they have to be included in all the *vidyās*.

If it is so arrived at, it is replied as follows: “For that same reason, the qualities of supporting (the eldest powers) and pervading the heaven (are limited to particular meditations)” (*Ved. Sū. III. 3. 23*). ‘*Sambhṛitidyuvyāpti*’ is a cumulative compound, and thus assumes the form of the singular. Although the qualities of supporting (the eldest powers) etc. are mentioned in the scripture in a general manner without reference to any

1131. The *Rāṇyāyānīya* version, quoted, differs from *Taitt. Br.* (II. 4. 72) in reading ‘*Brahma bhūtānam*’ in the place of ‘*ṛitasya Brahma*’ in the second line. The *Taittirīya* version

means that the *Brahman* was born earlier than the *ṛita*, which has been glossed as ‘the cause of all causes’ or ‘the cause of the cause of all things’.

previous topic, "for that very reason", that is, for the reason that there is distinction of places, they have to be fixed to these places; they should not be included everywhere. It may be asked how those qualities which are mentioned in the scriptures in a general manner without reference to any previous topic can be restricted to particular places. We say that it is due to their capability. Surely, it is not possible for the quality of pervading the heaven to be included in the meditations which fall within the range of small places; supporting (the eldest powers) and other qualities also, being concomitant with it, belong to the same places and cannot be included in the *vidyās* which are limited to small places. In the *Sāṇḍilya*, *Dahara* and other *vidyās*, which are related to small places, qualities such as in the following passages, "He is greater than the earth" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3), and "Whatever is the magnitude of this elemental ether, that is the magnitude of this ether within the heart" (*Ibid.* VIII. 1. 3), are incapable of being included in (the meditations in) the related contexts; they are concerned in describing the greatness of the *Brahman* who is associated with the qualities of being mind-made, of being free from all that is evil, etc.<sup>1132</sup>

## ADHIKARANA IX

### PURUSHAVIDYĀDHIKARANA

#### पुरुषविद्यायामपि चेतरेषामनाम्नानात्

**Sūtra 24.** *Purushavidyāyāmapi chetareshām  
anāmnānāt* (378)

<sup>1132</sup>. In certain meditations the *Brahman* is conceived as limited. Here His quality of the pervasion of heaven is clearly out of place. The support to the eldest powers, which is stated along with this quality, cannot also be included. But the

infinity which belongs to the *Brahman* in His essential nature finds a place in all meditations. The *Brahman* who is by nature infinite is conceived as allowing Himself, out of grace, to be limited in various ways for the purpose of the meditations.

In regard to the *Purusha-vidyā* also (there is distinction), because there is no declaration of other things.

In the *Taittiriya* text, the *Purusha-vidyā* is declared thus :—"As regards the sacrifice which is one who knows thus, his own self is the sacrificer; faith is his wife; his body is the fuel; his breast is the sacrificial altar; his hairs are the sacred bed of *kuśa* grass" (*M. Nār.* XXV. 1). In the *Chhāndogya* also, the *Purusha-vidyā* is declared thus :—"Indeed, the *purusha* himself is the sacrifice; those, his twentyfour years, (are the morning libation)" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 16. 1).

Here it is asked whether the *vidyās* are distinct or not. The *vidyās* are one, for the following reasons: because the name, '*Purusha-vidyā*', is one only; because there is oneness of form by reason of the similarity of ascribing the nature of the limbs of the sacrifice to the limbs of the *purusha*; because, in the *Taittiriya* text no connection with the fruit being declared, the fruit which is declared in the *Chhāndogya* in the passages, "He (i.e., Mahidāsa) lived a hundred and sixteen years" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 16. 7.), is itself the fruit of the *Purusha-vidyā*, and hence there is no distinction even as regards the connection with the fruit.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows. Although both the *vidyās*, which are declared in the scripture in the two places, have the character of the *Purusha-vidyā*, there is undoubtedly distinction between the *vidyās*. Why? "Because there is no declaration of other things". That is to say, because the qualities declared in one branch (of the *Veda*) are not declared in the other. It comes out thus. What is declared in the *Taittiriya* text thus, "These things which are evening, morning and midday, they are oblations" (*M. Nār.*

XXV.1), and other such things are not declared in the *Chhândogya* as oblations. The life of the *purusha*, divided into three parts, is assumed to be the oblations in the *Chhândogya*. The assumption of the character of a religious observance involving self-restraint, and such other things, on the part of fasting (lit. the desire to eat) etc., which are mentioned in the *Chhândogya*, is not made in the *Taittirīya* text, wherein the assumption of the characters of the sacrificer and his wife etc. is also distinct. Therefore, their form in both places is distinct.

Similarly, their connection with the fruits also is distinct. Indeed, in the earlier section in the *Taittirīya* text, meditation on the *Brahman* is stated in the passage: "With the help of the syllable, 'Om', one should surrender oneself unto the *Brahman* who is the highest object of worship saying, '(This is done) for attaining You'" (*M. Nār.* XXIV. 1.) ; by way of its fruits, it is stated: "He attains the greatness of the *Brahman*"; then, in the passage beginning with, "As regards him who knows thus", it is made out that the *Purusha-vidyā* declared by it has in view the ascription, to the person who knows the *Brahman*, of the character of a sacrifice.

Therefore, as it (i.e., that *vidyā*) is an essential part of the meditation on the *Brahman*, the fruit is the attainment of the *Brahman* itself. According to the maxim that, in the presence of a thing which yields fruits, anything which is (mentioned) without fruits is an auxiliary (yielding the same fruits), it is made out that the *Purusha-vidyā* declared in the *Taittirīya* text is an auxiliary to the meditation on the *Brahman*. But in the *Chhândogya* it is stated that the *Purusha-vidyā* has for its fruits the attainment of longevity. Therefore, there is distinction in respect of form and of connection with fruits, and so there is distinction between the two *vidyās* ; thus, the qualities

declared in one place cannot have unrestricted use in the other place.<sup>1133</sup>

## ADHIKARANA X •

### VEDHĀDYADHIKARANA

#### वेधाद्यर्थमेदात्

Sūtra 25. Vedhādyarthabhedāt

(378)

Because there is difference in purpose in regard to piercing etc. (the *mantras* referring to them are not elements of *vidyās*, though in close proximity thereto: similarly other *mantras* referring to the study of the *Vedas* are not elements of *vidyās*).

The Ātharvaṇikas, in the beginning of their *Upanishad*, read the *mantras* beginning with:—“Pierce the bright thing, pierce the heart” (?). The Sāmāgas, in the beginning of the *Rahasya Brāhmaṇa*, read this and other *mantras*: “O god Savitṛi, allow us to perform the sacrifice” (*Sāma-Mantra-Brāhmaṇa*, I. 1. 1). The Kāthakas and Taittiriyas read the *mantras*—“May Mitra do good, may Varuṇa do good to us” (*Taitt. Up.* I. 1. 1) etc. The Śātyāyanins read the *mantras*:—“You are a

1133. (i) The *Purusha-vidyā* in *M. Nār.* is regarded as having been begun in the previous section and elaborated in the XXV. Those desirous of attaining the *Brahman* are indicated as qualified for it, and the *vidyā* is later described in detail and its fruit laid down. It may be noted in passing that this *vidyā* has also been interpreted as *prapatti* (or surrender to God and seeking refuge in Him). See the *Adhikaraṇa-sārvalī* and

Raṅgarāmaṇuja's commentary on *M. Nār.* In this view, the knower of the *Brahman* is not considered as the sacrifice: his surrender to the *Brahman* is the sacrifice. (ii) The maxim about any ritual, which is not associated with any fruits, being regarded as subsidiary to any other ritual which has fruits and in whose presence it is enjoined, is well known to the *Mīmāṃsakas*. See, for instance, Śābarasvāmīn's commentary on *Pūr. Mīm.* (IV. 4. 19).

white horse, you are green and blue" (?) etc. The Aitareyins read the *Mahāvratā-Brāhmaṇa*, in the following and other *mantras*: "Indra, after killing Vṛitra, became great" (*Ait. Ār.* III. 2. 1). The Kaushītakins have the *Mahāvratā-Brāhmaṇa* itself thus: "Prajāpati, indeed, is the year, that which is the *mahāvratā* is this body of his" (*Sāṅkh. Ār.* I. 1). The Vājasaneyins read the *Pravargya-Brāhmaṇa* thus:—"Indeed, the gods performed the sacrifice" (*Śat. Br.* XIV. 1. 1).

Here the doubt arises whether the *mantras* such as, "Pierce the bright thing", "May Mitra do us good", which are read in the beginning of the *Upanishads*, and whether the *karmas* known as *pravargya* and others (like the *mahāvratā*) are auxiliary to *vidyās* or not. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they are auxiliary to *vidyās*. Why? Because they are read in the scriptures in close contact with *vidyās*, and are, therefore, made out to be auxiliary to *vidyās*. No doubt the use in *karmas*, each in its own place, of the *mantras*, "Pierce the bright thing" (?) etc., and of the *karmas* such as the *pravargya* are made out by means of self-sufficient scriptural texts, indicatory signs and contexts, which are powerful. Yet, in regard to *mantras* like, "May Mitra do us good" (*Taitt. Up.* I. 1. 1), "May it (i.e., the *Veda* which is studied) protect us together" (*Ibid.* II. 1), because they are not used elsewhere and the section in which they occur is that of the *vidyā*, their being auxiliary to *vidyā* is difficult to avoid. Therefore, in all *vidyās*, these *mantras* have unrestricted use.

If it be so arrived at, we reply:—"Because there is difference of purpose in regard to piercing etc." Because there are indicatory signs in the statements, "Pierce the bright thing, pierce the heart" (?), "I shall speak the right (words) and the true (facts)" (*Taitt. Up.* I. 1. 1), "I spoke the right (words), I spoke the truth" (*Ibid.* I. 12. 1), and "May what we learn be full of power, let us not hate each



other" (*Ibid.* II. 1), from which and others like them it is made out that they (*i.e.*, these *mantras*) are used in the study of the *Vedas*, for magical spells for malevolent purposes and so on; and they are, therefore, not auxiliary to *vidyās*.

What is said is this. From the support derived from the significance of *mantras* like, "Pierce the heart," etc., statements like, "Pierce the bright thing," are made out to be subordinate to magical spells for malevolent purposes; in this same manner from the very support of the significance of such *mantras* as, "I shall speak the right (words)" (*Ibid.* I. 1. 1), and "May what we study be full of power" (*Ibid.* II. 1), it is made out that *mantras* such as "May Mitra do us good" (*Ibid.* I. 1. 1), are subordinate to Vedic study; therefore they are not auxiliary to *vidyās*. The reading together here (*i.e.*, with the *vidyās*) of "Pierce the bright thing" (?) and other such (*mantras*), and of the *Brāhmaṇas* relating to *pravargya* etc., is due to their being recited in daytime and learnt in the forest (*i.e.*, recited and learnt in secret).<sup>1134</sup>

## ADHIKARANA XI

### HĀNYADHIKARANA

हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्स्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम्

**Sūtra 26.** *Hānau tūpāyanaśabdasheṣatvāt kuśaśchhandasstutyupagānavattaduktam* (380)

<sup>1134</sup>. In *V.D.*, the real subject of this section is said to be the determination of the purpose of *mantras* like "May Mitra do us good" (*Taitt. Up.* I. 1); the other *mantras* and *karmas* adduced in the *Sūtra* and commentary are intended to be merely illustrative. The *pūrvapakṣa* is based on these *mantras* being found and the *karmas* described

near sections dealing with *vidyā* (or meditation). The argument is very weak in regard to the *karmas*. The *mantras* are known to be used for other purposes. Their presence in or near a context of *vidyā* is really due to the fact that they have to be learnt in secret, like the *vidyā*.

In relation to giving up (and acquisition of *karmas*), however, the passage relating to acquisition is complementary; (hence thinking about both is enjoined) as is the case with the *kuśā*, *chbandas*, *stuti* and *upagāna*. It has been already stated.

The *Chhandogas* declare in their scriptures as follows: "Shaking off sin, just as a horse shakes off (dead) hair, and being freed, like the moon from the mouth of Rāhu (i.e., from an eclipse), I shake off the body, and then, I, the well-blessed individual self, attain the eternal world of the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 13. 1). Similarly, the *Ātharvanikas* declare in their scriptures as follows: "Then the wise man, shaking off merit and demerit, and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*)" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1.3). The *Sātyāyanins* also declare in their scriptures as follows: "His sons take their shares (of property), his friends take his good *karmas*: his enemies take his sinful *karmas*"(?). The *Kaushitakins*, however, have a declaration in their scripture as follows: "He shakes off his good and bad *karmas*; his dear relations take hold of his good *karmas*, his enemies take hold of his bad *karmas*" (*Kaush.* I. 4). In this manner the giving up of sin and merit is declared in some places, their reaching friends and enemies in some other places, and both (giving them up and their reaching friends and enemies) in some places.

Although both these are declared severally in separate passages, they have to be accepted as an element in all the *vidyās*. This is so, because in the case of one who is devoted to any *vidyā*, indeed, relating to the *Brahman*, the giving up of sin and merit has necessarily to take place when he attains the *Brahman*, and because their reaching another place is related necessarily to their being given up. Therefore, their consideration, which is enjoined in the above passages, deserves to be part of all the *vidyās*.

Here what is enquired into is this: whether the consideration of giving them up, the consideration of their reaching another place and the consideration of both (giving them up and their reaching another place) together are alternative, or whether they are to be included together. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they are given as alternatives. Why? Because there is the support of the significance of distinctive scriptural declarations. Indeed, if they are cumulative, then there will be the consideration of both everywhere in all the *vidyās*, and such consideration is established by the passage of the *Kaushītaki Upanishad* itself, and its declaration in other scriptures will undoubtedly become meaningless. Therefore, the purpose of their declaration in more than one scripture is solely alternative. The declarations in more places than one cannot possibly be explained on the basis of the distinction of those who study them. Indeed, repetition without distinction can be explained through the distinction of those who study. But here, in the present case, the giving up itself (of *karmas*) is given in two branches (of the *Veda*), and (their) reaching another place is given in one branch. It is also not possible to fix them (in particular *vidyās*) through the distinction of the *vidyās*, because this consideration is stated to be an element in all (of them).

It is said here in reply as follows: "In relation to giving up (and acquisition of *karmas*), however, the passage relating to acquisition is complementary; (hence thinking about both is enjoined)." The word, 'however,' sets aside the above view. The expression, 'in relation to giving up (*karmas*),' is intended to serve as an illustration (and it refers also to those *karmas* reaching other places). Where the mere giving up, or where the mere reaching of another place is declared in the scriptures, there the combination of each with the other of both of them becomes necessary. Why? "Because the passage relating to acquisition is complementary"; that is to say, because

the passage relating to their reaching another place is complementary to the passage relating to their being given up. Indeed, it is quite appropriate for the passage relating to acquisition to be complementary to the passage relating to giving up, because the passage relating to acquisition speaks of entry for the sin and merit which have been given up by the wise man.

In regard to passages declared in the scripture in one place being complementary to passages declared in another place in the scripture, illustrative examples are pointed out: "as is the case with the *kuṣā*, *chhandas*, *stuti* and *upagāna*." 1135

The Kālāpins have the following passage in their scripture:—"The *kuṣās* (or pieces of wood) are from flowerless trees" (?). But the passage of the Śātyāyanins is this: "The pieces of wood are of the fig tree" (?). This passage, particularising that the pieces of wood which have been made out to be of flowerless trees in general are of the fig tree, attains the character of a passage which is complementary to that (previous) passage.

Similarly, by means of the following among other such passages, "Through the metres of the gods and demons" (?), the subject that is given is the metres which without distinction belong to the gods and demons; in relation to this, there is the passage: "The metres of the gods come earlier" (?); this passage which establishes the

1135. The four illustrations given are connected with Vedic *mantras* and ritual. *Kuṣas* are small twigs or rods used by the *udgātṛis* in sacrifices for counting the *stotras* sung by them. *Chhandas* is Vedic metre. The shorter metres are said to belong to the gods, and the longer to the demons. See, for instance, *Taitt. Sam.* (VI. 6. 11), where the metres with fewer

syllables are said to remain with the gods, and those with more syllables with the demons. The *Shodāsin* is a modification of the *Agnishtoma* sacrifice. The *stotra* is a hymn which is sung. Gold is offered to the priests to encourage them to begin the ritual. The *adhvaryu* is a priest at a sacrifice among whose duties is the recitation of relevant texts of the *Yajurveda*.

particular order of succession attains the character of what is complementary to that (previous) passage.

Similarly, when a statement without any particularity is arrived at from the passage, "He helps (i.e., begins) the *stotra* of the *Shoḍaśin* with gold" (?), the passage, "When the sun has half-set, he begins the *stotra* of the *Shoḍaśin*" (*Taitt. Sam.* VI. 6. 1. 6), which has for its subject a particularity (i.e., the time of performance), attains the character of what is complementary to that (previous) passage.

Similarly, in relation to the passage, "The *ṛitviks* sing near by" (?), which is given in general terms without any particularity, the passage, "The *adhvaryu* priest should not sing close by" (*Taitt. Sam.* VI. 3. 1. 5), which gives rise to the knowledge that it (i.e., the former passage) relates to those who are not *adhvaryu* priests, attains the character of what is complementary to that (previous) passage.

In this manner, there are passages which are capable of particularising those things which are known in general terms; and by those who do not admit that they (i.e., the former) are complementary to them (i.e., the latter), an alternative as between those two things has to be accepted; and this (acceptance of an alternative) cannot be proper when there is a way out. "It has been already stated"; that is, in the earlier *kāṇḍa* relating to religious works, under the aphorism, "On the other hand, it is complementary to another passage, because to take them as alternatives is contrary to reason; it is part of injunctions in general" (*Pūr. Mīm.* X. 8. 4).<sup>1136</sup> Because in this very

<sup>1136</sup> *Pūr. Mīm.* (X. 8. 4) is not quoted for showing that a Vedic passage in one context can be complementary to a passage in a different context. The purpose is to seek authority for the principle of interpreta-

tion that injunctions should not be deemed to be alternative when there is some other way available to reconcile them. (Sāṅkara cites X. 8. 15, but Vāchaspati in his *Bhamaṭī* refers to X. 8. 4 as relevant here.)

same manner, both the passage dealing with the wise man giving up sin and merit and the passage dealing with their reaching another place form one and the same context ; and because also mere giving up and mere reaching of another place (on the part of sin and merit) do not exist ; no alternatives can appropriately be adopted. (All passages dealing either with mere giving up of sin and merit or mere acquisition of them alone are thus seen to deal with both the themes). The declaration of both in the scriptures of the *Kaushītakins* is (however) proper, because there is repetition without any distinction, and those that read and understand them are different (from those who read the other passages).

## ADHIKARANA XII

### SĀMPARĀYĀDHIKARANA

#### साम्पराये तर्तव्याभावात्तथाह्वन्ये

**Sūtra 27.** *Sāmparāye tartavyābhāvāttathāhyanye* (381)

It is (only) at the time of the separation of the soul from the body (that the giving up of *karmas* by the emancipated soul takes place), because there is nothing else to be gone through (by the soul afterwards). Indeed, others say the same thing.

It has been stated that in relation to sin and merit, giving them up and their reaching another place have to be taken into consideration in all the *vidyās*. Here the doubt is raised whether both this giving up and this reaching another place occur (in part) at the time of the soul's separation from the body and (in part) in the path of that (soul) which departs from the body at death, or whether they take place only at the time of its separation

from the body ; it being so, it is properly arrived at by reasoning as taking place at both the times ; because it is declared in the scripture as taking place at both the times.

Indeed, the Kaushītakins declare in their scriptures thus. The context begins with the passage, "He, attaining this path, the path of the gods, goes to the world of Agni" (*Kaush. Up.* I. 3) ; and continues thus : "He comes to the river, Virajā (on whose banks the subtle body is dropped), crosses it with (the speed of) the mind ; he shakes off the meritorious and sinful deeds" (*Ibid.* I. 4). Here in this passage the giving up of the sinful and meritorious deeds is made out as happening on the path. The Tāṇḍins (or Chhandogas) declare in their scriptures thus :—"Shaking off sin, just as a horse shakes off (dead) hair, and being freed, like the moon from the mouth of Rāhu (i.e., from an eclipse), I shake off the body, and then I, the well blessed individual self, attain the eternal world of the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 13. 1). Here it (i.e. the giving up of sin and merit) is made out as happening at the time of (the individual soul's) separation from the body. In the scriptures of the Śātyāyanins also (it is declared) thus : "His sons take their shares of his property ; his friends take his meritorious deeds ; his enemies take his sinful deeds" (?). Here it is made out that the transfer of meritorious and sinful deeds, which is declared to take place simultaneously with the transfer of their shares of property to the sons, happens only at the time of the soul's separation from the body. Therefore, a part of the soul's meritorious and sinful deeds is given up at the time of its separation from the body, and the remainder of the deeds on the path.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : "It is (only) at the time of the separation of the soul from the body." At the *sāmparāya*, that is, at the time of the departure (of the soul) from the body, the meritorious and sinful deeds of the wise man are fully given up

without any remainder. Why? "Because there is nothing else to be gone through"; that is to say, because, after his separation from the body, for the wise man there is no experience arising from meritorious and sinful deeds to go through. Indeed, apart from the attainment of the *Brahman*, who is the fruit of the *vidyās*, there do not exist pleasure and pain that arise from meritorious and sinful deeds and that have to be experienced.

"Indeed, others say the same thing". That is, some other schools read in their scriptures that, after (the soul's) separation from the body, there is no enjoyment of pleasure and pain, apart from the attainment of the *Brahman*, as in the following passages: "Indeed, the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him (i.e., the emancipated self) who remains without a body (built by *karma*)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 1); "The individual self, rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light and becomes manifest in his true nature" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 3); and "So long as he is not freed (from this body), so long there is delay; then he will be blessed" (*Ibid.* VI. 14. 2).

### छन्द उभयाविरोधात्

**Sūtra 28.** *Chhandata ubhayāvirodhāt*

(382)

According to the intended meaning, without contradicting both (the scriptural texts and the nature of what they describe) (the teaching about the giving up of *karmas* at the time of death has to be understood).

The time of giving up meritorious and sinful deeds having been determined in this manner according to the nature of the things—without contradicting both, that is to say, without contradicting both the scriptural passage (relating to the giving up) and the nature of those things



(that are to be given up), according to the intended meaning, that is, as desired (properly), the logical connection of the words (or phrases) has to be described. In the passage given in the *Kaushitaki Upanishad*, that part, namely, "He shakes off meritorious and sinful deeds" (*Kaush. Up.* I. 4.), which is last declared, has to be understood before that part which is first declared: "Attaining this path, the path of the gods" (*Ibid.* I. 3); this is the meaning.<sup>1137</sup>

Here the opponent raises the following objection:—

गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयधान्यथा हि विरोधः

**Sūtra 29.** *Gaterarthvattvamubhayadhānyathā*  
*hi virodhaḥ* (383)

The path will have a meaning, if (giving up deeds takes place) at two times; indeed, if it be otherwise, there will be contradiction.

The giving up of a part of the meritorious and sinful deeds occurs at the time of (the soul's) separation from the body, and the giving up of the remainder occurs afterwards; if, thus, at both these times the destruction of the *karmas* takes place, then only the path will have a meaning; that is, the scriptural passage relating to the path of the gods will have any significance. "Indeed, if it were otherwise, there will be contradiction." If the destruction of all the *karmas* were to take place only at the time of (the soul's) separation from the body, the

<sup>1137.</sup> *Kaush. Up.* (I. 3) begins: "He, attaining this path, the path of the gods, goes to the world of Agni." Much later, towards the end of I. 4, we have the statement: "He shakes off the meritorious and sinful deeds." This *Sūtra* is intended to show that chronologically the giving

up of sin and merit is earlier than reaching the path of the gods. '*Chhandataḥ*', which usually means 'according to desire', has to be understood here as 'according to the intended meaning', 'according to requirements'.

subtle body also will undergo destruction ; if that be so, movement of the mere individual soul (all by itself) cannot appropriately take place. Therefore, at the time of departing (from the body), the entire destruction of (all) the *karmas* of the wise man, without leaving any remainder, cannot properly be said to take place.

To this objection, the reply is as follows :—

उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धैर्लोकवत्

**Sūtra 30.** *Upapannastallakṣhaṇārthopabaddher-lokavat* (384)

It can properly take place, because a thing having similar characteristics with it (i.e., the subtle body) is obtained (later on); as is the case in the world (a thing meant for one purpose, when no longer needed for it, can be used for another).

The destruction of all *karmas* (meritorious and sinful) does undoubtedly properly take place, at the time of (the soul's) departure from the body. How? "Because a thing having similar characteristics with it (i.e., the subtle body) is obtained (later on)." Because, in respect of him (i.e. the self) whose true nature has become manifest, although his *karmas* have been destroyed, an event, which has the nature of association with the body, is known (from the sacred texts). There are the following among other similar passages: "Having attained the Supreme Light he becomes manifest in his true nature" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3); "He (i.e., the released self) moves about there (in the Highest Heaven), eating, playing, enjoying" (*Ibid.*); "He becomes his own ruler, he has free movement in all the worlds" (*Ibid.* VII. 25. 2); "He is one, he becomes threefold" (*Ibid.* VII. 26. 2); here the event known as association with the body is indeed known. Therefore, although one has his *karmas* destroyed, yet, in association with the subtle body, it is

quite appropriate for him to have movement through the path of the gods.

It may, however, be asked how, after the destruction of the *karmas* which produce the body, the subtle body can exist. If it be so held, we reply (that it exists) through the greatness of the *vidyā*. Indeed, *vidyā*, although it itself does not produce the subtle body, although complete destruction takes place of the gross body which is the means to enjoy the pleasure and pain arising from contact with the *prakṛiti*, as also of all *karmas*, still (that *vidyā*), for the purpose of giving its own fruit which consists in the attainment of the *Brahman*, establishes the subtle body with the object of making him (i.e., the person practising the *vidyā*) go through the path of the gods.<sup>1138</sup>

"As is the case in the world." For instance, tanks etc. are constructed with the object of raising crops etc. in abundance; although the reasons for constructing them and the desire for them (i.e., the crops) have all ceased, yet those who keep the tanks free from decay take there drinks of potable water and do similar things. The case under reference resembles this.

Again, the following objection may be raised here. It has been stated to the following effect. The complete destruction of the *karmas* of the wise men who have direct perception of the Supreme Entity (i.e., the *Brahman*) takes place at the time of the fall of the body; in consequence, subsequent to the fall of the body, only the subtle body continues (to remain with them) for the sake of their movement along the path of the gods: and

1138. The subtle body continues till the emancipated self acquires the divine form in Heaven. Otherwise there cannot be any movement for the

individual self. Thus the subtle body survives the destruction of the *karmas* which produced it: and this survival is brought by the power of *vidyā*.

there is no enjoyment of pleasure and pain—(all) this does not appropriately fit in. In the case of sages like Vasishṭha, Avāntaratapas etc., who have directly realised the Supreme Entity (i.e., the *Brahman*), it is seen that, after the fall of their bodies, they have association with other bodies and that they experience pleasure and pain due to the birth and death of sons (respectively) and other such things. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) reads the answer thus:—

### यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम्

**Sūtra 31.** *Yāvadadhikāramavasthitirādhi-*

*kārikāṇām* (385)

Those who hold offices have to remain as long as their offices last.

It has not been declared by us that, in the case of all wise men (i.e., those who have meditated successfully), the destruction of their meritorious and sinful deeds takes place at the time of the fall of the body; on the other hand, in regard to whichever wise men, after the fall of the body, there is attainment of the path beginning with light, it is in regard to them that it has been stated (by us) that, at the time of the fall of the body, the destruction of their meritorious and sinful deeds takes place. But, in the case of Vasishṭha and others who hold offices, they do not attain the path beginning with light after the fall of the body, because the office, which has begun (as the result of *karmas*), has not come to an end. They have attained particular offices through particular *karmas*; the *karma* which produces those (offices) is not destroyed till the termination of the office. Indeed, the destruction of the *karma* which has begun to yield fruit takes place only through its experience. Therefore, in regard to those who hold office, the *karma*, which produces that (office), continues till the period of office. Therefore, for

them, there is no attainment of the path beginning with light, after the fall of the body.<sup>1139</sup>

## ADHIKARANA XIII

### ANIAMĀDHIKARANA

अनियमस्सर्वेषामविरोधश्शब्दानुमानाभ्याम्

**Sūtra 32.** *Āniyamassarveshāmavirodhasśabdā-numānābhyām* (386)

In regard to all (worshippers), there is no restriction (about reaching the *Brahman* by the path beginning with light); (only when it is so) there will be no conflict between the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*.

The path which begins with light is declared in the scriptures in relation to the *Upakosala* and other such meditations. Here the doubt is raised whether it is only for those who are devoted to those meditations that the attainment of the *Brahman* results through that path, or whether it is for all who are devoted to (any kind of) meditation on the *Brahman*. Because for others, it (i.e., the attainment of the *Brahman* through that path) is not declared in the scriptures; because also there is no authority for showing that the passages, "And those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 10. 1*), and "(Those who) worship *Satya*

1139. Avantaratapas is an earlier incarnation of Vyāsa. See Note 972. In the cycles of creation and dissolution, Vyāsa is repeatedly born to edit and arrange the *Vedas*. See *V.P.* (III. 4). Vasishṭha, as a Vedic seer, is repeatedly born to reveal to the world the *mantras* ascribed to him. See Vol. II,

p. 158, under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3. 28). The *purāṇas* also speak of his being first born as a Prajāpati as the mind-born son of Brahma the creator and again as the son of Mitra and Varuṇa and so on. Both Vasishṭha and Vyāsa joyed in gifted sons and grieved in bereavement,

(or the *Brahman*) with faith" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15), serve to bring to the mind all the other *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman*; it is only for those who are devoted to those (*Upakosala* and other such *vidyās* that the attainment of the *Brahman* results through that path).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows:—"There is no restriction....." (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 32). "In regard to all," that is, in regard to those who are devoted to all forms of worship, as it is necessary to go through that path itself, there is no restriction to the effect that it (i.e., that path) is only for those who are devoted to those (particular *vidyās*). Indeed, it is when all (worshippers) have to go through that very thing (i.e., path) that there is no conflict with the *Śabda* and *Anumāna*, that is, between the *Sruti* and the *Smṛiti*. The meaning is that otherwise there will be conflict with them.

Indeed, the scripture says that all those who are devoted to any of the meditations on the *Brahman* proceed through the path beginning with light, in connection with the *Pañchāgni-vidyā* given in the *Chhāndogya* and the *Vājasaneyaka*. It runs as follows in the *Vājasaneyaka*: "Those who meditate on this (individual self) in this manner (as taught in the *Pañchāgni-vidyā*) and those who in the forest worship with faith *Satya* (or the *Brahman*)—they go towards (the deity presiding over) light" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15); in the *Chhāndogya* it runs thus:—"Those who know it (i.e., the essential nature of the individual self) thus (i.e., as set out in the *Pañchāgni-vidyā*) and those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith—they go to (the deity presiding over) light" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 1). Here, in these passages, the path beginning with light is taught in relation to those who are devoted to the *Pañchāgni-vidyā* by means of the expression, "Those who meditate on this in this manner", and by means of the expression beginning with "and those who", (it is taught) in relation to those who

meditate on the *Brahman* with faith beforehand. Because, in the following passages, "The *Brahman* is existence (or *Satya*), 'knowledge, infinity'" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1) and " *Satya* itself has to be known " (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1), the word, '*Satya*', is well known to denote the *Brahman*, and because the word, '*Tapas*', also has to have oneness of meaning with that (word, '*Satya*') itself, it is the *Brahman* Himself who is denoted by the words, '*Satya*' and '*Tapas*'. Elsewhere also, it is declared that the meditation on the *Brahman* is attended with faith beforehand, as in the passage which begins with " *Satya* itself has to be known " (*Ibid.* VII. 16. 1) and ends with " Faith itself has to be known " (*Ibid.* VII. 19. 1).<sup>1140</sup>

The *Smṛiti* also says that all those who know the *Brahman* go only through this path, as in the following passage: " Fire, light, day, the bright (fortnight), the six months of the northern course of the sun—through these (i.e., helped by the deities presiding over these) those persons who know the *Brahman* go to the *Brahman* " (*B. G.* VIII. 24). Many passages of a similar kind are given in the *Sruti* and the *Smṛiti*. In this manner, this path which is common to all the *vidyās* and which has been already arrived at through other means of knowledge, is reiterated (or referred to) in the *Upakosala* and other such *vidyās*.<sup>1141</sup>

1140. Both the *Chhānd. Up.* and the *Bṛihad. Up.* speak of two types of worshippers reaching the path beginning with light—those who are devoted to the *Pañchagni-vidyā* and those who worship the *Brahman* through any *vidyā*. In the *Bṛih. Up.*, the latter are described as worshipping *Satya* with faith; and '*Satya*' is a term well known as denoting the *Brahman*. The

corresponding passage in the *Chhānd. Up.* refers to those who worship *Tapas* with faith; and because of the force of the parallel passage in the *Bṛih. Up.*, '*Tapas*' here means the same thing as '*Satya*' there, that is, the *Brahman*.

1141. The path beginning with light is explained in the *Ved. Sūt.* (IV. 3).

## ADHIKARANA XIV

## AKSHARADHYĀDHĪKARANA

अक्षरधियांत्ववरोधस्सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम्

**Sūtra 33.** *Aksharadhiyām tvavarodhassāmānya-  
tadbhāvābhyāmaupasadavattaduktam* (387)

But there (is in all the *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman*) the inclusion of all the ideas relating to the *Akshara*, because of the sameness (of the *Brahman* everywhere) and because of those ideas being involved (in the conception of the essential nature of the *Brahman*); as is the case with the *mantras* of the *upasad* (the qualities follow their principal); this has been already explained.

It is declared in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* as follows: "This, verily, O Gārgī, is that well known *Akshara*, which those who know the *Brahman* say is neither gross nor atomic, neither short, nor long, nor red, nor viscid, not having any shadow, not having darkness, not having air, not having the spatial ether, not attached, not having taste, not having smell, not having eyes, nor ears, nor speech, nor mind, nor *tejas*, not having *prāṇa*, not having pleasure, not having senses, not having any inside, not having any outside; It eats nothing.....Indeed, under the supreme command of this (*Akshara*), O Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand well supported" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 8-9). Similarly, there is this passage relating to the *Atharvaṇa*: "And that is the higher *vidyā* by which that *Akshara* is known—that (Being) which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has no family, which has no colour, no eyes, no ears; that well known Being which has no hands and no feet" (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 5-6). Here there is the doubt—whether these qualities of being not



gross etc., which, in connection with the *Brahman* who is pointed out by the word 'Aksharā', are declared and whose nature is hostile to the world, should be sought after and referred to in all the *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman*, or whether they should be sought after only there (i.e., in that *vidyā*) where they are declared. They should be sought after only there (i.e., in that *vidyā*) where they are declared. Why? There is no reason for holding that the qualities which are the characteristics of one *vidyā* can be the characteristics of another *vidyā*, and because also these negative characteristics are not, like bliss etc., the means of making known the essential nature of the *Brahman*. Indeed, it is in relation to the *Brahman* whose essential nature is known through bliss and other such qualities, that the qualities of being not gross etc., which are the characteristic properties of the world, are denied; because there can be no denial of that which has no support (and has not been established in some way or to some extent).

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply as follows: "But there is the inclusion of all the ideas relating to the *Akshara*....." (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 33.) In all the *vidyās*, there is the inclusion (or *avarodha*)—the meaning is the admission (or *saṅgrahaṇa*)—of the ideas of not being gross etc., which are connected with the *Akshara* who is the *Brahman*. "Because of the sameness and of those ideas being involved (in it)"; because in all the meditations the *Akshara*, who is the object of the meditation and is the *Brahman*, is the same; because also the qualities of not being gross etc. are involved in the conception of His essential nature.

What is said is this. Indeed, to apprehend a thing is to receive it in the mind through its peculiar characteristics. And mere bliss and other such qualities do not present to the mind the specific character of the *Brahman*, as bliss and other such qualities are also found associated with the individual self. Indeed, bliss and other such

qualities, which are hostile to all that is evil, are the characteristics of the *Brahman*. But, in regard to the individual self, although it is of itself free from all that is evil, yet it is capable of association with evil, and to be hostile to all that is evil is to be hostile to the qualities of being gross etc., which are the characteristics of the world consisting of animate and inanimate things. Therefore, by one who meditates on the *Brahman* as associated with His peculiar characteristics, that *Brahman* whose characteristics of knowledge, bliss etc., are qualified by the qualities of not being gross etc., has to be meditated upon; therefore, the qualities of not being gross etc. are, like the qualities of bliss etc., involved in the conception of the essential nature of the *Brahman*; consequently, in all the *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* has to be meditated upon in that same manner (as is stated above).

For showing that the qualities follow their principal (which is qualified by them), he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives an illustrative example thus:—"As is the case with the *mantrās* of the *upasad*". For instance, there is the *mantra* which begins with, 'O Agni, know (i.e., crown with success) the work of the *hotṛi* priest, know (the sacrifice)" (*Tāṇḍ. Br.* XXI. 10. 11); it is read in the *Sāmaveda* (where it has to be pronounced loudly): it is (also) auxiliary to the ceremony of *upasad*, whose material offering is a cake (of rice or barley) and which belongs to the sacrificial ceremony of Jamadagni's *Chatūrātra* (or a sacrifice lasting over four days); as that *mantra* has to follow the principal (or the *upasad* ceremony), it is spoken with the low pronunciation of the *Yajurveda*. "This has been already explained", that is, in the first *kāṇḍa* under the aphorism: "When there is a conflict (which relates to the loudness in reciting *mantras* and which arises from their connection with different *Vedas*) between what is principal and what is subordinate (in ritual), the association with the *Veda* must be such as to suit the principal, because it (i.e., the subordinate) serves the

purpose of that (principal thing)" (*Pūr. Mīm.* III. 3. 9).<sup>1142</sup> (In the same way, the characteristics of not being gross etc., which are read in other contexts, have to follow their principal, which is the Possessor of those characteristics).

It may however be said as follows. In this manner, the *Brahman* Himself is the Possessor of the qualities in all the *vidyās*, relating to the *Brahman*, and the qualities have to follow the principal; hence the totality of the qualities given in such passages as "He is all actions, all smells, all tastes" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 4), though definitely laid down in respect of every *vidyā*, will become unsettled (because of the qualities being numerous and some of them comprising an infinity of particulars). To this objection he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :

### इयदामननात्

Sūtra 34. *Iyadāmananāt*

(388)

Because of meditation over this much (only).

The word, '*āmanana*', means thinking directed towards (a thing); that is to say, constant thinking (or meditation). For the sake of meditation, (only) this

<sup>1142</sup>. The *upasad* is part of the *Jyotishoma* sacrifice, which is typical of a whole class of sacrifices. A particular sacrifice lasting for four days is called after the sage, Jamadagni, who is said to have performed it frequently. See *Taitt. Sam.* (VII. 1. 9) and *Tānd. Br.* (XXI. 10. 11). The *upasad* here requires the offering of cakes on potsherds numbering from one to twelve. There are 12 *mantras* to be recited when making the offerings, and the opening words of the first of them have been quoted by

Rāmānuja. In regard to the recitation of these *mantras*, which are from the *Sāma-veda* and used in a ceremony prescribed in the *Yajurveda*, the question arises whether they should be pronounced loudly or in a low tone. The rule is that the *mantras* of the *Sāma-veda* should be pronounced loudly and those of the *Yajurveda* in a low tone. *Pūr. Mīm.* (III. 3. 9) lays down that the rule relative to the *Veda* which prescribes the ritual prevails.

much of the totality of the qualities of the *Brahman* has been arrived at as fit for meditation in all the *vidyās*—those (qualities) of being bliss etc., which are qualified by the qualities of not being gross etc. Without the totality of whichever qualities there can be no meditation on the essential nature of the *Brahman*, as distinguished from all else,—those qualities alone have to follow Him everywhere in all the *vidyās*, and those qualities are only this much; this is the meaning. But the other qualities, like His being all actions, etc., although they follow the principal, are determined (and differentiated) for each *vidyā* in so far as to be thought of (therein).

## ADHIKARANA XV

### ANTARATVĀDHIKARANA

अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनोऽन्यथा वेदानुपपत्तिरिति  
चेन्नोपदेशयत्

**Sūtra 35.** *Antarā bhūtagrāmavatsvātmano'nyathā  
bhedānupapattiriti chennopadeśavat* (389)

If it be said that what has been mentioned as being within (all) (in the reply to Ushasta in *Bṛih. Up.* III. 4) relates to the individual self who is the possessor of the multitude of great elements, and that, otherwise, there will be inappropriateness as regards the replies, it is replied that it is not so; it resembles (other) teachings.

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, the question of Ushasta is thus set out: "He who is no other than the *Brahman*, directly perceived everywhere and at all times, and who is the Self within all—teach Him to me" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 4.1); the reply to it is thus given: "He who through the *prāṇa* sustains life, He is your Self who is within all; He who through the *apāna* carries out the functions of the *apāna*,

He is your Self who is within all" (*Ibid.*). Being questioned again by him (Ushasta) who was not satisfied with this answer, he (i.e., Yājñyavalkya) said thus:—"You should not see the seer of the act of seeing, you should not think of the thinker of the act of thinking, you should not know the knower of knowledge: He is your Self, who is within all: all else is full of misery" (*Ibid.* III. 4. 2). After this, in like manner, in connection with the question of Kahola, it is declared in the scripture as follows: "He alone who is none other than the *Brahman*, directly perceived everywhere and at all times, and who is the Self within all—teach Him to me" (*Ibid.* III. 5. 1); and the reply is thus given: "He who transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow, delusion (or ignorance), old age and death,—knowing Him, that Self, to be thus, the knowers of the *Brahman* give up the desire for sons, the desire for wealth..." (*Ibid.*); and it ends with the sentence: "All else is full of misery" (*Ibid.*).

Here the doubt is raised whether between these two teachings there is distinction of *vidyās* or not. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they are distinct. How? Because there is the distinction of form between them. Through the distinction relating to the replies given, the forms differ. Although the questions have one and the same form, the modes of the replies given are known to be distinct. In the earlier (reply), the agent in the action of sustaining life is stated to be the inner self of all; in the later (reply) He is stated to be devoid of hunger and thirst etc. Thus, in the earlier reply, the life-sustaining individual self, who is distinct from the body, senses, intellect, mind and *prāṇa*, is mentioned; in the later (reply), on the other hand, it is the Supreme Self, who is different from that (individual self) and who is free from hunger and thirst etc. (that is mentioned).

In regard to the individual self, who is the possessor of the multitude of the great elements, as he is the inner self of all that multitude of elements, his being the inner

self also of all results in an appropriate manner. No doubt, in the case of the individual self, being the inner self of all is due solely to the multitude of elements and thus contingent; nevertheless, it has to be accepted as such. Otherwise, if through the desire to bring in the principal Inner Self, the Supreme Self is accepted to be taught, the distinction between the replies cannot appropriately fit in. Indeed, the earlier reply relates to the individual self, because it is not possible for the Supreme Self to be the agent of the activity of the *prāṇa*, the agent of the activity of the *apāna* and so on; and the later reply relates to the Supreme Self, because He has transcended hunger etc.

Then he (i.e., the opponent) raises the doubt: "If it be said that what has been mentioned as being within (all) (in the reply to Ushasta) relates to the individual self who is the possessor of the multitude of great elements, and that, otherwise, there will be inappropriateness as regards the replies..." (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 35). *Antarā*: the first reply dealing with the internal self of all—relates to the individual self; *bhūtagrāmaṇ*: he who is the possessor of the multitude of great elements; *tadantarāḥ*: the individual self. The individual self is taught to be within all; this is the meaning. Otherwise, there will be inappropriateness as regards the distinction between the replies, namely, "he who sustains life with the *prāṇa*" (*Bṛih. Up* III. 4. 2) and "He who has transcended hunger and thirst etc." (*Ibid.* III. 5. 1).<sup>1143</sup>

1143. The *Pūrvapakṣa* argument here is that Ushasta is taught about the individual self and Kahola about the Supreme Self. The former learns that the individual self, being present in all bodies, is everywhere; it sustains life, even though not in an unconditioned way; its difference from the acts of seeing etc. must be deemed to

be denied, because it is not merely knowledge as substance, but it also has knowledge as attribute. Kahola's question, though given in identical words, must be deemed to be different, because the answer thereto is different. Hence meditation on the individual self is taught to Ushasta and that on the Supreme Self to Kahola.

If it be so urged, the reply here is in the negative. The meaning is that there is no distinction between the *vidyās*. In both the cases, the question and answer deal with the Supreme Self. It comes out in the following manner. Surely, the question, "He who is no other than the *Brahman*, who is directly perceived everywhere and at all times, and who is the Self within all" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 1 & 5. 1), undoubtedly relates to the Supreme Self. Although the word '*Brahman*' specifically denotes the Supreme Self, yet it is seen to denote figuratively at times the individual self also; therefore, with the object of understanding the Supreme Self as different from it, the qualification, "He who is none other than the *Brahman*," is introduced. And the qualification of being directly perceived denotes association with all places and times, and it is appropriate only to the Supreme Self who is made out to be infinite in the passage, "He is existence, knowledge, infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1). To be within all things can belong only to the Supreme *Brahman* who is the Internal Controller of all, as declared in the passage, which begins with, "He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth," and concludes with, "He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self" (*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3-22).

The reply also quite similarly is related to the Supreme Self. As stated in the passage, "He who through the *prāṇa* sustains life" (*Ibid.* III. 4. 1), the unconditioned quality of being the agent of the act of sustaining life belongs solely to the Supreme Self, because during dreamless sleep the individual self is not the agent of sustaining life. Not knowing that it was thus, Ushasta thought that mere agency (and not the quality of being the unconditioned agent) in the act of sustaining life was taught, and thinking that (such) agency was common to the individual self as well (as to the Supreme Self), he was not satisfied (with the reply); he (i.e., the teacher, Yājñavalkya) was again questioned, and he taught him that the Supreme Self, who is distinct from the individual self, is the

unconditioned agent in the act of sustaining life as follows: "You should not see the seer of the act of seeing" etc. (*Ibid.* III. 4. 2). That is to say, do not think that the individual self, who is the agent of these actions of seeing, hearing, thinking and knowing, which are dependent upon the senses, is taught to be the agent of the act of sustaining life, because during dreamless sleep and swoon, he is not the agent of the activities of sustaining life etc. Indeed, elsewhere in the scriptures, it is declared that the Supreme Self alone is the cause of sustaining the life of all beings, as in the passage: "If this *Ākāśa* (i.e., the *Brahman*) is not bliss, who indeed is there that can live and who that can enjoy?" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1). Therefore, the earlier question and answer relate to the Supreme Self.

Similar is the case with the later (question and answer also), because the qualities of transcending hunger etc. are peculiar to the Supreme Self. In both, the concluding part, "All else is full of misery", has the same form. The repetition of the question and answer, however, has been made with the object of establishing that the Supreme *Brahman*, who is the cause of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life, has transcended hunger etc.<sup>1144</sup>

1144. Properly understood, the teachings given to both Ushasta and Kahola are about meditating on the Supreme *Brahman*. When Yajñavalkya says that the Internal Self sustains life in all beings through the *prāṇa*, Ushasta feels that the agent of the act of sustaining life, being the individual self, cannot be the internal ruler of all. He is then told that he should not see the seer of the act of seeing etc. This shows that the individual self cannot be the object of the injunction that the Self has to be seen etc. Being the seer, it cannot be what is seen. Moreover, it is

also suggested that the individual self, which sees with the help of the sense of sight, should not be seen as the agent of the act of sustaining life. Ushasta is now satisfied. But Kahola feels that, under certain circumstances, the individual self can also be said to sustain life, to be the internal ruler of all and to be both the seer and the sight. He wants therefore the Supreme *Brahman* to be distinguished from the individual self in a clearer and stronger way. Hence his question, which elicits the answer that the *Brahman* is free from hunger, thirst etc.



Here he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives an illustrative example thus: "It resembles (other) teachings" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 35). For instance, in connection with the *Sadvidyā*, the teaching regarding the *Sat* is begun in the passage: "Did you ask for that Controller?" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. I. 3); in regard to it, the repetition, again and again, of the question asked, "May you, venerable sir, teach it to me" or "May you, venerable sir, well establish that again to me" (*Ibid.* VI. 5. 4 etc.), and of the answer given, "He is very subtle; all this has Him for its Self; He is existence" (*Ibid.* VI. 9. 4 etc.), is seen to be made for the purpose of establishing that the *Brahman*, who is the *Sat*, is possessed of several particular kinds of greatness. The case on hand is similar to it. Thus, through establishing one and the same *Brahman* who is within all beings, as the cause of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life and as having transcended hunger etc., the forms (of the *vidyās*) are the same, and so they are only one *vidyā*.<sup>1145</sup>

Again, it may be said as follows. No doubt both the questions and the answers relate to the Supreme *Brahman*; nevertheless, the distinction between the *vidyās* cannot be avoided. In the one case, He is to be meditated upon as the cause of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life; in the other case, as transcending hunger etc.; thus, owing to the distinction in regard to the objects of worship, there is distinction of forms between the two *vidyās*; and (this is so) owing also to the distinction between the questioners; indeed, in the earlier case, the questioner is Ushasta, in the later Kahola. To this

<sup>1145</sup>. The *Sadvidyā* is taught to Śvetaketu in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI). The repetition of questions and answers here is compared to the repetition of questions and answers in the sections of

the *Byih. Up.* dealing with the teachings given to Ushasta and Kahola. In both cases, the repetitions expound the varied glories of the *Brahman*.

objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the reply as follows :—

व्यतिहारो विशिषन्ति हीतरवत्

**Sūtra 36.** *Vyatihāro viśiṣhanti hītaravat*

(390)

Interchange has to be made (of each other's ideas, by Ushasta and Kahola) ; indeed, they (i.e., the teachings of Yājñavalkya) particularise (one and the same *Brahman*) ; as is the case elsewhere (in the teaching on the *Sadvidyā*).

There is no distinction here between the two *vidyās* ; because, through the questions and answers, which have one and the same kind of subject-matter, and through a single word expressive of the injunction, it is made out that the context is one and the same. Surely, both the questions relate to the *Brahman* as characterised by the quality of being the Internal Self of all beings. In the second question, namely, "He alone who is none other than the *Brahman* directly perceived everywhere and at all times and who is the Self within all" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 5. 1), the word, 'alone' (or '*eva*'), determines accurately, for the question of Kahola, that it has for its object that *Brahman* who is associated with the qualities about which Ushasta asked earlier ; and the answer given, namely, "He is your Self who is within all beings" (*Ibid.*), is undoubtedly related to the *Brahman* who is associated with the quality of being the Internal Self of all beings. And the injunctive suffix is itself seen to occur later on only in the passage :— "Therefore, one who has studied the *Veda*, having attained proficiency and being associated with childlike qualities, should worship the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.*).

It being in this manner determined that both the sets of questions and answers have for their object only that *Brahman* who is associated with the quality of being the

Self of all beings, as between Ushasta and Kahola an interchange of each other's ideas has to be effected in relation to one and the same *Brahman* who is their object of worship as associated with the quality of being the Self of all beings. That idea of Ushasta which relates to the *Brahman*, who is the Internal Self of all, being the cause of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life, that has to be adopted even by the questioner, Kahola ; and that idea of Kahola, which relates to the quality of transcending hunger etc. that belongs to that same *Brahman*, that has to be adopted even by Ushasta.

If in this manner the interchange of ideas is effected, then the differentiation of the individual self from the *Brahman* who is within all beings becomes accurately determined by both (those questioners). It is, indeed, with the object of making known that this *Brahman*, who is the Internal Self of all beings, is distinct from the individual self, that the replies of (the teacher) Yājñyavalkya, particularise Him, by establishing (in regard to Him) the quality of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life and the quality of transcending hunger etc. Therefore the *Brahman's* quality of being the Internal Self of all beings is the only quality that has to be meditated upon ; and the quality of sustaining life and such others are its proofs, and should not be meditated upon.

It may, however, be said as follows. If the quality to be meditated upon is that of being the Internal Self of all, then for what purpose should there be meditation by both the questioners interchanging the quality of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life and the quality of transcending hunger etc. ? To this the reply is given as follows. Through the quality of sustaining life in all beings endowed with life, the *Brahman*, who is the Internal Self of all beings, is understood by Ushasta as distinct from the individual self ; and it being so, with the idea that through a particular characteristic which the individual self can never have, the *Brahman*, who is the Internal Self of all

beings, has to be meditated upon as distinct (from the individual self), the question was again asked by Kahola. Yājñyavalkya, knowing his mind, taught the quality of being hostile to hunger etc., which can never be thought of as existing in relation to the individual self. For that reason also (i.e., because Kahola's question is for clarifying the difference), with the object of producing the idea of differentiation of the object of worship (from the individual self through differentiating qualities), the idea of mutual exchange has to be adopted by both of them.<sup>1146</sup>

"As is the case elsewhere." For instance, "elsewhere," that is, in the case of the *Sadvidyā*, often and often by means of questions and answers, that same *Brahman* who is dealt with under the name of 'Sat', is distinguished from the individual self; but it is not declared therein that He is to be meditated upon as associated with a quality which is different from the quality that was understood to exist (in relation to Him) earlier in the same context. The case here resembles that.

Even in regard to that *Sadvidyā*, there being distinction regarding questions and answers, it may be asked how oneness is made out to exist between them. If it be so asked, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:—

सैव हि सत्यादयः

*Sūtra 37. Saiva hi satyādayaḥ*

(391)

1146. (i) A multitude of differentiating qualities makes clear the difference between the individual self and the Supreme Self to the worshipper engaged in meditation. Hence Ushasta will benefit from the teaching given to Kahola, and the latter by the instruction to Ushasta. (ii) The argument that because

there are two interrogators in Kahola and Ushasta two different *vidyās* must be presumed to be taught to them (p. 343) is not specifically answered. But a single *vidyā* can be taught to more than one aspirant. The *Vaiṣṇavara-vidyā*, for instance, is taught to six seekers in the *Chhand. Up.*

Indeed, That (Supreme Deity) Itself is (the subject in the *Sadvidyā*); (being) *Satya* and other qualities (are accumulated in regard to It).

Indeed, "That Itself," that is, that Supreme Deity Itself which is denoted by the word 'Sat' and which is the Supreme Cause of all things, is introduced as the subject-matter in the passages:—"That same Deity saw (i.e., thought)" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 3. 2*) and "*Tejas* (i.e., the subtle elements with the self) rests in the Supreme Deity (when a person dies)" (*Ibid. VI. 8. 6; 15. 2*); and it is explained in the various turns (of the teacher's discourse) beginning with, "Just as bees make honey" (*Ibid. VI. 9.1*). Because (the qualities of being) the *Satya* and others which are mentioned in the first turn (of the discourse) thus, "All this has that *Brahman* for its Self; That is real; That is the Self" (*Ibid. VI. 8. 7*), are explained in all the turns and set out at the end.<sup>1147</sup>

Some (i.e., the *Advaitins*), however, describe the two aphorisms, "Interchange has to be made (of each other's ideas); they (i.e., the replies of Yājñavalkya) particularise (one and the same *Brahman*)" and "Indeed, That (Supreme Deity) Itself is (the subject of the *Sadvidyā*); (being) *Satya* and other qualities (are accumulated in regard to It)" (*Ved. Sūt. III. 3. 36-7*), as comprising two *adhikaraṇas*. They say that by the first among them is taught that meditation involving interchange of the individual self and the Supreme Self (as subjects thereof), which is declared in the following passages, "Reverend Deity, I am indeed you; Reverend Deity, you are indeed I" (?) and "Therefore, whatever I am, that is

1147. "The Supreme Deity" is the subject throughout the context in *Chhānd. Up. (VI)*. Various glories are predicated of It. At every turn of the teaching, to show that the Deity to be worshipped is the

Supreme Cause of the world, its qualities of being the unchanging Real, the Self of all and the Internal Controller of individual selves are repeatedly mentioned.

that (Deity), and whatever that (Deity) is, that I am" (*Ait. Ār.* II. 2. 4. 6). That view is related to the existence of the Self as all things, as learnt from the following passages: "All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1), "All this has Him for its Self" (*Ibid.* VI. 8. 7) and "That thou art" (*Ibid.*); and therefore there is nothing that is new that deserves to form the object of the teaching here: and therefore that view has to be disregarded. That, however, will be explained later on under the aphorism, "But they (i.e., the Jābālas) worship (the Lord) as the self; and they (i.e., the scriptural passages) make us comprehend (it as such)" (*Ved Sūt.* IV. 1. 3). Moreover, except there be meditation as the Self of all things, meditation on the Supreme *Brahman* as the individual self and on the individual self as the Supreme *Brahman* will never be based on truth.

And by means of the later aphorism, oneness is declared to exist between the meditation on the *Sat* as declared in the passage, "He who meditates on this (heart) as great, worthy of veneration, unchanging, first-born and infinite" (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 4. 1) and the meditation declared in the passage, "What is the well known Real, that is this Sun; He is the Person within the sphere (of the sun), the Person in the right eye" (*Ibid.* V. 5. 1). This is also improper. Because in the later passage, owing to the distinction of places like the eye etc., there is distinction of *vidyās*, as was established earlier indeed under the aphorism, "Indeed, it is not so, because there is distinction" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 21). Further, in these two (types of) passages (in *Bṛih. Up.* V. 4 and V. 5), there are two *vidyās*, which have for their subject what has the mystic syllables for the body. Those two meditations have their separate connection with the fruit and injunction, as stated in the passage, "He who worships thus kills sin and gives up (the body)" (*Ibid.* V. 5. 2); and (these two) cannot be non-distinct from (i.e., identical with) the one previously mentioned meditation which is

independent, owing to its connection with the fruit as stated in the passage, "Indeed, he who meditates on this (heart) as great, worthy of veneration, first-born, unchanging and infinite, he conquers these worlds" (*Ibid.* V. 4. 1).<sup>1148</sup>

It should not be urged that the passage, "He kills sin and gives up (the body)" (*Ibid.* V. 5. 2), relates to the results of a subordinate part (of the *vidyā*), because there is no reason for it. If it be said that oneness of the *vidyās* with the earlier (*vidyā*) is the reason, it is replied it is not right to say so, because then the fallacy of reciprocal dependence arises (thus). When the two *vidyās* are definitely determined to be one, the fruit of the earlier is itself the chief fruit, and hence the two subsequent fruits (of killing sin and giving up the body) are the fruits of the subordinate part; if those two (latter) are definitely determined to be the fruits of the subordinate part, then they cannot be distinct from the connection with the chief fruit, and so there will be oneness of *vidyās* with the earlier (*vidyā*): thus there arises the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. Thus, through such (arguments) as these, the two aphorisms are only (to be understood) as set forth above.<sup>1149</sup>

1148. *Sūtras* 36 and 37 constitute two distinct sections, according to Śaṅkara, who numbers them 37 and 38. Rāmaṇuja sets down this difference and then argues in favour of his own views.

1149. As regards the difference in fruit, Śaṅkara's argument is slightly different. The result mentioned in connection with *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 5) is said

to merely by way of glorifying the teaching about the secret names of the *Satya*. Moreover, if the results are to be sought for in *arthavāda* (on account of specially qualified aspirants not being defined), then the results mentioned in the parts of the *vidyā* are to be cumulated. Rāmaṇuja may have adduced an additional argument in favour of Śaṅkara's position.

## ADHIKARANA XVI

## KĀMĀDHIKARANA

कामादीतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः

**Sūtra 38.** *Kāmādītaratra tatra*  
*chāyatanādibhyaḥ* (392)

The qualities of willing the truth etc. are given elsewhere (i.e., in the *Bṛih. Up.*) and there (i.e., in the *Chhānd. Up.*), because of the qualities of having the heart as the abode etc. (bringing them to the mind).

In the *Chhāndogya* it is declared as follows: "Now, in this city of the *Brahman* (i.e., in the body), there is the small lotuslike home (i.e., heart); that subtle ether which is inside of it and what is within that (subtle ether), that (i.e., the subtle ether and what is inside it) has to be sought after" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.). In the *Vājasaneyaka* also, it is declared thus: "Indeed, that same Great Being who is unborn, He consists of knowledge among the senses; that which is the ether inside the heart, in it He sleeps; He is the controller of all, the ruler of all..." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22). Here there is the doubt whether in these two passages there is distinction of *vidyās* or not. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? There is distinction. Why? Because there is distinction as regards their forms. That *Ākāśa*, which is associated with the eight qualities of being free from sin etc., is made out in the *Chhāndogya* to be the object of worship. But in the *Vājasaneyaka*, He who sleeps in the *ākāśa* and is associated with the qualities of being the controller of all etc., is made out to be the object of worship. Therefore, there is distinction of *vidyās* due to the distinction of forms.



If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows. That there is no distinction of the *vidyās*. Why? Because there is no distinction of forms. Elsewhere and there, also, the form consists of the qualities of willing the truth etc. In the *Chhāndogya* and the *Vājasaneyaka*, the *Brahman*, who is associated with the qualities of willing the truth etc., is Himself the object of worship: this is the meaning. How is this made out? Because of (His qualities of having) the heart as the abode etc. (which are mentioned in both the contexts). From the qualities of His having the heart as His abode, of His being the bridge, of His being the support etc., it is recognised that there is the very same *vidyā* in both the contexts. The qualities of being the controller of all things etc., which are declared in the *Vājasaneyaka*, are merely particular forms of the quality of willing the truth, which is one of the eight qualities that are declared in the *Chhāndogya*: therefore, they (i.e., these particular forms) produce the knowledge of the existence of the qualities which are mentioned together with the quality of willing the truth etc.—(namely, those) which begin with the quality of willing the truth and extend up to and include the quality of being free from sin. Therefore, the forms of the *vidyās* do not differ.<sup>1150</sup>

Their connection with the fruit also consists in the attainment of the *Brahman* and is not distinct according to the following passages:—"Having attained the Supreme

<sup>1150</sup>. The arguments in favour of the two meditations in *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII) and *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4) being different are based on the qualities enumerated in the two contexts being different; the Possessors of those qualities are also differently described as the *Ākāśa* in one and the Person sleeping in the *ākāśa* in the other. The reply is that the qualities of being the Controller of all things etc., given in the *Bṛih. Up.*, are merely forms of

the quality of willing the truth mentioned in the other context. The other qualities mentioned along with willing the truth are also to be recalled in connection with the meditation given in the *Bṛih. Up.* The common reference to the *Brahman* having the heart as the abode etc. shows the object of worship to have the same form. See *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 1 & 3) and *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 22) for the common characteristics.

Light, he becomes manifest in his own true nature" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3); and "Indeed, he becomes (of like nature with) the *Brahman* who is fearlessness" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 25).

That the word, 'Ākāśa', denotes the Supreme Self in the *Chhāndogya* has been already determined under the aphorism, "The 'little ether' (within the heart denotes the *Brahman*), because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context refer to Him)" (*Veā. Sūt.* I. 3. 13). But in the *Vājasaneyaka*, He who sleeps in the *ākāśa* is declared to possess the qualities of controlling all things etc., and therefore, that Sleeper being the Supreme Self, the word, 'ākāśa', which denotes the support of that (Self) is made out—in the passage, "Within it (i.e., the heart) there is a subtle cavity" (*M. Nār.* XI. 9) —to denote that *ākāśa*, which is inside the heart and is denoted by the word 'cavity'. Hence there is oneness of the *viśvās*.<sup>1151</sup>

Again, it may be said (by the *Advaitins*) as follows. What has been stated above to the effect, that in the *Vājasaneyaka*, along with the qualities of being the controller etc., the existence of the qualities of desiring the truth etc. is made out, that is not appropriate to say; because there the qualities of being the controller etc. themselves do not have existence, considered from the standpoint of the highest reality. The non-existence of that (i.e., the existence of the qualities) is made out from the *Brahman*, who is to be worshipped, being apprehended as without attributes; as stated in the following passage where the subject is introduced: "Afterwards (i.e., after 'hearing' and thinking), He has to be seen only with the mind; here (in the *Brahman*) there is no manifoldness whatever; he goes from death to death (in the cycle of *samsāra*), who sees even the slightest manifoldness here

1151. Raṅgarāmānuja, in his commentary on the *Bṛih. Up.*, takes *akāśa* in *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4.

22) to mean the individual self on the strength of an earlier passage (IV. 3. 7).

(in the *Brahman*). This (*Brahman*) has to be seen afterwards as one only"; and (stated) also in a later passage: "He, this Self above-named, is described as 'not so', 'not so'" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19, 20, 22). Therefore, it is made out that the qualities of being the controller of all etc., like the qualities of being not gross, not atomic, etc., are to be denied in relation to Him. For this very reason, in the *Chhāndogya* also, the qualities of desiring the truth etc. are not stated to be the really existing qualities of the *Brahman*. Therefore, qualities of this kind, owing to their being unreal, are rejected among the meditations which are intended to achieve salvation.<sup>1152</sup> To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:—

आदरादलोपः

Sūtra 39. Ādurādulopah

(393)

There is no rejection (of the auspicious qualities of the *Brahman*), because there is ardour (in teaching about them).

These qualities of desiring the truth etc. are not arrived at as the qualities of the *Brahman* through

<sup>1152</sup>. Sāṅkara takes the view that the *dahara-vidyā* of *Chhand. Up.* teaches meditation on the *Brahman* with attributes, while meditation on the *Brahman* without attributes is enjoined in *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4). The latter alone is intended for the purpose of the final emancipation of the self. At the same time, Sāṅkara states that the qualities of the *Brahman* given in each of these two contexts are to be recalled and understood in the other. But in the case of the *dahara-vidyā*, the qualities from the other context seem to be for meditation. In the *Bṛih. Up.* context, the qualities of the *dahara-vidyā* are merely added

on, as it were, to glorify the *Brahman*, and they are not intended to be meditated on. The *Bhamatī* explains that though there is distinction of *vidyās*, on account of the *Brahman* being with attributes in regard to one and without attributes in regard to the other, there is the rule for each context including the qualities in the other. Rāmaṇuja finds a reply to this view in the next two aphorisms, which Sāṅkara treats as a new section dealing with the question whether or not the *prāṇāgni-hotra*, mentioned in connection with the *Vaiśvānara-vidyā*, is to be performed when one is fasting.

other means of (knowledge than the scripture); in the following and other passages in these two scriptural contexts (in *Chhānd. Up.* and *Bṛih. Up.*), "What exists with that (subtle ether), that (i.e., the subtle ether and what is inside it) has to be sought after.....This Self is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst; He desires the truth, He wills the truth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1, 6) and "He is the controller of all, the ruler of all... He is sovereign over all, He is the lord of all beings, He is the protector of all beings, He is the 'bridge' and the support of all these worlds so that they may not get into confusion" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22), and in other (scriptural) contexts, they are taught with ardour as the qualities of the *Brahman*, who is the object of worship in all the meditations that are intended for the purpose of achieving salvation; and hence there is no rejection of them, but on the other hand, they have to be cumulated (in those meditations).

In the *Chhāndogya*, surely, the passage, "Now, to those who depart from here, after having known the Self and also these eternal and auspicious qualities, there is free movement in all the worlds" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6), mentions the knowledge of the *Brahman* who is associated with the qualities of desiring the truth etc.; then in the statement, "Therefore, to those who depart from here, not having known the Self and these eternal and auspicious qualities, there is no free movement in all the worlds" (*Ibid.*), it passes a censure on the absence of worship; it (thus) shows ardour in regard to the worship that is associated with auspicious qualities. To the same effect the following passage is given in the *Vājasaneyaka*: "He is the controller of all, the ruler of all.....He is the sovereign over all, He is the lord of all beings, He is the protector of all beings" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22). Here (His) sovereignty is taught often and often, and therefore ardour is made out to exist in regard to His auspicious qualities. The same is the case elsewhere also. Moreover,

the scripture which has more parental affection than hundreds of mothers and fathers cannot, like an impostor, first teach with earnestness auspicious qualities which are unreal and liable to be set aside and which have not been arrived at by other means of knowledge, and then deceive and set moving again (in the coils of *samsāra*) those who desire salvation and are already in motion through the revolution of the wheel of *samsāra*.

But in the passage: "There is nothing here that is manifold... He should be seen as one only" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 19, 20), it is stated that as all things have been produced by the *Brahman* as the cause of all things, they have Him as their Self, and therefore perception of Him as one only is laid down; then the perception, established earlier (to proper instruction), of manifoldness (in all things), through their not having the *Brahman* as their Self, is denied. This subject has been extensively dealt with already (in Vol. I, p. 107). And also in the case of the passage, "He, this aforesaid Self, is known as 'not so', 'not so'" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 22), by the word, 'so', reference is made to the form of the world as known through other means of knowledge; and then it is declared that the *Brahman* is not of that kind, and that hence the *Brahman*, who is the Self of all, is entirely distinct from the world.

This same thing (i.e., His being different from all things) is established immediately afterwards: He is incapable of being apprehended (by other means of knowledge) and so is not apprehended; incapable of destruction, He is not destroyed; not being attached, indeed, He has no attachments; not being subject to pains, He is not pained; He is not hurt" (*Ibid.*). As He is distinct from all things that are capable of being apprehended by other means of knowledge, He is not apprehended by the other means of knowledge (than the scripture). As He is distinct from objects that are capable of being broken to pieces, He is not shattered into pieces. In the same manner the qualities mentioned later on in the context have to be understood. In the

*Chhāndogya* also, there is the passage: "Through its (i.e., of the body) old age, this (subtle ether or the *Brahman*) does not become old; through its death, (this) is not killed. It is for this reason, indeed, that this Real Entity is the city known as the *Brahman*. In this are contained all desirable qualities" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6); here it is declared that the *Brahman* is distinct from all things and that the qualities of desiring the truth etc. are authoritatively taught in relation to Him.

It may, however, be further said (by the *Advaitins*) as follows. Even so, by means of the passage beginning with, "Now, to those who depart from here, after having known the Self and these eternal and auspicious qualities, there is free movement in all the worlds. If he desires to attain the world of the manes....." (*Ibid.* VIII. 1. 6; 2. 1), in regard to the worship of Him who is associated with the qualities of desiring the truth etc., the connection with the fruit appertaining to *samsāra* is declared; therefore for him who is desirous of salvation and wants to attain the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* who is associated with qualities cannot be the object of worship. Moreover, the fruit of the worship of the Supreme Being is this only, namely, "Having attained the Highest Light, he (i.e., the released self) is revealed in his own true form" (*Ibid.* VIII. 3. 4). Therefore, the qualities of desiring the truth etc. should not be included (in meditation) by one who is desirous of attaining the *Brahman*.

To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:

उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात्

**Sūtra 40.** *Upasthite' tastadvachanāt*

(394)

In regard to him who has attained (the *Brahman*), because of that (attainment) only (there is free movement in the worlds of the manes etc.), because there are scriptural statements to that effect.

'*Upasthiti*' means '*upasthāna*' (or attainment); that is, when the individual self, free from all bondage and revealed in his own true form, attains the *Brahman*, because of that only, that is, for the very reason that there has been attainment of the *Brahman*, it is stated that he has free movement in all the worlds thus: "Having attained the Highest Light, he (i.e., the released Self) is revealed his own true form. He (i.e., the Highest Light or the *Brahman*) is the Highest Person; he (i.e., the released self) moves about there (in the Highest Heaven), eating, playing and enjoying either in the company of women or with vehicles or in the company of relations; he (in His presence) does not mind this body which has had birth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3); and "He (i.e., the released self) is his own ruler, he has free movement in all the worlds" (*Ibid.* VII. 25. 2). This point (i.e., how there is free movement to one attaining the *Brahman*) will be examined with very great skill in the fourth Chapter. Thus, free movement in all the worlds is a fruit that is enjoyed by released souls, and therefore the qualities of desiring the truth etc. have to be included (in meditation) by him who is desirous of salvation.<sup>1153</sup>

## ADHIKARANA XVII

### TANNIRDHĀRAṆĀNIYAMĀDHIKARANA

तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्वृष्टेः पृथग्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्

Sūtra 41. *Tannirdhāraṇāniyamastaddṛiṣṭeḥ  
prithaghyapratibandhaḥ phalam* (395)

That determined thinking is not compulsory because it is so seen to exist; indeed its fruit, which is non-obstruction, is separate.

<sup>1153</sup>. The reference to the fourth Chapter appears to be to IV. 4. 7-8.

There is the passage: "One should meditate on the syllable, 'Om', as the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 1). This and other such meditations are connected with the auxiliaries of works (i.e., sacrificial rites); their observance as auxiliaries to works is well established through the *udgītha* etc., which are auxiliaries to works, just as the being made of *parṇa* wood (is established as an auxiliary to the sacrifice) through the ladle etc.; therefore, those things which are connected with the *udgītha* also have necessarily to be included in sacrificial rites, because it is not proper to assume a separate fruit as enjoined by what is indicated by the present tense in the passage, "That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation, associated with faith and with the knowledge of the *Brahman*, that certainly is possessed of greater power" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10)—just as it is assumed in the case of the fruit which is connected with the ladle being made of *parṇa* wood and which consists in not hearing any evil statement;<sup>1154</sup> therefore, they (namely, meditation etc., on the *udgītha* etc.) have necessarily to be included in sacrifices.

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply as follows: "That determined thinking is not compulsory." 'Determined thinking' is fixing of the mind definitely; it means meditation. 'That determined thinking is not compulsory' means that the meditations on the *udgītha* etc. are not compulsory in sacrifices. Why? "Because

<sup>1154</sup>. The *juhū* is a kind of *śruṣa* or wooden ladle for pouring ghee into the sacrificial fire. In *Taitt. Sam.* (III. 5. 7. 2) it is stated that one whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* (i.e., *palīṣa*) wood, does not hear any unpleasant statement. In *Pūr. Mīm.* (III. 6. 1-8), it is established that this statement about the *parṇa* wood is merely eulogistic and that it does not lay down a

special result. Thus, the *juhū* has to be made always of *parṇa* wood; there is no option left to the sacrificer to use such a ladle only when he desires the special result mentioned above. On the contrary, the special result mentioned in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1. 10) is not eulogistic; therefore, one desirous of it alone need carry out the injunction leading to the fruit.



it is so seen (in the scriptures)". That the carrying out of the meditations on the *udgītha* etc. is not compulsory is known from the passages:—"With it (i.e., the chanting of the syllable, 'Om'), both have to do (the ritual), he who meditates and he who does not meditate" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10), because there is here the statement<sup>1155</sup> about the performance of the ritual even by one who does not meditate. Moreover, if it (i.e., meditation) be an auxiliary to a sacrifice, it cannot be appropriate that the meditation is not compulsory. If in this manner the meditation is definitely determined not to be an auxiliary, then the injunction relating to the meditation desiderates a fruit; it being so, according to the maxim of the *rātri-satra*,<sup>1155</sup> it is made out that the quality of possessing greater power is the fruit, which is undoubtedly distinct from that of the (main) sacrificial ritual.

It may be asked what this quality of possessing greater power is. It is non-obstruction to the fruit itself of the sacrifice. Indeed, the fruit of the sacrifice is obstructed by the fruit of a more powerful ritual, so long as it lasts; the negation of this (obstruction) is non-obstruction. This non-obstruction certainly is a fruit different from that of the sacrifice which has the characteristic of attaining *Svarga* etc.; therefore it is stated (in the aphorism here): "Indeed, its fruit, which is non-obstruction, is separate."

Thus, the meditations on the *udgītha*, even though dependent upon auxiliaries to sacrificial rites, possess different fruits (from those of the sacrificial rites); and therefore, as is the case with (bringing water for certain

1155. The *rātri-satra* is a night-sacrifice. In *Pūr. Mīm.* (IV. 3. 17-19), it is established that in connection with such a sacrifice, for which no results have been laid down in the injunction, the results mentioned

in an *arthavāda* passage have to be regarded as promised. Here the fruit laid down in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 1. 10) has to be adopted as a distinct fruit for the meditation on the *udgītha*, enjoined in *Ibid.* (I. 1. 1).

sacrifices in) the *godohana* (or milk-pail),<sup>1156</sup> so also, in the case of the meditations on the *udgītha* that are related to sacrificial rites there is acceptance without any binding rule.

## ADHIKARANA XVIII

### PRADĀNĀDHIKARANA

#### प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम्

**Sūtra 42.** *Pradānavadeva taduktam*

(396)

It (i.e., the repetition of the meditation on the Possessor of the qualities in the case of every quality mentioned in the *dahara-vidyā*) has to be made, as is, indeed, the case with oblations; this has been already explained.

Regarding the *dahara-vidyā* there is the following passage:—"Now, those who depart from here, after having known the Self, and these (His) eternal and auspicious qualities....." (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* VIII. 1. 6); here the meditation on the *daharākāśa*, which is the Supreme Self, is (first) stated; and then, by the expression, "these (His) eternal and auspicious qualities," the meditation on the qualities is also separately enjoined. Here the doubt is raised whether, or not, even while meditating upon the qualities, the meditation on the Self, *Dahara*, as characterised by those qualities, has to be repeated.

1156. The *godohana* is a milk-pail. It is laid down that one desirous of having wealth in the form of cattle should bring water in the *godohana* (and not in the usual *chamasa* or big cup) for certain sacrifices. See *Pūr. Mīm.* (IV. 1. 2). Here the use of

the milk-pail is optional: it is intended only for those who desire cattle. Similarly, the meditation on the *udgītha* is optional and intended for those who wish for more potent results.

Because it is the *daharākāśa* (i.e., Supreme Self) who is the Possessor of the qualities of being free from sin etc., and because it is possible for that (Self) to be meditated upon only once, meditation upon Him for the sake of the qualities need not be repeated.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : "as is indeed the case with oblations". The meaning is that it should undoubtedly be repeated as is the case with oblations. No doubt, it is only the *daharākāśa* who is the possessor of the qualities of being free from sin etc., and He is first meditated upon. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the form that is associated with qualities is distinct from the essential nature, and inasmuch as also by means of the passage beginning with, "He is devoid of sin, free from old age" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6), He is enjoined as the object of worship by reason of His being associated with qualities, therefore, for the purpose of meditating upon Him as associated with qualities, repetition (of meditation) in relation to Him who has been meditated upon before through His essential nature has to be made.

For instance, there is the following passage — "Offerings should be made on eleven potsherd to Indra the king, to Indra the great king, to Indra the independent ruler" (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 3. 6. 2). Although Indra alone is associated with the qualities of kingship etc., the form associated with each such quality is distinct, and so repetition of oblations is practised in the case of each form. This has been already stated in the *Saṅkarshaṇa-kāṇḍa* thus: "The deity is distinct (in the case of each offering), because it (i.e., the deity) is distinct through its possessing distinct forms (in association with distinct qualities)" (II. 2. *Adhikaraṇa* 15).<sup>1157</sup>

1157. In the sacrificial rite known as the *traidhātavīyeshṭi*, Indra is invoked as the king, the great king and as the independent ruler. These three distinct

descriptions are taken as justifying Indra in his three different aspects being treated as three distinct deities and presented with separate offerings.

## ADHIKARĀNA XIX

## LINGABHŪYASTVĀDHIKARĀNA

लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि

**Sūtra 43.** *Liṅgabhūyastvāttaddhi bālīyastadapi* (397)

Because there is an abundance of indicatory marks (the *Nārāyaṇa-anuvāka* deals with the object of worship in all the *vidyār*) ; such passages are more powerful than the context ; this has been already explained.

The *Taittirīya* texts, immediately after the *dahara-vidyā*, set out a context, opening with the following passage : “ He who has a thousand heads, who is divine, whose eyes see everything, who brings about good to the universe, who is the universe, who is Nārāyaṇa, who is the Lord, who is unchanging, who is the Supreme Master ” (*M. Nār.* XI. 1) ; and (it) ends with : “ He is the released self, the Supreme Being, the absolutely independent one ” (*Ibid.* XI. 13). Here the doubt is raised whether, by means of this passage, through oneness of *vidyā* with the *vidyā* introduced earlier in the context, the particular determination of the object of worship therein (i.e., in the previous *vidyā*) is accomplished, or whether the particular determination relates to the object of worship associated with (all) the meditations that are prescribed by all the *Vedānta* texts. What is it that is arrived at by reasoning ? That it is the particular determination of the object of meditation of the *dahara-vidyā*. How ? Because of the context. Indeed, in the previous *anuvāka*, the *dahara-vidyā* is introduced as the subject-matter in the following passage : “ That small lotus (i.e., the heart) which is free from impurity, which is the home of the Supreme Being, which exists in the centre of the

city (i.e., the body), even in it is the subtle *Brahman* which is (infinite) like space, free from sorrow (sin, etc.); that and what is in that have (both) to be meditated upon" (*Ibid.* X. 7). In this *anuvāka* also, in the passage beginning with "The end pointing downwards, the heart is in the form of the calyx of a lotus" (*Ibid.* XI. 7), the lotuslike heart is mentioned; and this confirms the view that this *Nārāyaṇānuvāka* is determinative of the object of worship as taught by the *dahara-vidyā*.

If it be so arrived at, we reply : "Because there is an abundance of indicatory marks" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 43). For the purpose of showing that this (*Nārāyaṇānuvāka*) is specifically determinative of the object of worship in all the meditations on the Supreme Being, numerous indicatory marks are seen. It comes out in the following manner. In the meditations relating to the Supreme Being, the object of worship is denoted by the words, 'Akshara' (or the Indestructible), 'Śiva', 'Śambhu' (or He who does good), 'Parabrahman', 'the Supreme Light', 'the Supreme Entity', 'the Supreme Self' etc.; here (in the *Nārāyaṇānuvāka*) that object of worship is referred to by those very words, and is then authoritatively declared to be *Nārāyaṇa*. After repeating the things (i.e., the names) given in a very large number of *vidyās*, there is an abundance of the authoritative declarations about (these being) *Nārāyaṇa*. This abundance furnishes an abundance of marks, that is, very many marks, for the particular determination, that *Nārāyaṇa* alone is the object of worship in all the *vidyās*, and is the Supreme *Brahman* who is possessed of the qualities of bliss etc. that are associated with the qualities of not being gross etc.

Here the word, 'liṅga', is synonymous of symbol or sign. The meaning is that there are many passages which serve as signs. Such passages are, indeed, superior to the context for purposes of interpretation. This also has been explained in the first *Kāṇḍa* under the aphorism, "Independent scriptural texts, indicatory marks, sentences

(or short passages), contexts (or long passages), positional strength, names (or derivative words)—where these are all applicable (but tending to different results), one is superior to the other in order, because the significance of each succeeding thing is more remote" (*Pūr. Mīm.* III. 3. 14).<sup>1158</sup>

What has been stated above to the effect that the statement, "It (i.e., the heart) is in the form of the calyx of the lotus" (*Ibid.* XI. 7), confirms the view that it (i.e., the *Nārāyaṇānuvāka*) is complementary to the passage relating to the *dahara-vidyā*—that is not correct, because, where through a more powerful means of knowledge it is ascertained that it (i.e., the *Nārāyaṇānuvāka*) is determinative of the object of worship in all meditations, in regard to the *dahara-vidyā* also, that same *Nārāyaṇa* is the object of worship; thus that statement (above-quoted) becomes appropriate.

It should not, however, be supposed, that by the denotation of *Nārāyaṇa* by the accusative in "Him who has a thousand heads" etc., there is connection with the worshipper who is mentioned in the earlier *anuvāka* in the context. Because in the statement, "What is within It should be meditated upon" (*Ibid.* X. 7), by means of the *krit* affix ('*tavya*' in '*upāsītavya*'), which is associated with the person who performs the worship, it is the work connected with the object of worship that is expressed, and hence it is not appropriate for the object that is worshipped by him to have the accusative case. "This

1158. This is an important exegetical rule. Self-sufficient scriptural texts are the strongest in determining the meaning. Next to them are the *līngas* or indicatory marks. Less important are sentences or groups of words syntactically connected; contexts or long passages are even more so. The relative

position of two texts or two enjoined acts ranks lower still. Finally, there is the etymological significance—Vedic or profane—of some words as affording a clue to interpretation by establishing a context, suggesting a connection between different passages and so on.

*Purusha* is the universe", "Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Entity" (*Ibid.* XI. 3, 4)—in these there is denotation by the nominative and, therefore, it has to be known that the accusatives have all the sense of the nominative. There are also the following statements, "(Whatever thing there is in this world, either seen or heard) Nārāyaṇa pervades all that within and without and so remains.....In the middle of that flame the Supreme Self is seated. He is (the fourfaced creator) Brahmā, He is Śiva, He is Indra, He is the *akshara* (or the released soul), the Supreme, the absolutely independent Being" (*Ibid.* XI. 5, 13); through the denotations of these words, it is determined that Nārāyaṇa alone, who is superior to all, is the object of worship in all the *vidyās*. For this reason also, it is definitely determined that the accusative is used in the sense of the nominative.

## ADHIKARANA XX

### PURVAVIKALPĀDHIKARANA

#### पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत्

Sūtra 44. *Pūrvavikalpāḥ prakaraṇātsyāt  
kriyā mānasavat* (398)

They (i.e., the *manaschit* meditation etc.) are admissible along with those (sacrifices) which are mentioned earlier, because they are given in the context as subsidiary to the sacrifice; as is the case with the *mānasa* ritual.

In the section known as *Agnirahasya*, which belongs to the *Vājasaneyaka* (i.e., *Śat. Br.* X),—the fires known as *manaschit* (built by the mind) etc. are declared, namely, those built by the mind, those built by speech, those built by the vital air, those built by the eyes, those built

by the ears, those built by (the organs of) action and those built by (the gastric) fire. Here the doubt is raised whether these fires which, owing to their having been obtained through mental construction, have the nature of meditation, get the characteristics of action on account of having entered into the sacrifice of action, or whether they have the nature of meditation itself, owing to their entering into the sacrifice of knowledge. In this circumstance, it is stated thus in the aphorism beginning with: "They are admissible along with those which are mentioned earlier..." (*Ved. Sūta*. III. 3. 44). Because these fires, built of mind etc., which have been obtained through mental construction, are in need of entering into the sacrificial ritual; because there is no injunction about them in the place where they are given; because, also, in the passage beginning with, "Non-existence, indeed, was this in the beginning" (*Sat. Br.* VI. 1. 1), the fire on the brick-altar is introduced as the subject-matter; and because that fire, being invariably concomitant with the sacrifice of works, is in close proximity to the sacrificial ritual,—the fires built up by the mind etc., which are comprised in that context, are admissible along with the fire on the brick-altar, and they have undoubtedly the character of the sacrifice consisting of works.

Even as regards those fires which have the character of knowledge, it is appropriate for them to assume the character of action through their entry into the sacrifice consisting of action, as is the case with the vessel belonging to the *mānasa* (or mental) rite. For instance, in the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice, on the tenth day, known as 'avivākya'<sup>1159</sup>, in relation to the vessel of the *mānasa* ritual, taking (therein the *soma* juice), putting down in the proper place, chanting, reciting, bringing back (the

<sup>1159</sup>. The tenth day in the *dvādaśāha* of twelve days is called the *avivākya*. On that day recitations of varied passages

are not carried out. In *Taitt. Sam.* (VII. 3. 1), it is also suggested that the day should be free of disputes.



remnant of the sacrifice) and eating (therefrom)—all these have the nature of meditation on account of being carried out by the mind: hence even that which has the nature of meditation has the nature of the sacrifice of action as an auxiliary of that sacrifice. Here also it is thus.<sup>1160</sup>

### अतिदेशाच्च

Sūtra 45. *Atideśāchcha*

(399)

Because also of transfer.

For this reason also, the admissibility of such fires as the *manaschit* along with the fire of the brick-altar and their character as consisting of works are made out. There is the following passage: "Of these (*manaschit* fires), each is as much as that (fire on the brick-altar) earlier mentioned" (*Sat. Br. X. 4. 1. 3*): here that capability to do works which belongs to the fire on the brick-altar mentioned earlier in the context is transferred to *manaschit* and such other fires. As they produce effects similar to it, they have admissibility there. And therefore, as is the case with the fire on the brick-altar, through accomplishing that sacrifice, *manaschit* (fires) etc. are its auxiliaries; entering the sacrifice consisting of action, they are undoubtedly possessed of the character of the sacrifice consisting of action.

1160. In *Sat. Br. (X. 4. 3)*, the mental activities of a human life lasting for a hundred years are conceived of as 36,000 fires, each fire standing for a day's activities. These fires are built of the mind, and similar fires are spoken of as built of the *prāṇa*, the senses of vision and hearing, the organs of action and the digestive process. The question arises whether these fires, by virtue of their having only a mental existence, are of the nature of *vidyā*, or whether they

are connected with the sacrifices in the fires of the brick-altar described earlier. The latter view is sought to be supported by the analogy of a ritual in the *Soma* sacrifice; herein the sacrificer mentally visualises the sea as the *soma* juice in the cup of the earth, taking of the *soma* juice in the cup, putting down the cup in position, etc. Compare *Taitt. Sam. (VII. 3. 1)*. But the correct conclusion is that *vidyā* is taught.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows:

विद्यैव तु निर्धारणाद्दर्शनाच्च

**Sūtra 46.** *Vidyaiṣva tu nirdhāraṇād-  
darśanācchcha* (400)

But they are undoubtedly (of the nature of) *vidyā*, because it is so determined and because also there are scriptural statements to that effect.

The word 'but' (or 'tu') sets aside the *prima facie* view given above. What has been stated above to the effect that *manaśchit* (fires) etc., owing to their entry into the sacrifice consisting of action, are undoubtedly possessed of the character of the sacrifice of action—that view cannot stand. These "are undoubtedly of the nature of *vidyā*". The meaning is that they are associated with the sacrifice of knowledge. Why? "Because it is determined to be so and because also there are scriptural statements to that effect". Surely, that determination is contained in the following passage: "Those (fires) are built for knowledge only.....; to one who knows thus these become built for knowledge" (*Sat. Br. X. 4. 1. 12*). It is inappropriate for the activities of speech, mind, eye etc. to be piled up like bricks etc.; hence, although their having the character of knowledge is established through their having the character of a fire imagined in the mind, the determination in the statements, "(They) are built for knowledge only" and "For knowledge only, these become built", is definitely ascertained to be intended for reminding (us) of their consisting of knowledge through their association with the sacrifice of knowledge.

In this very context, their principal sacrifice, which is the sacrifice of knowledge, is also described, as in the following passage: "They (i.e., the *manaśchit* fires) were, laid by the mind itself, they were built up by the mind itself; in regard to these (fires), the vessels (for the

*soma* juice) were taken up by the mind itself, they chanted (the *stotras*) through the mind, they recited (the *śastras*) through the mind ; whatever little rite was carried out at the sacrifice, whatever little rite there was connected with the sacrifice, that was done through the mind only as consisting of the mind, in those (fires) built up by the mind" (*Ibid.* X. 4. 1. 3). There is thus the statement, that whatever sacrificial rite consisting of actions is performed in the fires on the brick-altar, that is done as consisting of the mind only in the fires built up of mind etc. and mentally imagined ; from this, it is made out that the sacrifice also here consists of knowledge.

It may, however, be said that because in the context there is no word containing an injunction and because also the connection with any fruit is not known to be given, their character as consisting of knowledge, by reason of their association with the sacrifice of knowledge, will itself be contradicted by the context relating to the sacrifice of action as determined by the proximity of the fire on the brick-altar. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies in the negative :

श्रुत्यादिवलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः

**Sūtra 47.** *Śrutyaādibaliyastvāchcha na bādhaḥ* (401)

Because self-sufficient scriptural texts etc. are more powerful (than the context), there is no contradiction (by the latter).

Because self-sufficient scriptural texts, indicative marks and sentences are more powerful than the context, the sacrifice (of knowledge) which is learnt through the self-sufficient scriptural texts etc. and the connection of these with that (sacrifice) cannot be contradicted by the context, which is (relatively) weak.

The self-sufficient scriptural text, indeed, is this: "Those (fires) are built for knowledge only" (*Sat. Br. X. 4. 1. 12*). The following passage explains it: "To one who knows thus, these become built for knowledge only" (*Ibid.*) The meaning is that *manaśchit* fires and similar fires get built up in association with knowledge, that is, with the sacrifice of knowledge. The indicatory mark is the following: "To one who knows thus, even while he is asleep, all beings at all times build up these above-mentioned (*manaśchit* fires etc.)" (*Ibid.*) And the sentence is this: "To one who knows thus.....(they) build up" (*Ibid.*). Bringing together (i.e., syntactical connection) makes a sentence. The meaning is that to one who knows thus, that is, in regard to one who performs the sacrifice of knowledge, at all times all beings build up (the fires). The building up (of the fires), which is done through the agency of all beings, which continues through all time, and which is imagined by the mind, cannot possibly enter into the sacrifice (of action) through the ritual performed in the fire on the brick-altar, which consists of action limited as regards time and agents; and this becomes the indicatory mark for entry into the sacrifice of knowledge.<sup>1161</sup>

It has also been stated above that because there is no injunctive suffix in the scriptural context, and because also connection with any fruit is not known, there can be no sacrifice consisting of knowledge which is other than the sacrifice consisting of action. To this (objection), he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) answers thus:

अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम्

**Sūtra 48.** *Anubandhādibhyaḥ prajñāntara-  
pṛithaktvavaddrishṭaścha taduktam* (402)

1161. Ś. P. explains that the building up of fires by all beings at all times means that the worshipper has to meditate on the mental operations of all beings at all times as fires and

not merely on his own mental operations. Thus the sacrifice is imagined in his mind as carried out by all beings and extending over all time.

Because through the subsidiaries etc. (the sacrifice of knowledge is inferred to be separate), as in the case of other *vidyās* being separate ; it (i.e., the injunction) also is seen ; this has been already explained.

Through the subsidiaries etc., which are the causes of otherness, the sacrifice of knowledge is known to be other than the sacrifice of action which is associated with the fire on the brick-altar. The subsidiaries are the subsidiaries of sacrifices such as vessels, hymns to be sung, texts to be recited, etc., which are given in the passage : " In regard to these (fires), the vessels (for the *soma* juice) were taken up by the mind itself, they chanted (the *stotras*) through the mind, they recited (the *śāstras*) through the mind " (Sat. Br. X. 4. 1. 3). By the expression, 'etc.' (in the *Sūtra*), the above-mentioned (bases for interpretation consisting of) self-sufficient scriptural texts etc. are denoted. The meaning is that through the self-sufficient scriptural texts etc., along with the subsidiaries (of the sacrifices), the sacrifice of knowledge is made out to be different. " As in the case of other *vidyās* being separate." For instance, another *vidyā*, such as the *dahara-vidyā* etc., is known through self-sufficient scriptural texts etc. to be different from the sacrifice of action ; the case here also is similar.

It being in this manner learnt through subsidiaries etc., that the sacrifice of knowledge is distinct from the sacrifice of action, an injunction (relating to the former) is presumed. And injunctions are seen presumed even in cases of passages similar in character to repetitive references. " This has been already explained " (under the aphorism) : " But the texts (are indeed injunctions), as they convey a new meaning " (Pūr. Mīm. III. 5. 21). And as regards fruit, there is transfer through reference in the passage : " Of these, each one is of such magnitude as is that (sacrifice in the brick-altar) mentioned earlier "

(*Sat. Br. X. 4. 1. 3*). From this, it is made out that whatever is the fruit of the fire on the brick-altar through its own sacrifice, that itself is the fruit of *manaschit* (fires) and others through their own sacrifices.<sup>1162</sup>

It has been stated above that, in view of the transfer, the effects (of the *manaschit* and other fires) are known to be the same (as those of the fire on the brick-altar), and that therefore it has to be understood that they enter into the sacrifice of action. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies as follows :

न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः

**Sūtra 49.** *Na sāmānyādapyupalabdhērmṛityuvanna  
ki lokāpattiḥ* (403)

It is not so ; it (i.e., a transfer) is obtained from some common feature ; as is the case with *Mṛityu*, where indeed there is no attainment of his world.

It is not necessary that by reason of transfer (or extended application) intermediate operations also should all be similar, whereby these (*manaschit* fires etc.) may have entry into the sacrifice of works ; for merely through something or other in common, transfer is obtained. Indeed, transfer is obtained through having in common the character of being the destroyer of all etc.,<sup>1163</sup> as in the following passage :—" He, the above-mentioned being, is Death (or *Mṛityu*), that same person who is within this orb (of the sun)" (*Sat. Br. X. 3. 6. 3*). Indeed, here for that person who is within the orb, there is not, as in the

<sup>1162.</sup> *Sūtra 45* argues that transfer indicates *vikalpa* of the *vidya* with the sacrifice in the brick altar. Now it is explained that the transfer indicates only

the same fruit for the *vidya* as for the sacrifice of action.

<sup>1163.</sup> It has been suggested that the sun presides over time and hence is identified with Death.

case of Mṛityu, the attainment of his world, that is, reaching his place. Similarly here also, through the transfer of similarity to the fire on the brick-altar, there can be no entry into the sacrifice of works which is the principal of the fire-rite on the brick-altar. So, whatever is the fruit of the fire on the brick-altar through its own sacrifice, that is the fruit of the *manaśchit* (fires) and others through the sacrifice consisting of knowing; this is made out from the transfer.

परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्वनुबन्धः

**Sūtra 50.** *Pareṇa cha śabdasya tādvidhyam  
bhūyastvāttvanubandhaḥ* (404)

Through the subsequent (*brāhmaṇa*) also, it is known that the text (referring to the *manaśchit* ritual) establishes it as such (i.e., as consisting of knowledge); its being connected (with the ritualistic portion) is due to the abundance (of the subsidiaries of the fire-sacrifice which have to be mentally carried out).

Through the subsequent *brāhmaṇa* (or subsection of the *Sat. Br.*), it is made out that the texts mentioning *manaśchit* (fires) and others, establish their being of that kind, that is, that they possess that character, namely, that they consist of knowledge. Through the subsequent *brāhmaṇa*, indeed, that is, through the passage beginning with—"Indeed, this built-up fire-altar is this (world): the waters (of the sea) are its enclosing stones" (*Sat. Br. X. 5. 4. 1*). There is the passage: "Indeed, he who knows this above-mentioned (fire) as filling this world, all things attain him (as their lord)" (*Ibid*): by this, knowledge, which has a different fruit from action, is itself enjoined. Similarly, in regard to the *Vaiśvānara-vidyā* etc. (in *Sat. Br. X. 4. 6*), it is *vidyā* itself which is enjoined.

Therefore, the *Agnirakasya* (i.e., *Sat. Br. X*) does not deal solely with action.<sup>1164</sup>

It may, however, be objected thus. If so, it is with the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* that the *manaścīti* (ritual) and others which consist of knowledge have to be connected, and it may be asked why they are attached here (to the *Agnirakasya*). The answer to this is thus given. The connection here is due to abundance. Because there is an abundance of the subsidiaries of (the sacrificial) fire which have to be imagined in connection with the *manaścīti* (fires) and others, they are attached here (to the *Agnirakasya*) in close proximity to that (fire on the brick-altar).

## ADHIKARANA XXI

### ŚARĪREBHĀVĀDHIKARANA

#### एक आत्मनश्शरीरे भावात्

**Sūtra 51.** *Eka ātmanaśśarīre bhāvāt*

(405)

Some are of opinion (that the individual self as associated with the qualities of being the agent of action etc., has to be meditated upon), because the self is of that character in the body.

Under the aphorism, "Accordingly, this exposition and question (in the context here) relate only to the three" (*Ved. Sūt. I. 4. 6.*), it has been established that in all the meditations relating to the Supreme Being, as is the case with the essential nature of the meditation and of the

<sup>1164.</sup> *Sat. Br. (X. 5. 4. 1)* is understood by Sayana as enjoining "that the world has to be

viewed as fire. But Raṅgarāmanuja explains that fire has to be viewed as the world.



object of worship, so also in regard to the meditating (individual self), its essential nature has to be known.<sup>1165</sup> Later on, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says under the aphorism, "But they (i.e., the Jābālas) worship the Lord as the self, and they (i.e., the scriptures) make us comprehend (it as such)" (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 3), that the meditation on the individual self has to be made as having the Supreme Self for its self. It may be asked whether this individual self has to be meditated upon as the agent of action, the enjoyer, the knower and one capable of movement both here and in the next world, or whether he is to be meditated upon as having the essential nature which consists of the qualities of being free from sin etc., which are given in the passage attributed to Prajāpati (in *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7). What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? Some are of opinion that he is (to be meditated upon as) merely of the form of the knower etc. Why? Because this self, who is the meditator, exists in the body; that is, the self who exists in the body has that very form; and because also by such meditation itself its fruit appropriately results.

Indeed, as regards those who are qualified to do ritualistic works and who are desirous of the fruit of *Svarga* etc., whatever form they have at the time of the enjoyment of the fruit over and above the quality of knowership etc., that same form has to be meditated upon at the time of practising the means; because by so much only such practice of the means and its result are arrived at, and because also there is no use in meditating upon what is different from that. Not being distinct therefrom here also, the case is very similar thereto. It may, however, be said that there is the specific statement: "Just as a person's worship is in this world,

<sup>1165.</sup> The interpretation of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 4. 6) here seems to be as set out in *V. D.* and *V. S.* In the *Śrībhāṣya*, the three are declared to be "the means of attainment, the object of attainment and the attainer". (*Vol. II*, pp. 208-9.)

so also after death will he be in the next" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1): hence the form which is free from sin etc. should alone be meditated upon. But it is not so, because that (statement) deals with the object of meditation, as stated in the passage: "In whatsoever manner he meditates upon Him..." (*Mudgala Upanishad*, 3).

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows :

व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत्

**Sūtra 52.** *Vyatirekastadbhāvabhāvitvānna  
tūpalabdhivat* (408)

It is not so; what is different (from the bound self) (has to be meditated upon); because it is that form (of the released self who is free from sin etc.) which is to come to pass; as is the case with (the) knowledge (i.e., meditation relating to the *Brahman*).

This, however, cannot be, that the form associated with the knowership etc. alone has to be meditated upon. Whatever is the difference, as regards this individual self, in the condition of final release from the condition of *samsāra*, that (state of difference), marked by the qualities of being free from sin etc., has to be meditated upon. Whatever is its form in the condition of final release, the self having that same form has to be meditated upon at the time of meditation; this is the meaning. Why? "Because it is that form which is to come to pass"; that is, because the form of that released self is attained. In the passages, "Just as a man's worship is in this world, so also after death will he be in the next" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1) and "In whatsoever manner he meditates upon Him, he becomes that same thing" (*Mudgala Upanishad* 3), the attainment is, indeed, declared to be suited to the meditation.

It is not, moreover, proper to say that this relates only to the essential nature of the Supreme Being, because, as forming the body of the Supreme Self who is the object of meditation, even the individual self is included among the things which are the objects of meditation. Therefore, what is said is this: the object of attainment of the meditation upon the Supreme Self—who has as His body the individual self possessed of the qualities of being free from sin etc., which are declared in the teaching of Prajāpati—is of that very same form. For this very reason, it is stated thus: "As is my meditation, so indeed will I become after departing this world" (?) Therefore, the individual self has to be meditated upon in that form which has to be attained.<sup>1166</sup>

"As is the case with knowledge", that is, with the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*. For instance, even as the knowledge relating to the *Brahman* is enjoined as having for its content the essential nature of the *Brahman* as He is, similarly the knowledge relating to the individual self has for its content the essential nature of the individual self as it is: this is the meaning. In connection with rituals, the meditation on the essential nature of the self is a subsidiary to rituals. Indeed, it is the very performance of the ritual that is given in the commandment, "One who is desirous of *Svarga* should perform the sacrifice": and it incites to (the seeking for) the fruit. The knowledge of the self as having the form marked by the qualities of being the knower etc., which are different from the body, is intended to produce the qualification required for the performance of works which are the means for realising the fruit that will come into existence at a later time: thus much is required in that connection, and therefore there is nothing here that is left out.

1166. Just as the qualities of the *Brahman* are to be meditated on, in addition to His essential nature, so also the pure form of

the individual self, as an attribute of the *Brahman*, has to be meditated upon. (Ś.P.) •

## ADHIKARANA XXII

## • ANGĀVABADDHĀDHIKARANA

अङ्गाववद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्

**Sūtra 53.** *Angāvabaddhāstu na śākhāsu hi  
prativedam* (407)

But they (i.e., the *vidyās*) connected with the subsidiaries of rituals are not attached to the (particular) branches (of the *Veda* wherein they are mentioned); (they are connected) with every *Veda*; because of (a reason).

There are the following and other such passages:—  
“One should meditate on the *udgītha* as the syllable *Om*” (*Chhāṇḍ. Up. II. 1. 1*); “Let him meditate on the fivefold *sāman* in regard to the worlds (i.e., by looking upon it as the worlds)” (*Ibid. II. 2. 1*); “The creatures say that it is *uktha*, *uktha*; therefore, this is *uktha*, this is the earth” (*Ait. Ār. II. 1. Z. 1*); and “Indeed, this (built-up fire-altar) is this (world)” (*Sat. Br. X. 5. 4. 1*)<sup>1167</sup>. These give the meditations as constituting the subsidiaries of sacrifices. Here the enquiry undertaken is this: whether those meditations are confined only to those branches in which they are established, or whether they are connected with the *udgītha* etc. in all the branches. Here it is proper to raise the objection that, although they are known to exist in all the *Vedāntas*, the *udgītha* etc. are differentiated in

1167. The *udgītha* (which is one of the elements of the *sāman*), the *uktha* (which is a sub-division of the *śastra* or the *mantra* which is recited audibly or inaudibly) and the fire on the brick-altar are auxiliaries to

sacrifices. Meditations in relation to them are enjoined in the three quotations here. The *udgītha* is to be meditated on as the syllable *Om*, the *uktha* as the earth and so on.

each *Veda* through the distinction of accent, and hence they are confined to each (particular *Veda*).

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning here? That they (i.e., those meditations) are confined (to those very branches). Why? Because in the passage, "Let him meditate on the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 1), there is a scriptural declaration of connection with the *udgītha* in a general way; near which declaration, in that very branch (of the *Veda*), there is a particular *udgītha* associated with a particular accent; therefore it is proper for it (i.e., the term '*udgītha*') to exhaust its meaning in denoting that particular (*udgītha* with a particular accent). So these and such other (meditations) are confined (to their particular branches).

If it be so arrived at, we give the following reply:— "But they (i.e., the *vidyās*) connected with the subsidiaries of rituals....." The word, 'but', sets aside the above view. Indeed, the meditations connected with the subsidiaries like the *udgītha* etc. are not confined to their particular branches (of the *Veda*), but they are connected with every *Veda*; the meaning is (that they are connected with) all the branches. The word '*hi*' (rendered as 'because of a reason') denotes a reason here. Because through the scripture itself they (i.e., these meditations) are connected merely with the subsidiaries of rituals like the *udgītha* etc., therefore, wherever there are the *udgītha* etc., with all those places they get connected. No doubt, through differentiation in their accents, the particular *udgīthas* are distinguished; nevertheless, through the scriptural passage relating to the *udgītha* in a general way, all the particular cases (of the *udgītha*) are brought near; and therefore, there is no authority for holding that there is any regulative restriction (about them). According to the maxim that a ritual mentioned in various branches or recensions (of the *Veda*) is one and the same, the sacrifice is one: thus, only one sacrifice is present in all the branches (of the *Veda*), and therefore

the *udgītha* etc., which are subsidiaries to the sacrifice, are also present in all the branches. Consequently, the settled conclusion is that there is no particular presence (in any one particular place) of any one (subsidiary).<sup>1168</sup>

### मन्त्रादिवद्वाविरोधः

**Sūtra 54.** *Mantrādivadvāvirodhaḥ*

(408)

Also, just as is the case with the *mantras* etc., there is no contradiction.

The word 'vā' means 'also'. By the expression 'etc.', are denoted class, quality, number, similarity, order of succession, substance and action. Just as, in the case of the *mantras* etc., although they are declared each in one branch (of the *Veda* only), their application in all the branches, as made out by the principles of interpretation like self-sufficient scriptural texts etc., is not contradicted because the principal sacrifice is only one in all the branches; similarly there is no contradiction in respect of the case here also.<sup>1169</sup>

<sup>1168.</sup> The maxim referred to is the conclusion established in *Pūr. Mīm.* (II. 4. 9). See Note 1106 above.

<sup>1169.</sup> Examples are given of the use of the *mantra*, class, number, etc. mentioned in one branch of the *Veda* and used in another branch by Sāṅkara (under III. 3. 56), Ś. P. and B. P. Sāṅkara and Ś. P. refer to the *Sajaniya* Hymn (*R. V.* II. 12.1) being directed to be recited in *Taitt. Sam.* (VII. 5. 5. 2). Again, while in one

recension a victim is directed to be offered to Agnishomau, this victim is described as a he-goat elsewhere. When a fire-altar is enjoined to be made so as to have the form of an eagle, we have a reference to similarity. The injunction that an animal victim is to be sacrificed refers to class (or species) and number. When *soma* is to be purchased with a red cow, one-year old, we have the quality of redness and a substance in which the quality inheres. And so on.

## ADHIKARANA XXIII

### BHŪMAJYĀYASTVĀDHIKARANA

भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथा हि दर्शयति

Sūtra 55. *Bhūmnaḥ kratuvajjyāyastvam*

*tathā hi darśayati* (409)

The whole (meditation) is very superior ; as in the case of sacrifice (parts are inferior); indeed, the scripture says so.

The *Vaiśvānara-vidyā* is declared in the scriptures, beginning with the passage, "Prāchīnaśāla, the son of Upamanyu" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 11. 1). Here *Vaiśvānara*, the Supreme Self who has all the three worlds as His body, and who has for parts of His body the heavenly world, the sun, air, the ether of space, water and the earth, is declared to the object of worship. And of these the heaven is His head, the sun is His eye, the air is His breath, the ether of space is His *sandeha* ; the meaning is that it is His middle body ; the water is His bladder ; the earth is His feet ; these are His particular organs.

Here the doubt is whether the meditation on this (*Vaiśvānara*) who has the three worlds as His body, has to be undertaken as in association with each limb separately, or whether it is to be both as that of one whole and of Him in association with each limb separately, or whether it is to be only of one whole (constituted of those limbs). What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it should be of Him in association with each limb separately. Why? Because in the beginning of the context here it is only the meditation in association

each separate part that is taught. Accordingly it is so taught (in *Chhāṇḍ. Up.* V. 11 & 12). Indeed, Upamanyu's son and others, with Uddālaka as the sixth, approached Aśvapati, King of the Kekayas, and asked him thus:—"Now you worship none other than this Vaiśvānara as the *Ātman* itself, teach us that same (Being)" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* V. 11. 6). Then, to each of them who stated his own object of worship such as the sky etc., he taught the worship, each separately, of the head etc. (of Vaiśvānara) and also taught their respective fruits, by means of the passage beginning with: "He who worships this very Vaiśvānara as the Self, he eats (good) food, he sees dear ones, in his family there will be the light of the *Brahman*; this (celestial world worshipped by you) is the head of the Self (known as Vaiśvānara)" (*Ibid.* V. 12. 2). In passages such as "This Self, Vaiśvānara, is the beautifully brilliant one" (*Ibid.* V. 12. 1), it is stated that the object of worship is Vaiśvānara in those several meditations. Therefore, the meditation of each limb separately has to be undertaken.

In another passage, it is stated: "He who worships this aforementioned Vaiśvānara who is such and is measured by the regions of space themselves and is (yet really) immeasurable" (*Ibid.* V. 18. 1); it has to be made out that the meditation on the head etc., which is taught in relation to the Vaiśvānara who is limited by the mere regions of the sky etc., is to be combined in the worship of the whole as made up of parts. Yet another school is of the opinion that in that same manner the meditation on the whole also has to be undertaken (in addition), because the fruit of this is pointed out to be distinct in the passage: "But he who worships this aforementioned Vaiśvānara who is such and is measured by the regions of space themselves and is (yet really) immeasurable, he eats (good) food (i.e., enjoys bliss) in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves" (*Ibid.* V. 18. 1). And by this much there is no splitting of the passage. For instance, at the commencement of the



*bhūma-vidyā*, the worship of name and other things and their fruits are stated ; and then by means of the passage beginning with, " He who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares his object of worship is transcendent, he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent " (*Ibid.* VII. 16. 1), the *bhūma-vidyā* is taught ; and then the passage teaches its fruit : " He is his own ruler ; he is free to move as he likes in all the worlds " (*Ibid.* VII. 25. 2). Here, although the context relates to the *bhūma-vidyā*, the worship of name etc. and their fruits are accepted. The case here also is the same.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : " The whole is very superior " (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 55). ' *Bhūman* ' means abundance, that is, the whole itself ; it is very superior ; the meaning is that it is well established by authority, because it is made out that the context is one. The context begins with the passage : " Prāchīnaśāla, the son of Upamanyu " (*Ibid.* V. 11. 1) ; then there is the passage, " Reverend sirs, this Uddālaka, son of Aruṇa, is now worshipping this Self, Vaiśvānara. Well, let us go to him " (*Ibid.* V. 11. 2) ; thus five sages, the son of Upamanyu and others, with the object of knowing the Self, Vaiśvānara, approached that Uddālaka ; and not obtaining from him the knowledge of the Self, Vaiśvānara, they with Uddālaka jointly approached Aśvapati, King of the Kekayas, who knew the Self, Vaiśvānara, and asked him : " You now worship none other than this Vaiśvānara as the *Ātman* itself, teach that same (Being) to us " (*Ibid.* V. 11. 6) ; through him they came to know that Vaiśvānara, who is the Supreme Self having as His body the things beginning with the world of heaven and ending with the earth, is to be worshipped ; then they came to know the fruit of it as the experience of the *Brahman* who is the food of all the worlds, all the beings and all the selves ; from thus concluding, the context is made out to be one and the same. The context having been thus made out to be one and the same, the statement regarding the worship

of particular limbs and the mention of their fruits are definitely determined to be a reference to a part of the worship of the whole made up of parts.<sup>1170</sup>

“As in the case of the sacrifice”. For instance, the parts of that very sacrifice enjoined in the passage, “As soon as a son is born, one should make the offering dedicated to Vaiṣvānara on twelve potsherds” (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 2. 5. 4), are reiterated in the following and other such passages: “In that there is an offering on eight potsherds (it purifies and brightens him with spiritual glory through the *Gāyatrī*)” (*Ibid.*).<sup>1171</sup> Similarly, only the worship of the whole made up of parts stands to reason, and not the worship of the parts separately. “Indeed, the scripture says so”; in the following and other such passages, “If you do not go to me, your head will fall off” (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* V. 12. 2) and “If you do not go to me, you will become blind” (*Ibid.* V. 13. 2), the scripture says that calamities occur in the case of the worship of the parts.

Therefore, this view is also set aside—that statement which relates to similarity with (the meditation on) name etc. Indeed, there no danger was declared in the case of the worship of name etc.; (but) in the scriptural passage, “He who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares

1170. In the *bhūma-vidyā*—for which see Vol. II (pp. 90-107)—the context is made out to be one because the fruit of the *vidyā* is said to be superior to the fruits of the worship of name etc. mentioned earlier. Here the oneness of context is based on the different parts of Vaiṣvānara making up His form, when taken together, and the separate fruit of the worship of each part being included in the fruit of the worship of the whole.

1171. In *Taitt. Sam.* (II. 2. 5. 3-4), the fruits of offerings made on eight, nine, ten, eleven and

twelve potsherds are first mentioned: then it is declared: “He (i.e., the son) on whose birth one offers this sacrifice, becomes pure, glorious, an eater of (good) food, possessed of good sense-organs and rich in cattle”. Here the separate fruits are all combined together. What is intended is that an offering on twelve potsherds should be made, and not that there should be offerings on eight potsherds, nine potsherds and so on. (Sāṅkara cites the example of the new moon and full moon sacrifices.)

that his object of worship is transcendent, he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent" (*Ibid.* VII. 16. 1), it is declared that the worship of the *Bhūman* has higher fruits than the worship of name etc. For that very reason, even though that context deals with the *Bhūma-vidyā*, yet there the meditations relating to name etc., and as possessed of fruits, are intended to be spoken of: because otherwise it is inappropriate to eulogise the *Bhūma-vidyā* through the declaration of transcendence in consequence of possessing a superior result. Consequently, only the worship of the whole made up of parts stands to reason.

## ADHIKARANA XXIV

### ŚABDĀDIBHEDĀDHIKARANA

#### नाना शब्दादिभेदात्

Sūtra 56. *Nānā śabdādibhedāt*

(410)

They are different, because there is distinction regarding the words denoting them etc.

Here the subject is all the *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman* having for their fruit only that salvation which consists in the attainment of the *Brahman*, such as the *sadvidyā*, *bhūmavidyā*, *daharavidyā*, *upakosalavidyā*, *śāṇḍilyavidyā*, *vaiśvānaravidyā*, *ānandamayavidyā* and *akṣaravidyā*, some of them belonging to one branch of the *Veda* and others to different branches; others (different from the *Brahmavidyā*), each relating to one object like the *prāṇa* and having one (particular) fruit, are also (the subject). Here the doubt is raised whether the *vidyās* are one or whether the *vidyās* are distinct. Here it is only when mutual distinction is established among these (*vidyās*) that the rule which is taught as regards the one thing to be

known from all the *Vedānta* texts can be applied to a single *vidyā* like the *daharavidyā*.<sup>1172</sup> What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they are all one and the same *vidyā*. How? Because the *Brahman* who is the object of knowledge in every case is one. Indeed, the object of knowledge is the form of the *vidyā*. Therefore, there is oneness of *vidyās* owing to the forms being one and the same.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows:—  
 “They are different.....” (*Ved. Sūtra*, III. 3. 56). The *vidyās* are marked by difference. Why? “Because there is distinction as regards the words denoting them etc.” By the expression, ‘etc.’, here (in the *Sūtra*) are denoted repetition, number, qualities, contexts and names. Here, through different words, the differences among the auxiliaries are seen as the cause of the distinction among the things (i.e., the principal rituals) enjoined.<sup>1173</sup> No doubt, the expressions, “He knows”, “Let him meditate” etc., denote the recurrence of cognitions, and the cognitions relate only to the *Brahman*; nevertheless, those *vidyās* which teach the recurrence of cognitions relating to the *Brahman* as associated with the attributes of being the only cause of the world, of being free from

1172. Under *Ved. Sūtra* (III. 1. 1-5), it has been shown that any particular *vidyā* mentioned in more than one Vedāntic context is one only. The *pūrvapakṣa* there argues that “the form of meditation is distinct in each branch, because its repetition without distinction, as also its occurrence in different contexts, serves to distinguish it” (Vol. III, pp. 278-9). The validity of the reasons for the distinction—repetition without distinction etc.—was assumed there. It is sought to be established here.

1173. In *Pūr. Mīm.* (II. 2), rituals are differentiated for several reasons. Of these,

repetition without distinction has been explained in Note 1104. In II. 2. 1, words such as *yagā* (sacrifice), *homa* (making offerings into fire) and *dana* (giving gifts) are shown to refer to distinct rituals or acts. Repetition is dealt with under the next aphorism. Then under II. 2. 21, number is taken up. When a number of animals are directed to be sacrificed, the sacrifice of each animal is a distinct ritual. The next aphorism shows that different names indicate different rites. Sacrifices with distinct materials and deities are said to be distinct in II. 3. 12. Differentiation by context is dealt with in II. 3. 24.

sin etc. that are taught in different contexts, and which are of the form of the recurrence of cognitions in (those *vidyās*), are distinct from one another. The passages which denote particular meditations that are related to the fruit of the attainment of the *Brahman* and which desiderate nothing (being self-sufficient in themselves) are definitely determined to denote a distinct *vidyā* in each context. Although this idea is established in the earlier (*Karma*-)*kāṇḍa* under the aphorisms beginning with, "There is distinction among rituals when there are different words denoting them" (*Pūr. Mīm.* II. 2. 1), and under other aphorisms, the establishment of it here again is intended to set aside the views of shortsighted persons to the effect that the *Vedānta* passages deal with (mere syntactical) knowledge which is not the subject of any injunction.<sup>1174</sup>

Therefore, it is conclusively established that there is distinction among the *vidyās*.

## ADHIKARĀṆA XXV

### VIKALPĀDHIKARĀṆA

#### विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात्

Sūtra 57. *Vikalpo' visishṭaphalatvāt*

(411)

Because they (i.e., the *vidyās*) do not differ in their results, there is freedom of choice (in regard to them).

It has been stated above that the *Sadvidyā*, *Dahara-vidyā* etc., which have for their fruit the attainment

<sup>1174</sup> The causes of differentiation, though established in *Pūr. Mīm.*, are again dealt with here in order to show that *vidyā* is enjoined meditation. The alternative view that knowledge

arising from the syntactical meaning of certain scriptural texts leads to liberation has been criticised in Vol. I (pp. 13-15).

of the *Brahman*, are different from one another. Here the doubt is whether there is cumulation also of all these *vidyās* in one person as being useful to him, or whether, owing to their not being useful (to him), there is option for choosing only one of the *vidyās*. It being so, what is it that is properly arrived at through reasoning? Even cumulation (of the *vidyās*) can possibly take place in one and the same person. How? Because those *vidyās*, which have one and the same fruit and which are dealt with as distinct topics in distinct *sāstras*, are seen to be distinct. Indeed, in the case of the *agnihotra*, the new moon and full moon sacrifices, and other such sacrifices, which are (all) the means of attaining *Svarga* which is only one, there can be cumulation of them in only one person with the object of attaining abundance of enjoyment of that very *Svarga* itself. In the same manner here, also, having in view the experience of the *Brahman* in a magnified measure, even cumulation (of the *vidyās*) takes place in one and the same person.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows:— There is certainly freedom of choice (in regard to them). Cumulation of the *vidyās* does not take place. Why? “Because they (i.e., the *vidyās*) do not differ in their results.” Indeed, in relation to all the *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman*, the enjoyment of the *Brahman* that is bliss unsurpassed in excellence is declared to be the fruit without any distinction whatsoever, as in the following and other such passages:—“He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), “(That is) the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman*, and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and who is free from desires” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 4); and “When the wise seer sees that Person who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*)” (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 3). Indeed, the

*Brahman* Himself becomes for Himself and for another, when being experienced, bliss unsurpassed in excellence. And if such enjoyment of the *Brahman* is attained by one *vidyā*, of what use is another *vidyā*? Therefore, there can be no cumulation of the *vidyās*. Because the enjoyment of the *Svarga* etc. is limited through time, space and their essential nature and hence in those cases there is a possibility of abundance having regard to space etc., in regard to him who desires that *Svarga* etc., there will be the possibility of cumulation. But here, in the case of the *Brahman* whose essential nature is the opposite of that (*Svarga* etc.), that abundance does not come to pass. And all the *vidyās*, through destroying the beginningless *avidyā* and *karma* which are hostile to the enjoyment of the *Brahman*, have for their fruit the attainment of the *Brahman*; thus the fruit being one and the same without any distinction whatsoever, there is freedom of choice in regard to all (the *vidyās*).

It may, however, be said as follows. Those *vidyās*, however, whose fruit is distinct from the attainment of the *Brahman*, are subject to option or are liable to cumulation, just as one desires, as is the case with the rituals whose fruit is the *Svarga* etc., because their fruit is limited, and hence there is the possibility of an abundance in their cases.

In regard to this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says thus:

काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेन्न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात्

**Sūtra 58.** *Kāmyāstu yathākāmam samuchchiye-  
ranna vā pūrvahetvabhāvāt* (412)

But these (*vidyās*) relating to desires are either cumulative or not according to desire, because there is no cause as is given above.

Because there is no unlimited fruit: this is the meaning.<sup>1175</sup>

## • ADHIKARANA XXVI

### YATHĀŚRAYABHĀVĀDHIKARANA

अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः

**Sūtra 59.** *Āngeshu yathāśrayabhāvāḥ* (413)

In the case of (the *upāsanas* dependent upon) the accessories (like the *udgītha*), they are like their basis (i.e., the *udgītha* itself) part of sacrifices.

There is the following among other such passages :—  
“ Let one meditate upon the *udgītha* as the syllable ‘Om’ ”  
(*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 1). The *vidyās* which are given in this and other passages are based upon the accessories of sacrifices like the *udgītha*. Here the doubt is raised whether these meditations have to be adopted in sacrifices invariably as being accessory to sacrifices, like the *udgītha* etc., or whether, like (the use of) the milkpail etc., they may be adopted optionally as relating to the benefit of the individual person.<sup>1176</sup> It being so, it is proper reasoning to arrive at the view that they have to be adopted invariably.

1175. Ś.P. says that among the *vidyās* dealt with in this *Adhikarāṇa*, the *nyāsa-vidyā* (or *prapatti*) is also intended to be included.

1176. In *Pūr. Mim.* (IV. 1) an investigation is undertaken about what is needful for sacrifices or rituals and what is helpful to fulfill the desires of man. When anything is done for getting a benefit (through propitiating the gods), it is for the

purposes of man. For example, the use of the milking pail to fetch water in a certain ritual. See Note 1156. Anything done because of a scriptural injunction is for the purpose of rituals. It may help in the accomplishment of man's purposes, but it does not get any reward directly by itself. It is an essential element of the ritual, while the acts fulfilling human purposes are taken up by choice.



It may, however, be asked whether under the aphorism, "That determined thinking is not compulsory, because it is so seen to exist; indeed, its fruit, which is non-obstruction, is separate" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 41), they were dealt with as optional through their being for the benefit of the individual person. True, they were so dealt with. It is only for the purpose of confirming that view by showing some indicatory marks and through reasoning that it is questioned here. There, according to the passage, "With it (i.e., the chanting of the syllable 'Om'), both have to do the ritual" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10), there is no restrictive rule, and therefore it was stated that the fruits are separate. In regard to accepting as an invariable rule that the meditations are accessory to sacrifices, like the *udgītha* which forms the subject of the meditations, many reasons are found. Indeed, here, as in the passage, "As regards him who desires cattle, he should bring (water) in the *godohana* (or milkpail)" (?), the meditation cannot be made out as being connected with the fruit in the statement giving the injunction about the meditation; the meditation (here) is made out only as being connected with the *udgītha* in the passage, "One should meditate on the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 1). In the passage. "That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation, associated with faith and with the knowledge of the *Brahman*, that certainly is possessed of greater power" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10), the relation with the fruit is understood from another passage which has the semblance of the present teaching. By its very statement, through the connection with the *udgītha* etc. that are connected invariably with sacrifices, (its) character as accessory to the sacrifice is fully known, and in that case to point out the fruit by the present tense in another passage is mere eulogistic reference, as is the case with not hearing any unpleasant statement (if a ladle made of the *parṇa* wood is used). Therefore, just as the *udgītha* etc., which are the subjects of meditations, are adopted as an invariable rule through

the commandments regarding their application as accessories of sacrifices, similarly the meditations, which are based upon that (*udgītha* etc.), have undoubtedly to be adopted as an invariable rule through that (*udgītha* etc.) as the accessories of sacrifices.<sup>1177</sup>

### शिष्टेश्च

**Sūtra 60.** *Sisṭeścha*

(414)

Because also there is a commandment (to that effect).

*Sisṭi* is commandment ; the meaning is that it is an injunction. Because also in the sentence—"One should meditate upon the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up. I. 1. 1*)—the meditation is enjoined as an accessory of the *udgītha*, there is a rule about the adoption of the meditation. As is the case with the *godohana* (or milk-pail) in the passage, "As regards him who desires cattle, he should bring (water) in the *godohana* (or milk-pail)" (?), in the sentence containing the injunction there is no other context mentioned, and, therefore, it is made out that what is laid down is undoubtedly the accessory character of the *udgītha*.<sup>1179</sup>

### समाहारात्

**Sūtra 61.** *Samāhārāt*

(415)

Because the defect is cleared up (from a scriptural text).

1177. See Note 1154 for the ladle of *parṇa* wood. The argument is that the fruits mentioned for using that ladle are treated as mere eulogy. Thus its use is essential and not optional. But the meditation on the *udgītha* has a distinct fruit whose mention is not eulogy. So the meditation is optional.

1178. It has been argued so far that if the fruit is mentioned along with the injunction, the ritual is optional; and that, otherwise, it is an essential element. Now the indicatory mark is shown from a scriptural passage. (S.P.)

The rule about clearing up the defect of the meditation is seen in the passage, "From the *hotṛi*'s position (of right knowledge about the identity between the *udgītha* and the syllable, 'Om'), he (i.e., the *hotṛi*) clears up the defect in the defective *udgītha* (whose identity with the syllable, 'Om' is not realised)" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 5. 5). 'Durudgītha' means the *udgītha* which is not meditated on. It (i.e., the passage) explains rectification by another when there is absence of meditation and shows that it has to be adopted as a rule.<sup>1179</sup>

### गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च

Sūtra 62. *Guṇasādhāraṇyaśruteścha*

(416)

Because also there are scriptural texts which show that the subject (of the meditation) is common (to all the *Vedas*).

From this passage, namely, "By it (i.e., the *praṇava*), the science of the three *Vedas* exists. He (i.e., the *adhvaryu*) orders through 'Om', he (i.e., the *hotṛi*) recites as 'Om', and he (i.e., the *udgātri*) sings as 'Om'" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 9), it is made out that the *praṇava*, which is the quality of the meditation, that is, the subject of the meditation, and which is accompanied by the meditation, continues in the meditation, as may be seen from the scriptural texts about its being common (to all the *Vedas*). By the expression, "By it", the subject-matter on hand is referred to, and hence the *praṇava* moves everywhere along with the meditation. Thus the meditation is seen to exist with the *praṇava* and, therefore,

1179. The scriptural text enjoins a meditation on the identity between the *udgītha* and the *praṇava* (that is, between the syllable, 'Om', as chanted by the *udgātri* priest as part of the *udgītha*, and the same syllable as recited by the *hotṛi* priest along with the Vedic

hymns). The *udgītha* chanted without this meditation by the *udgātri* is defective: this defect is cured if the *hotṛi* priest has performed the meditation. The prescription of the remedy for the defect is taken as showing that the meditation is compulsory and not optional.

it has to be adopted invariably like the *udgītha* etc. in the meditations on the *udgītha* etc.<sup>1180</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :—

• न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः

**Sūtra 63.** *Na vā tatsahabhāvāśruteḥ* (417)

This cannot be, because there is no scriptural text to show that it (i.e., the *udgītha*) co-exists (i.e., serves as an essential element).

This however cannot be—namely, that as a rule the meditations on the *udgītha* etc. have to be adopted as accessories to sacrifices, like the *udgītha* etc. Why? Because their invariable co-existence is not declared in the scripture; the meaning is that there are no scriptural texts declaring them to be accessories to the *udgītha*. Indeed, when there is the accessory character, invariable co-existence comes into being. No doubt, in this collection of words—“One should meditate on the *udgītha*” (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 1)—no other qualification is discerned; nevertheless, immediately afterwards, in the passage, “That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act), which is done along with meditation associated with faith and the knowledge of the *Brahman*, that certainly is possessed of greater power” (*Ibid.* I. 1. 10), it is taught that the *vidyā* (or meditation) is the means of producing greater potency in the sacrifice. By this, the *vidyā* which is the means of obtaining a fruit different from the fruit of sacrifices is enjoined as having to be done: “One should meditate on the *udgītha*” (*Ibid.* I. 1. 1).

As regards the meditation which is known to be the means of attaining a fruit different from the fruit of sacrifices, its application as the accessory of the *udgītha*,

<sup>1180.</sup> The presence of the syllable ‘Om’, as the subject of meditation in connection with the rituals of the three Vedas,

shows that the meditations on the syllable, ‘Om’, are not optional.

which is an accessory of sacrifices, does not appropriately fit in. Therefore, the meditation being in need of a basis (or subject), the *udgītha*, which is in close proximity, becomes the mere basis. And the *udgītha* being an accessory of the sacrifices, there is the meditation whose basis is the *udgītha* etc., which are made use of in sacrifices; thus, in regard to it, this other qualification, which is due to the desire for more potency to the sacrifice, belongs only to him who is qualified for the sacrifice. Therefore, in sacrifices, there is no invariable rule for the adoption of that (meditation).

It has already been stated that the greater potency of the fruit of sacrifices is non-obstruction by means of the fruit of a more powerful *karma*. The meaning is that it is of the nature of the sacrifice giving its fruit without delay. But the scriptures do not declare that the (ladle) being made of *parṇa* wood etc. are the direct means for not hearing any unpleasant statement, like the meditation being the means of obtaining the fruit as stated in the passage, "That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act), which is done along with meditation.....that certainly is possessed of greater power" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10); therefore there is no contradiction to its application as an accessory to the ladle, which is an accessory of the sacrifice. Hence, it is not proper to assume for them, which are its accessories, the character of being the means of attaining another fruit; consequently, the declaration of fruits there in the scripture (in regard to the ladle of *parṇa* wood) is merely eulogistic.<sup>1181</sup>

1181. Under this aphorism, the reasoning of *Sūtra* 59 is controverted. The alleged similarity between the declaration of fruit for the meditation on the *udgītha* and the use of a ladle made of *parṇa* wood is denied. In the latter case, the fruit is mentioned elsewhere than in the injunction; the ladle being made of *parṇa* wood is not stated to be the direct means for

the attainment of the fruit. Here, though the injunction and the declaration of fruit are not found together, the increased potency of the fruit is said to have for its direct means the meditation. The case, it is argued, is similar to the fetching of water in the *godohana* vessel for attaining an optional fruit.

## दर्शनाच्च

Sūtra 64. *Darśanāchcha*

(418)

Because also the scripture shows (that there is no invariable rule in regard to the adoption of the meditation).

The scripture also shows that there is no invariable rule about the performance of the meditation, as it states that through the meditation of the *brahmā* priest there results protection to all: "Indeed, the *brahmā* priest, who knows this (*vyāhṛiti-homa*), protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer and all the priests" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 17. 10). This is appropriate when there is no invariable rule regarding meditation by the *udgātri* and other such priests. By means of this indicatory mark, the indicatory marks which have been already stated, such as the rectification of defects, are known to be occasional. Hence it is conclusively established that there is no invariable rule at all.<sup>1182</sup>

<sup>1182</sup>. The argument from the indicatory marks from scriptural texts set out under *Sūtras* 60-62 is now opposed. The protection of the sacrificer etc. by the *brahma* priest through his knowledge of the *vyāhṛiti-homa* means that hindrances to the fruit of the sacrifice are thus removed. Hence, for curing

defects an alternative remedy to meditation on the *udgātha* is also enjoined. The latter has scope when one has optionally chosen the meditation for greater potency of the result. The arguments set out under *Sūtras* 60 and 62 also apply only to such a case.

## PART IV

### ADHIKARANA I

#### PURUSHĀRTHĀDHIKARANA

पुरुषार्थोऽतश्शब्दादिति बादरायणः

**Sūtra 1.** *Purushārtho 'taśśabdāditi*

*Bādarāyaṇaḥ* (419)

Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that the (highest) object of human pursuit results from that (i.e., *vidyā* or meditation), because of scriptural statements (to that effect).

The consideration of the oneness or manifoldness of the *vidyās* as related to the results produced by including or not including the qualities (of the *Brahman* from one another) has been already taken up. The question that is now taken up for consideration is whether the (highest) object of human pursuit results from the *vidyās* or whether it results from the *karmas* whose accessories the *vidyās* are. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? "From that": the venerable teacher Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that it results from the *vidyās*. Why? "Because of scriptural statements." Indeed, the following and other similar passages in the *Upanishads* are seen to teach that the (highest) object of human pursuit results from *vidyās*:—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), "I know thi

Person of sunlike lustre who is beyond darkness. He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is no other path for the attainment of final release" (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7), and "Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their names and forms (and becoming one as it were with the sea), similarly, a wise man, freed from name and form, attains the Divine Person who is higher than the highest" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 8).

Here the *pūrvapakṣin* (who puts forward the *prima facie* view) raises the following objections :

शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादो यथान्येष्विति जैमिनिः

**Sūtra 2.** *Śeṣatvāt puruṣārthavādo*

*yathānyeshviti Jaiminiḥ* (420)

Because it (i.e., *vidyā*) is subordinate (to the *karmas*), the theory of (its being the means for attaining) the (highest) object of human pursuit is (eulogistic) as with other things; so Jaimini opines.

It cannot be so, that the attainment of the (highest) object of human pursuit results from *vidyās*. Indeed, this scriptural passage, "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), does not make out that through knowledge (or *vidyā*) the attainment of the (highest) object of human pursuit results; because it deals with the establishment of the knowledge relating to the truth about the self who is the agent of *karmas*. Thus, through refining the agent, the *vidyā* is subordinate to the ritual; and so the scriptural declaration regarding the fruit (of the *vidyā*) is merely eulogistic. "As with other things" like substances etc.; "so the teacher Jaimini opines". This has been stated in the aphorism: "The declaration of fruits in regard to substances, refining rituals and actions is (mere) eulogy, because they



subserve the purposes of another" (*Pūr. Mīm.* IV. 3. 1).<sup>1183</sup>

It may, however, be asked whether it has not been already established that He who is other than the agent of actions is taught as the object of knowledge in the *Vedānta*, owing to His being the object of attainment to those who are desirous of salvation—(established to be so) in the following among other aphorisms: "He who is other (than the *Brahman*) is not (that Being denoted by the words of the *mantra*), because (in such a case) there would be inappropriateness", "Because also there is (in the context) the declaration of difference (between the individual self and the *Brahman*)", "The individual self, however, is not meant (to be declared herein), because it is inappropriate (to apply these attributes to him)", and "If it be said that, owing to a reference to another, it is he (that other, namely, the individual self, that is the *daharākāśa*), it is not so, because of the inappropriateness" (*Ved. Sūtr.* I. 1. 17; 18; I. 2. 3 and I. 3. 17).

This view also, that that same *Brahman* is (seen to be) not other than the individual self, through the grammatical equation, "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7), and such other statements, has been set aside under the following among other aphorisms: "(The *Brahman*) is, however, other than the individual self, on account of the difference (between them) which is taught (in the scriptures)" (*Ibid.* II. 1. 22). \*And the declarations of the

1183. (i) The *Mīmāṃsaka* view can be made clear from an analogy. The rice to be used in sacrificial ritual is purified by the sprinkling of water on it. Similarly, the individual self who is the agent of the sacrifice is purified by *vidyā*. The self is subordinate to the principal, i.e., the ritual. Another analogy is implied. The being made of *parṇa* wood is connected with

all sacrifices through the ladle, and the special fruit of not hearing any unpleasant statement is taken as mere eulogy. Similarly, the *vidyā* is connected with all sacrifices through the agent, and the fruits mentioned for it should be taken as eulogy. (ii) Some editions of the *Śrībhāṣya* read *Pūr. Mīm.* (IV. 3. 1) with *guṇa* between 'dravya' and 'sāṃs-kara'.

grammatical equation in "All this has Him for its Self" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7) and "All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.* III. 14. 1) are common to both intelligent and non-intelligent things; and are based on the *Brahman* remaining as the Self of each particular thing, as made out from passages like "He who dwelling within the earth.....He who dwelling within the self (is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self)" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3; 22); this has been demonstrated under the aphorism, "Kāśakṛtsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also), because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the Self of the individual self)" (*Ved. Sūtr.* I. 4. 22).

Therefore it is asked (by us) how the *Vedānta* passages can deal with the truth about the self who is the agent of actions; and how thereby it can be established that *vidyās* are accessory to *karmas*. To this, the reply is thus given. It is only in the *Vedāntic* passages that there are indicatory marks which show the primacy of *vidyā* in relation to *karma*: there are also declarations of grammatical equations which are developed from those indicatory marks; through these (indicatory marks and grammatical equations) the *Vedāntic* passages are made out as dealing with the truth about the essential nature of the individual self which is other than the body; this has to be accepted out of force. Such is the opinion of the *pūrvapakshin*.

It may, however, be said that it is not possible to maintain that through the refining of the agent of actions the *vidyās* have entrance into rituals, because the agent is common to both worldly and Vedic actions, and hence he has no invariable connection with rituals. It is not so, because for the agent worldly actions can be appropriately accomplished even while he is (regarded as) being non-distinct from the body, and because the essential nature of the self, which is eternal and other than the body, is useful only in respect of rituals; therefore, through establishing

its essential nature, the entrance (of *vidyā*) into rituals is not contradicted. Thus the *vidyās* are subordinate to sacrifices; hence through these (*vidyās*) the (highest) object of human pursuit cannot be won.

It may, however, be asked what those indicatory marks are, which amplify and support the grammatical equation through which it is decided that the *Vedānta* passages deal with the individual self. To this question, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer :

### आचारदर्शनात्

**Sūtra 3.** *Āchāradarśanāt*

(421)

Because conduct (to that effect) is seen.

In the case of those who know the *Brahman*, their conduct is seen chiefly in their *karmas*. Indeed, Āśvapati, King of the Kekayas and the best of those who knew the Self, told the sages who approached him for gaining the knowledge of that (Self) thus : "Reverend sirs, I am verily performing a sacrifice" (*Chhānd. Up. V. 11. 5*). Similarly, in the *Smṛiti*, Janaka and others, who are foremost among those who are possessed of the knowledge of the *Brahman*, are seen to be devoted to *karmas*, as in the following passages : "Indeed, through *karma* alone Janaka and others attained perfection" (*B.G. III. 20*) ; and "He (Keśidhvaja) also performed very many sacrifices, while relying on knowledge (of the *Brahman*)" (*V. P. VI. 6. 12*). Thus, those who know the *Brahman* are seen to attach primary importance to *karmas* ; therefore, *vidyās*, owing to their being of the nature of the knowledge of the essential nature of the agent of actions, are undoubtedly accessories

to *karmas*. Consequently, through *vidyās* the object of human pursuit cannot be accomplished.<sup>1184</sup>

It may be said, "All this refers (merely) to indicatory marks. Let the proof be given". To this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāṇḍīya*) answers thus :—

तच्छ्रुतेः

**Sūtra 4.** *Tachchhruteh*

(422)

That (i.e., *vidyā* being accessory to *karma*) is established from the scripture.

Indeed, the scripture itself speaks of the *vidyās* being the accessories of *karmas*, as in the passage: "That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation.....that certainly is possessed of greater power" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* I, 1. 10). It is not possible to establish this through the context, as relating merely to the *udgītha*, because the self-sufficient scriptural text is more powerful as a means of knowledge than the context. Indeed, this scriptural passage beginning with, "That very thing which is done along with meditation" (*Ibid.*), relates to mere *vidyās*.

समन्वारम्भणात्

**Sūtra 5.** *Samanvārambhaṇāt*

(433)

Because there is connection.

"Both the *vidyā* and *karma* (carried out by him) follow him (who dies)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2). Here the

1184. The argument here is that works are primary because they are performed and that meditations etc. are subsidiary to the performance. Rāmānuja interprets the texts differently. Rituals performed without the desire for fruit are subordinate to the *vidyā* leading to final

release. Asvapati must be deemed to have performed the sacrifice in this spirit. Janaka and others are regarded as having attained success in self-realization through *karma-yoga*. This is true also of King Keśidhvaja of the Janaka dynasty.

association of both *vidyā* and *karma* together is seen. And this existence together (or co-existence), according to the arguments given above (such as that the self is subordinate to works etc.), happens only when the *vidyās* form the accessories to *karmas*.

### तद्वतो विधानात्

**Sūtra 6.** *Tadvato vidhānāt*

(424)

Because the injunction is as regards him who is possessed of that (i.e., *vidyā*).

Because *karmas* are prescribed for him who is possessed of *vidyās*, the *vidyā* is made out to be accessory to *karma*. In the following passage, "Learning the *Veda* from the family of the teacher according to the dictates of the preceptor, carrying out all works, setting up a family and in a pure place....." (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 15. 1), the statement, "Learning the *Veda*," which prescribes rituals to one who has learnt the *Veda*, prescribes rituals only to him who has learnt the *Veda* upto knowing the meaning thereof. Indeed, it has been established (by the followers of Kumārila and Prabhākara) that learning the *Veda* extends upto knowing its meaning. Therefore, the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* also has its application in the performance of *karmas*, and therefore it cannot make for any separate fruit.<sup>1185</sup>

### नियमात्

**Sūtra 7.** *Niyamāt*

(425)

Because there is the restrictive rule.

<sup>1185</sup>. The reference here is to the views of the followers of Kumārila and Prabhākara who hold that the *Veda* has to be

learnt along with its meaning. From this it follows that *vidyā* is accessory to *karma*. See Vol. I, pp. 5-7, *Sūtra* 12 below etc.

For the following reason also, out of *vidyās*, the object of human pursuit cannot be attained. According to the passage, "Doing works here alone, one should desire to live for a hundred years" (*Is. Up.* 2), the whole life of a person who knows the Self is as a rule applied in doing works and, therefore, it is made out that *karma* alone has fruit while *vidyā* is an accessory to *karma*.

If it be so arrived at, we reply as follows :—

अधिकोपदेशात्तु वादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात्

**Sūtra 8.** *Adhikopadeśāttu Bādarāyaṇasyaivam  
taddarśanāt* (426)

But because there is the teaching about some one who is different (from the self who is the agent of works) (the object of human pursuit is attained from *vidyā*) ; (this is the opinion) of Bādarāyaṇa, as it is so seen given in the scriptures.

By the word, 'but,' the above view is set aside. Out of *vidyā* only is attained the object of human pursuit. How ? "Because there is the teaching about some one who is different." Because the Supreme *Brahman*—who, owing to His being hostile to all that is evil and to His being the inexhaustible mine of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, is different from, that is, a distinct entity other than, the individual self who is the agent of *karmas*,—is taught to be the object of knowledge; hence the opinion of the venerable Bādarāyaṇa is that out of *vidyā* only there is fruit. Let alone the indicative signs. But surely the teaching as the object of knowledge relates only to Him who is different from the individual self who is the agent of actions.

How ? "Because it is so seen given in the scriptures." Because it is seen in the passages relating to the teaching of meditation about Him who is the Supreme *Brahman*,

who is the mine of innumerable qualities that cannot be possibly thought of as existing in the individual self in both its conditions of purity and impurity, who is the object of knowledge, who is devoid of even the slightest trace of all that is evil, to whom the creation, preservation and destruction of the world out of His own free will is mere play, who is omniscient, who is omnipotent, whose bliss cannot be measured by mind and speech, who is the lord of the individual self, who is the Ruler of all,—in such passages as the following: “He is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, and free from thirst; He desires the truth and wills the truth” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5); “It saw (i.e., thought), ‘May I become manifold and be born’. It created *tejas*” (*Ibid.* VI. 2. 3); “He who knows all and understands all” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1, 9); “His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural and consisting of knowledge, strength and action” (*S’vet. Up.* VI. 8); “That is the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman*” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 4.); “Without being able to attain which speech returns with the mind—he who knows the *Brahman* as possessed of such bliss, need not fear anything” (*Ibid.* II. 9. 1); “He is the Lord of all, He is the master of all beings, He is the protector of all beings, He is the bridge and the support” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22); “He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of senses, (i.e., of the individual self), He has no progenitor and no superior” (*S’vet. Up.* VI. 9); “Indeed, O Gārgī, under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, the sun and the moon stand well supported; under the supreme command, O Gārgī, of this *Akshara*, heaven and earth stand well supported” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9); and “Through fear of Him the wind blows, through fear of Him the sun rises, through fear of Him the fire and Indra (do their work) and Death runs as the fifth” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1).

Therefore it is very well said that in the passages which teach the knowledge of the *Brahman*, there is not the slightest trace of the individual self who is the agent of

actions, who is like a firefly, and who is capable of association with ignorance and all other evil qualities. Therefore, the *vidyā* which relates to the Supreme *Brahman* has for its fruit immortality, which consists in attaining Him and which is declared in several particular passages. Thus, out of *vidyā*, the object of human pursuit is accomplished.<sup>1186</sup>

The indicatory marks (above adduced) are set aside.

### तुल्यं तु दर्शनम्

**Sūtra 9.** *Tulyam tu darśanam*

(427)

But scriptural declaration is equally available (in regard to *vidyā* not being subordinate to *karma*).

What has been stated above to the effect that, because those who know the *Brahman* are seen to perform works, *vidyā* is accessory to *karma*—that is not right, because, even in regard to *vidyā* not being an accessory to *karma*, “scriptural declaration is equally available”; the meaning is that the rule that those who know the *Brahman* perform works is not invariable, because their not performing the works is also declared in the scripture. Indeed, in the case of those who know the *Brahman*, their giving up works is declared in the following and other such passages:—“The seers, *Kāvasheyas* (or the sons of Kavasha), said: ‘For what purpose (i.e., for no purpose) do we study the *Veda*, for what purpose do we perform sacrifices?’” (*Ait. Ār.* III. 2. 6). Thus those who know the *Brahman* are declared to renounce works, and therefore *vidyās* are not accessory to *karmas*.

<sup>1186</sup>. *Vidyā* can become accessory to *karma* only if the scriptural texts enjoining meditation refer to the individual self and to nothing else. Since these

texts actually call for meditation on the *Brahman* who is different from the self, the argument fails.



It may be asked how this can be appropriate, the performance as well as the non-performance of *karmas* on the part of those who know the *Brahman*. Sacrifices and other works which are performed without attachment to fruits are accessory to the *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman* and, therefore, the performance of such works (on the part of those who know the *Brahman*) is quite appropriately declared. He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) deals with this later on under the aphorism: "There is need also of all (works), because there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices etc., just as (there is need of the harness) in the case of the horse" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 26). Because those very sacrifices and other works, which are performed with the object of attaining (their) fruits, are hostile to that knowledge of the *Brahman* whose fruit consists solely in salvation, the declaration of their non-performance becomes very highly appropriate. If *vidyās* are accessory to *karmas*, the giving up of works will not appropriately result in any manner whatsoever.<sup>1187</sup>

To the objection that from the scripture itself *vidyā* is made out to be accessory to *karma*, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:—

### असार्वत्रिकी

**Sūtra 10.** *Asārvatrikī*

(428)

It (i.e., that scriptural text) is not universal in its application.

That scriptural text (i.e., *Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10) does not relate all the *vidyās*, but it relates only to the *Udgītha-vidyā*, because in the passage, "That very thing

<sup>1187</sup>. In a discussion some sons of Kavasha take the view that the recitation of the *Veda* and the performance of works are not necessary for those pursuing *Brahma-vidyā*. This cannot be explained in any way

by the *pūrvapakshin*. For, in his view, all texts describing the fruit of *Brahma-vidyā* are of the nature of *arthavāda*. Thus, to him there is no real fruit like *moksha*, for realising which works can be performed.

(i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10), the expression, "That very thing", which refers to an undetermined particular thing, denotes (here) the particular *udgītha* which is introduced as the subject-matter at the beginning of the passage, "One should meditate upon the *udgītha*" (*Ibid.* I. 1. 1). Indeed, it should not be construed (or logically connected) thus—that which one does, that is (done) along with meditation. What, indeed, is done along with meditation is pointed out by the expression, 'that thing', and its being more powerful is then stated in the assertion—that very thing which is done along with meditation, that alone becomes more powerful.

What has also been stated to the effect that, in the passage, "Both *vidyā* and *karma* (carried by him) follow him who dies" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2), *vidyā* and *karma* are mentioned together, and that, therefore, *vidyā* is accessory to *karma*—to this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

### विभागश्शतवत्

**Sūtra 11.** *Vibhāgaśśatavat*

(429)

There is apportionment as in the case of a hundred (coins).

According to the reasoning adopted in the passage, "Both *vidyā* and *karma* (carried out by him) follow him (who dies)" (*Ibid.*), both *vidyā* and *karma* having distinct fruits, *vidyā* follows (him) to yield its own fruit, and *karma* follows (him) to yield its own fruit. Thus is the apportionment to be observed.<sup>1188</sup>

1188. The *vidyā* and *karmas* mentioned in the *Bṛih. Up.* text have worldly fruits. So they accompany the soul after death, each to give its respective fruit. Even if they should be taken as *Brahma-vidyā* and *karmas*

accessory thereto, the *vidyā* accompanies the soul to bring about final release after the *prarabdha* is exhausted, and the *karmas* to produce the *vidyā* in later births.

"As in the case of a hundred (coins)." For instance, when it is said that a couple of hundred (coins) falls to the seller of land and gems, the apportionment is made out that a hundred goes for land and a hundred for gems. Similar is the case here also.

अध्ययनमात्रवतः

Sūtra 12. *Adhyayanamātravataḥ*

(430)

In respect of him who learns the *Veda* only (the performance of *karmas* is prescribed).

What has been stated above to the effect that because *karmas* are prescribed for one who is possessed of *vidyā*, therefore *vidyās* are accessories to *karmas*—it is not right to say so, because in the passage, "After learning the *Veda*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 15.1), *karmas* are prescribed for him who has learnt the *Veda* merely, and the injunction relating to learning the *Veda* does not proceed to enjoin knowledge of the meaning of the *Veda*; and because, like '*adhāna*' (which means kindling the fire and does not refer to the sacrifice in the kindled fire), 'learning the *Veda*' terminates in merely apprehending the collection of Vedic syllables (and does not refer to the meaning of the *Veda*). Because the *Veda*, which is learnt to be recited, is seen to give rise to the knowledge of works yielding results, a person proceeds of his own accord to inquiry into its meaning, which results in determining them (i.e., those fruits of works). Then, he who is desirous of performing works proceeds to acquire the knowledge of works, while he who is desirous of attaining salvation proceeds to acquire the knowledge of the *Brahman*; thus *vidyā* is not an accessory to *karma*.

Even if the injunction itself relating to the study of the *Veda* causes one to proceed to acquire the knowledge of the meaning of the *Veda*, still *vidyā* is not accessory to *karma*, as *vidyā* is a different thing from the knowledge

of the meaning (of the *Veda*). Just as from the knowledge of the essential nature of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other rituals, the performance of that ritual which forms the means of attaining its fruit is a distinct thing, so also, from that knowledge of the essential nature of the *Brahman*, which is of the form of the knowledge of the meaning (of *Vedāntic* texts), *vidyā*, which is denoted by the words, *dhyāna*, *upāsana* etc., and which is the means of attaining the object of human pursuit, is distinct; thus there is not even the least trace of that (*vidyā*) being connected with *karmas*.<sup>1189</sup>

### नाविशेषात्

**Sūtra 13.** *Nāviśeshāt*

(431)

It (i.e., restricting the works enjoined on the knower of the *Brahman* to independent works) is not right, because there is no restriction (in the rule).

What has been stated above to the effect that the passage, "Doing works only there" (*Īśā. Up. 2*), separates him who knows the self from the attainment of knowledge and binds him to the performance of works as long as life lasts—this, it is not appropriate to say, "because there is no restriction". Indeed, there is no particular reason to say that this binding rule relates to any independent *karma* which is the means of attaining fruits, because it is appropriate also as relating to the *karma* which is an accessory to *vidyā*. The passage, "Indeed, through

1189. In Vol. I. (pp. 5-9), the various steps by which one progresses from learning the *Veda* by heart without understanding its meaning to the enquiry into the *Brahman* are detailed. Here they are briefly recapitulated to refute such arguments as that learning the

recitation of the *Veda* cannot lead to an enquiry into ritualistic works. It is now shown (i) that knowledge of the meaning of Vedic texts is not subsidiary to injunctions, and (ii) that such meaning is different from *vidyā*, which is continuous meditation.

*karma* alone, Janaka and others attained perfection" (B. G. III. 20), is (also similarly appropriate), because in the case of the wise man himself *upāsana* (as also the *karma* which forms a part of it) continues, until he departs from this life.<sup>1190</sup>

Having in this manner answered the objection through the nature of the thing (i.e., *vidyā*) under reference here, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the meaning of the passage, "Doing works here" (*Īśā. Up. 2*), in the following aphorism.

### स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा

Sūtra 14. *Stutaye 'numatirvā*

(432)

It (i.e., the permission given) is indeed for glorification.

The word, 'indeed' (or 'vā'), denotes determination. As the passage, "Through the Lord is all this pervaded" (*Īśā. Up. 1*), occurs in the context relating to *vidyā*, that permission given for the performance of *karmas* at all times has in view the glorification of *vidyā*. Indeed, through the greatness of *vidyā*, although one does *karmas* at all times, one is not tainted by (the effects of) works; thus *vidyā* is glorified. The supplementary passage also shows the same thing in the same manner thus: "In regard to you (the rule is only) in this manner; there is nothing other than this. Works do not taint (the disinterested) man" (*Ibid. 2*). Therefore, *vidyā* is not accessory to *karma*.

<sup>1190</sup>. Both the *Is. Up.* text and the quotation from B. G. are taken to refer to *karmas* which are auxiliary to *Brahma-vidya*. See also Rāmānuja's

commentary on B. G. (III. 20), where the value of performing *karma-yoga* with the conviction that the individual self is the body of the Lord is emphasised.

## कामकारेण चैके

Sūtra 15. *Kāmakāreṇa chaike*

(433)

According to desire (the life of the householder can be renounced)—some (think thus) also.

Moreover, some schools are of opinion that the householder's life may be renounced, according to desire, by one who is devoted to the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*, as stated in the passage: "What shall we do with children, we to whom this world (to be attained with the help of children) is this Self?" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22). This passage which says that a wise man, who is dispassionate, may renounce, according to desire, the householder's life, shows that the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* is not accessory to *karmas*. If *vidyā* is accessory to *karmas* like sacrifices, then in the case of one who is devoted to *vidyā*, the voluntary renunciation of the householder's life cannot possibly happen. Therefore, *vidyā* is not accessory to *karma*.<sup>1191</sup>

## उपमर्दं च

Sūtra 16. *Upamardam cha*

(434)

There is also destruction (of *karmas* by the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*).

In every *Vedānta* text also, it is read that through the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* destruction of *karmas*, which consist of sin and merit and which are at the root of all the miseries of *samsāra*, takes place; as for instance in the following passage, "When He who is (the soul of) the highest and the lowest is seen, the knot of the heart

1191. The reference is to the views of the *Vājasaneyins*. The argument is that if *vidyā* is accessory to *karma*, one can never renounce *karma* for the sake of *vidyā*.

is broken, doubts are all shattered and his *karmas* are destroyed" (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 9). This will not take place, if *vidyā* is accessory to *karmas*.<sup>1192</sup>

ऊर्ध्वरेतसु च शब्दे हि •

Sūtra 17. *Ūrdhvaretassu cha śabde hi* (435)

Indeed, (this is so declared) in the scriptures also in regard to celibates.

Because in regard to celibates in their stages of life the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* is seen to exist, and because also among them there are no religious rites like *agnihotra*, the new moon and full moon sacrifices, etc., *vidyā* is not accessory to *karmas*. It may, however, be said that there are assuredly no (religiously sanctioned) stages of life for celibates, because in scriptural passages like "One should perform *agnihotra* as long as life lasts" (?) it is stated that there is qualification to perform *agnihotra*, new moon and full moon sacrifices and other *karmas*, as long as life lasts, and because also the *Smṛiti* passages which (refer to such stages of life and) are hostile to scripture are not authoritative. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer: "Indeed, (this is so declared) in the scriptures". Because in the Vedic texts themselves these things are seen, as in the following passages: "Three (stages of life) are the bases of *dharma*" (*Chhānd. Up.* II. 23. 1); "Those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 1); and "Wishing for this *Brahman* alone, ascetics renounce the world" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22). The

1192. The term, '*karma*', stands for the effects of actions as well as for rituals and actions. The *Mund. Up.* text refers to the effects of all actions, good and bad, perishing when the Lord is 'seen'. *Vidyā* leads to such

vision; and as such, it is hostile to the effects of actions, as well as to the actions causing them. Among such actions are the rituals known as *karmas*. Hence *vidyā* cannot be accessory to *karma*.

scriptural passage relating to the performance of works as long as life lasts relates to him who is not free from attachment.<sup>1193</sup>

परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदनाच्चापवदति हि

**Sūtra 18.** *Parāmarśam Jaiminirachodanāchchāpavadati hi* (436)

Jaimini is of opinion that there is (only) reference (to other stages of life than that of the householder), because there is no injunction (about them); indeed, the scripture excludes (them).

This view, that in Vedic texts like "Three (stages of life) are the bases of *dharma*" (*Chhānd. Up.* II. 23. 1) the celibates are seen to possess (religiously sanctioned) stages of life, and that, therefore, those (stages of life) do undoubtedly exist—this is not appropriate. Because, in passages like "Three are the bases of *dharma*" (*Ibid.*), mere reference is made to those (stages of life); the meaning is that this is a mere reference to something said elsewhere. How is this? "Because there is no injunction"; the meaning is that there is no commandment in that behalf. Indeed, no word indicating an injunction is here declared. That meditation on the *Brahman* with the help of the syllable, 'Om', which is (to be) introduced as the subject-

1193. The term, *urdhvaretas*, which may be literally rendered as 'having the semen directed upwards', refers to one practising sexual abstinence. Among the four religiously sanctioned stages of life for the Hindus—those of the student, the married householder, the anchorite in the forest (or *vanaprastha*) and the ascetic—the first and the last two require strict chastity. Since men in these states can practise *vidyā*, and

since they cannot perform rituals like sacrifices, the dependence of *vidyā* on *karma* is refuted. But the *Mīmāṃsaka* objects that the householder's life alone is enjoined and that the other three stages of life lack scriptural sanction. Their mention in the *Smṛitis* is of no use, if they are ignored or rejected by the *Veda*. This objection is set out in *Sūtra* 18, and answered in the next two aphorisms.



matter, is praised in the passage commencing with "Three are the bases of *dharma*" (*Ibid.*), because the context is wound up with the passage, "He who is devoted to the *Brahman* attains immortality" (*Ibid.*). Therefore, the mere repetitive reference to those stages of life that is given here is for another purpose (i.e., for glorifying the *upāsana* of the *Brahman*). As regards the passage, "And those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 1), here also, as it denotes the injunction relating to the path of the gods, there is no possibility of any other injunction being given.

Moreover, the scripture also excludes, indeed, other stages of life, as in the passage beginning with—"Indeed, he is the killer of the hero among the gods (i.e., Agni)—(he) who removes the (sacrificial) fire" (*Taitt. Sam.* I. 5. 2. 5). Thus the teacher, Jaimini, is opinion that celibates have no religiously sanctioned stages of life.<sup>1194</sup>

### अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणस्साम्यश्रुतेः

**Sūtra 19.** *Anuśṭheyam Bādarāyaṇassāmya-  
śruteḥ*

(437)

They (i.e., the other stages of life) have to be practised ; (so says) Bādarāyaṇa, because of equality (of all the stages of life) as stated in the scripture.

<sup>1194</sup>. Scriptural sanction is claimed for all the four stages of life from passages like *Chhând. Up.* (II. 23. 1 & V. 10. 1) and *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 22), all quoted above. In the first of these mention is made of three bases of *dharma*. These are detailed as (i) sacrificing, learning the *Veda* and giving gifts, (ii) practising austerities, and (iii) the disciplining of the student in the preceptor's house. The first 'base' clearly

refers to the householder's life, the second to those of the anchorite and the ascetic, and the third to that of the student. The second passage refers to the worship of the *Brahman* in the forest and implies the anchorite and the ascetic. The third text refers to the ascetic. Jaimini argues that such passages do not enjoin other stages of life, but are mere references, complimentary or repetitive.

The reverend teacher, Bādarāyaṇa, is of opinion that like (the duties of) the householder's stage of life, other stages of life have also to be followed in practice. Why? "Because of the equality (of all religiously sanctioned stages of life) as stated in the scripture." Indeed, those stages of life also are declared to possess equality with the householder's life, which is approved as fit for acceptance. The utterance by way of praise of him who is devoted to the *Brahman* by means of the passage beginning with—"Three are the bases of *dharma*" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* II. 23. 1), is common to the householder's stage of life and the other stages of life. The argument is that the reference to the householder's stage of life as to something known elsewhere is possible only when that stage of life has been arrived at as obligatory and therefore its establishment has to be necessarily admitted; this (argument) is equal in regard to the other stages of life also, except for fervour (which may apply it to one stage of life only).

It should not be argued that it is proper to hold that the duties of the householder's stage of life only are denoted by all the words, 'sacrifice', 'giving gifts', 'austerities' and 'celibacy', since both celibacy and austerities are possible only to the householder. Because in the passage, "Three are the bases of *dharma*" (*Ibid.*), they (i.e., the bases of *dharma* or the stages of life) are summed up as three, and it is inappropriate to have a statement dividing them as 'the first,' 'the second' and 'the third'. Therefore, the householder's stage of life is described by the words, "sacrifice, recitation of the *Veda* and giving gifts" (*Ibid.*). The word, '*adhyayana*', relates to the repetition of the *Veda*. By the word, 'austerities', are denoted *vānaprasthas* (or anchorites) and ascetics, because for both of them the important thing is *tapas* (or austerities). Indeed, the word '*tapas*' is conventionally used to denote the mortification of the body, and it is equal in regard to both (anchorites and ascetics). By the word 'celibacy' is denoted the duty of the student.

The word, '*brahma-samstha*', which is given later in the passage, "One who is *brahma-samstha* attains immortality" (*Chhānd. Up.* II. 23. 1), is used in its etymological significance (of one who abides completely in the *Brahman*); and it is common to all stages of life, because complete abidance in the *Brahman* is possible for all stages of life. '*Samsthā*' in the *Brahman*, that is, complete abidance (in Him) (or devotion unto Him) is the quality of being a *brahma-samstha*; and that can undoubtedly happen to all. Those who are devoid of devotion unto the *Brahman*, and merely perform their duties according to the stages of life, attain auspicious worlds; among these (persons in different stages of life), he alone who is devoted to the *Brahman* becomes the enjoyer of immortality.<sup>1195</sup>

This has been very clearly explained by the venerable Parāśara in the context which begins with—"The world of the Prajāpatis (like Bhṛigu) is for the Brahmins" (*V. P.* I. 6. 34)—and ends with: "The world of *Brahmā* is for the ascetics" (*Ibid.* 37). After mentioning the fruit which extends up to the attainment of the world of *Brahmā* for (those performing the duties of) castes and stages of life, pure and simple, it is stated by him in the passage—"Those *yogins* who are single-minded, and who always meditate on the *Brahman*, for them is that supreme abode which the eternally free souls realise" (*Ibid.* 39)—that among them those who are devoted to the *Brahman* attain the *Brahman*.<sup>1196</sup>

Therefore, the stages of life of celibates are (seen to be) equal to that of the householder, and hence they have also

1195. Śaṅkara takes *brahma-samsthā* to refer to the state of the ascetic, the word '*tapas*' earlier in the text standing only for the anchorite. Contrast with the interpretation given in the previous Note.

1196. The *V. P.* mentions the various worlds attained by those who discharge the duties suited to their castes and orders of life. Even the ascetic attains only the world of *Brahma* the creator. The Supreme Heaven is reserved for those who practise devotion.

to be adopted. Then there is the passage also, "Those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* V. 10. 1). Because the injunction (there) relating to the path of the gods is in need of the adoption of the stages of life, of which austerities, which are indicated by the word 'forest', are the most prominent element, there also the establishment of those (stages of life) has to be accepted.

After pointing out that in the case of the view of reference and also in the case of the view of injunction, these stages of life also have necessarily to be adopted equally with the householder's life, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) seeks to show that this is certainly an injunction about all the stages of life and not a reference (to them); so he says as follows :—

### विधिरवा धारणवत्

**Sūtra 20.** *Vidhirvā dhāraṇavat*

(438)

It is certainly an injunction, as is the case with bearing (figsticks above the ladle in certain rituals).

The word, 'certainly' (or 'vā'), is used in the sense of determination. This is certainly an injunction relating to the stages of life. "As is the case with bearing (figsticks above the ladle in certain rituals)". In connection the funeral *agnihotra*, the following passage is given; "Bearing the figsticks below (the ladle), he runs behind, indeed; for the gods, indeed, he bears them above" (?) That passage is similar in character to a repetitive reference, yet as the bearing above (the ladle) has not been already arrived at, it must be accepted to be an injunction. In the section (of the *Pūr. Mim.*) on the characteristics of auxiliaries, this is stated: "There is, indeed, an injunction in relation to bearing (the figsticks above the ladle), because it (i.e., the bearing) is not arrived at in any other way" (*Pūr. Mim.* III. 4. 15). Similarly, here also an

injunction has certainly to be accepted, because it (i.e., the adoption of other stages of life) is not arrived at in any other way.<sup>1197</sup>

There is the following passage of the *Jābālas*: "After completing the life of the student, \*one should become a householder; from the house (i.e., the householder's life), one should become a forest-dweller (or *vānaprastha*), and then become an ascetic; or if otherwise, one should become an ascetic from the stage of the student itself, or from the house, or from the forest; on the very day on which one becomes free from attachment, on that very day one should become an ascetic" (*Jābāla. Up.* 4). In these sentences which relate primarily to other things, taking the injunction about the stages of life to be non-existent as it were, it is shown that the establishment of the stages of life has necessarily to be accepted.

In this manner, through enjoining other stages of life, the scriptural passage relating to debts, the scriptural passage relating to (the performance of works) as long as life lasts and the excluding passage have to be understood as dealing with one who is not free from attachment.<sup>1198</sup> And the other scriptural passages and

1197. The injunctive form is not seen in the scriptural text quoted. But it is determined to be an injunction on the ground that what is said there—carrying the figsticks above the ladle—is not arrived at by other statements or means of knowledge. It is a purposeless thing to do except it be by way of obeying an injunction. The statements in the *Chhandogya* and other texts quoted already are also in a similar way injunctions about stages of life other than that of the householder. They cannot be dismissed as laudatory or repetitive references.

1198. The texts referred to are respectively: "The Brahmin, being born, is born with three debts—of sacrifice to the gods, of celibate study (of the *Veda*) to the *ṛishis*, and of children to the manes. He indeed gets free of debts when he has become a sacrificer, a celibate student (of the *Veda*) and the begetter of a son" (*Taitt. Sam.* VI. 3. 10. 5); "One should perform *agnihotra* as long as life lasts" (?); and "Indeed, he is the killer of the hero among the gods (i.e., Agni)—he who removes the (sacrificial) fire" (*Taitt. Sam.* I. 5. 2. 1).

*Smṛiti* passages, which prescribe those works for the knowers of the *Brahman* that have to be performed until departure from this life, deal with the *dharma*s pertaining to each particular stage of life. Thus, even in regard to celibates, there is the injunction relating to the *vidyā* of the *Brahman*; hence, it is established that out of *vidyā*, the object of human pursuit is accomplished.

## ADHIKARANA II

### STUTIMĀTRĀDHĪKARANA

#### स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वान्

**Sūtra 21.** *Stutimātramupādānāditi*  
*chennāpūrvatvāt* (439)

If it be said that it (i.e., the description of the *udgītha* as the best *rasa*) is mere glorification, on account of the acceptance (already of the *udgītha* as an element of the sacrifice), it is not so, because it is new.

The question that is now taken up for consideration is this. There is the passage, "That (above-mentioned syllable 'Om' which is part of the *udgītha*) is the best *rasa* of all *rasas*: it is supreme; it deserves the place of the Supreme Self; this *udgītha* (i.e., the syllable 'Om') is the eighth<sup>1199</sup> in reckoning" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 3). Do passages of this kind relate merely to the glorification of the *udgītha* etc., which form parts of

1199: The enumeration is in *Chhānd. Up.* (I. i. 2): "The earth is the *rasa* (or essential basis) of these things (which make up the world), the waters are the *rasa* of the earth, the plants are the *rasa* of the waters,

man is the *rasa* of the plants, speech is the *rasa* of man, the *ṛiks* (or hymns) are the *rasa* of speech, the (musical) *saman* is the *rasa* of the *ṛiks*, and the *udgītha* is the *rasa* of the *saman*."

sacrifices, or are they intended to denote injunctions enjoining meditation, viewing the *udgītha* etc. as the best of the *rasas* etc.? Here, assuming that what is declared there is that they denote (such) meditation owing to the meditation being for the benefit of man, that meditation (on the *udgītha*) has been explained (under *Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 41) as not to be included invariably in sacrifices.

What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they relate merely to glorification. Why? On account of the acceptance of the *udgītha* etc. (as elements of sacrifices). Indeed, accepting the *udgītha* etc. as accessory to sacrifices, it has been declared that they are possessed of such qualities as that of being the best of the *rasas* etc. For instance, such passages as the following, "This (earth) itself is the ladle, the world of *Svarga* is the *āhavanīya* fire" (?), declare that the ladle etc. possess the qualities of being the earth etc. ; and they relate merely to their glorification. The same is the case here also. This, then, is the objection raised : "If it be said that it is mere glorification, on account of the acceptance.....". (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 21). That is, if it be said that, on account of the acceptance of the *udgītha* etc., the intended meaning of those passages is mere glorification thereof—

The reply to it is thus given. "It is not so, because it is new". Mere glorification is not appropriate. "Because it is new"; that is, because it has not been arrived at (by any other means of knowledge). Indeed, the *udgītha* etc. are not understood as being the best of *rasas* etc., through any other means of knowledge, so that, for the purpose of generating the idea of glorifying them, they may be referred to (here) as being the best of *rasas* etc. And there is here no injunction about the *udgītha* etc. near by, so that, as in relation to such passages as, "This (earth) is the ladle, the world of *Svarga* is the *āhavanīya* fire" (?), owing to being of one context (with such injunction), it (i.e., the passage about the best of *rasas*)

may be accepted in some manner or other as relating to glorification. It is hence reasonable to hold that, for the purpose of attaining the fruit of inducing greater potency in sacrifices, the injunction to view the *udgītha* etc. as the best of *rasas* is itself given.<sup>1200</sup>

### भावशब्दाच्च

**Sūtra 22.** *Bhāvaśabdāchcha*

(440)

Because also there is the word denoting action.

Because also there is the expression, "One should meditate" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up. I. 1. 3*), which denotes action, it stands to reason that it relates to an injunction. A word which denotes action, in association with an injunctive suffix, signifies as its own meaning what is enjoined. Thus, these scriptural passages are meant to lay down injunctions regarding (the subject-matter of) *upāsana*s.<sup>1201</sup>

1200. *Ś. P.* explains that a scriptural passage is taken to be laudatory when it (i) refers to a quality mentioned elsewhere, or (ii) states a quality not known from other means of knowledge, or (iii) points to a quality while being understood in a figurative or secondary sense. Here the *Sūtra* makes it clear that (i) cannot apply. As the *udgītha* is incapable of being described as *rasa* in any literal sense, (ii) does not apply. It is to show that (iii) also does not apply that the passage about the earth being the ladle is cited. This is in proximity to an injunction about a sacrifice, and has therefore been understood as a

laudatory reference to the ladle. Here there is no such injunction near by. On the other hand, the proximity of a *vidya* injunction makes it evident that meditation on the *udgītha* as the best of *rasas* is enjoined. *Śankara* cites *Pūr. Mīm. (I. 2. 1)*; and *Ś. P.* refers to the discussion under *Ibid. (VII. 1. 17-18)*.

1201. '*Bhāvaśabda*' in the *Sūtra* is glossed as 'verb' in the *Ś. P.* It is further meant that there is a verb in the imperative mood. Note that, while the previous *Sūtra* argues against the *pūrvapaksha*, this states the established conclusion and bases itself on a scriptural commandment.



## ADHIKARANA III

### PĀRIPLAVĀRTHĀDHIKARANA

#### पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात्

**Sūtra 23.** *Pāriplavārthā iti chenna viśeshitatvāt* (441)

If it be said that they (i.e., the *Vedānta* stories) are for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, it is not so, because they are particularised.

There are stories given in the *Vedānta* thus: "Now, Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, went to the favourite abode of Indra" (*Kaush. Up.* III. 1); and "Indeed, there was Śvetaketu, the son of the son of Aruṇa" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 1). Here the doubt is whether these are used merely for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, or whether they are used to expound (and establish) particular *vidyās*. Since by means of the statement, "They tell stories" (*Āsv. Sr. S. X. 6*), their use in story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice is made out, it is contrary to reason to say that they have *vidyās* for their principal purpose.

If it be so held, it is replied it is not right to say so; all the stories do not deserve to be used only for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice. Why? Because they are particularised in respect of their use. Having stated—"They tell stories" (*Ibid.*)—in the same context by means of such passages as, "King Manu, the son of Vivasvat" (*Ibid. X. 7*), the stories of Manu and others are particularised. Therefore, it is understood that stories only of Manu etc. are to be used in that context. Therefore, in all the *Vedānta* the scriptural passages giving stories are not used for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, but are used for establishing injunctions in regard to *vidyās*.

### तथा चैकवाक्यतोपबन्धात्

**Sūtra 24.** *Tathā chaikavakyatopabandhāt*

(442)

Because, also, in a similar manner (to stories linked to injunctions about *karmas*), they are connected together in the same context (with injunctions relating to *vidyās*).

Because also the *Vedānta* stories are in the same context logically connected with such injunctions as, "The Self, indeed, has to be seen" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 6), those (stories) are made out as subserving injunctions relating to *vidyās*—just as, "He (Agni) wept" (*Taitt. Sam.* I. 5. 1. 1), and other such (stories) are intended to subserve injunctions relating to ritualistic works, and not intended for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice.<sup>1202</sup>

## ADHIKARANA IV

### AGNĪNDHANĀDYADHIKARANA

#### अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा

**Sūtra 25.** *Ata eva chāgnīndhanādyanapekshā*

(443)

Because of the very same (scriptural text) also, there is no need (in the case of celibates) for kindling the (sacrificial) fire.

<sup>1202</sup> The term, '*pāriplava*', rendered as 'story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice', literally means 'that which is cyclic'. Thus, the cycle of stories repeated at due intervals during the year the *Aśvamedha* is performed, has come to be called by this name. The *Śrauta-sūtras* list what stories are to be recited and when. It is here held that not all the stories in the *Veda* are for use in *pāriplava*. The *Vedānta*

stories are related to the injunctions about *vidyās*; some stories in the earlier part of the *Veda* are related to injunctions about *karmas*. To the latter category belongs the story about the tears of Agni. It is said in the context that these tears became silver, and that hence silver is not a suitable gift. The point that is made is that the story is told in order to enjoin that silver should not be given as gift.

Incidentally to glorification, through particular intermediate links, two *adhikāraṇas* were taken up for consideration. Under the aphorisms beginning with, "Indeed, (this is so declared) in the scriptures also in regard to celibates" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 17-20), it has been stated that celibates, practising *vidyās*, have religiously sanctioned stages of life. Now it is objected that, because for celibates there are no sacrifices etc., *vidyā* having sacrifices etc. as its accessories cannot belong (to them). To this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the reply as follows: "Because of the very same (scriptural text) also, there is no need (in the case of celibates) for kindling the (sacrificial) fire" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 25). For the reason that celibates are accepted by the scripture, while being connected with *vidyā*, as having religiously sanctioned stages of life, with the help of the following among other scriptural passages: "He who is devoted to the *Brahman* attains immortality" (*Chhānd. Up.* II. 23. 1); "Those also who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 1); "Wishing for this *Brahman* alone, ascetics renounce the world" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22); and "Desiring which they practise celibacy" (*Kāth. Up.* II. 15)—for the very same reason, *vidyā* among celibates has no need for kindling the (sacrificial) fire. 'Kindling the fire' means 'the ceremony of installing the fire in the sacrificial fire-place'. Among them (i.e., the celibates), *vidyā* does not stand in need of *Agnihotra*, new moon and full moon sacrifices and other works, for all of which the installation of the sacrificial fire is a pre-requisite. The meaning is that there is need (only) of *karmas* prescribed merely for their own religiously sanctioned stages of life.<sup>1203</sup>

1203. The argument here is based on the fact that while the scriptures enjoin *vidyā* on both celibates and married persons, the latter alone can perform

fire sacrifices. It follows, therefore, that, for celibates, sacrifices do not form an essential auxiliary of *vidyā*.

## ADHIKARANA V

## SARVĀPEKSHĀDHIKARANA

## • सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्

**Sūtra 26.** *Sarvāpekshā cha*

*yajñādiśruterashvavat* (444)

There is certainly need for all works, because there are scriptural passages enjoining sacrifices etc., just as (there is need for the harness) in the case of the horse.

If *vidyā*, without standing in need of sacrifices etc., leads to immortality, then, among householders also, without at all standing in need of those (sacrifices etc.), it should lead to immortality. The scriptural passage enjoining sacrifices etc. does not establish that *karmas* are accessories to knowledge (or *vedana*, i.e., *vidyā*), as seen from the self-sufficient statement: "They desire to know" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:—"There is certainly need for all works" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 26). Among the householders who are given to the performance of works, *vidyā* is undoubtedly in need of sacrifices and all other works.<sup>1204</sup> Why? "Because there are scriptural passages enjoining sacrifices etc." (*Ibid.*). By means of the following and similar passages, "The Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him who is mentioned above, by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting" (*Ibid.*), sacrifices etc. are, indeed, declared as accessories to *vidyā*. '*Vividishanti*', that is, they desire to know—with the help of sacrifices. The meaning is

<sup>1204</sup>. For 'sacrifices and other works', there is a variant reading, 'Agnihotra and other works'.

that through sacrifices etc., they desire to attain *vidyā* (or *vedāna*).

It is only because sacrifices etc. are the means of attaining knowledge, the teaching that they desire to attain knowledge (or *vidyā*) through sacrifices etc. becomes appropriate. For instance, it is only because the sword is the means of killing that the statement, 'He desires to kill with the sword', can be made. Thus sacrifices etc. are made out to be the means of knowledge (or *vidyā*).

It has already been established by us earlier that (this) knowledge is something distinct from the knowledge of syntactical meanings; that it is denoted by words like '*dhyāna*' (or 'meditation'), '*upāsana*' (or 'worship') etc.; that it has the nature of remembrance which has attained the condition of direct perception of the clearest kind; that it is excessively dear; that it receives excellence through practice day by day; and that it is the means, continuing up to the time of departure from this life, of attaining final release. The same thing also he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) explains later on under the aphorisms beginning with:—"Frequent repetition (is to be practised), as it is so taught" (*Ved. Sūt. IV. 1. 1*). And meditation of this kind arises from pleasing the Supreme Person by means of the daily and occasional rituals, which are practised day by day and which are of the nature of the worship of the Supreme Person; therefore, it is established by the *śāstras* that "they desire to know Him by sacrifices" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 22*). Therefore, among householders who have to perform works, *vidyā* stands in need of all the daily and occasional works like sacrifices etc.

"As (the harness is needed) in the case of the horse." Just as the horse, which is the means of locomotion, stands in need of the harness and equipment, which are its decoration. In the same manner, even though *vidyā*

is the means of attaining salvation, it stands in need of the subordinate multitude of all the rituals, daily and occasional. The Divine Lord Himself says the same thing thus: "Sacrifices, giving gifts and austerities should not be given up; they must be performed always. Sacrifices, giving gifts and austerities purify men engaged in worship and meditation." (B. G. XVIII. 5), and "He out of whom all beings proceed, by whom all this is pervaded, by worshipping Him by means of his own religious works, man obtains perfection (i.e., salvation)" (B. G. XVIII. 46).<sup>1205</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VI

### SAMADAMĀDYADHIKARANA

समदमाद्युपेक्षास्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया  
तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात्

**Sūtra 27.** *Samadamādyupetassyaṭtathāpi tu  
tadvidhestadaṅgatayā  
teshāmavyavasthānushīheyaivāt* (446)

Even so (i.e., even when one is engaged in sacrifices etc. as a householder), one should be associated with tranquillity and self-restraint, owing to their being enjoined in the scripture as accessory to that (*vidyā*) and having necessarily to be practised.

In regard to the consideration whether or not tranquillity and self-restraint etc. have to be practised by

<sup>1205.</sup> Rāmaṇuja here writes, having in mind Śaṅkara's commentary on this aphorism, where it is declared that while *vidyā* may require ritualistic

works for its origination, they are not needed for its fruition. See also Vol. I, pp. 9-20 for a longer account of the views of both.

householders, (it is urged that) these need not be practised because the performance of works has the nature of the activities of the external and internal sense-organs and because also tranquillity and self-restraint etc. have a nature which is contrary to those activities. •

If it be so arrived at, the reply is given as follows. No doubt, the householder is engaged in the performance of works, which are the activities of the sense-organs; nevertheless, he, the possessor of *vidyā*, "should be associated with tranquillity, self-restraint etc." Why? "Because of their being enjoined in the scripture as accessories to that"; that is, because they are enjoined as the accessories to *vidyā*, as in the following passage: "Therefore (i.e., because the knower of the *Brahman* has this glory), one who knows thus, being tranquillised in mind, with the senses restrained, having given up desires, resigned and patient, and absorbed in abstract meditation, should see the Self in (his own) self, indeed" (*Bṛh. Up.* IV. 4.23). Because, for producing *vidyā*, tranquillity etc., by reason of their being of the nature of concentration of the mind, are seen to be the subordinate materials therefor; because also to accomplish *vidyā*, they, that is, tranquillity etc., have necessarily to be practised,—they also have to be necessarily practised.

There is no mutual opposition between works and tranquillity, self-restraint etc. by reason of (the former) being the activities of sense-organs and (the latter) being what is opposite thereto, because they relate to different things. The activities of the sense-organs take place in relation to works enjoined, while in relation to those which are not enjoined and those which are devoid of any use, there is cessation of those (activities). It should not be said that for him who is engaged in works which have the nature of the activities of sense-organs there is no chance of the taking up of tranquillity etc., because of the force of the innate impressions of (his) *karma*; for works that are enjoined are of the nature of being the worship of the

Supreme *Brahman*, and hence, through pleasing Him, they are the means of destroying all hostile innate impressions. Therefore, so far as the householder is concerned, tranquillity, self-restraint etc. have also to be practised.<sup>1206</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VII

### SARVĀNNĀNUMITYADHIKARANA

सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणायामे तद्दर्शनात्

**Sūtra 28.** *Sarvānnānumitiścha prāṇātyaye  
taddarśanāt* (446)

There is permission to eat all foods, only at the time of danger to life, because the scripture declares it so.

In connection with the *Prāṇavidyā* of the *Vājins* and the *Chhandogas*, the following passages are given : "Indeed, in relation to him (who meditates on the food of all creatures as the food of the *prāṇa*) there is nothing eaten by him which is not food, nothing which is not food is accepted" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 1. 14); and "In the case of one who knows thus (that the food of all creatures is the food of the principal *prāṇa*) nothing becomes unacceptable as food" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 2. 1). Here permission to eat all foods is declared as given to one who knows the *prāṇa*. Here there arises the doubt whether the permission to eat all foods is operative

1206. The tranquillity and self-restraint mentioned here are of a higher order than those of *Mund. Up.* (I. 2. 13). The former are among the auxiliaries of *vidyā*, while the latter refer

to one who seeks *vidyā*. See Vol. I, p. 9. Works and meditation, being performed at different times, are not opposed to each other.



always for him who is devoted to the *Prāṇavidyā*, or whether it does so only when there is danger to life ; it being so, since there is nothing distinctive added (in that connection), it is (claimed to be) operative at all times.

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given thus : “(It is only) at the time of danger to life” (*Ved. Sū. III. 4. 28*). The word, ‘*cha*’ (rendered as ‘only’), is used determinatively. The meaning is that (it is operative) only when danger to life befalls. Why? “Because the scripture declares it so” (*Ibid.*). Indeed, it is elsewhere seen declared in the scripture that permission to eat all foods is given to the knowers of the *Brahman* only when danger to life arises ; how much less should it be for the knower of the *prāṇa*?

Indeed, Ushasti, the son of Chakra, who was the foremost among the knowers of the *Brahman*, lived in a village of mahouts, which was in the Kuru country that was troubled by showers of hailstones and was struck by famine : for want of food, he reached the condition of danger to his life : with the object of carrying out meditation on the *Brahman* he desired that his *prāṇas* should not remain exhausted and begged a mahout who was eating inferior beans (for some of them) ; and he was given the answer that “there were no beans other than leavings” ; he again asked him, “Give me some of those (beans)” (*Chhānd. Up. I. 10. 3*) ; he then received some of those inferior beans given to him by that mahout from out of the leavings ; then he was requested by that mahout to receive the drink to accompany (food) ; he said, “That would be leavings drunk by me” (*Ibid. I. 10. 4*) ; and he, the son of Chakra, was questioned by the mahout, “Were those inferior beans not my leavings?” ; he said, “Without eating these (beans), I would have lost my life...The drink is optional with me” (*Ibid.*) ; if the beans had not been eaten, the existence of his life would have been in doubt, and therefore, by eating only that much of it (as was necessary), he had his life supported ; the drinking of the

leavings, being left to his option, was prohibited; so saying, he gave his wife what remained after he had eaten; desiring to earn something through getting sacrifices performed by others, he wanted to proceed from that place; and the next day there arose (again) danger to his life; and he ate those (beans) which were taken care of by her (i.e., his wife), which were the leavings of the mahout, the leavings of himself, and stale.

Thus, even as regards the knowers of the *Brahman*, it is seen that permission is granted to eat all foods only when there is danger to life itself; hence it is definitely determined that although it (i.e., the permission) is stated in the context without any conditions, for the knower of the *prāṇa* to eat all foods happens only when there befalls to him danger to his life.<sup>1207</sup>

### अवाधाच्च

**Sūtra 29.** *Abhādāchcha*

(447)

Because also there is no contradiction.

There is no contradiction (anywhere) of the rule prescribing purity of food for the purpose of obtaining the knowledge of the *Brahman*, as stated in the passage: "When the food is pure, the mind (or *sattva*, the internal organ) is pure; when the mind is pure, then remembrance (i.e., loving meditation) is firm" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2); from this also, it is made out that the eating of all foods by the knowers of the *Brahman* relates to the time when there is danger. Thus, the eating of all foods by the knowers of the *Brahman*, even though they have surpassing powers, relates to the time when there is danger; hence the permission given to the knower of the *prāṇa*,

1207. From the precept and example of Ushasti, it is concluded that the votary of *Prāṇavidyā* is permitted to eat

all foods (including those which are prohibited) only at the time of danger to life.

whose powers are very little, to eat all foods, assuredly relates to the time when there is danger.

## अपि स्मर्यते

Sūtra 30. *Api smaryate*

(448)

This is also stated in the *Smṛiti*.

Also, that for those who know the *Brahman* as well as to others, the eating of all foods (without being stained thereby) relates only to the time of danger is again stated in the *Smṛiti* in the following passage: "After attaining the condition of danger to life, whoever eats food from any quarter whatsoever, he is not stained by sin like a lotus-leaf by water" (?).

## शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे

Sūtra 31. *Śabdaśchāto'kāmakāre*

(449)

For this reason also the scripture is against doing (i.e., eating) according to desire.

Because there is the eating of all foods by the knowers of the *Brahman* and others only when there arises danger to life—for this very reason there is a scriptural text with reference all persons against doing (i.e., eating) according to desire ; that is to say, there is a scriptural text prohibitive of voluntary action (in regard to eating all foods). Indeed, in the *Samhitā* of the *Kaṭhas*, there is the scriptural text prohibitive of voluntary action: "Therefore the Brāhmaṇa does not drink liquor thus in order that he may not be touched by sin" (?). The meaning is: "Thinking, 'Let me not be touched by sin', the Brāhmaṇa does not drink liquor".

## ADHIKARANA VIII

## VIHITATVĀDHIKARANA

## विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि

**Sūtra 32.** *Vihitatvāchehāśramakarmāpi* (450)

Because also they are prescribed, even the ritualistic works of the religiously sanctioned stages of life (are to be performed).

It has been stated that the knowledge of the *Brahman* has sacrifices and other religious works as its accessories. The question to be considered is whether or not those 'sacrifices' and other works have to be performed even by those who are not desirous of salvation and who are merely getting through their *āśramas* (or religiously sanctioned stages of life). In this connection, if the accessories to the knowledge of the *Brahman* remain subordinate merely to the sanctioned stages of life, the contradiction of the combination of the daily and non-daily works will arise, and therefore sacrifices etc. cannot be the duties (or works or *dharma*s) of mere *āśramas*.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :—  
 "Even the ritualistic works of the religiously sanctioned stages of life (are to be performed)" (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 32). Even the works of the stages of life become (obligatory). The meaning is that they have to be performed even by one who is merely passing through the stages of life. Why? Because they are so prescribed in the passage : "One should perform the *Agnihotra* sacrifice as long as life lasts" (?). The meaning is that it is because they are prescribed as if they were daily works owing to their being dependent on life.

Similarly, owing to their being prescribed in the passage, "Him they desire to know by reciting the Vedas" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22), they have to be practised also as subordinate to *vidyā*. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

### सहकारित्वेन च

**Sūtra 33.** *Sahakāritvena cha*

(451)

They have to be performed also as auxiliaries (to *vidyā*).

They have to be performed also as they are helpful to *vidyā* through producing *vidyā*. Just as in the case of the *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices like the qualification to perform (the sacrifice) throughout life and the qualification to perform (the sacrifice) for (attaining) *Svarga*, to have two objectives through a difference in their application does not contradict : this is the meaning.<sup>1208</sup>

Similarly, indeed, there is no distinction in regard to the rituals (subservient the two purposes); this he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says in the following aphorism.

### सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात्

**Sūtra 34.** *Sarvathāpi ta evobhayaliṅgāt*

(452)

1208. *Vidyā* is meditation on the *Brahman* for the sake of emancipation from bondage. One engages in it after the desire for knowledge of the *Brahman* arises. Rituals helpful to it can also be started only at its commencement. But the rituals which are the duties of the *aśramas*—like the *Agnihotra*, for the householder—have to be performed daily. This difficulty is answered in *Sūtras* 32 and 33.

The rituals have to be performed by those without the desire for emancipation as the duties of their *aśramas*. Those who seek emancipation will perform them both as *aśrama*-duties and as helpful auxiliaries to *vidyā*. The same ritual can be performed to serve a double purpose—as in the case of the *Agnihotra* which is both a daily duty and a means for winning *Svarga*.

Even in all applications they themselves (are to be performed), because in both the places there are marks (indicative of their identity).

“In all applications”, that is, both when they are meant for *vidyā* and when they are meant for the sanctioned stages of life, “they themselves”, that is, the sacrifices etc., have to be understood: the meaning is that there is no difference in the essential nature of the rituals. Why? “Because in both the places there are marks (indicative of their identity)”. Because in the scriptural passages relating to both (the rituals for *āśramas* and the auxiliaries of *vidyā*), their application is recalled to the mind through the words, ‘sacrifice’ etc., and because also there is no authority for any distinction in regard to the essential nature of the rituals (to be performed in both the cases).

### अनभिभवं च दर्शयति

**Sūtra 35.** *Anabhibhavam cha darśayati*

(453)

The scripture declares that there is no overpowering (of it).

The scripture, after pointing out those duties, namely, sacrifices etc., by means of the passage, “He destroys sin through *dharma*” (*M. Nār.* XXII. 1), shows that there is no overpowering of *vidyā* by those (sacrifices); that is, it shows the absence of obstruction to the origination of knowledge by sinful *karmas* indeed.<sup>1209</sup>

Indeed, in the internal organ, which is purified by means of the sacrifices etc. that are every day performed,

<sup>1209</sup>. In the *M. Nār.* passage, sacrifices etc. performed for worldly objectives are deemed to be *pāpa* or sin, because their effects obstruct the emancipation of the self. The same

sacrifices, performed without the desire for fruits, are *dharma*, the means to emancipation. One practising *vidyā* should perform them thus.

*vidyā* which is every day drawn in is produced. Therefore the sacrifices etc. are they themselves (i.e., the same) in both the cases.

## ADHIKARANA IX

### VIDHURĀDHIKARANA

अन्तरा चापि तु तद्वेषः

**Sūtra 36.** *Antarā chāpi tu taddṛṣṭeh*

(454)

But (there is indeed fitness) even for (those who are) outside (the stage of life), because it is so seen declared in the scripture.

It has been stated above that all those who belong to the four *āśramas* are qualified to practise the knowledge of the *Brahman* and that the duties of the *āśramas* are helpful in the production of *vidyā*. In regard to those, however, who are outside the sanctioned stages of life, namely, widowers and others (like those who have completed the student stage and are unmarried), the doubt is raised whether or not they have the qualification to practise the knowledge of the *Brahman*. It is stated they have no such qualification, because it is the duties of the *āśramas* that form the essential elements of *vidyā* and because also those who belong to no *āśramas* have no duties of the *āśramas*.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus: "But (there is fitness) even for (those who are) outside (the sanctioned stages of life)" (*Ved. Sūt. III. 4. 36*). The word, 'but', sets aside the objection raised; and the word, 'cha' (rendered as 'even'), shows emphasis. Those who are outside, that is, even those who do not belong to any *āśramas*, have undoubtedly the qualification.

for the knowledge of the *Brahman*. Why? "Because it is so seen declared in the scripture" (*Ibid.*); it is indeed seen in the case of Raikva, Bhishma, Samvarta etc.,<sup>1210</sup> that even though they belonged to no *āśramas* they were devoted to the knowledge of the *Brahman*. It is not possible to say that there is help to *vidyā* only from the duties of the *āśramas*, because in the passage, "They desire to know (Him) by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by austerities associated with fasting" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22), it is declared that even giving gifts etc., which are not invariably concomitant with particular stages of life, are capable of assisting in the production of *vidyā*. For instance, among the celibates, it is seen that they are devoted to *vidyā*, and therefore the support for *vidyā* (in their case) is derived through things which are other than *Agnihotra* etc. Similarly, even among those who belong to no *āśramas*, *vidyā* is seen to exist; therefore, it is possible to get help for *vidyā* through prayer, fasting, giving gifts, worship of the Deity etc., which are all not exclusively connected with particular stages of life.<sup>1211</sup>

### अपि स्मर्यते

**Sūtra 37. *Api smaryate***

(455)

It is also given in the *Smṛitis*.

<sup>1210.</sup> Raikva is a sage mentioned in *Chhand. Up.* (IV). King Janasruti offers him his daughter in marriage. Evidently, he has been living unmarried after completing his studies. Samvarta is mentioned in (*M. B.* XIV) and in other places. A son of Angiras, he quarrels with his brother, Brihaspati, retires to a forest and lives there in nudity. Bhishma, the grand-uncle of the Pāṇdavas and the Kauravas in the *M.B.*, took on a vow of perpetual celibacy after com-

pleting the student stage. All the three are neither students, nor householders, nor anchorites nor ascetics.

<sup>1211.</sup> *Vidyā* can be helped not merely by the duties of the *āśramas* but also by prayer, fasting etc., which are not exclusively connected with particular *āśramas*. *S. P.* says that the duties of castes also are helpful. Thus one need not belong to an *āśrama* to practise *vidyā*.



In the case of those who belong to none of the stages of life, it is taught in the *Smṛitis* that help for *vidyā* is from muttered prayer etc. in the passage: "He (who is devoted to *vidyā*) obtains perfection even through muttered prayer; there is no doubt about this; let him do or not do anything else, he who is devoted to the *Brahman* is the friend (of all beings)" (*Manu*. II. 87). "He obtains perfection"; the meaning is that he becomes perfected through *vidyā* which is assisted by muttered prayer etc.

### विशेषानुग्रहश्च

**Sūtra 38.** *Viśeṣānugrahaścha*

(456)

There is also special help.

This conclusion is to be established not merely through reasoning and *Smṛiti*. It is also declared in the scripture that through particular duties (or rites) which are not exclusively connected with particular stages of life, help is obtained for *vidyā*: "One should search for the Self through austerities, celibacy, faith and *vidyā* (or meditation on the individual self)" (*Pr. Up.* I. 10).

### अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च

**Sūtra 39.** *Atastvitarajjyāyo liṅgāchcha*

(457)

The other (i.e., belonging to a stage of life), indeed, is greater than this, (i.e., not belonging to any stage) (because of more numerous duties and rites and) because also of the *Smṛiti*.

The word, 'tu' (rendered as 'indeed') indicates emphasis. "Than this", that is, than belonging to no *āśrama*, "the other", that is, to have an *āśrama*, "is greater". To belong to no *āśramas* relates to conditions of distress. The meaning is that one who is capable has

to resort to having *āśramas*, because that which has many *dharma*s and that which has few *dharma*s do not have equal effects (in regard to one who is capable). "Because also of *liṅga*"; the meaning is, "because of the *Smṛiti*". In the *Smṛiti*, it is stated that *āśramas* have to be accepted by one who is capable of entering into them, as in the following among other similar passages: "A twice-born one should not, even for a day, remain without an *āśrama*" (?). The condition of distress for one who has finished the student stage and for one whose wife is dead, if they have no freedom from attachment, is not getting a wife.

## ADHIKARANA X

### TADBHŪTĀDHIKARANA

तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमात्तद्रूपाभावेभ्यः

**Sūtra 40.** *Tadbhūtasya tu nātadbhāvo Jaiminerapi  
niyamāttadrūpābhāvebhyah* (458)

But he who is already that (i.e., in the condition of a perpetual celibate or an anchorite or ascetic) cannot undo it (i.e., cannot be condoned for a fall), because of restraint from the absence of the duties of that condition; so Jaimini is of opinion.

The doubt is raised here whether or not there is the qualification for practising the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* even for those who have fallen from the *āśramas* of the perpetual celibate, the anchorite and the ascetic; in connection with this it may be said that, as is the case with widowers etc., it is possible to get help for acquiring *vidyā* through the acts of giving gifts etc., which are not exclusively connected with particular *āśramas*, and that, therefore, they have the qualification.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus : “But he who is already that cannot undo it” (*Ved. Sūt.* III. 4. 40). The word, ‘but’, is intended to set aside the above view. “He who is already that”, that is, he who is in the *āśrama* of the perpetual celibate (i.e., one who has vowed to live as a student all his life and remain unmarried), or in other similar *āśramas* (i.e., those of the anchorite and the ascetic)—“cannot undo it”; that is, he cannot remain in the position of having no *āśrama*. Why? “Because of restraint from the absence of the duties of that condition”. “Their *rūpās*” means “the *rūpās* of the perpetual celibate and of the others”; that is, (their) forms, (their) duties: this is the meaning. “Their absence” is the absence of their duties. “Because of restraint from it (through the *śāstras*)”. Indeed, the *śāstras* restrain those who have entered the order of the *naishṭhikas* etc., from giving up the duties appertaining to their several *āśramas*.

Thus, there are the following passages : “The third (base of *dharma*) is the student, who, residing in the house of the teacher, subjects himself to painful austerities” (*Chhānd. Up.* II. 23. 1); “He (i.e., the anchorite) should go to the forest and not return again from it” (?); and “After giving up the fire, he should not return to it” (?). Thus it is not possible for the *naishṭhika* and others to be without an *āśrama*, like the widower etc., and therefore the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* is not meant for them. (when fallen). “Even Jaimini also” (is of that opinion): thus showing (Jaimini’s) consent, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) confirms his own opinion thereby.<sup>1212</sup>

Again, it may be said as follows : Qualification (for the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*) results to the *naishṭhikas* and others who have fallen from celibacy, owing to the

<sup>1212</sup>. The *Chhānd. Up.* passage refers to the student who has taken the vow of perpetual celibacy. The other

two passages refer to the anchorite and the ascetic. None of them can violate the vow of celibacy.

prescription of expiation for them. And (this) expiation is determined in the chapter relating to the characteristics of qualification (i.e., *Pūr. Mīm.* VI), under the aphorism, "The victim to be offered by one who has violated the vow of chastity should be dealt with as the foregoing" (*Ibid.* VI. 8. 21).<sup>1213</sup> Thus, as regards him who has fallen from the state of celibacy, expiation is possible, and, therefore, after undergoing the expiation, he will become qualified to take up the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakara*) gives the answer thus:

न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात्

**Sūtra 41.** *Na chādihikārikamapi*

*patanānumānāttadayogāt* (459)

Even that (expiation) which is mentioned in the chapter on qualifications (in *Pūr. Mīm.*) is not for him, because there is the *Smṛiti* text relating to his fall, as it does not prescribe it (i.e., the expiation).

Even the expiation prescribed in the chapter relating to the characteristics of qualifications (i.e., *Pūr. Mīm.* VI) cannot apply to the *naishthikas* etc. who have fallen from that (i.e., their state). Why? "Because there is the *Smṛiti* text relating to his fall, as it does not prescribe it (i.e., the expiation)"; that is, because there is the *Smṛiti* passage which is related to the fall of the fallen *naishthikas* etc., where it is not possible (for them) to undergo that expiation. Thus, there is the following passage to

1213. The student who violates the vow of chastity is enjoined to sacrifice an ass to Nirṛiti, the goddess of decay and destruction. The *Pūr. Mīm.* discussion is as to whether the sacrificial offering is to be made in consecrated or unconsecrated fire. It is concluded that this should

be done in unconsecrated fire, as in the case of some other rituals dealt with earlier. The point in the *Ved. Sūt.* is that the fallen student, after undergoing the expiation, is purged of his sin. So should he not be allowed to practise *vidyā*?

that effect: "But that twice-born one, who, having taken up the duties of the *naishṭhika*, falls from that state—I do not see any expiation by which that self-killer can be purified" (?). Therefore, the expiation stated in the chapter relating to qualifications appertains to celibate students other than the *naishṭhika*.

### उपपूर्वमपीत्येके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम्

Sūtra 42. *Upapūrvamapītyeke*

*bhātvamaśanavattaduktam*

(460)

Some are of opinion that it (i.e., expiation) exists, because it (i.e., the fall from chastity) also is (described as a sin) preceded by the word 'minor', as is the case with consuming (liquor); this has been already explained.

The fall of the *naishṭhikas* etc. from celibacy is (described by an expression) preceded by the word 'minor'; that is, (it is) a minor sin, because it is not reckoned among the great sins; therefore some teachers are of opinion that there is the *bhāva*, that is, the existence, of expiation (for it). "As is the case with consuming"; for instance, both the prohibition of drinking liquor etc., and the expiation therefor are common to the student who wants to enter the life of the householder as well as to the *naishṭhika* etc.

It has been so stated by the respected author of the *Smṛiti* in the following passage: "These (i.e., the aforesaid duties of the student), when unopposed, apply to those (*āśramas*) which come later" (*G. Dh. S. I. 3, 4*). The meaning is this:—Whatever has been prescribed for him who is residing in the house of the teacher, that, when not opposed to (the duties) of one's own *āśrama*, is also applicable to those belonging to later *āśramas*.

Similarly, here also, expiation being possible in regard to the fall from celibacy, even the fitness exists for the *vidyā* of the *Brahman* (after the necessary expiation is gone through).

### बहिस्तुभयधापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च

**Sūtra 43.** *Bahistūbhayadhāpi*

*Smṛiterāchārāccha*

(461)

But he (i.e., the person who falls from celibacy) is outside (the ranks of those who can be redeemed by expiation), because the *Smṛiti* says so and because also there is a custom (to that effect).

The word, 'but', is used to exclude other views. In the case of it (i.e., the fall from celibacy) being of the nature of a minor sin as well as in the case of its being of the nature of a major sin, these (*naishthikas* etc.) are undoubtedly excluded from the ranks of those who are qualified for the *vidyā* of the *Brahman*. The meaning is that they are not qualified to take up the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*. Why? "Because of the *Smṛiti*"; because of the passage about the fall (from celibacy) in the *Smṛiti*, which has been quoted already. The meaning is this. No doubt, for the purpose of destroying sins, the qualification to undergo expiation is ascertained to exist through some passages; nevertheless, the expiation which is the means of purification suitable for (bringing about) the qualification to perform religious works cannot possibly exist—because of the following passage from the *Smṛiti*: "I do not see any expiation by which that self-killer can be purified" (?). "Because also there is a custom (to that effect)". Indeed, virtuous persons avoid the company of the fallen *naishthikas* etc., even though they have undergone expiation; they do not teach them such things as the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*.

Therefore, they have no qualification for the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*.<sup>1214</sup>

## ADHIKARANA XI

### SVĀMYADHIKARANA

स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः

Sūtra 44. Svāmīnaḥ phalaśruterityātreyaḥ (462)

It (i.e., the agentship for the meditation on the *udgīthā*) belongs to the sacrificer, because of the scriptural text relating to the fruit; so opines Ātreya.

The consideration that is now taken up is whether the meditations on the *udgītha* etc., which are dependent upon the accessories of ritualistic works, have the sacrificer as their agent, or whether they have the officiating priest as their agent. Ātreya is of the opinion that they have the sacrificer as their agent. Why? "Because of the scriptural text relating to their fruit." Because, in the case of the worship of *Dahara* and other such instances, which are prescribed in the *Vedānta*, both the fruit and the meditation are seen to inhere in one and the same person, because here that fruit of the *udgītha* which has the nature of non-obstruction to the production of the fruit of the

1214. The *pūrvapakṣa* argues that because an expiation has been prescribed, the fallen sinner, after expiation, is restored to his original state of purity and can practise *vidyā*. But this cannot be, since the expiation is no adequate. As the *S. P.* puts it, a sinful act creates a burden of sin, disqualifies the sinner from religious works and produces a taste for similar sinful acts. Expiation can deal

with any or all of these effects of sin. The *naishṭhika*'s burden of sin is reduced, but his disqualification is not removed by expiation. The *Smṛiti* texts enjoining expiation and declaring the *naishṭhika*'s sin to be beyond expiation are not contradictory. The fall from an *āśrama* is a serious trespass, but being without an *āśrama* is merely less preferable to belonging to one.

sacrifice is declared to inhere in the sacrificer ; this is the meaning. And it is not possible for them not to have the sacrificer as the agent owing to their being connected with the auxiliaries, as is the case with the *godohana* vessels (used for fetching water in certain sacrifices). Indeed, in relation to the *godohana* etc., it is not possible for another to take up the *godohana*, which is the support of bringing in water, whose agent is the *adhvaryu* priest. Here, however, although the *udgītha* has the *udgātri* for its agent, the meditation of that *udgītha* as being the best of *rasas* is capable of being performed only by the sacrificer.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :—

आर्त्विज्यमित्यौदुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिक्रियते

**Sūtra 45.** *Ārtivijyamityaudulomistasmai hi parikriyate* (463)

It is the function of the *ṛitvik*, according to Audulomi ; for which indeed he is hired.

That the meditation relating to the *udgītha* etc. is *ārtvijya*, that is, has the *ṛitvik* priest for its agent ; the teacher, Audulomi, is of that opinion. Why? For which, indeed, for which purpose the *ṛitvik* is hired. The meaning is this : that it is for the purpose of taking up the sacrifice which is the means of producing the fruit and which is possessed of auxiliaries. Among the injunctions relating to *karmas*, as for instance in the following case, "He chooses the *ṛitviks*" (*Taitt. Sam.* VI. 3. 7. 5), and "He gives largess to the *ṛitviks*" (?), it is made out by the *sāstras* relating to the agency of the *ṛitviks*, that the *karmas* which are the means of producing fruits and which are possessed of auxiliaries have to be performed by the *ṛitviks*. And the mental and physical works, which are included in them, have undoubtedly the *ṛitvik* as their agent. Capability and the absence of capability are not the basis of that (agentship) (but only the *sāstras*). No



doubt, the *udgītha* meditations etc. are for the benefit of man (and hence chosen by the sacrificer as the means to accomplish his desires); yet these have the *ritvik* as their agent, because they belong to the jurisdiction of one who is qualified to perform the sacrifice and because the sacrifice with all its auxiliaries has the *ritvik* as its agent; and also because, in accordance with the passage—"That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation (or *vidyā*).....that certainly is possessed of greater power" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10)—*vidyā* being useful to the work whose agent is the *ritvik*, there is the scriptural declaration that it has one and the same agent (as that work). In the case of the meditations on the *Dahara* etc., because it is not declared in the scripture that they have the *ritvik* as the agent, and because also of the principle derived from the statement, "The fruit of the *śāstra* falls to the lot of one who performs (actions in obedience to it)" (*Pūr. Mīm.* IX. 7. 18), they have the enjoyer of the fruit as their agent.<sup>1215</sup>

## ADHIKARANA XII

### SAHAKĀRYANTARAVIDHYADHIKARANA

सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत्

Sūtra 37. *Sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣheṇa*  
*trītiyam tadvato vidhyādhivat* (464)

For him who has that (*vidyā*), there is the injunction for another aid (i.e., *mauna*), like (other) injunctions (about aids) and other things (implied by

1215. Though the *udgītha* meditation is optional, still, when chosen, it is auxiliary to the ritual to be performed by a *udgātṛi*, and hence it has

him for its agent. Ś. P. cites *Chhānd. Up.* (I. 7. 8-9 & IV. 17. 10) to show that the fruits of the activities of the *udgātṛi* belong to the sacrificer.

them); because it (i.e., *mauna*) is well-known (as such aid); it is the third thing (enjoined in addition to proficiency and childlike qualities).

In the passage—"Therefore, one who has studied the *Veda*, after attaining proficiency and being associated with childlike qualities, should worship the *Brahman*; having attained childlike qualities and proficiency, he then becomes a meditating sage" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 5. 1)—the doubt arises whether, like proficiency and childlike qualities, reflection (or *mauna*) is also enjoined; in this connection, because the words, 'proficiency' (or '*pāṇḍitya*') and 'reflection' (or '*mauna*'), have the meaning, 'knowledge', the knowledge enjoined in the statement, "after attaining proficiency", is repeated in the passage, "he then becomes a meditating sage". Indeed, no word giving an injunction is mentioned there.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows: "There is the injunction for another aid" (*Ved. Sūṭ.* III. 4. 46). "For him who has that", that is, for one who has *vidyā*. "Like injunctions and other (such) things"; by the word, "injunctions", are denoted sacrifices etc., the duties of all the *āśramas*, and tranquillity, self-restraint, etc., because these are all enjoined; by the words, "other (such) things" are apprehended 'hearing' and 'reflection' (as set out in passages like *Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5). In the expression, "There is the injunction for another aid" also, the injunction is that which is enjoined. "The injunction for another aid" means that which is another aid and also a commandment.

What is said is this. Just as sacrifices etc. and tranquillity, self-restraint etc. are enjoined as aids in passages like, "The Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him who is mentioned above by means of recitation of the *Vedas*, by sacrifices, by giving gifts and by religious austerities associated with fasting" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22), and

"Being tranquilised in mind and with the senses restrained" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 23); just as, by means of the passage, "He (i.e., the *Ātman*) has to be heard (about), He has to be reflected upon" (*Ibid.* II. 4. 5), 'hearing' and 'reflection', which have been arrived at by implication, are apprehended as aids to *vidyā*; similarly, by means of the passage beginning with, "Therefore, one who has studied the *Veda*, after attaining proficiency" (*Ibid.* III. 5. 1), the triad consisting of proficiency, childlike qualities and reflection is enjoined as another aid to *vidyā*.

Reflection (or *mauna*) is a different thing from proficiency and childlike qualities. So he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says: "Because it is particularly well-known." Because the word, '*muni*' (or 'sage') is well known to be used to denote Vyāsa and others like him who were given to deep reflection, *mauna* (or reflection) is the third in relation to (and different from) both proficiency and childlike qualities. No doubt in the passage, "(He then becomes) a meditating sage", no injunctive suffix is given; nevertheless, as *mauna* has not been already arrived at through other means of knowledge, it has to be accepted as enjoined thus: Then let him become a meditating sage. And this *mauna* is a different thing from the *mauna* whose object is to fix in the mind what has been heard; it is to be in touch often and often with that which is the object of meditation; it has the nature of the mental conception of that (object).<sup>1216</sup>

1216. Four types of aids to *vidyā* are mentioned. (i) & (ii) Sacrifices and such rituals and tranquillity and such qualities have been enjoined as aids. (iii) 'Hearing' and 'reflection' (or *manana*), though not the subject of an injunction, are also aids. The investigation of the *Vedas*, which discovers the injunction to meditate as the means for final release, needs them. See Vol. I. p. 16.

(iv) *Pandītya*, *balya* and *mauna* are additional aids enjoined. Though both *mauna* and *manana* mean reflection, the contexts give them different meanings. *Manana* in (iii) means reflection on what has been heard with a view to fix it in the mind. *Mauna* in (iv) stands for thinking over the form of the Lord at times other than those of deep meditation.

Therefore, the meaning of the whole passage comes to this. The Brāhmaṇa is he who is possessed of *vidyā* (or knowledge of the *Veda*); "after attaining proficiency", that is, after knowing the object of worship—namely, the entity, *Brahman*—as fully pure and perfect; the meaning is: "after obtaining the knowledge, which is arrived at through 'hearing' and 'reflection'". And that (knowledge) is due to the increase of the quality of *sattva*, which (increase) is due to devotion to the Divine Lord. To the same effect is the following passage beginning with, "I am not (capable of being seen) with the help of the *Vedas*" (*B. G.* XI. 53), and ending with: "(It is possible really) to know (Me) exclusively by means of devotion" (*Ibid.* XI. 54).<sup>1217</sup> And the scriptural texts (here) are the following among others: "He who has supreme devotion to the Lord" (*S'vet. Up.* VI. 23), and "This Self is not (to be reached) by reflection (or *pravachana*)" (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 3).

"Being associated with childlike qualities, one should worship the *Brahman*". He (i.e., the teacher) explains later on the essential nature of the childlike qualities. After attaining childlike qualities and proficiency, let him become a sage; that is, after attaining, in the proper manner, childlike qualities and proficiency, one should be given to reflecting about the *Brahman* who is fully pure and perfect, for the purpose of attaining the *vidyā* which has the nature of steady meditation.

In this manner alone, through acquiring the triad (of proficiency etc.), he becomes the possessor of *vidyā*; hence he (the teacher) says: "After attaining *amauna* and *mauna*, he becomes a Brāhmaṇa" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 5. 1). 'Amauna' means the whole collection of all aids other than *mauna*; one who takes up all that and *mauna* in the

<sup>1217</sup>. 'Hearing' and 'reflection' are helped by devotion of an elementary type. This is not the devotion (or *bhakti*) which is enjoined as the means

to *moksha*. See *Vedānta Desika* on Rāmānuja's commentary on the *B. G.* (XI. 53-4) for the various stages of devotion.

proper manner will obtain that highest limit of the *vidyā* which is capable of being obtained only through them ; this is the meaning. He (i.e., the teacher) is questioned whether there are any means other than the means already given : "By what can he become a Brāhmaṇa ?" (*Ibid.*) ; the answer is given : "By whatsoever (means) he is thus, by that he becomes of this kind" (*Ibid.*). By whatever means extending up to *mauna* it has been said that he becomes a Brāhmaṇa, by that itself he becomes of this kind, and not by any other means. Therefore, in regard to the man of *vidyā* who is in any *āśrama*, proficiency etc. with *mauna* as the third of them, are enjoined as other aids to *vidyā*, even like sacrifices etc. and the duties of one's own *āśrama*.

Again, it may be said as follows. If in regard to the men of *vidyā* who remain in all the *āśramas*, *vidyā*, helped by the duties of the respective *āśramas* and in association with *mauna* as the third (additional aid), is stated to be the means of attaining the *Brahman*, then it is asked how it is appropriate to declare that one has to discharge the duties of the householder throughout life, as has been stated in the *Chhāndogya* in the passage beginning with : "After finishing the student life, setting up a family, and in a pure place" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 15. 1), and ending with, "Living, indeed, in this manner, throughout life, he obtains the world of the *Brahman*, and does not return" (*Ibid.*). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following reply :

**कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः**

**Sūtra 47.** *Kṛitsnabhāvāttu grihiṇopasamhārah* (465)

But, as it (i.e., *vidyā*) is existent in all (the *āśramas*), it is concluded with the householder.

The word, 'but', sets aside the objection raised. "Because of *kṛitsnabhāva*"; that is, because it is existent

in all. Because in all the *āśramas*, there is the existence of *vidyā*, the householder also has it; and so the conclusion is made with him. Thus the idea is that the conclusion of the context with the householder is intended to illustrate the duties of all the *āśramas*.

Similarly, even in the passage—"The Brāhmaṇa, giving up the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for the world, then follows the conduct of an ascetic" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 5. 1)<sup>1218</sup>—the duty which is invariably associated with the ascetic is established; then, by means of the passage beginning with, "Therefore, the Brāhmaṇa, after attaining proficiency" (*Ibid.*), the laying down of the aids with *mauna* as the third, which are produced through the existence of the duties of the ascetic, is intended to be merely illustrative. This he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says thus:—

### मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात्

**Sūtra 48.** *Maunavaditareshāmapyupadeśāt* (466)

Because, like *mauna*, the others also are taught.

To him who is freed from all desires, the teaching regarding *mauna* is given, preceded by the practice of begging as an ascetic; it is intended to be illustrative of the duties of all the *āśramas*. Why? As is the case with the teaching regarding *mauna* in this manner, in regard to those who are in other *āśramas* also, the teaching relating to the attainment of the *Brahman* is given in the passage beginning with—"Three are the bases of *dharma*"

1218. All the desires for worldly happiness are included in the three kinds of desires to be given up. The desire for sons presupposes the desire for a wife, the desire for wealth implies the desire for works to be carried out with wealth, and the desire for the world

includes all other desires to be achieved with the help of wife, sons, wealth and action. Compare *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 4. 17). The giving up of desires and the adoption of mendicancy are illustrative of the duties of the ascetic.

(*Chhānd. Up.* II. 23. 1), and ending with, "He who is devoted to the *Brahman* attains immortality" (*Ibid.*). It has already been established (under *Sūtra* 19 above) that the expression, "devoted to the *Brahman*", is common to all the *āśramas*. Thus, it has been well said that like the duties of all the *āśramas*, such as sacrifices etc., proficiency etc. with reflection as the third of them, are enjoined as aids to *vidyā*.

## ADHIKARANA XIII

### ANĀVISHKĀRĀDHIKARANA

#### अनाविष्कुर्वन्नवयात्

**Sūtra 49.** *Anāvishkurvannanvayāt*

(467)

(‘Childlike qualities’ mean) not manifesting (one’s nature): because there is connection (only between this and *vidyā*).

In the passage—"Therefore, one who has studied the *Veda*, after attaining proficiency and being associated with childlike qualities, should worship the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 5. 1)—it is declared that, for a man with *vidyā*, childlike qualities should be accepted. ‘*Bālya*’ is the condition of a child or its action. Because the condition of a child is a particular condition of age, it cannot be accepted; its action alone is apprehended here (*viz.*, by the word ‘*bālya*’). Here the doubt is whether all the actions of the child such as doing and moving as it pleases have to be accepted by the man of *vidyā*, or whether it is only the absence of pride etc. In this connection, it may be said that, owing to the absence of any particularisation, all have to be accepted; the general restrictive *śāstras* (prohibiting wilful behaviour) are stultified by this particular injunction.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus : "Not manifesting (one's nature)." That act of the child which consists in not revealing his characteristics, the man of *vidyā* should live, accepting it. Why? "Because there is connection"; because there is connection only with this. In the injunction, "Being associated with childlike qualities, one should worship the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.*), there can be connection only with this, because, in regard to others (i.e., other activities of the child), there is contradiction with *vidyā*, as stated in the following and other similar passages: "One who has not ceased from evil conduct, is not tranquilised, is not distracted, is not content in mind also, will not attain Him (i.e., the *Brahman*) through knowledge (or *vidyā*)" (*Kāth. Up.* II. 24), and "When the food is pure, the mind is pure" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2).

## ADHIKARĀṆA XIV

### AIHIKĀDHIKARĀṆA

#### ऐहिकमप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात्

**Sūtra** 50. *Aihikamaprastutapratibandhe*

*taddarśanāt* (468)

Worldly prosperity occurs, when there is no obstruction (which is accidental or extraneous); because it is so seen declared in the scripture.

The *vidyā* is twofold—that which yields the fruit of worldly prosperity and that which yields the fruit of salvation. Here the doubt is whether that *vidyā*, whose fruit is worldly prosperity and which is produced by means of the meritorious deeds which are the means of producing that same (*vidyā*), is produced immediately after the meritorious deeds are done, or whether it may



be produced immediately afterwards or at another time indefinitely. Indeed, a man of *vidyā* is born through the meritorious deeds done in the past. To the same effect, it has been declared by the Divine Lord in the following passage:—"O Arjuna, four kinds of persons who have done meritorious deeds worship Me" (*B. 9. VII. 11*). When the means ceases to act, there is no cause of delay, and therefore it is immediately afterwards (that the *vidyā* is produced).<sup>1219</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows:—"Worldly prosperity occurs when there is no obstruction (accidental or extraneous)." 'Worldly prosperity' is the meditation which has the fruit of worldly prosperity; "when there is no obstruction", that is, when there is no obstruction through more powerful *karmas*; then (it is produced) immediately afterwards; when there is obstruction, (it is produced) some time afterwards; thus there is no definite determination (as to when *vidyā* is produced). Why? "Because it is so seen declared in the scripture." Indeed, it is declared in the scripture that through another more powerful *karma*, there is the perception of obstruction, as in the following passage—"That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation, associated with faith and the knowledge of the *Brahman*, that certainly is possessed of greater power" (*Chhānd. Up. I. 1. 10*)—where it is declared that the *karma* which is associated with the *udgītha* meditation has no obstruction to getting its fruit.

1219. '*Aihika*' may mean either 'in this birth' or 'in this world'; it may also mean 'anywhere other than in Heaven'. *B.P.* discusses which meaning is applicable here. If it is 'in this birth', the aphorism may be construed: when there is no obstruction,

the fruit becomes available in this birth. Alternatively, we may take it thus: the *upāsana* whose fruit is *aihika*, is produced immediately when there is no obstruction. '*Aihika*' may then mean 'in this world, anywhere other than in heaven, in this or in any future birth'.

## ADHIKARANA XV

## MUKTIPHALĀDHIKARANA

एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः

**Sūtra 51.** *Evam muktiphalānīyamastadavasthā-  
vadhṛiteṣṭadavasthāvadhṛiteḥ* (469)

In this manner, there is no definite determination as to the fruit of salvation, because it (i.e., the *upāsana*) bears that condition (of giving fruit in the absence of obstruction), bears that condition.

In regard to the origination, through surpassingly high *karmas* which are the means of producing it, of that *upāsana* also whose fruit is salvation, the absence of definite determination (in regard to time) is of the very same character, because that *upāsana* also bears the condition of the absence of obstruction and the ending of the obstruction as before. Because here also the cause is similar; this is the meaning. The extra doubt is that, of all *karmas*, that *karma* which is the means of producing the *vidyā* whose fruit is salvation is very powerful, and that, therefore, there is no obstruction. In that case, also, offences formerly committed against the knowers of the *Brahman* can possibly exist, and there is chance of obstruction; thus is the doubt solved. The use of a phrase twice (in the *Sūtra*) shows the close of the chapter.<sup>1220</sup>

1220. The preceding section dealt with meditations whose fruits are worldly and whose rise is due to sacrifices and other good deeds unaccompanied by *udgītha* meditations.

Now the subject is the rise of the *vidyā* which aims at salvation and whose rise is brought about by sacrifices and other good deeds unaccompanied by *udgītha* meditations.

## CHAPTER IV

### PART I

## ADHIKARANA I

### ĀVRITTYADHIKARANA

#### आवृत्तिसकृदुपदेशात्

**Sūtra 1.** *Āvṛittirasakṛidupadeśāt*

(470)

Frequent repetition (of meditation) (is to be practised), because it is so taught.

*Vidyā*, together with the means of producing it, was taken up for consideration in the third Chapter. Hereafter the fruit of *vidyā*, after examining the essential nature of *vidyā*, is taken up for consideration. It being so, the following passages, among others, are given in the *Vedānta* in this connection: "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the highest" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); "Knowing Him thus, one transcends death" (*S'vet. Up.* III. 8); "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes like unto the *Brahman*" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9); and "When the wise seer sees Him who is bright like gold....." (*Ibid.* III. 1. 3).

Here the doubt is raised whether the purport of the *śāstras* is that the *vedana* (or *vidyā*) that is prescribed in these passages as the means of attaining the *Brahman* is to be practised only once, or whether it has to be frequently repeated.<sup>1221</sup> What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it should be practised only once. Why?

<sup>1221</sup>. Rāmānuja takes *asakṛit* while S'āṅkara takes it to qualify *upadeśa*.  
in the *Sūtra* to qualify *āvṛitti*.

Because in the passage, "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes like unto the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.* III. 2. 9), mere *vedana* is itself enjoined, and because also there is no authority for frequent repetition. It is not possible to say that, as is the case with the husking (of paddy) etc.,<sup>1222</sup> *vedana* is the directly perceived means for acquiring the direct perception of the *Brahman*, and that therefore repetition of it has to be practised till the end is attained—because *vedana* does not possess the character of a directly perceived means. Rituals like *Jyotishṭoma*, as also the *vedana* prescribed in the *Vedānta*, are of the nature of the worship of the Supreme Person, and the attainment of the objects of human pursuit known as duty, wealth, desire and salvation results from the Supreme Person (so) worshipped; this indeed has been established under the aphorism: "From Him are produced (all) the results, because it is appropriate" (*Ved. Sūtr.* III. 2. 37). Therefore, the purport of the *sāstra* is that it (i.e., *vedana*) should be performed only once like the *Jyotishṭoma* etc., according to the scriptural text.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply as follows: that repetition is frequent. The purport of the *sāstra* is that *vedana* has to be frequently repeated. Why? "Because it is so taught". Because it is taught by the word, '*vedana*', which is synonymous with the words, '*vidi*', '*dhyāna*' and '*upāsana*'.<sup>1223</sup> Their synonymity is made out from the use of '*upāsti*' and '*dhyāyati*' in

1222. The husking of paddy, when enjoined, involves repeated operations till the rice grain is free of its sheath. But enjoined rituals like *Jyotishṭoma* are performed only once for them to yield the promised fruits. The question here is: whether meditation on the *Brahman* has to be performed once or repeatedly.

1223. Synonyms should be qualified by the same attribute and signify the same meaning.

*Vedana*, *dhyāna* and *upāsana* may not be synonyms in this sense, because *vedana* (knowing or knowledge) is a general term, and *dhyāna* and *upāsana*, signifying meditation, are particular terms, standing for a specific variety of *vedana*. But when *vedana* is mentioned as the means for the emancipation of the self, it can mean nothing other than meditation. Hence all the three terms in this context are synonymous.

the passages relating to the teaching about *vedana* in respect of one and the same object.

It comes out thus: The topic which was begun in the context with the word, '*upāsi*', in the passage, "Worship (*upāsita*) the mind as the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 18. 1), is concluded by the word, '*vid*', in the passage, "He who knows (*veda*) thus shines and warms up through fame, greatness and spiritual glory" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 18. 6). Similarly, in the beginning of the passage namely, "Whoever knows anything, that he (i.e., Raikva) knows: he has been told this by me" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1. 4), the knowledge of Raikva is taught by the word, '*vidi*'; (this knowledge) is in the concluding passage taught by the word, '*upāsi*': "Reverend sir, that deity which you worship (*upāsse*), teach that deity unto me" (*Ibid.* IV. 2. 2). Similarly, in the passages which have the same meaning as the passage, "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the highest" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), such as the following among other similar passages, "Verily, the Self has to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected upon, to be steadily meditated upon" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5) and "But then he who is engaged in meditation (or *dhyāna*) sees Him who is free from parts" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 8), *vedana* is denoted by the word, '*dhyāyati*'.

And '*dhyāna*' is contemplation, and contemplation is of the nature of a stream of remembrances, but it is not mere remembrance. The word, '*upāsti*', also has the same meaning with it, because it is seen used to denote the uninterrupted series of the activities of the mind that is one-pointed. As both these words mean the same thing, the stream of frequently repeated remembrances is here definitely determined as denoted by the words, '*vedana*' etc., which are given in such passages as the following:—"He who knows (*veda*) the *Brahman* attains the highest" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1) and "Knowing (*jñātvā*) the Lord, he is free from all sins" (*Śvet. Up.* II. 15).

## लिङ्गाच्च

Sūtra 2. *Liṅgāchcha*

(471)

Because also there is the *Smṛiti*.

‘*Liṅga*’ (in the *Sūtra*) means ‘*Smṛiti*’. This conclusion is made out from the *Smṛiti* also. Indeed, it is stated in the *Smṛiti* that the *vedana* which is the means of attaining salvation has the nature of a stream of remembrances, as in the following passage: “The meditation on His form is one stream without attachment to anything else. Meditation on Him is thus produced by the first six elements<sup>1224</sup> (of the process of meditation and mental concentration known as *yoga*)” (V. P. VI. 7. 91). Therefore the purport of the *sāstra* is that *vedana* is undoubtedly repeated frequently.

## ADHIKARANA II

## ĀTMA TVOPASANĀDHIKARANA

आत्मेति तृपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च

Sūtra 3. *Atmeti tūpagachchhanti grāhayanti cha* (472)

Certainly, they (i.e., the Jābālas) worship (the *Brahman*) as the self, and they (i.e., the scriptures) make us comprehend (Him as such).

Now the question that is taken up for consideration is this: whether the *Brahman* who is the object of

<sup>1224</sup>. In the context in the V. P., meditation on the Lord is taught in varied ways. The six elements or stages of *yoga* mentioned in the quoted verse are *yama* (self-control), *niyama* (religious vows and austerities), *asana* (postures for meditation), *prāṇāyama* (control of breath),

*pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of the senses from external objects), and *dharāṇa* (steady abstraction of the mind). The two other stages are *dhyāna* (meditation) and *samādhi* (perfect absorption of thought into the object of meditation).

worship has to be worshipped as other than the worshipper, or whether He has to be worshipped as the self of the worshipper. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That He is other than the worshipper. Why? Because the *Brahman* is a different entity from the individual self who is worshipper. His being a different entity has been explained under the following, among other aphorisms: "(The *Brahman*) is however other (than the individual self), on account of the difference (between them) which is taught in the scriptures" (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 22), "(But) because there is the teaching about some one who is different (from the self who is the agent of works)....." (*Ibid.* III. 4. 8), and "He who is other (than the *Brahman*) is not (that Being who is denoted by the words of the *mantra*), because (in such a case) there would be inappropriateness" (*Ibid.* I. 1. 17). The *Brahman* should be worshipped as He is. Indeed, if the worship relates to Him as He is not, the attainment of the *Brahman* also will be other than what it should be, by reason of the maxim, "As is a man's deed here, so will he be after death" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1). Therefore, He is to be worshipped as a different entity.

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given thus: "Certainly, they worship (the *Brahman*) as the self" (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 1). The word, 'tu' (rendered as 'certainly'), denotes determination. He should be worshipped only as the self of the worshipper. Just as the individual self who is the worshipper is the self of his own body, similarly, he should worship the Supreme *Brahman* as the Self of his own self: this is the meaning. Why? Indeed, the ancient worshippers thus understand Him: "Reverend deity, you are me, I am you indeed." (?) It may, however, be asked how the worshippers accept as that the *Brahman* who is a different entity from the worshipper. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus: "They make us comprehend Him as such." Indeed, the *śāstras* make the worshippers

understand that this meaning is non-contradictory of the meaning that they teach to them. Thus there is the passage:—"He who, dwelling within the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self from within—He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self" (*Mādh. Brīh. Up.* III. 7. 22). Similarly, there are the passages: "All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *Sat*, have their abode in the *Sat* and are established in the *Sat*. All this has That for its Self" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* VI. 8. 6-7), and "All this is, indeed, the *Brahman*; (all things) are created by Him, are absorbed into Him and are preserved by Him" (*Ibid.* III. 14. 1).

Accordingly, inasmuch as all intelligent and non-intelligent things are created by Him, are absorbed by Him and are preserved by Him, are controlled by Him and are His body, He is the self of all; therefore He is your self. Therefore, just as the individual self is the self of its own body and hence there are the notions of "I am a god", "I am a man" etc., similarly, as the Supreme Self is the Self of even the individual self, it is proper to have the very notion, "I", in relation to Him.

Those who accept the teaching which is thus given by the *sāstras* to the effect, that, owing to all notions being devoted to Him, all words denote only the *Brahman*—(they) have taught in reciprocal terms thus: "O reverend deity, you are indeed I, I am indeed you" (?). There is the prohibition relating to not meditating as the self in the following passages: "And he who worships another deity, thinking that that (deity) is one and he another, does not know" (*Brīh. Up.* I. 4. 10), "He (i.e., the self) is not all this.....Let him worship (Him) as the self itself" (*Ibid.* I. 4. 7), and "All things abandon (or scorn) Him who knows all things apart from the Self" (*Ibid.* II. 4. 6); there is the positive injunction that the meditation has to be separate, as given in the passage, "Knowing the



individual self and the Impeller to be different" (*S'vet. Up.* I. 6); both these (positive and negative injunctions) are not contradictory.

Through the meditation as 'I', that is, one's own self, the prohibition of meditation as other (than one's own self) is saved. As is the case with the meditation of one's own self as different from the body, there is the meditation on the Supreme Self as different from one's own self, and therefore the injunction relating to meditation as distinct is also saved. Because the *Brahman* who is different (from the individual self) is the self of the individual self, and because he (i.e., the individual self) is the body of the *Brahman*, it is stated in the passage containing the negative injunction—"Indeed he (i.e., the individual self) is not all this" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7). Therefore, it is established that the *Brahman* should be worshipped as the self of the worshipper.<sup>1225</sup>

### ADHIKARANA III

#### PRATĪKĀDHIKARANA

न प्रतीके न हि सः

**Sūtra 4.** *Na pratīke na hi saḥ* (473)

(The self) should not be (meditated on) in the *pratīka* (or symbol); indeed, he is not (that).

The worship of symbols (or *pratīkas*) is given in the following passages: "One should worship the mind as

1225. When the *Brahman* is regarded as the self of the worshipper, what is meant is that there is a 'grammatical equation' between the two. On the grammatical equation,

see Notes 75 and 228, Vol. I. The equation between the self and the *Brahman* is taught authoritatively by the scripture. Objections to it are here answered.

the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 18. 1), "Indeed, he who worships the name as the *Brahman*..." (*Ibid.* VII. 1. 5) etc. The consideration here is whether, in connection with these meditations also, meditation on them as the self has to be made or not; here, it is concluded that because the worship directed in the passage, "One should worship the mind as the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.* III. 18. 1), is the same as the worship of the *Brahman* and because the *Brahman* is the self of the worshipper, it (the symbol) should be worshipped as the self.<sup>1226</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus: "Not in the symbol". On the symbol meditation should not be made as the self. "Indeed, he is not"; indeed, the self of the worshipper is not a symbol. In the worship of symbols, the symbol itself has to be worshipped, and not the *Brahman*, but the *Brahman* is merely a particular attribute of the viewing. Indeed, the worship is well known to be the meditation on what is not the *Brahman* through viewing it as the *Brahman*. There the symbol which is the object of worship is not the self of the worshipper, and therefore it should not be meditated upon as such (i.e., as the self).

It may however be said here as follows. Herein (i.e., in the symbols) also, the object of meditation is the *Brahman* Himself; when it is possible for the *Brahman* to be the object of worship, then it is contrary to reason to say that the mind etc., which are non-intelligent and have very little power, should be the substratum of the quality of being the object of worship. Therefore, through viewing Him as the mind etc., the *Brahman* Himself should be taken as the object of worship. To

1226. The worship of the symbol is the same as the worship of the *Brahman* in the sense that the *Brahman* is, though in different ways, the subject of meditation in both.

this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the reply as follows:—

ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात्

**Sūtra 5.** *Brahmadṛisṭīrutkarshāt*

(474)

To view (the symbols) as the *Brahman* is (proper), because He is superior.

In regard to the mind etc., it is proper to view them as the *Brahman*, and not, in regard to the *Brahman*, to view Him as the mind etc; because the *Brahman* is superior to the mind etc., while they are the opposite (i.e., inferior). Indeed, in regard to the king, who is the superior, to view him as the servant produces evil, but in regard to the servant to view him as the king is capable of producing worldly prosperity.<sup>1227</sup>

## ADHYĀRANA IV

### ĀDITYĀDIMATYADHIKARĀṆA

आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः

**Sūtra 6.** *Ādityādimatayaśchāṅga upapattēḥ*

(475)

In regard to the auxiliary (such as, the *udgītha* in the ritual), to view (it) as the sun-god etc. is indeed (proper), because it is appropriate.

The meditations whose objects are the auxiliaries of rituals are given in the following among other such

1227. It is the *pratīka* which is viewed as the *Brahman*, and not the *Brahman* who is viewed as the *pratīka*. This is because He is greater than the symbols.

When the symbols are inanimate, it is to be presumed that their presiding deities are intended.

passages: "He who burns (i.e., the sun), meditate upon him in relation to the *udgītha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 3. 1); in this connection the doubt arises whether, in regard to the *udgītha* etc., which are the auxiliaries of rituals, the view that they are the sun etc. should be taken, or whether in regard to the sun etc. the view that they are the *udgītha* etc. should be taken. Because it stands to reason that in regard to that which is inferior the view that it is superior should be taken, and because also the *udgītha* etc., owing to their being the auxiliaries of rituals, which are the means of attaining desired results, are superior to the sun etc., which yield no fruits,—the view that they are the *udgītha* etc. should be taken in regard to the sun etc.

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given as follows: "In regard to the auxiliary (such as the *udgītha* in the ritual), to view it as the sun-god etc. is indeed (proper), because it is appropriate" (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 6). The word, '*cha*' (rendered as 'indeed'), is used in the sense of determination. In regard to the *udgītha* etc., which are the auxiliaries of rituals, only the views that they are the sun etc. should be taken. Why? "Because it is appropriate"; because the sun etc. can alone be appropriately superior. Indeed, through the worship of the deities such as the sun, even rituals get the character of being the means for realising fruits. Therefore, the view that they are the sun etc. should be taken in regard to the *udgītha* etc.<sup>1228</sup>

1228. The *pūrvapaksha* assumes that the ritual is greater than the deity propitiated thereby, that the propitiation is incidental and that the fruits are yielded by the ritual. The

correct view is that the ritual is of the nature of the worship and propitiation of the deity and that the deity, pleased thereby, grants the desired fruits.

## ADHIKARANA V

### ĀSINĀDHIKARANA

#### आसीनस्सम्भवात्

**Sūtra 7.** *Āsīnassambhavāt* (476)

Seated (one should meditate), because (then alone) it (i.e., mental concentration) is possible.

It has been stated above that the knowledge (or *jñāna*), which is prescribed by the *Vedānta-sūtras* as the means of attaining salvation, is denoted by the words, '*dhyāna*', '*upāsana*' etc., is to be frequently repeated in practice, and has the nature of a constant, uninterrupted succession of remembrances. For practising it, no particular posture either of sitting or of sleeping or of standing is given; therefore (it is urged that) it may be practised without regard to any restriction as to posture.

If it is so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus: "Seated (one should meditate)..." (*Ved. Sūti. IV. 1. 7*). That is, in a sitting posture, one should perform meditation. Why? "Because (then only) it is possible". Indeed, it is only he who is seated that can possibly have one-pointed attention; because both standing and motion stand in need of effort, and because in the reclining posture there is the possibility of getting sleep. So that one need not make effort for subsequently maintaining the body in the same posture, one should, in a sitting posture, where there is a support, perform meditation.

#### ध्यानाच्च

**Sūtra 8.** *Dhyānāchcha* (477)

Because also of continued contemplation.

Because worship is of the nature of meditation, as taught by the injunction, "The Self has to be steadily meditated upon" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5), one-pointed attention has necessarily to be attained. Indeed, it has already been stated that meditation is that contemplation of one and the same thing, which is not interrupted by ideas which are of a different kind.

### अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य

**Sūtra 9.** *Achalatvam chāpekshya*

(478)

And it is in need of immovability.

Having the absence of motion in view, cleverness of expression in describing meditation is seen in the case of the elements of earth etc., as in the following passage: "The earth meditates as it were, the sky meditates as it were, the heaven meditates as it were, the waters meditate as it were, the mountains meditate as it were" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 6. 1.).

### स्मरन्ति च

**Sūtra 10.** *Smaranti cha*

(479)

Because also it is so declared in the *Smṛiti*.

Meditation is declared in the *Smṛiti* in regard only to one who is in a sitting posture, as in the following passage: "Having fixed in a pure place a firm seat, neither too high nor too low, and upon a cloth, a deer-skin and grass in order, and there, making the mind one-pointed, with the mind, the senses and activities all restrained, and sitting on that seat, one should have recourse to yoga (or mental concentration leading to self-realisation) with the object of purifying one's own self" (*B. G.* VI. 11-12).

## यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात्

Sūtra 11. *Yatraikagrataṭ tatrāviśeshāt* (480)

Wherever there is one-pointedness, there (meditation must be practised), because no other particular is specified.

Because no mention is made of particular times or places over and above one-pointedness, whichever time and place are favourable to one-pointedness, they themselves are the time and place for meditation. The statement—"In an even and pure place, devoid of pebbles, fire, and gravel, meditation has to be practised" (*Svet. Up.* II. 10)—implies a sequestered place which is fit for one-pointedness; but it does not fix any place, because there is the statement later on: "in a place pleasing to the mind" (*Ibid.*).<sup>1229</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VI

### ĀPRAYĀṆĀDHIKARANA

## आप्रयाणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम्

Sūtra 12. *Āprayāṇāttatrāpi hi dṛishtam* (481)

It (i.e., meditation) should be performed until departure from life, because here also scriptural authority is seen.

<sup>1229</sup> In order that there may be no distraction or interruption, *dhyāna* (or meditation) has to be carried out by one, while seated on a firm and comfortable seat in a posture favourable to concentration of

mind. This does not apply to the *abhyāsa* or repeated contemplation of God, one of the seven means for producing devotion to God. See Vol. I, pp. 20-21. There interruption is excusable, and indeed inevitable.

Here the doubt is whether this meditation, which is the means for attaining salvation and which has the characteristics stated above, has to be carried out only for a day, or whether it has to be practised every day until departure from life; in answer to this doubt, it is urged that inasmuch as the purpose of the *sāstras* is fulfilled through the practice in only one day, it should be completed only by so much.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply thus: "Until departure from life" (*Ād. Sūtr.* IV. 1. 12); that is, upto the time of death it should be practised. Why? "Because here also scriptural authority is seen." Whatsoever period of time there is between the commencement of the task of meditation and the time of departure from life, during the whole of that (interval) also, meditation is seen to be enjoined, as in the passage: "Living, indeed, in this manner throughout life, he obtains the world of the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 15. 1.).<sup>1230</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VII

### TADADHIGAMĀDHIKARANA

तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात्

*Sūtra 13. Tadadhigama uttarapūrvāghayora-  
śleshavināśau tadvyapadeśāt* (482)

1230. (i) The previously mentioned characteristics of the meditation are its frequent repetition, its having to be performed when seated etc. (ii) "Departure from life" does not necessarily mean the end of the life in which meditation is carried out. The *prarabdha-karma* or the *karma* which has

begun to yield fruits has to be exhausted; and that may mean one or more lives to be lived. (iii) Rāmānuja appears to have quoted *Chhānd. Up.* (VIII. 15. 1) by way of implied reply to Śaṅkara's view that this section deals only with *upasanā*s which do not have *moksha* or right knowledge as their aim.



On attaining it, non-attachment and destruction will result to the later and earlier sins respectively, because it is so taught.

Having, in this manner, carefully examined the essential nature of *vidyā*, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) begins to consider the fruits of *vidyā*. It is stated in the scriptures that, after the attainment of the *vidyā* of the *Brahman*, non-attachment and destruction of the later and earlier sins result in regard to the person (who has the *vidyā*). In the following passages, "Just as water does not cling to the lotus leaf, so also, in the case of a person who knows thus, sinful deeds do not cling to (i.e., taint) him" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 3), and "His own self is the knower of the essential nature of the Goal (or the *Brahman*); knowing Him, one is not tainted by sinful *karmas*" (?),<sup>1231</sup> non-attachment of later sins is spoken of. In the following passages destruction of the earlier sins is spoken of: "Therefore, just as the fibre in the *ishika* reed, thrown into the fire, is burnt up, so also all his sins are indeed burnt up" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 24. 3), and "When He who is the Self of the highest and the lowest is seen, all his *karmas* perish" (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 9).

Here the doubt arises whether or not these non-attachment and destruction appropriately result as the fruits of meditation. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they do not so result. Why? Because of the contradiction with the following *sāstra* text—"No *karma* which is not enjoyed and experienced will perish even after hundreds of crores of periods of time known as *kalpas*" (?). However, the teaching relating to non-attachment and destruction is given in a passage supplementary to that which prescribes meditation as the means for salvation, and it fits into the context somehow

1231. The quoted *śruti* text instead of '*tasya atma*', as differs slightly from *Brih. Up.* (IV. 4. 23), which has '*tasya syat*' quoted.

through declaring an eulogy of the meditation. Moreover, meditation is not enjoined as an expiation of the earlier and later sins, so that the destruction of the sins may be said to come about through such expiation. Indeed, in the following passages, "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), and "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes like unto the *Brahman*" (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 9), meditation is enjoined as the means for attaining the *Brahman*. Therefore, this teaching relating to the destruction and non-attachment of sins is merely an eulogy of the meditation.<sup>1232</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows:—  
 "On attaining it..." (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 13). On attaining *vidyā*, through the greatness of *vidyā* itself, the non-attachment and destruction of the earlier and later sins appropriately take place. How? The greatness of *vidyā* is made out of to be of this character, as stated in the following among other passages, "Sinful deeds do not cling to (i.e., taint) him who knows thus" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 3) and "So also, all his sins are, indeed, burnt up" (*Ibid.* V. 24. 3). There is no contradiction of this with the *śāstra* passage, "No *karmā* which is not enjoyed and experienced perishes" (?), because it relates to a different subject-matter. Indeed, that (*śāstra* passage) relates to the confirmation of the capability of *karmas* to produce fruits. However, these passages establish that the *vidyā* which has come into being possesses the capability to destroy the power of the *karmas* done before to produce fruits, and also the capability to cause obstruction to the power of the *karmas* that may hereafter come into being to produce fruits; thus the subject of both the passages is distinct.

1232. That the scriptures declare the destruction of earlier and the non-attachment of later sins of the man of *vidyā* is not in question. Whether the destruction and non-attachment are appropriately declared is

investigated here. If they contradict the statement about *karmas* being exhausted only through experience, they are merely in eulogy of *vidyā*. If otherwise, they are appropriately declared.

For instance, regarding the two means of knowledge which relate to the power of heating and its destruction that respectively belong to fire and water, they are accepted as criteria of truth through the distinction in regard to their objects. Similar is the case here, and there is no contradiction whatever. To cause non-attachment of sins is to cause obstruction to the origination of the power which is the cause of producing unfitness for the rituals enjoined by the *Veda*, innate impressions (tending to the performance of similar sins) and the taint of sin. Indeed, the sins which are committed bring about in relation to a person incompetency for the performance of the religious works enjoined by the *Veda*, the desire to undertake other activities similar in nature (to the sinful), and they also produce the taint of sin. To cause destruction of the sins is to cause destruction of the several particular powers that have been produced and are capable of producing effects.

This power also is nothing other than the displeasure of the Supreme Person. In this above-mentioned manner, as the object of meditation is excessively dear to the meditator, *vidyā* is itself also surpassingly dear to him, and is of the nature of the worship of the Supreme Person, who forms the object of meditation; and (it) destroys that displeasure of the Supreme Person which has been produced by a heap of sins committed before; and that same *vidyā* obstructs the origination of that displeasure of the Supreme Person which is due to the sins that arise subsequent to its own generation.<sup>1233</sup>

1233. (i) 'Sins' here refer to whatever stands in the way of salvation. They thus signify both good and evil deeds. (ii) Meditation destroys hindrances to salvation. Then the attainment of the *Brahman* comes of itself. (iii) Though *karmas* have the capability to produce effects, the Supreme Person can

prevent the effects from being produced. (iv) It may be supposed that at the commencement of *vidyā* the Supreme Person resolves to forgive the sins of the person practising it and that at its successful culmination the sins are actually forgiven.

This above-mentioned non-attachment has to be considered as related to those (sins) that arise through inadvertence, because from such *sāstraic* passages as the following, "One who has not ceased from evil conduct..." (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 24), it is made out that the *vidyā*, which up to departure from life is produced every day and which obtains further and further increase, is accomplished through cessation from evil deeds.

## ADHIKARANA VIII

### ITARĀDHIKARANA

इतरस्याप्यैवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु

**Sūtra 14.** *Itatrasypyevamaśleṣaḥ pāte tu* (483)

In the case even of (meritorious) deeds which are other (than sinful), there is in the same manner (non-attachment as also destruction): but there is non-attachment (in the case of deeds helpful to *vidyā*) after death.

It has been stated above that non-attachment and destruction of the later and earlier sins are caused by *vidyā*. "In the case of other," that is, meritorious deeds also, "there is the same", that is, according to the same reasoning, there will be non-attachment and destruction (to them) by *vidyā*, because of (them, i.e., the meritorious deeds) being opposed to the results of *vidyā* in common (with sinful deeds), and because it is so taught. And the teaching is given thus. After referring to both sinful and meritorious deeds, the passage runs thus: "All sins (i.e., deeds whose effects are opposed to the knowledge of the *Brahman*) turn away from him" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 4. 1); and there is the passage: "Then alone, he shakes off his good and bad *karmas*" (*Kauśh. Up.* I. 4). Inasmuch as

it is an undesirable fruit for one who is desirous of salvation, even meritorious deeds are denoted by the word, 'sin' (or 'pāpman'). Because meritorious deeds are also recommended by the *śāstras*, and because also their fruits are seen desired by some, the doubt arises that they may not be hostile to *vidyā*; to remove this doubt, there is extended application (of the reasoning under the previous *Sūtra*).<sup>1234</sup>

It may, however, be said that even to a man of *vidyā*, rains, food etc. are quite desirable for the purpose of accomplishing meditations as associated with the several subordinate details of procedure, and it may be asked how, owing to their hostility, their destruction is brought about (by means of *vidyā*). To this objection he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows:—"But after death"; only when the body falls (i.e., with the death of the body), their destruction is brought about. Only subsequently to the destruction of the body, meritorious deeds which are helpful to *vidyā* and whose fruits are directly perceived (i.e., worldly) are destroyed: this is the meaning.

1234. This *Sūtra* is intended to show that 'agha' (or sin) in the previous *Sūtra* refers to both meritorious and sinful deeds. In other words, there are destruction and non-attachment of earlier and later meritorious deeds also. This is because meritorious deeds, like sins, obstruct the fruit of *vidyā*, which is salvation. Thus the reasoning under the previous aphorism finds extended application here. It is also pointed out that *Chhand Up.* (VIII. 4. 1)

includes meritorious deeds also in *pāpman* (or sin). For the text says that to one who attains the Bridge or Support (i.e., the *Brahman*), "there is no old age, no death, no grief, no meritorious deed, no sinful deed: all sins turn away from him". The additional *Sūtra*, in spite of the extended application of earlier reasoning, is justified on the ground that meritorious deeds are recommended by the scriptures and their results are widely desired.

## ADHIKARANA IX

## ANĀRABDHAKĀRYĀDHIKARANA

अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः

**Sūtra 15.** *Anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tadavadheḥ* (484)

It is only the two (i.e., sin and merit) which are earlier (than *vidyā*) and which have not begun to produce their fruits (that perish), because they (i.e., the *karmas* which have begun to yield fruits) last till that (i.e., death).

It has been stated above that non-attachment and destruction happen to the good and bad deeds done both before and after the origination of the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*. The doubt is here raised whether the good and bad deeds done before the origination of the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* are destroyed in their entirety, or whether it is only such of those deeds as have not yet begun to produce their fruits (that are destroyed). In this connection, it may be said that they are all (destroyed) in their entirety; because in the passages, "All the sins turn away from him" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 4. 1*), and "Then only he shakes off (his) good and bad *karmas*" (*Kaush. Up. I. 4*), mention is made of the (destruction of the) fruits of *vidyā* in their entirety without any distinction whatever; and because also the existence of the body subsequent to the origination of *vidyā* appropriately fits in through the influence of the impressed tendencies, as is the case with the revolutions of the potter's wheel (even after the potter stops pushing the wheel).

• If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows:  
"It is only the two (i.e., sin and merit) which are earlier

(than *vidyā*) and which have not begun to produce their fruits (that perish)..." (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 15). The good and bad deeds, done earlier, that is, before the origination of *vidyā*, and whose effects have not begun (to materialise), that is, which have not begun to produce their fruits—(only such deeds) undergo destruction through *vidyā*. Why? "Because they last till that;" because in the scriptural passage, "So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay; then he will be blessed" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* VI. 14. 2), it is declared that the delay is till the body is destroyed. Moreover, apart from the divine Lord's pleasure and displeasure, which are respectively produced by the meritorious and non-meritorious deeds, there is no sanction for the existence of any impressed tendencies that are the cause of the existence of the body.<sup>1235</sup>

## ADHIKARANA X

### AGNIHOTRĀDHIKARANA

अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्

**Sūtra 16.** *Agnihotrādi tu tatkāryāyaiva  
taddarśanāt*

(485)

*Agnihotra* etc., however, have to be performed solely for producing that effect (i.e., the origination of *vidyā*), because it is so seen declared in the scripture.

Under the aphorism, "In the same manner there is non-attachment (as also destruction) even of other (than

1235. The intention of this section is to show that the *karma* which is *prarabdha* (i.e., which has begun to yield fruits) is not destroyed by *vidyā*. It

has to be exhausted only by enjoyment or experience. *S.P.* points out that the *prarabdha-karma* is treated as real by this *Sūtra*.

sinful deeds)" (*Ved. Sūti*. IV. 1. 14), it has been stated that there is non-attachment of even good deeds by reason of the strength of *vidyā*. *Agnihotra* and all other daily and occasional rituals of one's own stage of life are also good deeds in general, and hence there is no attachment of their results, and therefore one who does not like (them) need not perform them.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows: "Agnihotra etc., however..." (*Ved. Sūti*. IV. 1. 16). The word, 'tu' (rendered as 'however') is for particularisation from other good deeds. *Agnihotra* and other religious works, which are the duties of the stages of life, owing to the impossibility of the non-attachment of their fruits, have undoubtedly to be performed, and such impossibility is due to their being intended for producing their own effects. Indeed, the performance of the *Agnihotra* etc., by the wise man, is solely intended for the effect known as *vidyā*. It may be asked how this is made out. "Because it is so seen declared in the scripture." Indeed, it is seen declared in the scripture by means of the following and other passages: "The Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him by reciting the *Vedas*, by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22), that *Agnihotra* etc. are the means for producing *vidyā*. Because *vidyā*, which receives excellence through practice every day until departure from life, is produced every day, for producing that (*vidyā*), even the rituals belonging to the religiously sanctioned stages of life have undoubtedly to be performed every day. Otherwise, if the rituals of the stages of life are not performed, he (who thus fails to perform the rituals) will have his mind besmirched, and there will be no origination of *vidyā* at all.<sup>1236</sup>

1236. To the man of *vidyā*, *Agnihotra* does not yield *Svarga*, but it is helpful in his practice of *vidyā*. *Bhakti* in the mind is like water in a clean vessel.

The vessel requires frequent cleaning, and *Agnihotra* helps in cleansing the mind and keeping it fit for *bhakti*.



It may, however, be objected as follows. If *Agnihotra* and other good deeds are intended to be performed for producing *vidyā*, then the *karma* anterior to the production of *vidyā* is destroyed as stated in the following passages: "Residing (there in the heavenly world) as long as (ripened) *karmas* last" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 5) and "Having reached the end of (the) *karmas* (done)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 6); as for the fruits of the *karmas* that have begun to yield their fruits, (only) that remains after what has been enjoyed already; and it is therefore asked what the purport of the following passage is: "His friends take his good deeds" (?).<sup>1237</sup> To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:

अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषामुभयोः

**Sūtra 17.** *Ato'nyāpi hyekeshāmubhayoḥ*

(486)

Other than this (i.e., *Agnihotra* and such rituals), (there are many good deeds) among the two (i.e., good deeds done before and after the origination of *vidyā*); such is the opinion of some.

"Other than this", that is, other than *Agnihotra* and other good deeds, which are intended to produce *vidyā*, there is an infinite number of good deeds among the meritorious deeds which are done before and after the production of *vidyā* and whose fruits are obstructed by more powerful *karmas*. These (deeds) are the subject-matter of that passage which belongs to some schools: "His sons take their shares (of property), his friends take his good deeds" (?). And the scriptural passage which speaks of the non-attachment and destruction (of

<sup>1237</sup>. 'Sampata' in *Chhānd. Up.* (V. 10. 5) has to be understood as 'the *karmas*' which remain to be enjoyed. The reference is not to all *karmas*,

but only to those which have begun to yield fruits. In *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 6), the reference is to *karmas* yielding worldly fruits.

earlier and later *karmas*) through *vidyā* is concerned with those (deeds). He (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) recalls to mind the possibility, already mentioned, of obstruction to the fruits even of *karmas* already performed.

### यदेव विद्ययेति हि

**Sūtra 18.** *Yadeva vidyayeti hi*

(487)

Indeed, (that there is obstruction to the fruit of good deeds is declared in the scriptural text beginning with): “That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation...”

There is the passage: “That very thing (i.e., the sacrificial act) which is done along with meditation...that certainly is possessed of greater power” (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 1. 10). From this statement, that the *udgītha-vidyā* has for its fruit the non-obstruction of the fruit of rituals, it is indeed pointed out that there is obstruction even to *karmas* which have been performed. Therefore, the passage which is attributed to Śāṭyāyana, namely, “His friends take his good deeds” (?), has for its object the fruits which have been obstructed in regard to *karmas* performed by a man of *vidyā*.<sup>1238</sup>

1238. (i) The performance of *Agnihotra* etc. has been dealt with from other points of view under *Ved. Sūt.* (III. 4. 26 & 33). A fresh doubt justifies this *Sūtra*. (ii) The Śāṭyayin text refers to good deeds whose fruits have

not been enjoyed on account of powerful obstruction. In the case of a man of *vidyā*, these are the only good *karmas* that remain after his *prarabdha-karma* is exhausted. See also under III. 3. 26.

## ADHIKARANA XI

### ITARAKSHAPANĀDHIKARANA

### भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वाथ सम्पद्यते

**Sūtra 19.** *Bhogenā tvitare kshapayitvātha sampadyate* (488)

After exhausting the other two (i.e., the good and bad deeds which have begun to yield their fruits) through enjoyment, then he attains (the *Brahman*).

Other than these two, namely, the meritorious deeds and the non-meritorious deeds whose non-attachment and destruction have been stated above, there are meritorious and non-meritorious deeds which have begun to produce their fruits; the doubt is raised, whether they are destroyed at the end of the body which produced *vidyā*, or whether there is no restriction as to their destruction either at the end of that body or at the end of other bodies; (in regard to this doubt) it is urged that, according to the passage, "So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 14. 2), it is stated that it is at the end of the giving up of that body, and therefore (those deeds are destroyed) at the end of that (body).

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given as follows: "After exhausting, however..." (*Ved. Sūtr.* IV. 1. 19). The word, 'tu' (rendered as 'however'), is intended to set aside the above view. "The other two," that is, the meritorious and non-meritorious deeds which have begun to yield their fruits—after exhausting them through the enjoyment of the fruits which were yielded by themselves, and after the completion of the enjoyment

of those fruits, the *Brahman* is attained. And if those meritorious and non-meritorious deeds are such as have their fruits capable of enjoyment in one body, then at the end of that (body) the *Brahman* is attained; if their fruits are capable of enjoyment in more than one body, then at the end of those (bodies) It (i.e., the *Brahman*) is attained; because the *karmas* which have begun to yield their fruits have to be exhausted solely through enjoyment. According to the passage, "So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay" (*Ibid.*), freedom from those two kinds of *karmas* (i.e., meritorious and non-meritorious) is stated to result through enjoyment, because there is no mention of the fixing of any limit as at the end of the body.

In this very manner, the *karmas* which have been done before the (origination) of the *vidyā* of the *Brahman*, whose fruits have not yet been enjoyed, which have not yet begun to yield their fruits, which consist of merit and sin, which have been accumulated from beginningless time and which are endless in number—are destroyed through the greatness of *vidyā*; and the *karmas* performed subsequent to the production of *vidyā* do not get attached (to the performer). It being so, all (his *karmas*) which are meritorious, the friends of the man of *vidyā* receive, and (his) sins (his) enemies (receive): thus all this is free from fault.<sup>1239</sup>

1239. (i) Ś.P. points out that while texts like *Chhand. Up.* (VI. 14. 2) do not mention either the body or its end, others like VIII. 13. 1 mention the body.

The term 'body' refers not to any particular body, but to bodies in general. (ii) The last paragraph sums up the purport of many sections.

## PART II

### ADHIKARANA I

#### VĀGADHIKARANA

#### वाङ्मनसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च

**Sūtra 1.** *Vāṇmanasi darśanāchchhabdāchcha* (489)

Speech (rests) in the mind (at the time of death), because it is so seen and because also there are scriptural statements to that effect.

Now he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) begins to take up for consideration the modes of going (to the *Brahman*) of one who practises *vidyā*. At first, it is the departure of the soul (from the body) that is taken up for consideration. In this connection it is thus revealed in the scriptures: "Of this person who is dying, my dear child, (his) speech rests in the mind, the mind in the *prāṇa* (i.e., the principal vital air), the *prāṇa* in the *tejas* (and other elements associated with the self), and the *tejas* (i.e., the elements in their subtle state with the individual self) in the Supreme Deity" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6). Here the doubt arises whether this scriptural text which speaks of the resting of the sense of speech in the mind relates merely to the function of speech, or whether it relates to the sense of speech itself: that it relates merely to the function of the sense of speech is properly arrived at by reasoning. Why? Because the mind does not possess the character of being the material cause of the sense of speech, and therefore here the essential nature of the sense of speech cannot rest in the mind. As the functions of the sense of speech etc. are dependent upon the mind, the scriptural text which speaks of the resting of the sense

of speech etc., appropriately fits in somehow or other.<sup>1240</sup>

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : "Speech (rests) in the mind..." (*Ved. Sūtr.* IV. 2. 1). It is the essential nature of the sense of speech that rests in the mind. Why? "Because it is so seen." Indeed, even when the sense of speech ceases to function, the activity of the mind is perceived. If it be said that this (state of affairs) appropriately results even through the association of the mere function (of the sense of speech), then he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says in reply: "Because there are scriptural statements to that effect." Indeed, the scriptural statement which says, "Speech rests in the mind" (*Ibid.*), relates, indeed, to the association of the essential nature of the sense of speech with the mind, and not merely to the function of the sense of speech. Indeed, at that time (i.e., of death), when there is cessation of the function of the sense of speech, the existence of the sense of speech is not ascertained through any other means of knowledge, so that it may be said that it is merely its function that rests (in the mind). What has been stated above to the effect that, because the mind has not the character of being the material cause of the sense of speech, the resting of the sense of speech in the mind cannot appropriately take place, that objection has to be set aside on the ground that the statement, "Speech rests in the mind" (*Ibid.*), means that the sense of speech is associated with the mind, but is not absorbed into it.

1240. The *pūrvapakṣa* claims to solve the difficulty arising from the fact that speech, not having the *manas* as its material cause, cannot be absorbed into the latter. But the function of speech also cannot be absorbed into the *manas*, which is only an instrumental cause of the former.

Hence the admission that the scriptural text "appropriately fits in somehow or other". As a matter of fact, the *pūrvapakṣa* is obliged to give a secondary significance to both '*vak*' and '*sampatti*', while the *siddhanta* gives such significance only to the latter.

अत एव सर्वाण्यनु

Sūtra 2. *Ata eva sarvāṇyanu*

(490)

For that very reason, all the senses follow (the sense of speech).

Because the resting of the sense of speech in the mind is merely the association of the sense of speech and not its absorption (into the latter), for that very reason, the scriptural text which speaks of the association of all the senses, following the sense of speech, with the mind, appropriately fits in, in this regard, as is made clear thus: "Therefore, with his bodily heat subsided, (to attain) rebirth, (he, the departing soul) with the senses resting in the mind (reaches the *prāṇa*)" (*Pr. Up.* III. 9).<sup>1241</sup>

## ADHIKARANA II

### MANODHIKARANA

तन्मनः प्राण उत्तरात्

Sūtra 3. *Tanmanah prāṇa uttarāt*

(491)

That mind (rests) in the *prāṇa*, because of the subsequent passage.

That mind, that is, the mind which is conjoined with all the senses, rests in the *prāṇa*; that is, it gets conjoined with the *prāṇa*; but it is not the mere function of the

1241. (i) The existence of the sense of speech may not be perceived, when it is not functioning. But that does not mean that it has ceased to exist. (ii) Only a part of the *Pr. Up.* text is quoted. The whole of it may be thus rendered: "Therefore (i.e., because the *tejas*

*udana*), the dying self, with the bodily heat subsided, with whatever desire it may have, for the sake of rebirth in accordance therewith, reaches the *prāṇa*, accompanied by the *manas* with which all the senses are associated in a particular way".

mind (that so gets into conjunction with the mind). Why? "Because of the subsequent passage", namely, "The mind (rests) in the *prāṇa*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6), which says so.

There is, however, the additional objection here as follows. From the statement, "Indeed, my dear child, the mind consists of *anna* (or the element, earth)" (*Ibid.* VI. 6. 5), it is made out that the mind has *anna* for its material cause; and from the statement, "They (i.e., the waters) created *anna*" (*Ibid.* VI. 2. 4), it is established that *anna* consists of water; and from the statement, "The *prāṇa* consists of water" (*Ibid.* VI. 6. 5), it is made out that the *prāṇa* has water as its material cause. Therefore, in the statement, "The mind rests in the *prāṇa*" (*Ibid.* VI. 8. 6), by the word, '*prāṇa*', the water which is the material cause of the *prāṇa* is pointed out; then through stating the resting of the mind in that (water), the statement relating to (its) association appropriately fits in, in the context, as the absorption of the mind in its own cause thus takes place indirectly.

The answer to this objection is given thus: In the statement, "Indeed, my dear child, the mind consists of *anna*, the *prāṇa* consists of water" (*Ibid.* VI. 6. 5), what is stated is that the nourishment of the mind and the *prāṇa* takes place through *anna* and water respectively, and not that they are the material causes of those two (i.e., the mind and the *prāṇa*); because the mind is a product of the principle of *ahaṅkāra*, and because also the *prāṇa* is a modification of the spatial ether. Moreover, (according to the opponents' view), by means of the word, '*prāṇa*', 'water' is indicated (only) by way of a secondary significance.<sup>1242</sup>

<sup>1242</sup>. The absorption of the mind in its own cause in an indirect way is to be understood thus. As the earth is absorbed into water, the mind which

has the earth for its cause may be supposed to be absorbed into the *prāṇa*, which has water for its cause.



## ADHIKARANA III

### ADHYAKSHĀDHIKARANA

#### सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः

**Sūtra 4.** *So'dhyakshe tadupagamādibhyah* (492)

It (i.e., the *prāṇa*) (rests) in the lord (of the senses) (i.e., with the individual self), because it (i.e., the *prāṇa*) goes near it and does such other things (at the time of death).

Just as, according to the statement, "Speech rests in the mind, the mind in the *prāṇa*" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* VI. 8. 6), only in the mind and the *prāṇa* there is resting of speech and the mind respectively; similarly, according to the statement, "The *prāṇa* (rests) in the *tejas*" (*Ibid.*), the *prāṇa* rests only in the *tejas*.

If it be so arrived at, it is replied as follows: "It (rests) in the lord (of the senses)" (*Ved. Sū.* IV. 2. 4). It, the *prāṇa*, rests in the lord, that is, in the individual self who is the lord of the senses. Why? "Because it (i.e., the *prāṇa*) goes near it and does such other things." That the *prāṇa*, indeed, goes near the individual self (at the time of death) is stated in the following scriptural passage: "In this very manner, at the time of death, all the *prāṇas* go to the individual self" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 38). Again, the departure from the body of the *prāṇa* along with the individual self is declared in the following scriptural passage: "The *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) departs from the body following that departing (self)" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 2). Its existence in a place along with the individual self is again declared in the following scriptural passage: "After the departure of whom (from this body) shall I (the self) depart? By the stay of whom shall I remain?" (*Pr. Up.* VI. 3).

In this manner, after conjunction with the individual self, along with that (self), its (i.e., of the *prāṇa*) association with the *tejas* is here stated in the passage, "The *prāṇa* (rests) in the *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6). For instance, even when the river, Yamunā, after uniting with the river, Gaṅgā, moves towards the sea, the expression, 'Yamunā moves towards the sea,' involves no contradiction : similar is the case here.<sup>1243</sup>

## ADHIKARANA IV

### BHUTĀDHIKARANA

भूतेषु तच्छ्रुतेः

**Sūtra 5.** *Bhūteshu tachchhruteḥ*

(493)

In the elements (the *prāṇa* rests), because it is so declared in the scriptures.

In the passage, "The *prāṇa* rests in the *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6), the association of the *prāṇa* with the individual self was stated. Here the doubt is whether this association is with the *tejas* merely, or with all the elements combined together ; here it may be said that it is with the *tejas* merely, because the scripture speaks of the *tejas* merely.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows :— "In the elements" (*ved. Sūt.* IV. 2. 5). It (i.e., the *prāṇa*) rests in the elements. Why? "Because it is so declared in the scriptures." Because it is declared in the scriptures that the individual self in motion consists of all the

1243. (i) The 'other things' mentioned in the *Sūtra* are the departure from the body and co-existence in a particular place. (ii) Corresponding to the Gaṅgā-Yamunā example,

S'ankara has under the next aphorism the illustration of a man proceeding from Srighna to Pāṭaliputra and passing Mathura on the way.

elements, as in the following passage: "It consists of (i.e., is associated with) the earth, of the element of water,.....of the element of *tejas*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 5).

It may however be said that, even if there be association in order with each of the elements, the *tejas* etc., the scriptural text beginning with, "It consists of the earth" (*Ibid*), will appropriately fit in, in the context. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:

नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि

**Sūtra 6.** *Naikasmin darśayato hi*

(494)

Not with each (element) separately (is there any association of the *prāṇa*); indeed, the two (i.e., the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*) show it.

"Not with each separately," because each one separately is incapable of producing any effect. Indeed, both the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti* show this incapability. In the (scriptural) passage, "Entering (the elements of *tejas*, water and earth) as this individual self, which is Myself, I evolve the differentiation of name and form; I will make each of these tripartite, tripartite" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2), for inducing the capability to differentiate names and forms tripartition is taught. (There is also the following *Smṛiti* passage here): "Then they (i.e., the constituent elements), possessing varied powers (or properties), were, while separate, wholly unable to create beings, without (themselves) having been thrown together. Having secured combination with one another and abiding in one another,.....they (i.e., the elements), beginning with the (universal) principle of *mahat* and ending with the particular principle (of the earth), have gone to make up the the eggshaped universe indeed" (*V. P. I. 2. 52-54*). Therefore, in the passage, "The *prāṇa* (rests) in the *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6), it is

the *tejas* as combined with the other elements that is denoted by the word, '*tejas*'. Therefore, the resting (of the *prāṇa*) happens only in the elements.<sup>1244</sup>

## ADHIKARĀṆA V

### ĀSRITYUPAKRAMĀDHIKARĀṆA

समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य

**Sūtra 7.** *Samānā chāsṛityupakramādāmṛtatvam chānuṣoṣhya* (495)

It (i.e., the mode of departure of the soul from the body) is the same (in the case of both the men of *vidyā* and others) up to and before the commencement of the path; the immortality (of the man of *vidyā*) (is obtained) indeed, without burning (the connection with the body).

The consideration taken up here is whether this departure (of the self) from the body at the time of death is the same both in the case of the man of *vidyā* and in the case of one who has no *vidyā*, or whether it relates only to the man without *vidyā*. That it relates only to the man without *vidyā* is properly arrived at by reasoning. Why? Because here in this world itself the man of *vidyā* is declared to have immortality and hence in his case there can be no departure (of the self) from the body at the time of death. Indeed, the man of *vidyā* is declared in the scripture to have immortality even in this world itself as in the following passage: "When all those desires which exist in the heart subside, then the mortal becomes immortal and enjoys the *Brahman* here" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 7).

<sup>1244.</sup> About tripartition and the combination of the five elements among one another, see Note 166 (Vol. I) and Note 1046 (Vol. III).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows : "It is the same up to and before the commencement of the path" (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 2. 7). The departure (of the self) from the body at the time of death is the same even in the case of the man of *vidyā* (as it is in the case of the man without *vidyā*) up to the commencement of *āśṛiti*, that is, up to the commencement of the path: the meaning is that it is before (the final) entering (of the self) into the blood-vessels. Indeed, in the case of the man of *vidyā*, the movement (of the self) out of the body is declared in the scripture to take place through a particular blood-vessel, as in the following passage: "There are a hundred and one blood-vessels of the heart; of these one has come out to the head; going up through that, one attains immortality; others spreading in all directions are for departure from the body (without the attainment of immortality)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6. 6). In this manner, there is the scriptural declaration of the movement (of the self) through a particular blood-vessel, and hence the departure (of the self) from the body at the time of death is unavoidable even in the case of the man of *vidyā*; and about this departure from the body, there is no declaration of difference (in the case of the men of *vidyā* and others) before the entrance (of the self) into the blood-vessels; hence it is the same in the case of the man of *vidyā* and the man without *vidyā*. At the time of entering that, distinction is declared in the scripture: "This individual self departs (at the time of death from the body) with the help of this light (i.e., the lighted edge of the heart) through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 2). Because it (i.e., this passage) has to have oneness of meaning with the scriptural passage beginning with, "There are a hundred and one blood-vessels" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6. 5), the departure (of the self) from the body at the time of death through the head relates to the man of *vidyā*; others (i.e., other ways of departure) relate to the man without *vidyā*.

What has been stated above to the effect that it is declared in the scripture that the man of *vidyā* has immortality here in this world itself—to this the reply is given thus: “The immortality (of the man of *vidyā*) (is obtained), indeed, without burning” (*Ved. Sū.* IV. 2.7). The word, ‘*cha*’ (rendered as ‘indeed’), is used to denote emphasis. Without burning, that is, without at all burning the connection with the body and the senses etc., that immortality—which consists of the non-attachment and destruction of the later and earlier sins—is attained: that is stated in the scriptural passage beginning with, “When all those desires which exist in the heart subside...” (*Bṛh. Up.* IV. 4. 7): this is the meaning. And the statement, “He enjoys the *Brahman* here” (*Ibid.*), is concerned with that experience of the *Brahman* which is obtained at the time of meditation; that is the idea here.<sup>1245</sup>

### तदापीतेस्संसारव्यपदेशात्

**Sūtra 8.** *Tadāpīteṣṣamsāravvyapadeśāt*

(496)

That (immortality of the man of *vidyā*) (must be understood as stated above), because up to the attainment of the *Brahman*, *samsāra* (or connection with the body) is taught to exist.

“That”, namely, immortality, has necessarily to be understood as belonging to him whose connection with the body has not been burnt up. Why? “Because, up to the attainment of the *Brahman*, *samsāra* is taught to

1245. The *pūrvapakṣa* here appears to be set up by the *Advaitin* who believes in *jīvan-mukti* (or emancipation even during life) and denies that the attainment of the *Nirguṇa-brahman* (or the *Brahman* without attributes) requires departure from the body.

*Śaṅkara* explains this *Sūtra* as being concerned with one who meditates on the *Saguṇa-brahman* (or the *Brahman* with attributes). His *utkranti* is similar to that of the man without *vidyā* up to the entrance into the blood-vessels.

exist" (*Ved. Sūt. IV. 2. 8*). 'Apīti' means 'union', that is, the attainment of the *Brahman*; and he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says later on that this (attainment) happens after going to a particular place through the path beginning with light. *Samsāra*, having the characteristic of connection with the body, is indeed taught to continue until the attainment of that condition, as in the following passages: "So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay; then he will be blessed" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 14. 2*); "Shaking off sin, just as a horse shakes off (dead) hair, and being freed like the moon from the mouth of Rāhu (i.e., from an eclipse), I shake off the body, and then, I, the well-blessed individual self, attain the eternal world of the *Brahman*" (*Ibid. VIII. 13. 1*).

### सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धेः

**Sūtra 9.** *Sūkshmam pramāṇataścha*

*tathopalabdheḥ*

(497)

Because also the subtle (body) (accompanies the departing self), for it is so known through authoritative means of knowledge.

For this reason also, the bondage of even the man of *vidyā* is not burnt up here; that is, because the subtle body continues to follow (him). How is this made out? "Because it is so known through authoritative means of knowledge". Indeed, from the following dialogue, "One should speak to him" (*Kaush. Up. I. 3*), and "One should speak the truth" (?), which the man of *vidyā* who moves through the path of the gods has with the moon-god, the existence of a body for the man of *vidyā* is made out. Therefore, the subtle body continues to follow him. For which reason also, his connection with the body is not burnt up.

### नोपमर्देनातः

**Sūtra 10.** *Noṣamardenātāḥ*

(498)

For this reason, not through the destruction (of the body) (does he attain this immortality).

The passage, "When all the desires which exist in the heart subside, then the mortal becomes immortal and enjoys the *Brahman* here" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 7), hence does not speak of immortality as arising out of the destruction of the connection with the body.<sup>1246</sup>

### अस्यैव चोपपत्तैरूष्मा

**Sūtra 11.** *Asyaiva chopapatterūshmā*

(499)

Because also this (i.e., continued connection with the subtle body) is appropriate, there is heat (in some parts of the body of the dying man of *vidyā*).

Because this, that is, because the subtle body appropriately does exist in some place, before the death of the man of *vidyā* who has begun to die, heat is discerned in the gross body as existing somewhere. And this heat does not belong solely to the gross body, because elsewhere (i.e., in other parts of the gross body) it is not perceived; and therefore it is made out that the perception

1246. *Sūtra* 10 is explained by Rāmaṇuja as directed against *jīvanmukti*. Ś.P. recalls the reasons against it: (i) scriptural injunctions enjoining meditation till death; (ii) scriptural passages describing the departure of the self of the man with *vidyā* through a particular

blood-vessel, those which describe the path of the gods, and those which speak of the attainment of the *Brahman* in Heaven; (iii) opposition to experience; (iv) denial by *Āp. Dh.* (II. 21. 13-17). See also Vol. I, pp. 271-273.



of heat in some part (of the gross body) is dependent upon the departure of the subtle body of the man of *vidyā*.<sup>1247</sup>

Therefore, it has been well said that, up to the commencement of the path, the departure (of the self) from the body at the time of death is the same even with the man of *vidyā* (as it is with the man without *vidyā*).

Again, the doubt is raised that, in regard to the man of *vidyā*, there is no departure of the soul from the body at the time of his death, and it is then set aside.

प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शरीरात्स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्

**Sūtra 12.** *Pratishedāditichenna śārīrāt  
spashṭo hyekeshām* (500)

If it be said that it (i.e., the departure of the self from the body of the man of *vidyā*) is negatived (in the scriptures), it is not so; because (the non-separation of the *prāṇas*) from the embodied self (is alone stated in the context); indeed, this is clear, according to some.

What has been stated above to the effect that, even in the case of the man of *vidyā*, the departure of his soul at the time of death is the same (as it is in the case of the man without *vidyā*)—that is not appropriate, because the departure of the soul from the body at the time of death is negatived in the case of the man of *vidyā*.

1247. In the gross body the heat is uniformly distributed. At the time of death it is felt only in some part of the body. This is presumed to be due to the

subtle body being present there, having drawn into itself all the heat the self was previously radiating throughout the body. (S.P.)

(The context here) opens with the passage: "He (i.e., the departing individual self), taking with him these bright things (i.e., the senses), leaves the heart" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 1); then in the passage, "With the help of that light (i.e., the lighted edge of the heart), this individual self departs (at the time of death from the body)...; the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) departs from the body, following that departing self" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 2), the mode of departure from the body of the self of the man without *vidyā* is given; then in the passage, "He takes up another newer and more auspicious form" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 4), the acquiring of another body (by the self) is stated; then with the passage, "Whatever little (*karma*) he does, having reached the end of the (same) *karma*, he comes back to this world from that world for doing *karma*; thus indeed is the person who has desires" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 6), the subject relating to the man without *vidyā* is concluded: then in the passage, "Now, he who does not desire (is dealt with); he who is without desires, whose desires have left him, who has had his desires fulfilled, whose (sole) desire is the Self—his *prāṇas* do not depart at the time of death; being the *Brahman* Himself, he attains the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.*), the departure of the soul from the body at the time of death is negated in the case of the man of *vidyā*.

In the same manner, in the earlier part of the context, in connection with the questions of Ārtabhāga also, the denial of the departure of the soul from the body at the time of death of the man of *vidyā* is seen. In the passage, "He again conquers death" (*Ibid.* III. 2. 10), the man of *vidyā* is introduced; then he (i.e., Yājñavalkya) is thus questioned: "He (i.e., Ārtabhāga) asked: 'O Yājñavalkya, when this person dies, do his *prāṇas* rise up from the body, or not?'" (*Ibid.* III. 2. 11); it is then concluded, "'No', said Yājñavalkya, 'they are absorbed here itself, he swells,...he becomes bloated (with air) and he lies down dead'" (*Ibid.*). Therefore, the man

of *vidyā* attains immortality here (in this world) itself.<sup>1248</sup>

If it be said so, it is replied that it is not right to say so. Indeed, here the departure of the *prāṇas* from the embodied, that is, from the individual self, is negated, but not from the body. By the word, '*tat*' (or 'he' in 'him') in the passage, "Of him the *prāṇas* do not depart at the time of death" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 6.), the individual self, who is the subject-matter in the passage, "Now he who does not desire" (*Ibid.*), is referred to, but not the body which is not made mention of. By '*tasya*' (or 'of him'), which is in the genitive case, the embodied self may be said to be pointed out as being connected with the *prāṇas*, but not as the thing from which there is departure at the time of death. And it may be said that it is the body from which there is departure at the time of death. It is not so. If there be any need for a thing from which there is departure, inasmuch as the individual self itself which is mentioned as being related to the *prāṇas* is in closer proximity (to the context) than the body which is not made mention of, that self itself may be accepted as being the thing from which the departure proceeds.

Moreover, in regard to the *prāṇas* which are well known only as being related to the individual self, no purpose is served in mentioning the relation to that (self), and therefore it is definitely determined that the ablative itself is particularised by the genitive which denotes relations in general: as in the statement, "Of the actor, he hears" (which means "He hears from the actor").

1248. *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 2) was interpreted under *Sūtra* 7 as having oneness of meaning with a *Chhândogya* text, and hence as referring both to the man of *vidyā* and the man without *vidyā*. Now it is suggested that even the departure of the self through the head relates to the

man without *vidyā*: he who meditates with a view to reach the world of *Hiranyagarbha* (or *Brahmā*) departs that way. Moreover, there is the denial of the *utkranti* of the man of *vidyā* in the teaching given to *Ārta*bhāga. This is the *pūrvāpakṣa* here.

And here there is no matter for controversy. Indeed, "this is clear according to some"; that is, in the scriptures of the *Mādhyaṇdīnas*, the individual self itself is the thing from which the separation of the *prāṇas* takes place, as in the following passage: "He who is without desires, whose desires have left him, who has had his desires fulfilled, whose (sole) desire is the Self—from him the *prāṇas* do not depart at the time of death" (*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 6).

If it be said, there being no possibility of the departure of the *prāṇas* from the embodied self, it is not appropriate to speak of the negation of that (departure), it is replied that it is not right to say so. It may be said that in the passage, "So long there is delay for him" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* VI. 14. 2), there is the statement of the attainment of the *Brahman* by the man of *vidyā* at the time of departure from the body and hence it leads to the separation of the *prāṇas* also at that time (of death) from the embodied self with *vidyā*; and therefore the attainment of the *Brahman* through the path of the gods does not appropriately take place. (But) in the passage, "His *prāṇas* do not depart at the time of death" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 6), what is stated is this: before the attainment of the *Brahman* through the path of the gods, the *prāṇas* are not separated even from the individual self with *vidyā*.<sup>1249</sup>

If the questions of *Ārtabhāga* also relate to the man with *vidyā*, then this, indeed, is the solution. But they

1249. The *Bṛih. Up.* text is interpreted by the *pūrvapakṣa* as relating to the attainment of *mukti* resulting from the realisation of the *Nirguṇa-brahman* (or the Absolute without attributes). 'Tasya' in the genitive case is taken in ablative sense, and to refer to the body which is not mentioned

in the context. But Rāmānuja, while retaining the ablative sense, makes it refer to the individual self mentioned earlier in the text. In regard to this self, love of the *Ātman* has destroyed existing desires and prevented new ones from rising up.

relate to the man without *vidyā*, because there in the questions and answers no scope for (discussion about) the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman* is seen. Indeed, there (in the context) these are the topics dealt with by way of answers preceded by questions in each case: the characteristics of the senses and their objects (described) in the form of vessels and their contents, waters being the food of fire, the dying individual self not giving up the *prāṇas*, the continuance of the dead man's fame expressed through his name, and his attainment of a condition suited to his merit and sin; and there in the passage, "He again conquers death" (*Ibid.* III. 2. 10), it is stated that through the knowledge of water being the food of fire the conquest of fire itself is the conquest of death. Therefore, here there is no scope for reference to the man with *vidyā*.<sup>1250</sup> But, as regards the man without *vidyā*, the statement of there being no departure of the *prāṇas* at the time of death declares this: the *prāṇas* do not leave him as the gross body does; on the other hand, embracing the individual self like the subtle elements, they go with him; thus it is all faultless.

### स्यते च

Sūtra 13. *Smāryate cha*

(501)

It is said by the *Smṛiti* also.

The *Smṛiti* also speaks of the departure (of the self) at the time of death from the body of even the man of *vidyā* through the blood-vessel in the head, as in the passage: "Among those (blood-vessels) one stands above; one (who departs by it) pierces the sun's orb and,

1250. Rāṅgaramānuja in the commentary on the Ārtabhaga section suggests that by water its presiding deity, Nārāyaṇa, can also be meant, especially as Ārtabhaga has asked the

question, "Who is that deity whose food is Death?" It is because of this implication that the section can also be looked upon as dealing with the *vidyā* of the *Brahman*.

transcending the world of (the four-faced creator) Brahmā, goes to the highest goal" (*Yājñyavalkya-Smṛiti*, III. 167).<sup>1251</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VI

### PARASAMPATTYADHIKARANA

तानि परे तथा ह्याह

**Sūtra 14.** *Tāni pare tathā hyāha*

(502)

Those (elements) (are absorbed) into the Supreme Being, and indeed, the scripture says so.

It has been stated above that at the time of departure from the body at the time of death, the individual self, who is the lord of the senses, having become united with the group of the senses and having become united with the *prāṇas*, becomes associated with the subtle elements, the *tejas* and others. The doubt that this association does not happen to the man of *vidyā* has also been set aside (in *Ved. Sūt.* IV. 2. 7-13). The doubt here is whether those subtle elements which are associated with the individual self proceed to get their own results according to the *karma* and according to the *vidyā* (of the meditator), or whether they get associated with the Supreme Self; here it may be said that in the stage intermediate to attaining the Supreme Self, no results consisting of the enjoyment of pleasure and pain are seen, and that therefore they proceed (to get their results)

1251. The previous verse in the *Smṛiti* refers to countless 'rays' of the individual self which remains like a light in the heart. The *Mitākshara* suggests that the 'rays' may mean 'blood-vessels' also. Anyhow

the quoted verse can also be translated thus: "Among those (rays) one stands above; which (remains) piercing the orb of the sun and transcending the world of Brahmā: by it one reaches the highest goal".

according to the *karma* as well as according to the *vidyā* (of the worshipper).

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given as follows:—"Those (elements) (are absorbed) into the Supreme Being" Why? "Indeed, the scripture says so", as in the following passage: "The *tejas* (i.e., the elements in their subtle state along with the individual self) rests in the Supreme Deity" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6). The meaning is that just as the scripture says, in accordance therewith, results have to be assumed. Just as in the conditions of dreamless sleep and universal dissolution there is rest (for the individual self) from the exhaustion brought about by the enjoyment of pleasure and pain, the case here also is similar<sup>1252</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VII

### AVIBHĀGĀDHIKARANA

#### अविभागो वचनात्

Sūtra 15. *Avibhāgo vachanāt* (503)

There is non-differentiation (when the individual self rests in the Supreme Self at the time of death) because there are scriptural statements to that effect.

The consideration here taken is whether this resting (of the individual self) in the Supreme Self (at the time of

1252. The *jīva* with the senses and the subtle elements rests in the Supreme Self for a moment to recover from the agony and travails of death. This association with the Lord is different from what takes place in deep sleep or in *pralaya*

or in *moksha*. The resting in the Lord during deep sleep is compared by the *S.P.* with a man, heavily laden, seeking some relief by leaning against a stick, while during *pralaya* the self is like a man who has thrown off his load.

death) has the character of resolution into the cause as is the case with the absorption into the *prakṛiti* (of the world at the time of universal dissolution), or whether it has the character of non-differentiation as is the case where it is stated, "Speech (rests) in the mind" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6). Here it may be said that, as the Supreme Self is the cause of all things, it has the character of resolution into the cause.

If it be so arrived at, the reply is thus given: "There is non-differentiation" (*Ved. Sūtr.* IV. 2. 15). There is no separate existence: the meaning is that there is such an association as does not allow separate discussion or dealing (in regard to those associated). Why? "Because there are scriptural statements to that effect." Because, even in the passage, "The *tejas* (rests) in the Supreme Deity" (*Ibid.*), the word, 'rests', has to be taken from the passage, "Speech rests in the mind" (*Ibid.*), and because that word denotes a particular kind of association; and because in regard to a word which is taken over from another place there is no authority to indicate any change in its denotation, because at the time of the departure (of the individual self) from the body there is no useful purpose served by resolution into the cause, and because also there is no statement relating to the creation again of the *avyakta* and other such things.

## ADHIKARANA VIII

### TADOKO'DHIKARAṆAM

तदोकोऽग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात्तच्छेष-  
गत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीतशताधिकया

**Sūtra 16.** *Tadoko'grajvalanam tatprakāśitadvāro vidyāsāmarthyāt-tachchheshagatyanusmṛti-yogāchcha hārdānugṛhītaś-śatādhikayā* (504)



Through the power of *vidyā* and through the meditation on the path (of the departing self) which is its requisite, he is blessed by Him who is within the heart; his abode has its edges made radiant; and having its doors lighted up by Him, he starts out through the blood-vessel above the hundredth.

In this manner it has been stated that, up to the commencement of the path, the mode of departure from the body is of the same character in the case of both the man with *vidyā* and the man without *vidyā*. Now, the distinctive feature of the man with *vidyā* is explained. In regard to this, it is declared in the scriptures: "There are a hundred and one (important) blood-vessels of the heart; of these, one has come out to the head; going up through that, one attains immortality; others spreading in all directions are for departure from the body" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 6. 6*). Here the doubt arises whether it is appropriate to have this rule to the effect that the movement of the man of *vidyā* takes place only through this blood-vessel of the head which is above the hundredth and that the movement of the man without *vidyā* takes place only through other blood-vessels. What is it that is properly arrived at through reasoning? No (such) rule can appropriately exist. Why? Because, the blood-vessels being numerous and being very subtle, they are difficult to discriminate, it (i.e., the hundred and first blood-vessel) is incapable of acceptance and use by the (departing) person. The passage, "Going up through that, one attains immortality; others spreading in all directions are for departure from the body" (*Ibid.*), refers (merely) to the otherwise established chance-departure (of the soul from the body through any blood-vessel at the time of death); this is properly arrived at by reasoning.

If it be so arrived at, we reply thus: "Through the blood-vessel above the hundredth". The man of *vidyā*

departs from the body solely through the blood-vessel which is above the hundredth and which leads to the head; and this (blood-vessel) is not difficult for man of *vidyā* to distinguish. Indeed, through the power of the *vidyā*, which is excessively dear as forming the worship of the Supreme Person and through having repeated recollections of the path which is excessively dear to the individual self as being a requisite of the *vidyā*, the Supreme Person, who is seated in the heart, is pleased; and by Him, indeed, the man of *vidyā* is favoured; and then his abode, that is, that residence of the individual self which is the heart, has its edges made radiant; that at whose edge there is radiance, it is this thing which has its edges made radiant; having the doors (of his abode) lighted up by the Supreme Person, the man of *vidyā* distinguishes that blood-vessel; therefore through that blood-vessel the movement of the man of *vidyā* appropriately takes place.<sup>1253</sup>

## ADHIKARANA IX

### RASMYANUSĀRĀDHIKARANA

#### रश्म्यनुसारी

**Sūtra 17.** *Rasmyanusārī*

(505)

He (certainly) follows the rays of the sun.

The man of *vidyā* goes out of the heart through the hundred and first blood-vessel, which leads to the head, and it is declared in the scripture in relation to him that the movement is towards the sun's orb, following the sun's rays, as in the following passage — "Now, when he goes out of this body, then through those very rays (of the sun), he goes up" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6. 5). Now

• 1253. The scriptural text on which the conclusion is based here is *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4. 2) quoted under *Ved. Sūt.* (IV. 2. 12).

the consideration here is whether or not there is a restriction of movement to the effect that it should only follow the rays: here it may be said that, inasmuch as in the case of the man of *vidyā* who dies during the night it is not possible to follow the sun's rays, there is no such restriction. The (scriptural) statement, however, relates to a few cases (only).

If it be so arrived at, the reply is given thus: "He (certainly) follows the rays of the sun". The man of *vidyā* goes up only by following the rays of the sun. Why? Because it is emphatically affirmed to be so by the sentence, "Then (he goes up) through these very rays (of the sun)". (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6. 5). If it were to relate only to a few cases, the word, 'very', would become meaningless.

What has been stated above to the effect that, in the case of one who dies during the night, there being no rays of the sun, movement following the rays of the sun cannot appropriately take place—that is not right. Even during the night the act of following the rays of the sun comes to pass. Indeed, during the summer season, even during the night, through the experience of heat, the very existence of the rays of the sun is seen. But during the winter months (lit. the *hemanta* season etc.), owing to its being overpowered by snow, there is no experience of heat as during a cloudy day.

In the scripture also it is stated that between the blood-vessels and the rays (of the sun) there is mutual relationship, as in the following passage: "Just as a great road spreads out and reaches two villages, this and that, these rays of the sun go to both the worlds, this and that; they are spread out from yonder sun, they are connected with these blood-vessels; they are spread out from these blood-vessels, they are connected with the sun yonder" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6. 2). Thus, even during the night there are the rays of the sun; therefore even as regards the men of *vidyā* who die at night, the attainment of the

*Brahman* is undoubtedly effected only through following the rays of the sun.<sup>1254</sup>

## ADHIKARANA X

### NIŚĀDHIKARANA

निशि नेति चेन्न सम्बन्धस्य यावदेहभावित्वाद्दर्शयति च

**Sūtra 18.** *Niśi neiti chenna sambandhasya  
yāvaddehabhāvitoḍḍādarśayati cha* (506)

If it be said that it (i.e., the attainment of the *Brahman*) cannot be (for one who dies) at night, it is not so; because contact (with *karmas*) lasts (only) up to the end of the body; the scripture also declares it so.

Now, that which is taken up for consideration is this, whether or not in the case of the man of *vidyā* who has died at night, there is the attainment of the *Brahman*. No doubt, owing to the existence of the sun's rays at night, his moving up, following the rays of the sun, can take place even at night. Nevertheless, inasmuch as death at night is considered undesirable in the *Sāstras*, that attainment of the *Brahman* which has the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit does not accrue to one who dies at night. In the *Sāstras* death during the day-time is praised (and) death during the night is contrariwise, as in the passage: "Day-time, the bright fortnight and the northern course of the sun itself, these are praiseworthy for those who are to die; all the times contrary to these are undesirable" (?). Let it be that death during day-time and death at night are praiseworthy

<sup>1254</sup>, (i) It is assumed for the purposes of this section that the men of *vidyā* dying at night also attain salvation. The assumption is proved in the next section.

(ii) Compare *Chhand. Up.* (VIII. 6. 2) quoted here with *Yajñavalkya-smṛiti* (III. 167) quoted under *Sūtra 13*.

and contrariwise respectively because they lead to the highest and the lowest destiny respectively; hence it may be said that death at night leads to the lowest destiny and does not therefore lead to the attainment of the *Brahman*.

If so, it is replied that it is not right to say so, because the contact of the man of *vidyā* with *karmas* lasts up to the end of the body. What is said is this. In regard to the man of *vidyā*, even though he may die at night, the attainment of the *Brahman* is undoubtedly established, because there is destruction through mere contact with *vidyā* of all the *karmas* which lead to the lowest place and have not yet begun to yield their fruits; because there is non-attachment of the later *karmas*; and because the *karma* which has begun to yield its fruits lasts up to the end of the ultimate body; and thus there is no cause for bondage subsisting. And the scripture declares it so: "So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay: then he will be blessed" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 14. 2). The passage beginning with "Day-time, the bright fortnight..." (?) relates to the man without *vidyā*.<sup>1255</sup>

## ADHIKARANA XI

### DAKSHINĀYANĀDHIKARANA

#### अतश्चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे

Sūtra 19. *Ataschayane'pi dakshine*

(507)

For that very reason (there is attainment of the *Brahman* for the man of *vidyā* who dies) even during the southern course of the sun.

1255. The point of the argument is that bondage cannot continue, when *karma*, its cause, has been destroyed and exhausted. When the *prā-*

*rabdha-karma* of the man of *vidyā* is exhausted, he dies, leaving no cause for the continuance of bondage.

That reason which was given in regard to the attainment of the *Brahman* by the man of *vidyā* who dies even at night,—on account of that very same reason, attainment of the *Brahman* is accomplished even for one who has died during the southern progress of the sun.

There is, however, an additional doubt. It is to this effect. Because in the passage, "Now he who dies during the southern course of the sun, he attains the glory of the manes and experiences intimate union with the moon-god" (*M. Nār.* XXV. 1), one who dies during the southern course of the sun is spoken of as attaining the moon; because also in the passages, "In regard to them (i.e., those who perform rituals to get fruits) when it (i.e., their *karma*) gets exhausted." (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 16) and "They (i.e., those who go up by the path of the manes) return to this same path again" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 2), those who have attained the moon are stated to return (to this world); and because Bhishma and others who were devoted to the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*, are seen to have waited for the return of the northern course of the sun (for dying then),—the attainment of the *Brahman* can not be won by one who has died during the southern course of the sun.

But the answer to this objection is as follows. Only for those who are without *vidyā* and who attain the moon through the path of the manes, there is return to the world; but as regards the man of *vidyā*, even though he may have attained the moon, there is the supplementary passage, "From there (i.e., from the sun and the moon) he attains the glory of the *Brahman*" (*M. Nār.* XXV. 1), from which it is made out that when he who desires to reach the *Brahman* dies during the southern course of the sun, his attaining the moon merely leads to his taking rest (on the way). Even in the absence of such a supplementary passage, owing to the above-mentioned absence of any cause for bondage, in the case of the man of *vidyā*,

even though he may have attained the moon, the attainment of the *Brahman* is difficult to avoid. In the case of Bhīṣma and others who could die at their choice owing to the strength of their *yoga*, such conduct on their part is intended to demonstrate the praiseworthiness of the northern course of the sun for the purpose of propagating *dharma*.<sup>1256</sup>

It may, however, be said as follows. As regards the men of *vidyā* who are dying, there is an authoritative rule in which particular times are pointed out as the cause of returning or not returning to this world, as in the following passage: "O Arjuna, I shall tell you, however, of the time when the *yogins*, after departing from this life, do not come back, and also (the time) when (after departing) they come back. Fire, light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, departing therein, those persons who know the *Brahman* go to the *Brahman*. Smoke, night and similarly the dark fortnight and the six months of the southern progress of the sun—departing therein, the *yogin* attains the light of the moon and comes back. Indeed, these two paths—the bright and the dark—are understood to be never-ending in relation to the world. By the one, one does not return; by the other (however), one returns" (B.G. VIII. 23–26). To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:

योगिनः प्रति स्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते

**Sūtra 20.** *Yoginah prati smaryete smārte chaite* (508)

1256. (i) The scriptural passage which speaks of one who dies during the southern course of the sun reaching the moon also declares later on that he attains the *Brahman*. So in effect it means that the man of *vidyā* dying at this time is honoured at the moon on the way to the attainment of the *Brahman*. This differentiates him from one who dies during

the northern course of the sun. (ii) Bhīṣma, the grand-uncle of the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas in the *Mahabharata*, was wounded in war during the southern course of the sun. Though a man of *vidyā*, he waited for the winter-solstice and the return of the sun to the northern course, as he had the power to choose the time of death.

These two (paths) are also taught in the *Smṛiti* in relation to the *yogins* as things to be remembered (in their meditations).

Here particular times in regard to those who are dying are not taught in the *Smṛiti*. But in regard to the *yogins*, that is, those who are devoted to (*bhakti*-) *yoga*, "the two things to be remembered," that is, the two things that are the subject-matter of memory, which are the two paths known as the path of the gods and the path of the manes and which deserve to be remembered, "are taught in the *Smṛiti*" for the purpose of being remembered every day as part of the *yoga* (practised). Accordingly, the concluding stanza (to this section) says: "On knowing, O Pārtha, these two paths, no *yogin* becomes deluded by doubt (at the time of his death). Therefore, O Arjuna, do you remain at all times devoted to *yoga* (or thoughtful meditation on the two paths)" (B.G. VIII. 27). By the expressions, "Light in the form of fire" (*Ibid.* VIII. 24) and "Smoke, night" (*Ibid.* VIII. 25), the path of the gods and the path of the manes are recalled to the mind. The word 'time' at the beginning of the passage in "the time when, however," (*Ibid.* VIII. 23) denotes the deities presiding over particular times who conduct (the freed soul to the *Brahman*), because fire and other such things cannot possibly be of the nature of time. Therefore, the continued remembrance of the path of the gods, authoritatively described in the passage, "They reach the light" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* V. 10. 1), is here enjoined upon those who are devoted to *vidyā*; but no particular time for the death of the dying (as leading either to return or non-return) is authoritatively declared.<sup>1257</sup>

1257. (i) Rāmānuja takes B.G. (VIII. 23-26) to refer to the *paths* and not the *times* leading to return and non-return. 'Agnir-jyotis' in 24 is taken as 'Light in the form of fire'. The two paths are referred to as that beginning with light and that with smoke. In the *Śrībhāṣya* it is established that 'light,' 'smoke' etc. stand for deities presiding over them. These deities rule different stages of the paths where they conduct the travelling souls. For an interesting theory about the two paths, see B. G. Tilak's

"The Arctic Home of the Aryans". Compare also "The Hindu Philosophy of Conduct, being Lectures on the *Bhagavad-gīta*" by M. Rangacharya, Vol. II, under the verses cited here. (ii) The *pūrvapakṣa* is based on the force of the word '*kāla*' (or 'time') at the beginning of the passage. The *Siddhānta* relies on the middle and concluding portions and the force of important sentences. Compare the reliance on *mahāvākyas* in *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1. 29-32).



## PART III

### ADHIKARANA I

#### ARCHIRĀDHYĀDHIKARANA

अजिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः

Sūtra 1. Archirādhinā tatprathiteḥ

(593)

Through the path beginning with light (the released self goes to the *Brahman*), because it is well-known to be so (in the scriptures).

It has been stated above that the man of *vidyā* who departs from the body at the time of death begins his journey through a particular blood-vessel as a result of the favour of Him (i.e., the Supreme Self) who is seated in the heart. His path, when he goes, is now sought to be determined. It being so, in the scripture various kinds of paths are declared in many ways. Surely, in the *Chhāndogya*, the context which begins with the passage, "Just as water does not cling to the lotus leaf, so also in the case of a person who knows thus, sinful deeds do not cling to (i.e., taint) him" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 3), reaches the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*. It is declared then as follows: "Whether they (i.e., the sons of the dead) perform the funeral ceremonies fit for the dead body, and whether they do not perform them, in his case (i.e., in regard to every man of *vidyā*) they attain the light itself, from the light the day, from the day the bright fortnight (of the moon's increase), from the bright fortnight the six months which belong to the northern progress (of the sun), from those months the year, from the year the sun, from the sun the moon, from the moon the lightning; its person who is superhuman—he leads

them to the *Brahman*. This is the path of the gods, the path to the *Brahman*; those who proceed on this (path) do not return to this human cycle (of *samsāra*)” (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 5-6). In the eighth section of this very same *Upanishad*, there is the following passage:—“Now through these very rays (of the sun) he goes up” (*Ibid.* VIII. 6. 5).

The *Kaushītakins* describe in their scriptures the path of the gods in a different manner, as in the following passage: “He (i.e., the man of *vidyā*), after attaining this path of the gods, comes to the world of Agni, he (then) goes to the world of Vāyu, he goes to the world of Varuṇa, he goes to the world of the sun, he goes to the world of Indra, he goes to the world of Prajāpati, he goes to the world of the *Brahman*” (*Kaush. Up.* I. 3):

Again, in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, the following passage is given: “Those who know it (i.e., the essential nature of the individual self) thus (i.e., as set out in the *Pañchāgni-vidyā*) and those who, in the forest, worship the *Satya* (or the *Brahman*) with faith, they go to the light, from the light the day, from the day the bright fortnight (of the waxing moon), from the bright fortnight those six months when the sun proceeds northwards, from the months the world of the gods, from the world of the gods the sun, from the sun him of lightning; the person of lightning who is superhuman, he comes and leads them to the worlds of the *Brahman*” (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15). In that same (*Upanishad*), this is again stated in a different manner: “Indeed, when a man (of *vidyā*) dies and departs from this world, he goes to Vāyu; he (i.e., Vāyu) there gives him room, such as is the hole of a wheel of the chariot; through it he goes up; he comes to the sun; he (i.e., the sun) gives him room there such as is the hole of a trumpet; through it he goes up; he comes to the moon; he (i.e., the moon) there gives him room such as is the hole of the kettle-drum” (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 10. 1), and so on.

Here the doubt is this: whether by means of these scriptural passages the path beginning with light is the only road that is prescribed, so that through that very road the man of *vidyā* goes to the *Brahman*, or whether other than that road there are roads elsewhere, so that either through those roads or through that road he goes to the *Brahman* and there is thus no restriction (as to this or that road). What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That there is no such restriction. Why? Because those roads are many and are independent (of one another).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply as follows: "Through the path beginning with light" (*Ved. Sūt. IV. 3. 1*). The path beginning with light is the only one that is dealt with everywhere. Therefore, he goes only through that (path) which begins with light. Why? "Because it is well known to be so"; that is, because that very same path is well-known everywhere. '*Prāthiti*' is 'being well known'. The meaning is: because it is that very same thing (i.e., path) that is everywhere recognised. Because of (such) recognition, that very same road is found to be expounded with more or less completeness everywhere (in the scriptures); hence (in regard to this path) those characteristics which are mentioned in one place have to be transferred to another place (where also it is described), as is the case with the combination of the characteristic qualities of *vidyās*. In the *Chhāndogya*, both in the *Upakosala-vidyā* and the *Pañchāgni-vidyā* it (i.e., the path) is declared to be one and the same. And in the *Vājansaneyaka* (i.e., the *Bṛih. Up.*), that same thing (i.e., path) beginning with light is declared in the *Pañchāgni-vidyā* with a slight difference. Therefore, even there, it is made out to be the very same (path). In all other places, Agni, the sun etc. are recognised to be the same.<sup>1258</sup>

<sup>1258</sup>. For the *Upakosala-vidyā*, see *Chhānd. Up.* (IV, 10-15). The *Pañchāgnividya* is described in *Chhānd.* (V. 10) and *Bṛih. Up.* (VI. 2).

## ADHIKARANA II

## VĀYVADHIKARANA

## वायुमब्दाद्विशेषविशेषाभ्याम्

**Sūtra 2.** *Vāyumabddāviśeṣaviśeṣābhyām* (816)

*Vāyu* (has to come) after the year, because of general and particular terms (to show it).

It has been stated above that the men of *vidyā* go (to the *Brahman*) only through that (path) which begins with light. Here, in connection with the path which begins with light, the *Chhandogas* in their scriptures place the year between the months and the sun, as in the following passage :—"From the months (they go to) the year, from the year the sun" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 2). But the *Vājasaneyins* in their scriptures (place) the world of the gods between those very two (i.e., the months and the sun), as in the following passage :—"From the months (they go to) the world of the gods, from the world of the gods the sun" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15). As the path given in both (passages) is only one, both have to be drawn together as one in both the places.

It being so, in the case of both the year and the world of the gods, which are mentioned after the months, the order of succession as given in the scripture by means of the ablative is the same; nevertheless, according to the passage, "From the light (they attain) the day, from the day the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight the six months which belong to the northern progress of the sun" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 1), longer periods of time are seen placed later than times of shorter duration; and therefore the year itself revolves in the mind after the months; and hence the year itself has to be placed after

the months ; therefore it is definitely determined that the world of the gods has to be placed after that (i.e., the year).

Elsewhere, the *Vājasaneyins* read in their scriptures Vāyu before the sun, as in the following passage : "Indeed, when a man (of *vidyā*) dies and departs from this world, he goes to Vāyu ; he (i.e., Vāyu) there gives ; him room such as is the hole of the wheel of a chariot through it he goes up ; he comes to the sun" (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 10. 1). The *Kaushītakins*, however, read in their scriptures Vāyu after the light which is denoted by the term, "the world of Agni," as in the following passage "He (i.e., the man of *vidyā*), after attaining this path of the gods, comes to the world of Agni, he (then) comes to the world of Vāyu" (*Kaush. Up.* I. 3). Here, Vāyu is arrived at after the light, in the order of succession according to the text of the *Kaushītakins* ; as against this, according to the *Vājasaneyins*, the order of succession expressed by the *śruti*, by means of the word, 'up' in the passage, "Through that he goes up, he comes to the sun" (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 10. 1), is more powerful than the order of succession of the text ; through this, the place (of Vāyu) is definitely determined to be before the sun.

Thus, before the sun and after the year, both the world of the gods and Vāyu have been arrived at. Here this is taken up for consideration, namely, whether the world of the gods and Vāyu are distinct things which the man of *vidyā* may attain in any order which he likes, or whether, they not being distinct from each other, he attains the world of the gods that is Vāyu, after the year. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning ? That they are distinct entities, because they are well known as such. And when they are distinct entities, through the word, 'up', and through the ablative, both of them have been arrived at as existing between the year and the sun through the order of succession directly expressed by the *śruti* ; because of this, and because also there is no

distinction (between them), as he likes (the man of *vidyā* attains them in any order).<sup>1259</sup>

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given thus : "Vāyu (has to come) after the year" (*Ved. Sū.* IV. 3. 2). He has to attain Vāyu after the year. Why? "Because of general and particular (terms)", through which Vāyu alone is pointed out (as their denotation). Indeed, the term 'devaloka' (or 'god-world'), is non-specific, that is, a general term in use; and it assumes, when dissolved, the form of 'devānām lokaḥ' (or 'the world of the gods'); by this, it denotes only Vāyu. In the passage, "He goes to Vāyu; he (i.e., Vāyu) there to him..." (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 10. 1), the word, 'Vāyu', denotes Vāyu by particularisation. Thus, by means of the terms, 'the world of the gods' and 'Vāyu', which are general and particular respectively, Vāyu alone is denoted: hence, after the year, he (i.e., the man of *vidyā*) should attain Vāyu alone. As regards the *Kaushītakins*, the expression, 'Vāyu-world' (or '*Vāyu-loka*'), resembles the expression, 'Agni-world', (or '*Agni-loka*'), and being interpreted as 'Vāyu who is the *loka* (or a world)', it denotes Vāyu alone. Elsewhere in the scriptures Vāyu is described as being the abode of the gods, as in the following passage: "He who has been mentioned above and who blows, he is the mansions of the gods." (*Jaimini Upanishad Brāhmaṇa*, III. 1).

1259. P. M. (V. 1) refers to six indications for determining order or sequence. *Krama* or order can be based on (i) *śruti*, a direct statement by a scriptural sentence or word, (ii) meaning, (iii) a scriptural passage or text (*paṭha*) containing many sentences, (iv) position, (v) the relative importance of what is principal (and what is subordinate), and (vi) practical considerations or convention. The first of these prevails against any\* of the others. Order can

be directly indicated by words like 'then', 'now', by the ablative case etc. We have such an instance in *Bṛih. Up.* (V. 10. 1), where the word, '*ūrdhvam*', and the ablative determine the order directly. This prevails over the order given in a series of textual statements (or *paṭha*) in *Kaush. Up.* (I. 3). (For an elementary account of the six ways of determining sequence, see A. B. Keith, *Karma-Mīmāṃsā*, p. 91.)

## ADHIKARANA III

### VARUṆĀDHIKARANA

#### तटितोऽधि वहणस्सम्बन्धात्

**Sūtra 3.** *Taṭito'dhi Varuṇassambandhāt* (511)

After lightning Varuṇa (has to be placed), because there is (such a) connection (between the two).

In the scripture of the *Kaushītakins*, there is the following passage: "He (i.e., the man of *vidyā*), after attaining this path of the gods, comes to the world of Agni, he (then) goes to the world of Vāyu, he goes to the world of Varuṇa, he goes to the world of the sun, he goes to the world of Indra, he goes to the world of Prajāpati, he goes to the world of the *Brahman*" (*Kaush. Up.* I. 3): thus here the first place in order is given to the expression, 'the world of Agni'; as it is the synonym of 'light', it (i.e., the place given) is faultless. And it has been stated above that the situation of Vāyu is after the year. As regards the situation of the sun also, there is contradiction of the order of succession in the text as arrived at here, through the order of succession according to the order of the *śruti*, expressly given by the *Vājasneyins* in the passage: "From the world of the gods the sun, from the sun him of lightning" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15); hence it (i.e., the position of the sun) is definitely established to be after Vāyu, who is denoted by the expression, 'the world of the gods'.

Now the consideration that is taken up relates to (the positions of) Varuṇa, Indra etc. The doubt here is whether these, Varuṇa and others, have to be placed after

Vāyu in accordance with the order of succession in the text, or whether they have to be placed after lightning. As regards light and all else, the order of succession in the text as given in the passage, "From the light the day" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 1), would be contradicted; and after lightning, according to the passage, "Its person who is superhuman, he leads them to the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.*) the person of lightning is declared to lead them towards the *Brahman*; hence these (i.e., Indra etc.) are not arrived at anywhere, owing to the absence of room for them; and in order that the teaching here may not be rendered nugatory, necessarily one or the other has to be set aside; and hence through following the order of succession in the text, Varuṇa has to be placed after Vāyu. The order of succession of Vāyu and the sun having been contradicted, even Indra and Prajāpati also have to be placed here alone (i.e., after Vāyu).

If it be so arrived at, the reply to it is given as follows:—"After lightning Varuṇa (has to be placed)" (*Ved. Sūtr.* IV. 3. 3). Surely, Varuṇa has to be placed after lightning. Why? "Because there is (such a) connection (between the two)." As lightning is within the cloud, the connection of it with Varuṇa (the god of waters) is well known both in the *Veda* and in the world.

What is said is this. With the object of rendering the teaching not nugatory, Varuṇa etc. have to be placed somewhere; it being so, because that order of succession in sense is more powerful than the order of succession in the text, Varuṇa has to be placed after lightning. And hence it is made out that the leading (of the souls) by the superhuman person (to the *Brahman*) can bear interruption in order; and because it can bear interruption in order, and because it is taught that Indra and others, who are taught to have to be necessarily placed, have to be placed after Varuṇa, and because those who are adventitiously



brought in have to be placed at the end, Indra etc. have to be placed after Varuṇa. 1260

## ADHIKARANA IV

### ĀTIVĀHIKĀDHIKARANA

#### आतिवाहिकास्तल्लिङ्गात्

Sūtra 4. Ātivāhikāstallīṅgāt

(512)

They (i.e., light etc.) are those who lead (the man of *vidyā* to the *Brahman*) because of their characterisation (given in the context showing them to be such).

Now that which is taken up for consideration is this: whether light etc. are mere sign-posts on the road to the *Brahman*, or whether they are places of enjoyment, or whether they are those who lead men of *vidyā* who desire to attain the *Brahman*. Indeed, what is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That they are sign-posts on the road to the *Brahman*. Why? Because the teaching given is of that kind. Indeed, as regards those who go to villages etc., the following kind of teaching is given by those who give directions: 'Starting from this place, go to this tree, then to this river, then to this side of the

1260. (i) The position of Varuṇa is determined by the order based on meaning or purpose, which has greater force than the order based on a passage. The stock example is an injunction which directs *Agnihotra* to be offered and gruel to be cooked in that order. Obviously, the gruel has to be cooked first in order to be offered in the *Agnihotra*. (ii) In

the path beginning with light, it is now shown that the various stages are ruled in order by the gods presiding over light, the day, the bright fortnight, the months of the northern course of the sun, the year, Vayu, the sun, the moon, lightning, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajapati. (The last three, however, merely assist the god of lightning. See Sūtra 5 below.)

mountain, and then go to that village'. Or they may well be places of enjoyment, because the day etc., which are well known as particular times, cannot appropriately be sign-posts on the road, and there is nothing else which is a sign-post that is denoted by these. That they are places of enjoyment is appropriately made out from the following passage, "These are the very worlds—the days and nights, half months, months, seasons, years" (?), where day etc. are spoken of as worlds. For this very reason, the *Kaushītakins* describe the light etc., through the repetition of the word, 'world', as in the following passage beginning with: "He comes to the world of Agni" (*Kaush. Up.* I. 3).

If it be so arrived at, we reply as follows: "They (i.e., light etc.) are those who lead" (*Āt. Sū.* IV. 3. 4). These, the light etc., are particular gods who, in regard to leading the men of *vidyā* (to the *Brahman*), have been appointed as those who lead them. How? "Because of their characterisation," that is, of characterisation in leading. Indeed, leading (*ativāhana*) is conducting those who go (on the path of the gods). And this leading, which is declared in the concluding passage, "Its person who is superhuman leads them to the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 2), makes it known that it is this very relationship that is meant in relation to the earlier (deities) also who are not heard mentioned with any such particular relationship. And the words, 'light' etc., denote the presiding deities who are the selves of light etc., as in the passage, "To him (i.e., *Prajāpati*) the earth spoke" (*Taitt. Sam.* V. 5. 2. 10).

It may however be said here as follows. If in this manner the scriptural passage, "Its person who is superhuman, he leads them to the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 2), speaks of the person of lightning himself as leading to the *Brahman*, how can there be any relationship as leaders in the case of others, namely, *Varuṇa* etc. To

this objection he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः

**Sūtra 5.** *Vaidyutenaiva tatastachchhruteḥ* (513)

Afterwards (i.e., after the lightning) it is by the person of lightning alone (that those going to the *Brahman* are led), because there are scriptural statements to that effect.

“Afterwards”, that is, after the lightning, through the person of lightning alone, that is, through the superhuman leader himself, the journey of the man of *vidyā* continues up to the attainment of the *Brahman*. Why? “Because there are scriptural statements to that effect”; because in the passage, “He (i.e., the superhuman person) leads these to the *Brahman*” (*Chhānd. Up. V. 10. 2*), he is himself declared to be the leader. But Varuṇa etc. help him, and therefore they also have connection with leadership (in conducting the released souls on the path of the gods).

## ADHIKARANA V

### KĀRYĀDHIKARANA

कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः

**Sūtra 6.** *Kāryaṃ Bādarirasya gatyupapatteḥ* (514)

Bādari is of opinion that (he who is led by the escorting gods is he who worships) the effect (i.e., Hiranyagarbha who is produced by the *Brahman*), because movement on the part of him (i.e., such a worshipper) is appropriate.

It has been stated above that the man of *vidyā* goes to the *Brahman* only through that (i.e., the path) beginning with light, and that the group of escorts beginning with (the god presiding over) light and ending with the superhuman person conduct the man of *vidyā* to the *Brahman*. Now that which is taken up for consideration is this: whether this group (of gods) beginning with (the god presiding over) light leads those who worship the effected (or created) Hiraṇyagarbha, or those who worship only the Supreme *Brahman*, or both those who worship the Supreme *Brahman* and those who worship the individual self as having the Supreme *Brahman* as its self. Thus the doubt is raised here. In this connection, the teacher, Bādari, is of opinion that it conveys only those who worship the effect (i.e., Hiraṇyagarbha). Why? "Because on the part of him", that is, on the part of him alone who worships Hiraṇyagarbha, "movement is appropriate." Indeed, in regard to him who worships the Supreme *Brahman*, who is fully perfect, omniscient, all-pervading and the self of all beings, no movement to another place for the purpose of attaining Him is appropriate, because surely He has already been attained. Indeed, the effect to be produced by *vidyā* relating to the Supreme Being is merely the cessation of the ignorance about the Supreme *Brahman* who is eternally attained. But in the case of one who worships the effect, the *Brahman* in the form of Hiraṇyagarbha, movement is appropriate for the purpose of attaining that which has to be attained and which exists in a limited (or particular) place. Therefore, the group of conducting gods which begins with (the god presiding over) light conveys only him (i.e., the worshipper of Hiraṇyagarbha).

### विशेषितत्वाच्च

**Sūtra 7.** *Viśeshitatvāchcha*

(515)

- Because also it (i.e., the place of attainment) is particularised.

There is the passage:—"The (superhuman) person mentally created (by the *Brahman*), he comes and leads them to the worlds of the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15); here by the word, 'worlds', and by its being used in the plural, it is particularised that the superhuman person leads only him who worships the Hiraṇyagarbha dwelling in particular worlds. Moreover, according to the passage, "I attain the mansion which is the court of Prajāpati" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1), one who moves along that (path) beginning with light, has for his purpose going near Hiraṇyagarbha, who is a produced effect.

It may, however, be said that, if this were so, the declaration, "Its person who is superhuman, he leads them to the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 2), does not appropriately fit in. Indeed, in the case of conveyance to Hiraṇyagarbha, it has to be declared, "He leads them to Brahman."<sup>1261</sup> To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :—

### साम्नीप्यात् तद्व्यपदेशः

**Sūtra 8.** *Sāmīpyāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ* (516)

Because of nearness, however, that description is given.

"He who creates (the four-faced) Brahman first" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 18); in this passage Hiraṇyagarbha is the

1261. Bādari presents the standpoint of the school of *Advaita*. Śaṅkara takes his view to be the *siddhānta* and that of Jaimini to be the *pūrvapakṣa*, though given later. Bādaraṇya is regarded as dealing with a different topic under *Sūtra* 14. By the term, '*kārya*' (or 'effect'), Bādari refers to the so called 'lower *Brahman*' or the '*Brahman* with

attributes', who is also sometimes known as Hiraṇyagarbha. The latter term stands also for Brahman, the four-faced creator, whose name is the word, '*Brahman*', in masculine gender. The same word in neuter, signifying the Absolute, having been used in the scriptural passages under reference, this objection is raised.

first-born; hence he is near the *Brahman* and therefore he is denoted by the word, '*Brahman*': this is definitely determined through the above-given reasons, consisting of the inappropriateness of movement, particularisation (of location) etc. Such is the meaning.

Again, it may be urged as follows. If through the path beginning with light Hiraṇyagarbha is attained, then, the teaching relating to the attainment of immortality and non-return to the world, as stated in the following passage, "This is the path of the gods, the path to the *Brahman*; those who proceed on this (path) do not return to this human cycle (of *samsāra*)" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 6), and "Going up through that (blood-vessel), one attains immortality" (*Ibid.* VIII. 6. 6), will become inappropriate: because of Hiraṇyagarbha, who is a produced effect, the *śāstra* declares destruction at the end of the period of time known as *dviparārdha*: and because also from the passage, "O Arjuna, all the worlds, beginning from the world of (the four-faced creator) *Brahmā*, are such as give rise to re-birth" (*B. G.* VIII. 16), return again (to this world of men) is not capable of being avoided by one who has attained Hiraṇyagarbha. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:

कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात्

**Sūtra 9.** *Kāryātyaye tadadhyakṣeṇa*  
*sahātaḥ paramabhidhānāt* (517)

After the destruction of the effect (i.e., the world of *Brahmā*), along with its ruler it is stated he goes beyond.

After the destruction of the effect, that is, of the world of *Brahmā*, "along with its ruler," Hiraṇyagarbha, who holds this office, whose office has come to an end, and who has learnt *vidyā*, he (i.e., the man of *vidyā*)

himself learns *vidyā* there ; from that place (i.e., the effected world of *Brahmā*), he attains the *Brahman*. And thus it is made out from the statement that he who goes by the path beginning with light attains immortality and does not return, and from the (scriptural) passage : "They, at the end of the period of time known as *para* (which measures the life of *Brahmā*), in the world of *Brahmā*, are all liberated by the Supreme Immortal Being" (*Munḍ. Up.* III. 2. 6).<sup>1262</sup>

### स्मृतेश्च

Sūtra 10. *Smṛiteścha*

(518)

Because also the *Smṛiti* says so.

This meaning is made out from the *Smṛiti* also as in the following passage : "When dissolution is at hand, all of them, along with *Brahmā*, at the end of the period of time called *para*, having fulfilled themselves, then enter the highest seat" (*Kūrma-purāṇa*, I. 12. 269). Therefore, the opinion of Bādari is that the group (of gods) beginning with (the god presiding over) light conveys only him who worships the effect (i.e., *Hiraṇyagarbha*).

Here, Jaimini, through his acceptance of another view, raises the following objection :

### परं जैमिनिर्मुख्यत्वात्

Sūtra 11. *Param Jaiminirmukhyatvāt*

(519)

<sup>1262</sup>. The quoted scriptural text occurs both in the *Munḍ. Up.* and *M. Nār.*, and is here rendered according to Jaimini. For *para*, see Note 901 above. Rāmānuja understands the text thus : "They (i.e., the ascetics with whom the earlier

half of the verse is concerned), dwelling in the world which is the *Brahman* (i.e., being devoted to Him), at the end of the ultimate (body), are released through (the grace of) the Supreme (*Brahman*) who is immortality" (*V. D.* IV. 3. 15).

(Only those who worship) the Supreme (*Brahman*) (are led by the group of gods), (according to) Jaimini, because it (i.e., the word, '*Brahman*', signifying the goal to which the released self is led) is used in its primary significance.

The teacher, Jaimini, is of opinion that the group (of gods) beginning with (the god ruling over) light conveys only those who worship the Supreme *Brahman*. Why? "Because of its primary significance." Because, in the passage, "Its person who is superhuman, he leads these to the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 10. 2), the word, '*Brahman*', has its primary sense in the Supreme *Brahman* only. Indeed, it is only when through some other means of knowledge it is determined that it (i.e., the word) denotes the effect (or Hiraṇyagarbha) that it is proper to take it (i.e., the word) in a secondary sense. Inappropriateness of the movement towards the all-pervading *Brahman* is no such means of knowledge, because, although the Supreme *Brahman* is all-pervading, the scriptural statement dealing with the cessation of ignorance applies only to the man of *vidyā* who has gone to a particular place. For instance, the production of *vidyā* is dependent upon the duties of castes and stages of life, purity, good conduct, place and time, and this is learnt from the scriptural text beginning with, "Him who is above-mentioned, through reciting the *Veda* (the Brāhmaṇas desire to know)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22). Similarly, from the scriptural statements regarding the path (of the released self), it is made out that the fulfilment of *vidyā*, which is in the form of the cessation of all ignorance, is dependent upon movement towards a particular place. The negation of the departure of (the self of) the man of *vidyā* from the body at the time of death has, however, been already set aside (under *Ved. Sūti.* IV. 2. 12).

• What has been stated above to the effect in the passage, "(He leads them) to the worlds of the *Brahman*"



(*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15), that by means of the particularisation through the word, 'world', and its plural number, the effect, namely, Hiraṇyagarbha, comes to be known—it is not proper (to say so), because, according to the maxim relating to the Nishāda chief, it is proper to take the term, 'brahmaloka', only as an appositional compound which has to be dissolved into "The Brahman Himself is the world"; because also, where the meaning (of a word) is determined to be singular, its plural number is appropriately taken (to denote only one), as in the sentence, "(May) Aditi (break) the bonds" (*Maitrāyaṇi-Samhitā*, IV. 14. 4).<sup>1263</sup> It is not that supernatural worlds which are peculiar to Him and which are created out of His own will by the Supreme Brahman who is fully perfect, who is all-pervading and who wills the truth, do not exist in great numbers, because it (i.e., their existence) is founded upon the authority of the *śrutis*, *smṛitis*, *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*.

### दर्शनाच्च

Sūtra 12. *Darśanāchcha*

(520)

The scripture also shows it.

The scripture also shows that the attainment of the Brahman results to him who, going out of the body at death through the blood-vessel in the head, proceeds through the path of the gods, as in the passage: "This individual self, rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light and becomes manifest in his true form" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 4; 12. 1).

<sup>1263</sup> For the maxim of the Nishāda chief, see *P. M.* (VI. 1. 51-2) and Note 540 in Vol. II. The justification for understanding the plural number in some scriptural texts as denoting the singular is discussed in *P. M.* (IX. 3). One such case is that of Aditi's bonds.

The rope tied round a sacrificial victim is thus described. In *Taitt. Sam.* (III. 1. 4. 4), Aditi is entreated to break the bond (in singular), while in the *Maitrāyaṇi-Samhitā* the bonds are in plural. When the rope is loosened, the concerned mantra is recited.

It has been stated above (under *Sūtra* 7) that in the case of one who has travelled through the path beginning with light there is the intention to attain the effected Hiraṇyagarbha, as shown by the scriptural passage, "I attain the mansion which is the court of Prajāpati" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1). To this objection the reply is as follows :

न च कार्ये प्रत्यभिसन्धिः

**Sūtra** 13. *Na cha kārye pratyabhisandhiḥ* (521)

There is also no intention to attain the effect.

This intention to attain is not in regard to the effect, Hiraṇyagarbha, but it is in regard only to the Supreme *Brahman*; because in the supplementary passage, "I (who am one with the *Antaryāmin* or the Internal Ruler) become the self (lit. the fame or excellence) of the Brahmins" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1),<sup>1264</sup> there is for that worshipper the meditation of his being the self of all preceded by the release from all ignorance; because also, according to the passage, "Shaking off sin, just as a horse shakes off (dead) hair, and being freed, like the moon, from the mouth of Rāhu, I shake off the body, and then I, the well-blessed individual self, attain the eternal (lit. uncreated) world of the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.* VIII. 13. 1), the world of the *Brahman* which is to be attained is declared to be uncreated (and indestructible); and because there is the direct declaration of release from all bondage. Therefore, the opinion of Jaimini is that the group of escorts beginning with (the god ruling over) light leads only those who worship the Supreme *Brahman*.

Now, the revered Bādarāyaṇa, gives the correct conclusion according to his opinion.

<sup>1264</sup>. Prajāpati, according to Bādari, is Hiraṇyagarbha, but Jaimini holds him to be the *Brahman*. 'Fame' (or *yaśas*) is taken to mean the Self in the supplementary passage. Sāṅkara compares *Śvet. Up.* (IV. 19).

अप्रतीकालम्बनाज्ञयतीति बादरायण उभयधा च दोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च

**Sūtra 14.** *Apratīkalambanāññayatīti Bādarāyaṇa  
ubhayadhā cha doṣhāt tatkratyścha* (522)

It (i.e., the group of escorting gods) conveys those who are not dependent on symbols, so says Bādarāyaṇa, because there is error in both the cases; and there is also the maxim of accordant worship.

Those who are not dependent on symbols are those who are other than those who are dependent on symbols—these, that group of escorts beginning with (the god ruling over) light convey to the *Brahman*; thus the revered Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion. What is said is this. The view that they convey those who worship the effect cannot be held; there is no invariable rule that they convey those who worship only the Supreme *Brahman*; and they do not convey also those who worship the symbols. But they convey both these classes, namely, those who worship the Supreme *Brahman* and also those who meditate on the individual self as freed from the *prakṛiti* and as having the *Brahman* for its Self; but those who worship such things as name etc., which fall within the range of the effects produced by the *Brahman*, looking upon them as the *Brahman*, just as Devadatta and others may be regarded as the lion etc., and those who worship those things themselves absolutely—such persons they do not convey. Therefore, they convey those who worship the Supreme *Brahman* and also those who worship the individual self as freed from the *prakṛiti* and as having the *Brahman* for its Self.

Why? "Because there is error in both the cases". In the case of the view (of Bādari) that they convey those

who worship the effect, scriptural passages such as, "Rising up from this body, he attains the Supreme Light" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 4), will be contradicted. If there be an invariable rule that they convey those who worship only the Supreme Self, scriptural passages such as, "Those who know it (i.e., the essential nature of the individual self) thus (i.e., as set out in the *Pañshāgni-vidyā*) and those who in the forest worship *Tapas* (or the *Brahman*) with faith, they go to light" (*Ibid.* V. 10. 1), which say that the group beginning with (the god of) light conveys those who know the five fires will be contradicted. Therefore, as regards both the views, there will be error. Therefore it is said that they convey both those classes.

This same thing he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) states thus: "And there is also the maxim of accordant worship." The meaning is, just as one worships, so will one attain. Because there is the rule (or maxim) given in the passages, "Of whatever worship a man is here in this world, so will he be after he dies and departs from here" (*Ibid.* III. 14. 1) and "In whatsoever manner he meditates upon Him" (*Mudgala Upanishad*, 3); because those who know the five fires also are declared to have movement on that (i.e., the path) beginning with light; and because also in regard to one who has travelled by the path beginning with light it is declared in the scripture that he attains the *Brahman* and does not return (to this world of mortals). For this very reason, from the maxim of accordant worship, meditation on the individual self as freed from the *prakṛiti* and as having the *Brahman* for its Self is established. With regard, however, to those who are dependent upon the symbols beginning with name and ending with the *prāṇa* (as set out in *Chhānd. Up.* VII), there is no worship such as is established by both the sets of scriptural texts; and because in regard to the worship of that (individual self) which is associated with the non-intelligent (matter), the maxim of accordant worship has scope, both the movement through the path

beginning with light and the attainment of the *Brahman* cannot be. 1265

He (he., the *Sūtrakāra*) shows this same distinction thus:—

### विशेषं च दर्शयति

**Sūtra 15.** *Viśeṣaṃ cha darśayati*

(523)

And it (i.e., the scripture) shows the distinction.

The scriptural passage which begins thus, "So far as it falls within the range of Name, there he has free movement" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 5), shows that for those who worship the symbols which begin with name and end with the *prāṇa* there are certain particular fruits of a limited duration, which do not need (for their attainment) any (particular) path. They (i.e., the escorting gods) do not convey those who worship intelligent things (or selves) as associated with the non-intelligent things or by themselves, either with the view that they are the *Brahman* or without that (view). But the group of escorts leads them who worship the Supreme *Brahman* and those who worship the individual self as released from the *prakṛiti* and as having the *Brahman* for its Self: this is the established conclusion.

1265. The two types of souls on the path of the gods are (i) those who have meditated on the *Brahman* having their own selves as His attributes and (ii) those who have meditated on their selves as having the *Brahman* for their Self. In his commentary on the *B. G.*, Rāmānuja explains that the latter attain a state from which there is no re-birth. This is something like an inferior *mukti*, called *kaivalya* (lit. aloneness) where there is bliss from self-realisation, but no experience of the *Brahman* in His fullness. A

controversy has developed among the Southern and Northern schools into which Rāmānuja's followers are divided as to whether or not the state of *kaivalya* is permanent, where the selves experiencing it are located and so on. The Southern School holds *kaivalya* to be permanent, while the Northern argues that it is a half-way house to the higher *mukti*. The *tatkratu-nyaya* (or the principle of results according to worship) is taken as pointing out to the two different kinds of *mukti*.

## PART IV

### ADHIKARANA I

#### SAMPADYĀVIRBHĀVĀDHIKARANA

##### सम्पद्याविर्भावस्त्वेन शब्दात्

**Sūtra 1.** *Sampadyāvirbhāvassvena śabdāt* (524)

After attaining (the *Brahman*), he (i.e., the individual self) becomes manifest (in his own true nature) because of the expression, "in one's own".

It has been stated above that, as regards those who worship the Supreme *Brahman* and those also who worship the individual self as freed from the *prakṛiti* and as having the *Brahman* for its Self, there is (the attainment of) a state—through the path beginning with light—whose characteristic is non-return (to this world of mortals). Now he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) begins to take up for consideration what kind of superhuman greatness the released souls have.

The following passage is given in the scriptures: "In this manner only, this individual self, rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light and appears in his own form" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 3*). Here the doubt is raised, whether by means of this passage it is declared that he who rising up from this body has attained the Supreme Light, has any connection with any body which has to be produced, like that of a god etc., or whether the manifestation of his own inherent and essential nature (is declared thereby). In connection with this doubt, it may be said that what is properly arrived at by reasoning is that he is associated with a form that is

produced. For, otherwise, the *sāstras* dealing with final release will indeed be taken to teach an undesirable goal, as one's own nature is not a desirable goal (of attainment).

When the functions of the body and the senses are at rest during deep sleep, in regard to the essential nature of the self by itself, no association is, indeed, seen with any desirable object of attainment. And to him who has attained the Supreme Light, mere relief from sorrow is not the desirable object of attainment, so that it may be said that final release is only the manifestation of (one's own) essential nature; for it has been declared in the scriptures that there is infinite bliss for the released (self), in such passages as the following: "That is the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman*, and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1) and "Having obtained that very same Bliss (i.e., the *Brahman*), he (i.e., the individual self) becomes blissful" (*Ibid.* II. 7. 1).

Moreover, it is not possible to say that his essential nature is consciousness of the form of unlimited bliss and that it (i.e., this essential nature), having been concealed by ignorance in the state of *samsāra*, becomes manifest to him who has attained the Supreme Light; for there can be no concealment of an essential nature which is knowledge. It has, indeed, been stated earlier (in Vol. I, p. 142) that the concealment of knowledge, which is equivalent to luminousness, is nothing but its destruction. Further, the condition of bliss cannot happen to mere luminousness. Indeed, the essential nature of bliss is the essential nature of pleasure, and the essential nature of pleasure is to be agreeable to one's own self. As regards one who upholds the doctrine that mere luminousness is the individual self, to whom is the luminousness capable of being known to be agreeable? Thus in the case of one who upholds the doctrine that mere luminousness is the self, that it has the essential nature of bliss is difficult to maintain under any circumstances. And if the mere attaining of the

essential nature is to be accomplished, since the essential nature is eternally manifest in the case of one who has attained (the Light), the statement, "He becomes manifest in his own true nature" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3) becomes meaningless. Therefore, he is connected with a new form that has to be produced, and in this manner, the expression, "appears", will have its primary significance itself. Moreover, the expression, "in his own form," in the sense of "in that (form) which is peculiar to oneself and which is bliss absolute", appropriately fits in.

If it be so arrived at, we reply thus: "After attaining (the *Brahman*), he (i.e., the individual self) becomes manifest (in his own true nature), because of the expression, 'in one's own'" (*Ved. Sūta*. IV. 14. 1). That particular condition which this individual self reaches, after attaining the Supreme Light through that (path) which begins with light—it consists of the manifestation of his own essential nature, but it does not consist of the production of a new form. Why? "Because of the expression, 'in one's own'." That is, because it is mentioned with a specifying attribute in the expression, "in his own true nature" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3). Indeed, if an adventitious attribute is accepted, then the attribute expressed by the words, "in his own true nature", will become meaningless, because even in the absence of the attribute (i.e., 'his own'), it is his own true nature that is established (as becoming manifest).<sup>1266</sup>

1266. The *pūrvapakṣa* is based on the argument that *mukti* involves a positive access of bliss and that the word, 'abhinishpadyate', in the *Chhandogya* text can mean only the appearance in a new body to experience the bliss. The term, 'svena' (or 'in his own'), is taken to refer to a body which is peculiar to each revealed self.

The *siddhanta* accepts the positive access of bliss in the sense that the inherent bliss of the self, overpowered by *karma* during the state of *samsāra*, becomes manifest in *mukti*. 'Abhinishpadyate' refers to manifestation, 'svena' gets its primary sense as 'in one's own', and *rūpa* is 'true nature'.



It has been stated above that, inasmuch as the essential nature is eternally manifest, the statement, "He attains (the Supreme Light) and becomes manifest" (*Ibid.*), becomes meaningless. To this objection, the reply is this :

**मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात्**

**Sūtra 2.** *Muktaḥ pratijñānāt*

(525)

It is the released soul that is dealt with, because of (that being) the topic enunciated (here).

It is he who is released from contact with *karmas* and from the body produced by them and who exists in his own true nature that is dealt with here in the passage, "He becomes manifest in his own true nature" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 3*). Therefore, even though the essential nature is eternally manifest, it is concealed by the ignorance consisting of *karma*, and the removal of the concealment is called here 'manifestation'. Why? "Because of the topic enunciated (here)". Indeed, it is that (removal) which is enunciated as the topic to be expounded.

How is this made out? Because the individual self is introduced as the subject-matter in the passage, "He who is the self" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 7. 1*); and to show him as freed from the three conditions of waking etc., and as freed also from the body produced by the *karmas* which are caused by love and hatred, it is frequently stated, "This (self), indeed, I shall explain again at great length" (*Ibid. VIII. 9. 3*; *10. 4*; *11. 3*); then it is stated, "In this very manner, this same individual self, rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light and becomes manifest in his own true nature" (*Ibid. VIII. 12. 3*). Thus, as regards one who is associated with *karma*, after he attains the Supreme Light, final release, which consists of the cessation of bondage, is called manifestation in his own true nature. The word, 'manifestation', is seen to denote even the

revelation of the (already existent) essential nature of a thing, as in the following and other similar statements : "This meaning is revealed (or established) by reasoning." 1267

It has also been stated above as follows. Inasmuch as the essential nature of the individual self is seen, in the condition of dreamless sleep, to be no desirable goal of attainment, so also in regard to the manifestation of (one's own) essential nature, the *śāstra* relating to final release has to be taken as teaching what is not a desirable goal of attainment ; taking it thus, (it has been argued that) the attainment of another condition which is related to pleasure, like the condition of the gods etc., constitutes manifestation. To this objection, the answer is this :

### आत्मा प्रकरणात्

**Sūtra 3.** *Ātmā prakaraṇāt*

(526)

It is the self (in its essential nature) that is dealt with, because the context relates to it.

It is made out from the context here that this self is in his essential nature possessed of the qualities beginning with that of being free from sin and ending with that of willing the truth (as set out in *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7). The beginning of the passage attributed to Prajāpati runs, indeed, thus : "He who is the self is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1). Moreover, that this context relates to the individual self has been already established under the aphorism : "If it be said that it (i.e., the idea of the *daharākāśa* being the individual

1267. The teaching of Prajāpati is expounded in Vol. II, pp. 134-140, where also it is made clear that the essential

nature of the self, as free from the veil of ignorance, is the theme.

self) results from a subsequent passage, it is not so; for that (individual self mentioned later) is what has its essential nature made manifest" (*Ved. Sūt. I. 3. 18*). Therefore, this individual self, who is certainly possessed of an essential nature that is free from sin etc., has, in the condition of *samsāra*, his essential nature veiled by the ignorance which is known as *karma*; and, after attaining the Supreme Light, he becomes one whose essential nature is made manifest. Thus, the qualities of being free from sin etc. are natural to the individual self, and become manifest when he attains the Supreme Light; but they are not produced.

To the same effect, it has been stated by the revered Śaunaka also thus: "Just as by washing the dirt of gems, no brilliance (which is not already there) is produced, similarly, through giving up of evils, no knowledge is produced for the individual self. Just as by constructing a well (through digging), no spatial ether or water is produced (in the cavity thereof); only that which is always existent is made to become manifest; how can that which is non-existent have existence? Similarly, through the destruction of evil qualities, the qualities of intelligence etc. are made to shine; they are not produced; indeed, they are eternal to the individual self" (*Vishṇudharma, IV. 55-7*).

Therefore, as regards the qualities of intelligence, bliss etc., which suffer contraction by means of *karmās*, after the attaining of the Supreme Light, the destruction of the bondage in the form of *karmās* takes place, and their manifestation in the form of expansion (in the condition of final release) is not inappropriate. Thus it has been well said, "After attaining (the *Brahman*), he (i.e., individual self) becomes manifest (in his own true nature)" (*Ved. Sūt. IV. 4. 1*).

## ADHIKARANA II

## AVIBHĀGENADRISHTATVĀDHIKARANA

## अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात्

Sūtra 4. *Avibhāgena drishtatvāt*

(527)

Without separation from Him (the released soul enjoys the *Brahman*), because it is so seen declared in the scriptures.

The doubt here is whether this individual self, who has attained unto the Supreme Light and who is freed from all bondage, enjoys his own self as distinct from the Supreme Self, or as His mode without separation from Him. In this connection, it may be said that he enjoys (his own self) as distinct (from the *Brahman*), because from the *śruti* and the *smṛiti* it is made out that the released self is associated with the Supreme Being, or has similarity (with Him), or has attributes similar (to His), as in the following and other similar passages:—"He attains, along with the omniscient *Brahman*, all auspicious qualities" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); "When the wise seer sees that Person who is bright like gold, and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with Him)" (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 3); and "Depending upon this knowledge, those who have attained sameness of nature with Myself are not born at the time of creation and are not hurt at the time of dissolution" (*B. G.* XIV. 2).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated (by way of reply) as follows:—"Without separation..." (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 4). The released soul enjoys his own self without separation from the Supreme *Brahman*. Why? "Because it is so

seen declared in the scriptures", that is, because it is seen declared in the scriptures that, through attaining the Supreme *Brahman*, he has the veil of ignorance removed and his own self is then (experienced) as it is in reality. Indeed, the essential nature of his own self has been established under the aphorism, "Kāśakṛtsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also) because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the Self of the individual self)" (*Ved. Sū. I. 4. 22*), as having the Supreme Self as the Self and as being His mode through forming His body; (this establishment resulting) from the declarations of the grammatical equations given in the following and other such passages, "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7*), "This self is the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 5*), "All this has Him for its Self" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7*), and "All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*" (*Ibid. III. 4. 1*); (and resulting) also from the following and other similar passages: "He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self from within—He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self" (*Mādh. Bṛih. Up. III. 7. 22*) and "He who has entered within, who is the Ruler of all things that are born and who is the Self of all" (*Taitt. Ār. III. 21*). Therefore, without separation (from the Supreme *Brahman*), he enjoys Him, saying thus: "I am the *Brahman*".

Indeed, the teaching regarding equality and similarity (with the *Brahman*) is to the effect that the essential nature of the individual self who is himself only a mode of the *Brahman* is equal to His; hence it establishes that, on giving up the material forms (or bodies) which are known as those of the gods etc., it has that purity which is equal to that of the *Brahman*. The scriptural passage which speaks of (the enjoyment of the individual self in) association (with the *Brahman*) establishes that the individual self, who is in the above condition, has, together with the

*Brahman* who is the possessor of the (self as His) mode, the enjoyment of His qualities; thus there is nothing contradictory here.<sup>1268</sup> Indeed, through the statement that, owing to (his) being the mode of the *Brahman*, he is not separate from Him, the following aphorisms, among others, are not contradicted: "Solely through his willing (the truth) (the released self gets what he wants), because of scriptural statements to that effect" (*Ved. Sū.* IV. 4. 8) and "(The *Brahman*) is, however, other (than the individual self) on account of the difference (between them) which is taught (in the scriptures)" (*Ibid.* II. 1. 22): as also the following and such other aphorisms, "(But) because there is the teaching about some one who is different....." (*Ibid.* III. 4. 8).

### ADHIKARANA III

#### BRĀHMĀDHIKARANA

#### ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः

**Sūtra 5.** *Brāhmeṇa Jaiminirupanyāsādibhyaḥ* (528)

Jaimini says that with that which pertains to the *Brahman* (i.e., His qualities) (the released self becomes manifest in his essential nature), because of statements etc. (in the scripture) to that effect.

It has been stated that the individual self who, after attaining the Supreme Light, has the veil of ignorance

1268. The teaching regarding the equality and similarity of the released self with the *Brahman* is to be found in *Mund. Up.* (III. 1. 3), *B.G.* (XIV. 2), etc. The essential nature of the self—which is manifested in final release—is made out from

grammatical equations such as *Chhand. Up.* (III. 14. 1 and VI. 8. 7). The text which speaks of the released self enjoying His qualities in association with the *Brahman* is found in *Taitt. Up.* (II. 1. 1).

removed, has his own essential nature revealed. It being so, that essential nature of his which he manifests is now enquired into, on account of there being a variety of scriptural texts in relation thereto. Does his essential nature consist solely of the qualities of being devoid of sin etc., so that through that form he is revealed, or is it (i.e., his essential nature) mere knowledge so that through that form (he is revealed), or, again, are both those forms not hostile to each other so that through the two forms he is revealed?

What is it that is surely arrived at, here? The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that it (i.e., the manifestation) is through that which pertains to the *Brahman*; 'through that which pertains to the *Brahman*' means 'through the qualities of being devoid of sin etc.' Indeed, the qualities of being devoid of sin etc. have been given in the scriptures in the passage on the *Daharā* as being related to the *Brahman*. How is it made out that it is revealed through that which pertains to the *Brahman*? "Because of statements etc. (in the scripture) to that effect." Indeed, the qualities of being devoid of sin etc., which belong to the *Brahman*, are stated to exist even in relation to the individual self in the passage which is attributed to Prajāpati and which begins with, "He who is the self is devoid of sin" and ends with,— "He wills the truth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1). By the expression, "etc." (in the *Sūtra*), are denoted eating and other activities which are dependent upon the qualities of willing the truth etc., and which are made out from such passages as the following: "He (i.e., the released self) is eating, playing and enjoying" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 3). Therefore, the opinion of Jaimini is that, on account of these statements etc., the individual self cannot possibly have the essential nature of knowledge.

चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः

**Sūtra 6.** *Chititanmātreṇa tadātmakatvādityauḍulomiḥ* (529)

Auḍulomi says that it is (revealed) as mere intelligence, because it consists of that.

The teacher, Auḍulomi, is of opinion that the essential nature of the individual self is mere consciousness (or intelligence) and that, therefore, through that form it is revealed. Why? "Because it consists of that", that is, because this individual self consists merely of that (i.e., intelligence). The essential nature of this (self) is made out to be mere intelligence from the exclusive propositions set out in the following passages: "Just as a mass of salt has no interior or exterior, is wholly a mass of (salty) taste only, even so, my dear, this Self has no interior or exterior, is everywhere only in the form of a mass of intelligence (called the individual self)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 13) and "He is in the form only of a mass of intelligence" (*Ibid.* II. 4. 12). Hence, because he (i.e., the self) has no other qualities, the statements in the scripture such as "He is free from sin" (*Chhāṇḍ. Up.* VIII. 7. 1), denote freedom from the qualities such as modification, pleasure and pain that are made up of ignorance; therefore the opinion of Auḍulomi is there is manifestation (of the essential nature of the released self) in the form of intelligence only.<sup>1269</sup>

Now the revered Bādarāyaṇa gives the conclusion according to his opinion as under.

<sup>1269.</sup> Auḍulomi's view of the qualities enumerated in *Chhāṇḍ. Up.* (VIII. 7. 1) may be taken to be as follows. The self being devoid of sin, free from old age etc. indicates that he is free from modifications; his desiring the truth means that he is free of fleeting desires and

pleasures; and his willing the truth points to his freedom from indifference or from obstructed resolves. (S.P.) The *Chhāṇḍogya* texts under *Sūtras* 5-6 are fully rendered in Vol. II (pp. 134-139); for the *Bṛih. Up.* texts, see p. 273.



एवमप्युपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः

**Sūtra 7.** *Evamapyupanyāsatspūrvabhāvād-  
avirodham Bādarāyaṇaḥ* (530)

Even in this manner, there is no contradiction, because of the existence of the earlier (mentioned qualities), on account of declarations (to that effect): (so says) Bādarāyaṇa.

The teacher, Bādarāyaṇa, is of opinion that "even in this manner", that is, even though he (i.e., the self) is declared to possess an essential nature consisting only of intelligence, there is no contradiction of the qualities of willing the truth etc., which have been mentioned before. Why? "Because of the existence of the earlier, on account of declarations (to that effect)"—that is, because of the being, namely, the existence of the earlier ones or the quality of being free from sin, the quality of willing the truth and such other qualities, on the authority of declarations in the *Upanishads* such as the following: "He who is the self is devoid of sin" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1). The meaning is that between things which are known through means of knowledge that are equally strong, mutual contradiction cannot be proper.

Moreover, to say that the qualities of being devoid of sin etc. are manufactured by ignorance does not stand to reason on account of opposition (between the ignorance and the qualities) as things; because there is the maxim: (in regard to statements of equal authority) in the absence of anything special (leaning to one side), why should not the contrary be the case? Indeed, when there is equal strength (in regard to the authoritativeness of both statements), it stands to reason to say that the exclusive

emphasis which cannot be sustained has to be interpreted in another sense.<sup>1270</sup>

He (i.e., Bādarāyaṇa), conceding the opponent's point of view (i.e., that the self is stated to be of the nature of mere intelligence) states: "Even in this manner"; but he thinks that from such statements as, "He (the Self) is in the form only of a mass of intelligence (called the individual self)" (*Bṛh. Up.* II. 4. 12), the proposition that the essential nature of this self is mere intelligence and that there is nothing else, is not propounded. Then what is the meaning of the exclusive emphasis in the statement, "He is only a mass of intelligence" (*Ibid.*)? The whole of this self is self-luminous, being distinct from non-intelligence; there is not even a little region whose luminousness is dependent upon another: this meaning is very clear from the concerned passage itself: "Just as a mass of salt has no interior or exterior, is wholly a mass of (salty) taste only, even so, my dear, this Self has no interior or exterior, is everywhere only in the form of a mass of intelligence (called the individual self)" (*Ibid.* IV. 5. 13).

And in this manner, even if the whole of the individual self, which has the essential nature of the possessor of attributes, is one mass of intelligence, its association with the qualities of being devoid of sin, willing the truth etc., as ascertained from another passage, is not contradicted. For instance, when the whole of the mass of salt has

1270. (i) The *vastu-virodha* (or hostility as substances) referred to above is between ignorance and any quality like freedom from sin etc. Both these are of the nature of knowledge (or intelligence); and what is of the nature of knowledge cannot be the substratum of knowledge. (However, knowledge as attribute is different from knowledge as essential nature; and it is knowledge as attribute which cannot be the substratum

of knowledge, while knowledge as essential nature is qualified by attributive knowledge.) (ii) The maxim referred to merely points out that when two statements of equal authority contradict each other, it is equally reasonable to accept either. Here, why should we not accept qualities like freedom from sin and reject the statement about the self being nothing but intelligence?

attained that condition of a mass of taste which is known by means of the sense of taste, its qualities of form, hardness etc., which are known through the sense of sight etc., are not contradicted. The purport of this passage is this. Although in the mango and other such fruits, which are full of juice, there is a difference of taste due to a difference of place such as the skin (of the fruit) etc., as regards the mass of salt there is in it everywhere an uniformity of taste; similarly, the self also has everywhere the essential nature of knowledge; the meaning is that it has the essential nature of self-luminousness.<sup>1271</sup>

## ADHIKARANA IV

### SAṆKALPĀDHIKARANA

सङ्कल्पादेव तच्छ्रुतेः

Sūtra 8. *Sankalpādeva tachchhruteḥ*

(631)

Solely through his willing (the truth) (the released self gets what he wants), because of scriptural statements to that effect.

It has been stated above that the released self, after attaining the Supreme *Brahman*, becomes manifest as having the essential nature of knowledge and as possessing the qualities beginning with those of being devoid of sin etc. and ending with that of willing the truth. Regarding him, it is declared in the scriptures that there are activities arising from the quality of willing the truth, as in the following passage: "He (i.e., the released self) moves

1271. The exclusive emphasis is not independent and primary, so as to contradict other primary and independent statements. It has to be seen in its context as dependent on what requires exclusion. Thus, in

this case, the emphasis is about the self being uniformly of the nature of intelligence, even as a lump of salt is uniformly a mass of salty taste. There is nothing in the self of the nature of non-intelligence.

about there (in the Highest Heaven), eating, playing and enjoying either in the company of women, or with vehicles, or in the company of relatives" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3). Here the doubt is raised whether his attaining relatives etc. is dependent upon any other effort, or whether, as in the case of the Supreme Person, it happens merely through willing. In the world, kings etc., who carry on their activities by willing the truth (i.e., whose wishes are realised without obstruction), are seen to be dependent upon other efforts, and hence he (i.e., the released self) also has need of such (efforts).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated as follows: "Solely through (his) willing (the truth)..." (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 8). Why? "Because of scriptural statements to that effect." There is the passage: "If he has the desire for the world of fathers, solely through his willing (the truth) the fathers rise up (before him)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 2. 1); thus, indeed, through (his) mere willing, the rising up of fathers etc. is declared in the scripture. There is not seen any other scriptural passage which states that there is need of any other effort—by which passage, the exclusive emphasis in "Solely through (his) willing (the truth)" (*Ibid.*) may be restricted to a definite setting, as in "He is in the form only of a mass of intelligence" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12) (which is explained under *Sūtra* 7 above).

अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः

**Sūtra 9.** *Ata eva cha ananyādhīpatiḥ*

(532)

For that very reason, he has none else as (his) lord.

Because the released (self) has the quality of willing the truth, for that very reason he has also none else as (his) lord. Indeed, to have another as lord is to be capable of being subject to mandatory and prohibitory commandments. If, indeed, there is the capability to be subject to mandatory and prohibitory commandments, there

is the condition of one's will being obstructed. Hence, solely through the scriptural passage declaring the quality of willing the truth, that he has none else as (his) lord is established. For this very reason, it is stated, "He is his own ruler" (*Chhānd. Up. VII. 25. 2*).<sup>1272</sup>

## ADHIKARANA V

### ABHĀVĀDHIKARANA

#### अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम्

**Sūtra 10.** *Abhāvam Bādarirāha hyevam*

(533)

There is non-existence (of the body and the senses in regard to the released soul) (according to) Bādari; indeed, the scripture declares so.

Here the doubt is raised whether the released (self) has no body and senses, or whether he has them, or whether he has them or has them not according to his will. In this connection, the teacher, Bādari, is of opinion that no body and senses exist (for the released self). Why? "Indeed, it (i.e., the scripture) declares so." In the following passage, "To him who remains with a body, there is, indeed, no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who remains without a body" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 1*), the scripture states that where there is connection with the body, there pain is unavoidable; then, indeed, (it) declares that the released soul is devoid of any body in the passage: "Rising up from this body, he (i.e., the self)

<sup>1272.</sup> To be able to will the truth one must have risen above subjection to the mandates and prohibitions of the *Veda*; that is, one's will must no longer rely on *punya* for aid, nor be hindered by the effects of sin. In such a state the self is described as devoid of sinful-

ness. *apahatapāpman*. Activities which would otherwise give rise to merit or sin do not produce these effects then. This freedom from *karma* implies that the released self has none else—other than the *Brahman*—as his lord. (*Ś.P.*)

attains the Supreme Light and becomes manifest in his own true nature" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 3).

### भार्वे जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात्

**Sūtra 11.** *Bhāvam Jaiminirvikalpāmananāt* (534)

There is existence (of the body and the senses in regard to the released soul) (according to) Jaimini; because of the declaration by the scripture of manifoldness (in regard to him).

The teacher, Jaimini, is of opinion that, in regard to the released self, the body and senses do exist. Why? "Because of the declaration by the scripture of manifoldness (in regard to him)." Manifoldness is having many kinds of forms; the meaning is that there is differentiation into many forms; because there is the following scriptural passage: "He is one, is threefold, fivefold, sevenfold" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2). As a self which is incapable of being cut (or divided), cannot possibly have many forms, it is made out that his becoming threefold etc. is due to (his connection with) the body. The statement that he has no body, however, relates to the absence of bodies due to *karma*; for such a body, indeed, is the cause of the pleasing and the unpleasing (experiences of the self).

But the revered Bādarāyaṇa states the settled conclusion, as under, according to his opinion.

### द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं वादरायणोऽतः

**Sūtra 12.** *Dvādaśāhavadubhayavidham*  
*Bādarāyaṇo'taḥ* (535)

Bādarāyaṇa (is of opinion that) through that, he (i.e., the released self) is of both kinds, as is the case with the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice.

By the expression, 'through that', the expression, 'through willing (the truth) itself', is referred to; 'through that', that is, through willing (the truth), Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that the released self is of both kinds, with a body and without a body; and in this manner both the kinds of scriptural texts appropriately fit in. "As is the case with the *dvādaśāha* sacrifice." For instance, in the following and other such passages, "Those who wish for wealth resort to the *dvādaśāha*"(?) and "By means of the *dvādaśāha* one who desires children may be made to sacrifice"(?), through the commandments given by the words, "he resorts to" (or '*upaiti*') and 'he sacrifices' (or '*yajati*'), there arises a difference in mental resolution, and owing to this, it (i.e., the sacrificial rite) is a *satra* in the one case and an *ahīna* in the other.<sup>1273</sup>

When it (i.e., the individual self) is possessed of the body and other auxiliary instruments, there is then no invariable rule that those, the body and other auxiliary instruments, should only be created by himself; thus he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says as under.

### तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवदुपपत्तेः

Sūtra 13. *Tanvibhāve sandhyavadupapatteḥ* (536)

1273. Looking on the body as an instrument for the experience of pleasure and pain, Bīdari denies it to the released self. Jaimini affirms a different kind of body for him: in fact, according to the scripture, he can have many kinds of bodies. Bādarāyaṇa says that the released self can be associated with a body of his own creation, or can remain without it. (In the latter case, it is later pointed out that he is associated with a body created by the Lord.) That the released

self can be in either of these states, according to his will, is compared to a sacrifice of twelve days being either a *satra* or *ahīna*, according to the resolves of the sacrificers. See P. M. (X. 6. 59-60) on the distinction between *satra* and *ahīna*. The former is enjoined by verbs having the meaning of resorting to or having recourse to: between 17 to 24 must join in it. In the latter, the injunction uses the verb, to sacrifice: the number of sacrificers is not limited,

In the absence of the body (created by himself) it (i.e., enjoyment for the released self) appropriately results, as is the case in the condition of dreams.

In the absence of the body and other auxiliary instruments created by (that self) himself, through the auxiliary instruments created by the Supreme Person, there is appropriateness of enjoyment for him; and therefore, although he (i.e., the individual self) can will the truth, he does not then create them. For instance, there is the (scriptural) passage which begins with, "So then He creates chariots, horses, roads", and ends with "So then He creates ponds, wells, rivers; indeed, He is the Creator (of all of them)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 10): there is also the passage, "He who is awake when these (individual selves) are asleep, this Person creates (all desired things) after resolving and resolving; He alone is the giver of light, He is the *Brahman*; He is alone called (naturally and unconditionally) immortal; in Him all the worlds are contained; none indeed can surpass Him" (*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 8 ): according to these, in the condition of dreaming the individual self enjoys with the help of chariots and such other auxiliary instruments created by the Lord. Similarly, even the released (self), through the world of fathers etc., which are created by the Lord who is engaged in play, experiences the joy of sporting.

### भवे जाग्रद्वत्

**Sūtra 14.** *Bhāve jāgradvat*

(537)

When there is (creation of the body etc., by him), it (i.e., enjoyment for the released self) resembles the waking state.

Where there are auxiliary instruments like the body and the world of fathers etc., which are created solely



through his own will, the released (soul) enjoys the joy of sport, even like a person in the waking state. Just as the Supreme Person also, for the purpose of His sport, creates for Himself (during incarnations) the world (or group) of fathers like Daśaratha and Vasudeva, and enjoys through them the joy of sport suited to the qualities of human beings; similarly, in regard to the released selves also, for the sake of their own sport, He (i.e., the Lord) Himself creates sometimes the world of their fathers etc.; sometimes the released selves themselves, owing to their power of willing the truth, create the world of their own fathers etc., which lies within the scope of the play of the Supreme Person: thus everything is proved appropriate.

It may, however, be said thus. It has been stated above that the individual self is of the size of an atom, and it is asked how, as regards many bodies, there can be the idea of being one's own, on the part of a single thing (i.e., a self) which is an atom. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) replies thus:—

### प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथाहि दर्शयति

**Sūtra 15.** *Pradīpavadāveśastathā hi darśayati* (537)

The pervasion (of many bodies by the released self) is like that of a lamp; indeed, it (i.e., the scripture) shows it to be so.

Just as there is pervasion of other places by a single lamp existing in one place, through its own light, similarly, in the case of the individual self also, which is seated only in one body, through its own light (of attributive intelligence) the pervasion of all bodies appropriately results. Just as also, although in any one body it (i.e., the self) exists in a part of it such as the heart, through the pervasion of consciousness there is the sense of one's own in regard to the whole of the body; similar to it is the case here.

There is this much of difference. As regards one who is not free (from the bondage of *karma*) and whose intelligence has suffered contraction through *karman*, there can be no pervasion (by him) of other bodies as is suited to the sense of they being his own; but as regards the released self, whose intelligence is not contracted, pervasion (of other bodies) appropriately takes place just as he wills it, both in accordance with the sense of they being his own and in accordance also with the apprehension (or power of illumination) which says, 'It is this'.

"Indeed, it (i.e., the scripture) shows it to be so," as in the following passage: "A hundredth part of the point of a hair is divided into a hundred parts, and one part (of the latter) is understood to be (the size of) the individual self: and he (after final release) becomes infinite (through his attributive intelligence)" (*Svet. Up.* V. 8). There is this distinction that in the case of one who is not finally released, *karman* exercise control, but in the case of a finally released soul it is his own will (that does so).

It may, however, be said the scripture shows that in regard to one who has attained the Supreme *Brahman* there is the absence of both external and internal knowledge, as in the passage: "When he is embraced by the Omniscient Self, he does not know anything that is external nor anything that is internal" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 21), and it may be asked how the released soul can possess omniscience. To this (objection), the answer is as follows:—

स्वाप्ययसम्पत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविकृतं हि

**Sūtra** 16. *Svāpyayasampattiyoranya-*

*tarāpēkṣamāvīkṛtāṃ hi*

(533)

It (i.e., the *Bṛih. Up.* text about the ignorance of the self when embraced by the Omniscient Lord) has in view either of the two, namely, dreamless sleep and death; indeed, it is so revealed in the scripture.

That (scriptural passage from the *Bṛih. Up.*) does not relate to the released self ; but it has in view either of the two, *svāpyaya* or *sampatti*. ' *Svāpyaya* ' is dreamless sleep. ' *Sampatti* ' is death, as seen from the passage beginning with, "Speech rests in the mind" and ending with, "The *tejas* (rests) in the Supreme Deity" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 6). It is made out that those two conditions consist of the attainment of the Omniscient (Lord) and the absence of consciousness. Therefore, the (*Bṛih. Up.*) passage has in view either of those two conditions. The absence of consciousness in the conditions of dreamless sleep and death, and omniscience as regards the released self are, indeed, revealed by the scripture.

In the following passage, "Indeed, he himself, the afore-said person (in dreamless sleep) denoted in this manner, does not now know the self thus, 'I am that same person'; nor (does he know) these beings; he is, as it were, absorbed in destruction; I do not see here any object of enjoyment" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 11. 1), it is stated that at the time of dreamless sleep there is no consciousness; in that very same context, omniscience is affirmed with reference to the released soul: "Indeed, this above-mentioned person, perceiving with his mind, namely, the divine eye (or attributive intelligence), enjoys all the qualities which are in the world which is the *Brahman*" (*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 5). Indeed, omniscience is clearly declared in the passage, "Indeed, the seer (i.e., the released self) sees all and attains all in all places" (*Ibid.* VII. 26. 2).

In regard to the condition of death, the absence of consciousness has been stated thus: "Rising up from these (external) elements, he perishes after them, indeed" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12). The meaning of 'perishes' is 'does not see (or perceive)'. Therefore, the statement, "He (is embraced) by the Omniscient Self" (*Ibid.* IV. 3. 21),

has in view either of the two conditions of dreamless sleep and death.<sup>1274</sup>

## ADHIKARANA VI

### JAGADVYĀPĀRAVARJĀDHIKARANA

#### जगद्व्यापारवर्ज प्रकरणादसन्निहितत्वाच्च

**Sūtra 17.** *Jagadvyāpāravarjaṃ prakaraṇād-  
asannihitatvāchcha* (540)

Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc. of) the world (the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the Lord), because of (the Lord being) the topic in the contexts (wherein the above activity is referred to) and because also of the remoteness (of the released souls therefrom).

The doubt here is whether the power and glory of the released self includes also that lordship of all things which involves the creation of the world etc. and which is peculiar to the Supreme Person, or whether, devoid of those (activities), it relates merely to the experience of the Supreme Person. What is it that is properly arrived at by reasoning? That it includes the lordship of the world also. Why? Because there is the scriptural passage,

1274. (i) The released self, in calling forth the world of his fathers, is not cutting himself off from the experience of the Brahman, nor showing that he has not fulfilled himself. Even the all-perfect Lord has chosen fathers for Himself in His incarnations. Such creation as well as the creation of fathers by

the released self is for the sport of the Lord. (S.P.) (ii) For the atomic soul pervading the body with the light of knowledge, see *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 3. 26). (iii) The self is in close association with the Lord during deep sleep, death, *pralaya* and *moksha*. In the last state alone, the self is omniscient.

"Being untainted, he (i.e., the released self) attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*)" (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 3), which speaks of the attainment of the highest degree of equality with the Supreme Person; and because also (in regard to the released self) there is the scriptural passage speaking of willing the truth (i.e., *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1). Indeed, the attribute of having the highest degree of equality and the attribute of willing the truth cannot be appropriately affirmed (of the released self) without that control of the world which is peculiar to the Supreme Person. Therefore, for fitting in appropriately the attribute of having the highest degree of equality and the attribute of willing the truth, the control of the whole world also is included in the power and glory of the released self.

If it be so arrived at, we give the reply to it as follows: "Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc. of) the world" (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 17). The activity in relation to the world is control over the distinction of the essential natures, existence and actions of all intelligent and non-intelligent things. Free from it is that power and glory which consists of the unconditioned experience of the *Brahman* (as He is) and which belongs to the released self, all of whose veils (of ignorance) have been removed. Why? "Because of the topic in the contexts." Indeed, the control of the whole universe is declared in the scripture as existing (only) with reference to the Supreme *Brahman*, as in the following passage: "From whom all these beings are born, by whom, when born, they are all preserved, and to whom they go when they perish—do you desire to know That well; That is the *Brahman*" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1). If this control of the whole world is common to the released souls and to the *Brahman*, then thereby the characteristic of the *Brahman*, that He is the lord of the world, cannot be appropriate. Indeed, it is that which is peculiar that has the nature of a defining characteristic. Thus, we have the following

and other such passages : "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, 'May I become manifold and be born'; It created the *tejas*" (*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1); "The *Brahman*, indeed, this one alone, was in the beginning; being one, He did not feel strong; He created the Kshatriyas of excellent quality so that they might be superior to others—these Kshatriyas among the gods, Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛityu and Īśāna" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 11); "The Self, indeed, this alone was in the beginning; there was nothing else blinking (i.e., active); He thought, 'May I create the worlds'; He created these worlds" (*Āit. Up.* I. 1); and "Indeed, Nārāyaṇa alone then was, and not Brahmā, nor Īśāna, nor the sky and earth, nor the stars, nor the waters, nor fire, nor the moon, nor the sun: being alone, He did not feel happy; of Him, who was at the height of meditation.....one maiden (i.e., *buddhi*) and ten senses (came out)" (*M. Up.* I. 1). The control of all the worlds is declared to exist (only) with the Supreme Person, who is the subject-matter introduced in such passages as that beginning with, "He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth" and ending with, "He who, dwelling in the self" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3, 22).

"And because also of the remotenes (of the released selves therefrom)." In all these (passages) relating to the control of all the world, there is no presence of the released soul, so that the activity relating to the world may belong to him also.<sup>1275</sup>

1275. (i) The contrast is between the released self participating in the creation etc. of the world by the *Brahman* and his experiencing the *Brahman* with a body created by himself or the *Brahman*. (ii) The quotation from *M. Up.* is from a passage that refers to fourteen 'men' and one 'maiden' being

born out of Nārāyaṇa—the ten senses, *manas*, *ahaṅkara*, *prāṇa*, *ātman* and *buddhi*. The only word in feminine gender here is *buddhi*, and so the 'maiden' is identified with it. Ś. P. suggests *manas* to be the *kanya* or maiden from the root, *kan*, to shine.

प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः

**Sūtra 18.** *Pratyakshopadeśāditi chennādhikārikamaṇḍalasthokteḥ* (541)

If it be said there is scriptural teaching with regard to it, it is not so, because of the statement being about those (enjoyments) which are in the spheres of those (deities) who hold offices.

In the following passages, by *pratyaksha* (lit. directly), that is, by the scripture, it is taught that the activity relating to the world belongs to the released self: "He is his own ruler: he is free to move as he likes in all the worlds" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 2) and "He (i.e., the released self) moves about in all these worlds, enjoying whatever things he likes and assuming whatever forms he likes" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 10. 5). Therefore, it (i.e., the glory and power of the released self) is not free from the activity relating to the world.

If it be so held, it is not right to say so. "Because of the statements being about those (enjoyments) which are in the spheres of those (deities) who hold offices." 'Those who hold offices' are those who are appointed to posts wielding authority, such as Hiraṇyagarbha; 'spheres' are their worlds; 'those (things) which are in them' are enjoyments; the teaching that these belong to the released self, who is free from subjection to *karmas*, is taught in such passages as, "He is free to move as he likes in all the worlds" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 2). The meaning is this: the released self whose knowledge is not obstructed by *karma* enjoys the worlds which are produced effects and which are the manifestations of the glories of the *Brahman* and gets satisfied to the extent of his desires. Thus it is taught by means of this passage that he (i.e., the released soul) enjoys all the enjoyments which exist within the

created worlds, that is, which exist in the worlds of those (deities) who hold offices and which are the manifestations of the glories of the *Brahman*; but not that he has the activity relating to the world.

It may, however, be said thus: If, like one subject to *samsāra*, the released soul also enjoys the enjoyments within the created worlds, then, as is the case with a bound soul, the totality of the objects of enjoyment of a released soul also will certainly be finite and will also be insignificant. To this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:—

विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह

**Sūtra 19.** *Vikāravartī cha tathā hi sthiti māha* (542)

It (viz., the *Brahman*) does not at all exist subject to modification. Accordingly, the scripture speaks of the existence (of the released self in it).

‘In the sphere of modification’, such as birth etc., It does not lie, and so It is ‘not subject to modification’. The released self experiences the Supreme *Brahman*, who has avoided all modifications, who is hostile to all evil and is the sole abode of all auspicious qualities, who is bliss unsurpassed in excellence, who is possessed of the glory of (His) manifestations, and who has all auspicious qualities. Even the worlds which are produced effects, owing to their being included in His glory, are the objects of enjoyment for the released soul.

Accordingly, the scripture speaks of the released soul’s remaining as the enjoyer in the Supreme *Brahman*, who is not subject to modifications and whose bliss is limitless and unsurpassed in excellence, as in passages like the following:—“Indeed, whenever he obtains fearless support in Him who is invisible, incorporeal, indefinable



and homeless, then he becomes fearless" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1), and "Bliss indeed is He. Having obtained that very same Bliss, he (i.e., the individual self) becomes blissful" (*Ibid.*). And the world which is the manifestation of His glory exists there itself, because of the following scriptural passage: "In Him all the worlds are contained: none, indeed, can surpass Him" (*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 8). Therefore, in such passages as, "In all the worlds, he is free to move as he likes" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 2), it is stated that he (i.e., the released soul) experiences the *Brahman* with the manifestations of His glory and enjoys also the enjoyments which are within the produced effects, that is, existent in the worlds of those (deities) who hold offices; but not that the activity relating to the world belongs to the released soul.

### दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने

**Sūtra 20.** *Darśayataśchaivam* (543)  
*pratyakashānumāne*

And both the *śruti* and the *smṛiti* show it (i.e., the activity relating to the world) to be thus (i.e., as stated above).

It has been stated above that the released individual self, who is subject to control, cannot possibly possess that ruling authority which is peculiar to the Supreme Person who is the controller and which is of the nature of the activity (such as creation etc.) relating to the world. Both the *śruti* and the *smṛiti* show that the activity which relates to the world and which is of the nature of control of all the worlds is peculiar to the Supreme Person: "Through fear of Him the wind blows; through (that) fear the sun rises; through fear of Him Agni and Indra (do their duties), and Death runs as the fifth" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1); "Indeed, under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, O Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand well

supported" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9), and so on; similarly, "He is the Lord of all, He is the master of all beings, He is the protector of all beings. He is the bridge and support of all the worlds so that they may not get into confusion" (*Ibid.* IV. 4. 22); thus far the *śruti*. And the *smṛiti*: "The *prakṛiti*, presided over (and thought over) by Me, gives birth to it (i.e., the world) with animate and inanimate beings. Indeed, for this reason, O son of Kuntī, the world goes on undergoing transformations" (*B. G.* IX. 10); and "I stand supporting the whole world by a small part (of My power)" (*Ibid.* X. 3.).

Both the *śruti* and the *smṛiti* similarly show that the Supreme Person Himself is the cause of the released soul's bliss also, which is based upon his quality of willing the truth: "He, indeed, causes bliss" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1) and "He who worships Me with unswerving *bhakti-yoga* transcends these *guṇas* (i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), becomes fit for the attainment of the *brahman* (or the self in its pure state). Indeed, I am the support of the *brahman* (i.e., the self) who is immortal and unchanging, of lasting (power and glory to be won from) *dharma*, and of the bliss (of salvation) of one solely devoted to the Lord" (*B. G.* XIV. 27-28).

No doubt the sum of the qualities of the individual self beginning with that of being devoid of sin and ending with that of desiring the truth, which are manifested (in the condition of final release) are such as belong to his essential nature; nevertheless, their condition as such (i.e., as belonging to the self's essential nature) is dependent upon the Supreme Person; and that it (i.e., the essential nature of the self as manifest in the state of final release) continues eternally is dependent upon Him; and inasmuch as the eternal existence of that is eternally willed by Him, it exists eternally: thus there is nothing contradictory here. In this very manner, it is ascertained from the *sāstras* that the eternal existence of the auxiliary instrument of enjoyment of the Supreme Person and of the

auxiliary instrument of sport, as such, is solely due to the eternal willing of the Supreme Person, who is known from the *śāstras*. Hence the released soul's quality of willing the truth and his having (the highest degree) of equality with the Supreme Person exclude the activity relating to the world.<sup>1276</sup>

### भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च

**Sūtra 21.** *Bhogamātrasāmyaliṅgūchcha* (344)

Because the indicia relate merely to equality of enjoyment (for the released self with the *Brahman*).

Because the indicia which deal with the equality of the released soul with the *Brahman*, are in respect merely of the enjoyment which consists of the experience of the *Brahman* as He is in reality, it (i.e., that equality) is made out to exclude the activity relating to the world, as in the passage here: "He attains, along with the omniscient *Brahman*, all auspicious qualities" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1). Thus, in regard to the released soul, its equality with the Supreme Person and its quality of willing the truth have to be explained in accordance with the scriptural passages which deal with that control of all the worlds that is peculiar to the Supreme Person; hence the glory and

1276. (i) The eternal bliss of the released self is due to the eternal willing of the Lord. He enjoys the created worlds as manifesting the glory of the Lord. The dependence on the Lord does not affect the bliss, because such dependence is in consonance with the essential nature of the self. (ii) B.G. (XIV. 26-27) has been rendered according to Rāmānuja's commentary on the B.G. These

verses are there shown as indicating that the Lord is the bestower and support of the different objectives of three types of devotees—those who seek *kaivalya*, those who seek power and prosperity and those who seek *moksha*. Ś.P. suggests an alternative interpretation: the *brahman* is the individual self, that which is immortal is *moksha*, *sukha* is *ananda* and the lasting *dharma* is knowledge.

power of the released souls is altogether devoid of the activities relating to the world.<sup>1277</sup>

It may be said that, if the glory and power of the released soul is dependent upon the Supreme Person, then, inasmuch as He is independent, there is the doubt that through Him will there be the possibility of the released soul returning (to this world of mortals); to this objection, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus :

अनावृत्तिशब्दादनावृत्तिशब्दात्

**Sūtra 22.** *Anāvṛtṭiśabdādānāvṛtṭiśabdāt* (545)

There is no return because the scriptures say so ;  
there is no return because the scriptures say so.

Just as it is made out from the scriptures that there exists the Supreme Person, who is hostile to all evil and is the home of all auspiciousness, who is the cause of the origin etc. of the world, who is entirely distinct from all other things, who is omniscient, who wills the truth, who is the sole ocean of parental affection for those who resort to Him, who is possessed of the highest mercy, who has dispelled the possibility of there being any one superior or equal to Him and whose name is the Supreme *Brahman* ; similarly, it is also made out from the scriptures themselves that, pleased with His worship which consists of meditating on Him and is helped on by the duties of castes and stages of life as practised day by day, He removes that ignorance of the worshippers which consists of the sum of the *karmas* which have begun (to accumulate)

<sup>1277</sup>. The general statement of equality between the individual self and the *Brahman*, as in *Mund. Up.* (III. 1. 3), is specified and delimited as applying only to enjoyment in passages like *Taitt. Up.* (II.1. 1).

*Ś. P.* cites also *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 5. 20, 23) in this connection.  
(ii) The scriptural texts dealing with the control of all the world peculiar to the Supreme Person are such as those quoted under *Sūtra 20*.

from beginningless time and which are infinite in number and difficult to overcome ; then He causes them to attain that bliss which is boundless and unsurpassed in excellence and which consists of experiencing Him as He is in reality ; and He does not cause them to return (to this world).

And those scriptural passages are such as the following : " Living, indeed, in this manner throughout life, he attains the world of the *Brahman*, and he does not return, and he does not return " (*Chkād. Up.* VIII. 15. 1). So, too, it has been declared by the Divine Lord : " After attaining Me, they do not again obtain the unenduring (life of) re-birth which is the abode of misery—those great souls who have attained (Me as) the supreme consummation. O Arjuna, all the worlds beginning from the world of *Brahmā* are such as give rise to re-birth. After attaining Me, however, O son of Kuntī, there is no re-birth " (*B.G.* VIII. 15-16).

And to him whose bondage of *karma* has been cut off, whose knowledge is not contracted, whose innate disposition is solely concerned with the experience of the Supreme *Brahman*, to whom He is solely dear, and who experiences the *Brahman* as possessed of bliss unlimited and unsurpassed in excellence—there cannot possibly be any need for anything else, nor for any undertaking on that account ; and therefore there can arise no fear of his return (to the world).

And the Supreme Person, who wills the truth, after obtaining the man of wisdom, who is exceedingly dear (to Him), will never cause him to return (to this world)—He who has said thus : " Indeed, I am inexpressibly dear to the man of wisdom and he is dear to Me. All these (four types of devotees) are undoubtedly noble, but it is My belief that the man of wisdom is My own self, because he, with dedicated self, is exclusively devoted to Me as his highest goal. At the end of many births the man of

wisdom resorts to Me, thinking that Vāsudeva is everything. Such a great soul it is very difficult to find" (B. G. VII. 17-19).

The repetition of the aphorism shows the end of the *śāstra*. Thus everything is consistent and clear.<sup>1278</sup>

श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः

1278. (i) The return of the released self to the world can be due to three reasons and three only: his own desire, *karma* and the unfettered will of the Lord. It is argued out here that these causes cannot operate in his case. (ii) The concluding sentence of the *Śrībhashya* claims that different types of scriptural texts such as those

asserting identity between the self, the world and the *Brahman*, those asserting difference etc. have been harmoniously explained and reconciled, that logical reasoning has upheld Rāmānuja's position and refuted those who differ from him and that the thesis enunciated at the outset has been successfully expounded.

## TRANSLITERATION

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THE FOLLOWING IS THE SYSTEM OF  
TRANSLITERATION ADOPTED IN THIS WORK.

| <i>Vowels.</i> |                   | <i>Equivalents and Pronunciation.</i> |                      |
|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|
| अ              | a                 | in                                    | mica                 |
| आ              | ā                 | "                                     | father (fāther)      |
| इ              | i                 | "                                     | give                 |
| ई              | ī                 | "                                     | police (police)      |
| उ              | u                 | "                                     | put                  |
| ऊ              | ū                 | "                                     | rule (rule)          |
| ऋ              | ṛi                | "                                     | gridiron or critique |
| ॠ              | ṛī                | "                                     | the above prolonged  |
| ऌ              | lṛi               | "                                     | revelry (revelṛi)    |
| ॡ              | lṛī               | "                                     | the above prolonged  |
| ए              | e                 | "                                     | prey                 |
| ऐ              | ai                | "                                     | aisle                |
| ओ              | o                 | "                                     | note                 |
| औ              | 'au' like<br>'ou' | "                                     | loud                 |

| <i>Consonants.</i> |     | <i>Equivalents and Pronunciation.</i> |                          |
|--------------------|-----|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| क                  | k   | in                                    | kind                     |
| ख                  | kh  | "                                     | ink-horn (inkhorn)       |
| ग                  | g   | "                                     | gun                      |
| घ                  | gh  | "                                     | log-hut (loghut)         |
| ङ                  | ṅ   | "                                     | king                     |
| च                  | ch  | "                                     | such                     |
| छ                  | chh | "                                     | church-hill (churchhill) |
| ज                  | j   | "                                     | jump                     |
| झ                  | jh  | "                                     | hedge-hog (hejhog)       |

*Consonants.**Equivalent and Pronunciation.*

|   |           |   |                        |
|---|-----------|---|------------------------|
| ञ | ñ         | in  | singe (siñj)           |
| ट | t         | "   | cat                    |
| ठ | th        | "   | ant-hill (anthill)     |
| ड | d         | "   | dance                  |
| ढ | dh        | "   | red-haired (redhaired) |
| ण | n         | "   | bind                   |
| त | t like th | "   | kith                   |
| थ | th        | "   | nuthook (more dental)  |
| द | d like th | "   | this                   |
| ध | dh        | "   | adhere (more dental)   |
| न | n         | "   | not                    |
| प | p         | "   | pot                    |
| फ | ph        | "   | uphill                 |
| ब | b         | "   | bear                   |
| भ | bh        | "   | abhor                  |
| म | m         | "   | map                    |
| य | y         | "   | royal                  |
| र | r         | "   | rod                    |
| ल | l         | "   | like                   |
| व | v         | "   | waver                  |
| श | ś         | "   | s palatalised          |
| ष | sh        | "   | rush                   |
| स | s         | "   | sir                    |
| ह | h         | "   | hear                   |
| : | h         | (aspirate) symbol for the sibilant called <i>visarga</i> , or substitute for final s. |                        |



## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME

- Adhik :—Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali of Vedānta-Deśika.  
 Ait. Ār.—Aitareya-Āraṇyaka.  
 Ait. Br.—Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa.  
 Ait. Up.—Aitareya-Upanishad.  
 Āp. D. S. or Āp. Dh.—Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtras.  
 Āśv. Śr. S.—Āśvalāyana-Śrauta-Sūtras.  
 Ath. S.—Atharva-Samhitā.  
 B. P.—Bhāva-prakāśikā of Raṅgarāmanuja.  
 B. G.—Bhagavadgītā.  
 Brahmabindu Up.—Brahmabindu-Upanishad.  
 Brih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad.  
 Chhānd. Up.—Chhāndogya-Upanishad.  
 Garbha. Up.—Garbha-Upanishad.  
 G. Dh. S.—Gautama-Dharma-Sūtras.  
 Iśā. Up.—Iśāvāsya-Upanishad.  
 Jābāla. Up.—Jābala-Upanishad.  
 Kāṇ. Brih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad, Kāṇva  
 Kāth. Up.—Kātha-Upanishad. [recension.  
 Kaush. Up.—Kaushītaki-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad.  
 Mād. Brih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad,  
 M. B.—Mahābhārata. [Mādhyaṇdina recension.  
 M. Nār. Up.—Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad.  
 M. Up.—Mahopanishad.  
 Manu.—Manu-Smṛiti.  
 Muṇḍ. Up.—Muṇḍaka-Upanishad.  
 Pāṇini.—Ashtādhyāyī of Pāṇini.  
 Pr. Up.—Praśna-Upanishad.  
 Pūr. Mim.—Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini.  
 R. V.—Rigveda-Samhitā.  
 Rām.—Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki.  
 Ś. P.—Śrūtaprakāśikā of Sudarśana.  
 S. T. Kau.—Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī of Vāchaspati Miśra.  
 Sāṅkh. Ār.—Sāṅkhyāyana-Āraṇyaka.  
 S. Kār.—Sāṅkhya-Kārikās of Iśvara-kṛishṇa.  
 Ś. Br.—Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.  
 Sub. Up.—Subāla-Upanishad.  
 Śvet. Up.—Śvetāśvatara-Upanishad.

Taitt. Ār.—Taittiriya-Āraṇyaka.  
 Taitt. Br.—Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa.  
 Taitt. Sam.—Taittiriya-Samhitā.  
 Taitt. Up.—Taittiriya-Upanishad.  
 V. D.—Vedāntadīpa of Rāmānuja.  
 V. S.—Vedāntasāra of Rāmānuja.  
 Ved. Sūt.—Vedānta-Sūtras.  
 V. P.—Vishṇu-Purāṇa.

The following works, mentioned or quoted in the text or the notes, are referred to by their full names:

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 Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtras.  
 Atharva-Samhitā.  
 Dravyasaṅgraha of Neminichandra.  
 Kāthaka-Samhitā.  
 Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtras.  
 Kūrma-purāṇa.  
 Maitrāyaṇī-Samhitā.  
 Mitākshara of Vijñāneśvara.  
 Mudgala-Upanishad.  
 Parama-Samhitā.  
 Paushkara-Samhitā.  
 Prasastapāda's Commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*.  
 Samāchāra.  
 Samhitopanishad.  
 Sāma-Mantra-Brāhmaṇa.  
 Saṅkarshaṇa-kāṇḍa of Jaimini.  
 Sāttvata-Samhitā.  
 Tattvasāra of Vātsyā Varada.  
 Tātparyachandrikā of Vedānta-Deśika.  
 Vedārthasaṅgraha of Rāmānuja.  
 Vibhāṣā.  
 Viṣṇudharma.  
 Vṛitti of Bodhāyana.  
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## INDEX OF QUOTATIONS

(n=footnote. For example, 44 n means 'footnote on page 44').

### Adhikaraṇa-sārāvaḥi :

182 n, 317 n.

Āgamaprāmāṇya : 78 n.

Aitareya Āraṇyaka :

II. 1. 2. 1 378

2. 4. 6 348

III. 2. 1 318

2. 6 406

Aitareya Brāhmaṇa :

V. 31. 6 85

VII. 4 221

Aitareya Upanishad :

I. 1. 161, 305, 556

Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtras :

XXIII. 10. 6 293 n

Āpastamba Dharma Sūtras :

II. 1. 2. 2 220

1. 2. 3 203

21. 13-17 494 n

Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtras :

X. 6 423

7 423

Atharva Samhitā :

XIII. 3. 10 283 n

Bhāvaṇaprakāśikā :

41 n, 55 n, 59 n,

82 n, 182 n, 190 n,

216 n, 230 n, 282 n,

380 n, 455 n.

### Bhagavadgītā :

I. 11 16 n

III. 3 88

20 401, 411

27 132, 133

VI. 11, 12 468

VII. 11 455

17-19 564

21 276

23 276

VIII. 15-16 563

16 524

23 510

23-26 509, 510 n

24 333, 510

25 510

27 510

IX. 10 246, 560

24 276

25 276

X. 2 246

3 560

8, 10, 11 142

10, 11 16

42 175, 246

XI. 53, 54 255, 450

XIII. 5 165, 176

20 132

21 134

XIV. 2 538, 540 n

19 132

26-27 561 n

27-28 560

|                              |                                 |          |  |                        |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------|--|------------------------|
| XV.                          | 150 n                           | III. 2.  | 1  | 164                    |
| 7                            | 149, 177                        | 10-11    | 496, 499   |                        |
| 7-8                          | 194                             | 13       | 194-5  |                        |
| 15                           | 140                             | 3.       | 1  | 250                    |
| 17                           | 246                             | 6        | 250-1•   |                        |
| XVI.                         | 8                               | 4.       | 338  |                        |
| 18                           | 143                             | 1        | 338-9, 341   |                        |
| 19                           | 14, 143                         | 2        | 339-40, 342  |                        |
| XVIII.                       | 5                               | 5.       | 1  | 339-41, 344,<br>448-53 |
| 14                           | 134                             | 7.       | 104, 174, 276  |                        |
| 16                           | 134                             | 7.       | 3, 4, 22   | 248                    |
| 46                           | 14, 428                         | 3-5      | 104  |                        |
| 61                           | 140                             | 3, 22    | 400, 556   |                        |
| Bhāmatī :                    |                                 | 3, 23    | 238, 240   |                        |
| 42 n, 45 n, 323 n,<br>353 n. |                                 | 4        | 11   |                        |
| Brahmabindu Upanishad :      |                                 | 5        | 174  |                        |
| 12                           | 247                             | 7, 5, 9  | 276  |                        |
| Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad :   |                                 | 5, 7, 9, |  |                        |
| 285, 294, 296, 309, 374      |                                 | 22 & 18  | 174  |                        |
| I. 3.                        | 1                               | 12       | 104  |                        |
| 7                            | 286, 289-90, 292                | 8.       | 8  | 300 n                  |
| 22                           | 286, 288-91                     | 9        | 175, 560   |                        |
| 4.                           | 7                               | 8-9      | 405  |                        |
| 10                           | 114, 162, 462-3                 | 9.       | 334  |                        |
| 11                           | 200, 256, 462                   | IV. 3.   | 6  | 120                    |
| 17                           | 556                             | 7        | 119, 121,<br>123-4, 352 n.                                   |                        |
| 5. 13                        | 452 n                           | 9        | 223 n, 224   |                        |
| 21                           | 166, 172                        | 10       | 223-6, 550   |                        |
| 22                           | 170, 177                        | 21       | 552-3  |                        |
| II. 1.                       | 18                              | 30       | 125  |                        |
| 19                           | 230                             | 38       | 487  |                        |
| 3.                           | 1                               | 4.       | 351 n  |                        |
| 3                            | 255, 257                        | 4.       | 1  | 496                    |
| 6                            | 95, 98, 160                     | 2        | 120, 166, 172,<br>194, 402, 408,<br>487, 491,<br>497 n, 504. |                        |
| 4.                           | 5                               | 4        | 496  |                        |
| 6                            | 244-5, 252-3,<br>258, 269       | 5        | 145-6, 151,<br>489, 539.                                     |                        |
| 12                           | 448-9, 459, 468                 | 6        | 202, 479,<br>496-8.  |                        |
| 14                           | 462                             |          |  |                        |
| 19                           | 118, 129, 542,<br>544, 546, 553 |          |  |                        |
| 5.                           | 1                               |          |  |                        |
| 259                          |                                 |          |  |                        |

|                |                |                        |
|----------------|----------------|------------------------|
| IV. 4. 7       | 490, 492, 494  | Chhāndogya Upanishad : |
| 13             | 122            | 182 n, 285, 293, 294,  |
| 19, 20         | 355            | 296, 306, 346 n.       |
| 19, 20,        |                | I. 1. 1 290, 358,      |
| • 22           | 353            | 359 n. 379             |
| 22             | 76, . 350-1,   | 390-2, 394,            |
|                | 352 n, 354,    | 408                    |
|                | 355, 405,      | 2 420 n.               |
|                | 412-3, 415 n,  | 7. 8-9 447 n.          |
|                | 425-7, 435,    | 9 393                  |
|                | 438, 448,      | 10 287 n, 293,         |
|                | 478, 526,      | 358-9, 391,            |
|                | 540.           | 394-5, 402,            |
| 23             | 429            | 407-8, 420,            |
| 24             | 273            | 422, 447,              |
| 25             | 113, 121, 262, | 455, 480.              |
|                | 352            | 2. 1 286, 289-90,      |
| 5. 5           | 119, 271       | 294.                   |
| 6              | 424            | 7 170, 286,            |
| 13             | 118-9, 542,    | 288, 290-1.            |
|                | 544            | 8 287                  |
| V. 1.          | 295 n.         | 3. 1 466               |
| 4.             | 312 n, 348     | 4. 3, 4 294 n.         |
| 4. 1           | 348-9          | 5. 1, 3 294 n.         |
| 2              | 310            | 5 393                  |
| 6              | 203            | 6 292 n.               |
| 23             | 449, 471 n.    | 6, 7 312 n.            |
| 5. 1           | 310, 348       | 6, 9 292 n.            |
| 2              | 348-9          | 7. 5 312               |
| 2-3            | 311            | 9. 292 n.              |
| 9. 4           | 165            | 10. 3, 4 431           |
| 10. 1          | 512, 515-6     | 11. 5 161              |
| VI. 1. 7       | 297            | II. 1. 1 378           |
| 14             | 430            | 22 399                 |
| 2.             | 513 n.         | 2. 1 378               |
| 15             | 332, 512, 514, | 23. 1 413-4, 415 n,    |
|                | 517, 523, 527. | 416-7, 425,            |
| 16             | 508            | 441, 453.              |
| (For the       | Kāṇva and      | III. 4. 1 539          |
| Mādhyandina    | recensions,    | 6. 1 200               |
| see. under     | 'K' and 'M'    |                        |
| respectively.) |                |                        |

|            |               |          |               |
|------------|---------------|----------|---------------|
| III. 12. 6 | 149 n.        | 2        | 508, 514,     |
| 14. 1      | 90, 110, 348, |          | 520-1, 523,   |
|            | 376, 400,     |          | 526.          |
|            | 461-2, 530,   | 3        | 211           |
|            | 540 n.        | 3-6      | 198           |
| 3          | 314           | 4        | 199           |
| 4          | 337           | 5        | 201-3, 479    |
| 16. 1, 7   | 315           | 5, 6     | 214, 215 n.   |
| 18. 1      | 459, 464.     | 6        | 216-7, 222    |
| 2          | 265 n, 266.   | 7        | 202, 204, 218 |
| 6          | 459           | 8        | 212           |
| IV.        | 438 n.        | 11. 1    | 381, 383      |
| 1. 4       | 459           | 2        | 383           |
| 2. 2       | 459           | 5        | 401           |
| 4. 2       | 120           | 6        | 382-3         |
| 5. 8       | 265           | 11 & 12. | 382           |
| 7. 10      | 396           | 12. 1    | 382           |
| 10. 15     | 513 n.        | 2        | 382, 384      |
| 14. 3      | 471-2, 511.   | 13. 2    | 384           |
| 15. 5-6    | 512           | 18. 1    | 382           |
| 6          | 524           | 24. 3    | 471-2         |
| 17. 10     | 447 n.        | VI. 1.   | 167           |
| V. 1. 1    | 193, 295.     | 1. 1     | 423           |
| 6          | 296           | 2-3      | 97            |
| 7          | 171           | 3        | 113, 343      |
| 13         | 297           | 4        | 113           |
| 2. 1       | 430           | 2. 1     | 76, 97, 98 n, |
| 2          | 307-8         |          | 161, 556      |
| 9          | 229           | 3        | 75, 93, 95-6, |
| 3. 3       | 191, 196-8,   |          | 98 n, 101 n,  |
|            | 212.          |          | 103, 181, 405 |
| 4. 2       | 191, 196-7    | 3, 4     | 183 n.        |
| 9. 1       | 192, 197,     | 4        | 101, 103, 486 |
|            | 211-2.        | 3. 1     | 213           |
| 10.        | 513 n.        | 2        | 178, 181,     |
| 1          | 331-2, 413,   |          | 242, 259,     |
|            | 415, 418,     |          | 347, 489      |
|            | 425, 510,     | 2, 3     | 180           |
|            | 514, 518,     | 3        | 183-5, 187,   |
|            | 530.          |          | 193           |
| 1, 2       | 210           |          |               |

|        |               |  |            |               |
|--------|---------------|--|------------|---------------|
| VI. 4. | 187           |  | 9          | 271           |
| 1      | 102, 183      |  | 26. 2      | 119, 129,     |
| 7      | 183           |  |            | 234, 328,     |
| 5.     | 186 n.        |  |            | 432, 454,     |
| 1      | 183-5         |  |            | 548, 553      |
| 1-3    | 187           |  | VIII. 1    | 284 n.        |
| 2      | 184           |  | 1 & 3      | 351 n.        |
| 3      | 184-5         |  | 1. 1       | 350           |
| 4      | 185, 343      |  | 1, 6       | 354           |
| 6. 5   | 486           |  | 3          | 314           |
| 8. 1   | 230           |  | 5          | 239, 262, 405 |
| 4&6    | 109           |  | 6          | 354, 356,     |
| 6      | 347, 483,     |  |            | 360-1         |
|        | 486-9, 501-2, |  | 2. 1       | 356, 546      |
|        | 553           |  | 3. 4       | 234, 356,     |
| 6-7    | 462           |  |            | 527, 530      |
| 7      | 97-8, 109-10, |  | 4. 1       | 264-5, 474,   |
|        | 145-6, 151,   |  |            | 475 n, 476    |
|        | 347-8, 399,   |  | 6. 1       | 230 n.        |
|        | 400, 539,     |  | 2          | 505, 506 n.   |
|        | 540 n.        |  | 3          | 230, 234 n.   |
| 9. 1   | 347           |  | 5          | 491, 504-5,   |
| 4      | 343           |  |            | 512           |
| 10. 2  | 232-3, 103.   |  | 6          | 491, 503, 524 |
| 14. 2  | 326, 477,     |  | 7.         | 375, 556      |
|        | 481, 482 n,   |  | 7. 1       | 119, 224,     |
|        | 493, 498,     |  |            | 239, 535-6,   |
|        | 507           |  |            | 541-3, 555    |
| 15. 2  | 347           |  | 8. 1. 1, 2 | 283           |
| VII.   | 85, 530.      |  | 9. 3       | 535           |
| 1. 2   | 85            |  | 10. 4      | 535           |
| 5      | 464, 531      |  | 11. 1      | 118, 234 n,   |
| 2. 1-3 | 85            |  |            | 553           |
| 6. 1   | 468           |  | 2          | 223           |
| 16. 1  | 338, 383, 385 |  | 3          | 535           |
| 19. 1  | 333           |  | 12. 1      | 326, 527, 547 |
| 25. 2  | 234, 259,     |  | 3          | 119, 129,     |
|        | 328, 357,     |  |            | 234, 326,     |
|        | 383, 547,     |  |            | 328, 352,     |
|        | 557, 559      |  |            | 357, 532,     |
|        |               |  |            | 534-5, 541,   |
|        |               |  |            | 546, 548      |

|  |          |                                 |
|--|----------|---------------------------------|
| VIII. 12.                                | 4,5,6    | 119                             |
|  | 5        | 129, 553                        |
| 13.                                      | 1        | 320, 325,<br>482 n, 493,<br>528 |
| 14.                                      | 1        | 243, 523, 528                   |
| 15.                                      | 1        | 403, 409, 451,<br>470, 563      |
| Dravyasaṅgraha (of<br>Nemichandra): 67 n |          |                                 |
| Garbha Upanishad:                        |          |                                 |
| I.                                       |          | 128                             |
| Gautama Dharma Sūtras:                   |          |                                 |
| I.                                       | 3. 4     | 443                             |
| XI.                                      | 31       | 203                             |
| Īśāvāsyā Upanishad:                      |          |                                 |
|  | 1        | 411                             |
|  | 2        | 404, 410-1,                     |
| Jābāla Upanishad:                        |          |                                 |
|  | 4        | 419                             |
| Jaimini Upanishad<br>Brāhmaṇa:           |          |                                 |
|  | 1        | 516                             |
| 'Karma Mīmāṃsā' of<br>A. B. Keith 516    |          |                                 |
| Kaṭha Upanishad:                         |          |                                 |
| I.                                       | 1. 23,25 | 224                             |
| II.                                      | 6        | 208                             |
|  | 15       | 425                             |
|  | 18       | 80, 113, 131,<br>133            |
|  | 19       | 132                             |
|  | 24       | 454, 474                        |
| III.                                     |          | 302                             |

|   |           |   |
|---|-----------|---|
| V.  | 8         | 222, 223 n,<br>226, 228,<br>550, 559              |
| VI.   | 9         | 254.  |
|   | 10        | 164   |
| Kāṇva Bṛihadāranyaka<br>Upanishad:                    |           |   |
| III.  | 7. 22     | 117, 126  |
| VI.   | 1         | 307 n   |
| Kāṭhaka Samhitā:                                      |           |   |
| XXVII.  | 9         | 283 n   |
| Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtras:                              |           |   |
| XXIV.   | 4. 21     | 293 n   |
| Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇa<br>Upanishad:                     |           |   |
|   |           | 294, 295 n, 296, 321                              |
| I.  | 2         | 120, 207, 211                                     |
|   | 3         | 325, 327,<br>493, 512,<br>515, 516 n,<br>517, 520 |
|   | 4         | 320, 325,<br>327, 474, 476                        |
| II.   | 14        | 295 n   |
| III.  | 1         | 423   |
|   | 9         | 141, 142 n  |
| Kūrma Purāṇa:   |           |   |
| I.  | 12.       | 269 525   |
| "Logic as the Pure Science<br>of Concept" (of Croce): |           |   |
|   |           | 54 n.   |
| Mahābhārata: 509 n.                                   |           |   |
|   | I. 149    | 213 n.  |
| VI.   | 66. 39-40 | 88  |



|                           |        |                          |
|---------------------------|--------|--------------------------|
| XII. 342. 1               | 87     | Maitrāyaṇi-Samhitā :     |
| 343. 33,41,45             | 88     | IV. 14. 4 527            |
| 348. 62                   | 88     | Manu Smṛiti :            |
| 352. 11-12                | 88     | I. 9 181                 |
| 358                       | 81     | II. 9 221                |
| 359. 1-2                  | 88     | 87 439                   |
| 64-5                      | 88     | 103 225                  |
| 66                        | 89     | Mādhyandina Bṛihad-      |
| 69                        | 89, 91 | āraṇyaka Upanishad 310 n |
| 68-9                      | 90     | III. 4. 1 341            |
| XIV. 438 n                |        | 7. 3-22 341              |
| (Taittirīya) Mahānārāyaṇa |        | 22 117, 140,             |
| Upanishad :               |        | 152, 462,                |
| 317 n, 525 n              |        | 539                      |
| I. 4 109                  |        | IV. 4. 6 498             |
| 5 265                     |        | VI. 1. 14 307            |
| 6 14                      |        | VII. 6. 1 309            |
| 6-7 276                   |        | Mitākshara (of           |
| 8, 10 269                 |        | Vijñāneśvara) 500 n      |
| 12 269                    |        | Mudgala Upanishad :      |
| IX. 23 284 n              |        | 3 376, 530               |
| X. 7 363                  |        | Muṇḍaka Upanishad :      |
| 23 283                    |        | I. 1. 5-6 334            |
| XI. 1 362                 |        | 6 271                    |
| 3 258                     |        | 9 96, 103, 127,          |
| 5 271                     |        | 246, 405                 |
| 7 373                     |        | 2. 13 430 n              |
| 9 352                     |        | II. 1. 1 242             |
| 13 362                    |        | 2 268, 270               |
| XIII. 75                  |        | 3 81, 93, 103,           |
| XXII. 1 436               |        | 104, 105,                |
| XXIV. 1 316               |        | 106, 161,                |
| XXV. 1 315-6, 508         |        | 167, 169,                |
| Mahopanishad :            |        | 177, 268                 |
| I. 1 76, 556              |        | 8 163                    |
|                           |        | 2. 5 265, 267 •          |
|                           |        | 9 413, 471               |

|                            |   |  |                       |            |
|----------------------------|---|--|-----------------------|------------|
| III. 1 3                   | 320, 388,<br>538, 457,<br>538, 540 n,<br>555, 562 n |  | II. 2. 1              | 386 n, 387 |
| 8                          | 254, 255  |  | 2. 21                 | 386 n      |
| 9                          | 122   |  | 3. 12, 24             | 386 n      |
| 2. 3                       | 255, 268,<br>450                                    |  | 4. 27                 | n          |
| 6                          | 525   |  | 4. 9                  | 280, 380 n |
| 8                          | 265, 268,<br>270, 398,<br>459                       |  | III. 3. 9             | 337        |
| 9                          | 457-8, 472  |  | 14                    | 304        |
| 10                         | 279, 282  |  | 5. 21                 | 371        |
| Parama Samhitā :           | 84, 86  |  | 6. 1-8                | 358 n      |
| Paushkara Samhitā :        | 82, 83  |  | 7. 18                 | 133        |
| Pāṇini's 'Ashtadhyāyī' :   |   |  | IV. 1                 | 390 n      |
| I. 4. 54                   | 180 n   |  | 1. 2                  | 360 n      |
| II. 3. 18-19               | 180 n   |  | 3. 1                  | 399        |
| 23                         | 182 n   |  | 3. 17-19              | 359        |
| III. 4. 21                 | 180 n   |  | 4. 19                 | 317        |
| Praśastapāda-bhāṣhya (VII) |   |  | V. 1                  | 416 n      |
| on the 'Vaiśeṣika          |   |  | VI. 1. 51-2           | 527 n      |
| Sūtras' :                  | 34 n  |  | 4. 15                 | 418        |
| Praśna Upanishad :         |   |  | VII. 1. 17            | 422        |
| I. 10                      | 439   |  | IX. 7. 18             | 447        |
| III. 6. 2                  | 123   |  | 3                     | 527        |
| 9                          | 485   |  | X. 6. 59-60           | 549 n      |
| IV. 9                      | 119   |  | 7                     | 364        |
| VI. 1                      | 265 n, 266  |  | 8. 4                  | 323        |
| 3                          | 487   |  | 8. 15                 | 323 n      |
| 4                          | 119 n   |  | XI. 3. 4              | 365        |
| 5                          | 119   |  | 5. 13                 | 365        |
| Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of    |   |  | 7                     | 364        |
| Jaimini :                  |   |  | Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki : |            |
| I. 2. 7                    | 422 n   |  | I. 1. 25              | 225        |
| 3. 2                       | 79  |  | Ṛig-veda Samhitā :    |            |
|                            |   |  | II. 12. 1             | 380 n.     |
|                            |   |  | X. 14. 1              | 208        |
|                            |   |  | 90. 3                 | 266        |
|                            |   |  | 121. 1-8              | 269        |
|                            |   |  | 129. 2                | 167, 168 n |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| 'Srutaprakāśikā' of<br>Sudarśana: <i>passim</i>  | X. 4. 1. 3 367, 369,<br>371-2  |
| Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī:<br>23 n.   | 4. 1. 12 368, 370<br>4. 6 373<br>5. 4. 1 373, 374 n,<br>378<br>4. 3 367 n  |
| Samāchāra: 282   | 6. 3 309   |
| Samhitopanishad: 146   | XIV. 1. 1 318  |
| Sāma Mantra Brāhmaṇa:<br>I. 1. 1 317   | Sāttvata Samhitā: 82   |
| Saṅkarshaṇakāṇḍa:<br>(II. 2. Adhikaraṇa 15)<br>361   | Subāla Upanishad:<br>II 107<br>VII 104   |
| Sāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka:<br>I. 1. 318<br>III to VI 295 n<br>XI. 2 297<br>XI 295 n  | Śvetāśvatara Upanishad:<br>I. 6 155, 463<br>9 110, 141, 155<br>II. 10 469<br>15 459<br>III. 8 269, 457<br>9 268, 269 n,<br>270-1<br>9-10 285<br>10 268-70<br>IV. 6 155<br>19 528 n<br>V. 8 122, 552<br>9 122<br>VI. 7-9 246<br>8, 9 405<br>13 110, 113, 114,<br>149, 258<br>18 523<br>19 246, 258, 265<br>23 450 |
| Sāṅkhya-Kārikās:<br>3 2<br>11 23 n<br>15-16 6<br>16 11, 20<br>17 137<br>17, 19 23<br>18 27 n<br>19, 20 24<br>20, 21 19, 21<br>21 3 n<br>57 23<br>59-61 25<br>62 23<br>64 138 n |  |
| Satapatha Brāhmaṇa:<br>VI. 1. 1 160-1, 366<br>X 309, 365, 374<br>3. 6. 3 372   |  |

## Taittiriya Āraṇyaka :

- I. 7 283 n  
 III. 10 148  
     12. 7 75, 398  
     13. 1 83, 269  
     21 139-140,  
         149 n, 539

## Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa :

- I. 1. 10 109, 113  
     5. 11 274  
 II. 4. 72 313 n  
 III. 7. 92 221

## Taittiriya Samhitā :

- I. 5. 1. 1 424  
     5. 2. 1 419 n  
     5. 2. 5 411  
     6. 8. 1 197  
 II. 1. 1. 1 275  
     2. 5. 4 384  
         34 384 n  
     3. 6. 2 361  
 III. 1. 4. 4 527 n  
     5. 7. 2 358 n  
 V. 3. 2. 5 164  
     5. 2. 10 520  
 IV. 1. 6. 1 323  
     3. 1. 5 323  
     3. 7. 5 446  
     3. 10. 5 412 n  
     6. 11 322 n  
 VII. 1. 9 337 n  
     3. 1 366 n, 367 n  
     5. 5. 2 380 n

## Taittiriya Upanishad :

- 96 n  
 I. 1. 1 317-9  
     11. 2 204  
 II. 1 95 n, 318-9  
     1. 1 93, 95, 100-3  
         126-7, 244-5,  
         266, 299,  
         300 n, 301,  
         303, 305, 333,  
         341, 388,  
         397-8, 457,  
         459, 472, 538,  
         561, 562 n  
     2. 1 304  
     2. 3 303  
     3. 2 304  
     4. 1 126  
     5 300 n  
     5. 1 117, 126,  
         135, 304  
     5. 2 299  
     6. 1 75, 175, 266  
         305, 306 n  
     7. 1 75, 126, 227,  
         266, 273, 342,  
         533, 559-60  
     8. 1 126, 175, 227,  
         246, 405, 533,  
         559  
     4 388, 405  
     9. 1 246, 405  
     12. 1 318  
 III. 1. 1 76 n, 109,  
         301, 540 n,  
         555  
     6. 1 126, 301  
     10. 5 557

**Tattvasāra :**

48 141 n

**Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa :**

XXI. 10. 11 336, 337 n

XXV. 4. 293 n

Tātparyachandrikā : 132 n

“The Arctic Home of the  
Āryans” of B. G. Tilak :  
510 n

“The Hindu Philosophy of  
Conduct” of M. Raṅgā-  
chārya : 510 n.

“The Prābhākara School of  
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā ” of  
Gaṅgānāth Jhā : 35.

**Vaiśeṣika Sūtras :** \*

VII. 2. 26 34 n

IX. 2. 1 34 n

**Vedānta-dīpa :**

1 n, 106 n,  
108 n, 158 n,  
319 n, 375 n

IV. 3. 15 525 n

**Vedānta-sāra :**

1 n, 106 n,  
108 n, 158 n,  
375 n

**Vedānta Sūtras :**

I. 1. 1 124, 129 n,  
145 n, 152,  
155

1. 2 76

1. 3 33, 77, 99 n

1. 4 69

I. 1. 5 2

9 70 n

15 47

17 399, 461

29-32 510 n

31 76

2. 3 399

8 237

3. 6 237

13 352

17 399

18 537

28 331 n

4. 6 374

22 400, 539

23 259

23-8 100 n

II. 1. 3 141

4 25, 31

5 173

10 25 n

15 144, 259

22 144, 461, 540

24 11

24-5 11 n

32-5 12 n

34 115

35 115, 162 n

2. 9 81 n

10-16 100 n

31 74

35 79

3. 17 191

18 85, 119, 140

26 554

32 136, 158

II. 3. 36 158  
 40-41 174 n  
 42-5 262  
 42-52 260 n.  
 48 149  
 49 158

4. 1 168 n  
 3, 4 178  
 6 375 n  
 6, 7 173 n  
 8 168 n  
 9 170 n  
 13-4 178

III. 1. 1-5 386 n  
 2. 37 408  
 3. 21 348  
 26 480 n  
 36-7 347  
 41 287, 391, 421  
 56 380 n

4. 8 461, 540  
 17-20 425  
 26 407  
 26, 33 480 n

IV. 1. 1 427  
 3 348, 375  
 2. 7-13 500  
 12 526  
 3 333 n

IV. 4. 1 537  
 8 540

Vedārtha Saṅgraha:  
 14 n, 106 n,  
 108 n, 375 n

Vibhāṣhā: 39 n

Vishṇudharma:  
 V. 55-7 537

Vishṇu Purāṇa:  
 I. 2. 6 117  
 47 165  
 52-4 186, 489  
 5. 63 180  
 6. 34, 37, 39 417  
 22. 38, 56 152  
 53 239

II. 2. 6 126  
 6. 46-8 241

III. 4. 331 n  
 7. 5 208

V. 1. 47-9 247

VI. 5. 84-5 239  
 6. 12 401  
 7. 91 460

Vṛitti of Bodhāyana: 282 n

Yājñavalkya-smṛiti:

III. 167 500, 506 n  
 144 247, 249

'Yugas' of M. Raṅgāchārya:  
 33 n.

# GLOSSARIAL INDEX

## OF

### SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES

(Arranged according to the Sanskrit Alphabet)

The reference is to page numbers.

p=page.

n=note.

*Aṃśa* (s): see 144 n: 143, 145, 148, 149 n, 150-1, 152 n, 259, 262.

*aṃśin*: the whole, the possessor of *aṃśas*, 151, 259.

*Akshara*: the Indestructible One or the *Brahman*, 175, 334, 363, 405, 559; undifferentated *prakṛiti*, 268, 270; the released self, 355.

*Akshara-vidyā*: meditation on the *Akshara*, 385.

*Agni*: the god of fire, 276, 293 n, 325, 327 n, 336, 415, 419 n, 424, 512-3, 516-7, 559.

*Agnirahasya*: the secret teaching about *Agni*, *Śat. Br. X.*, 309, 365, 374.

*Agnirjyotis*: lit. fire, light; see Note 1257, p. 510 n.

*Agniloka*: the world which is *Agni*, the deity presiding over light in the path of the gods, 516.

*Agnishomau*: *Agni* and *Soma*, 380 n.

*Agnishomiya*: a sacrifice to *Agni* and *Soma*, 219-21.

*Agnishṭoma*: a sacrifice forming an essential part of the *Jyotishṭoma*, 322 n.

*Agnihotra*: a Vedic ritual in which an oblation is offered particularly to *Agni*, 85, 280, 293, 388, 413, 418, 419 n, 425-6, 434-5, 438, 477-80, 519 n.

*agha*: lit. sin; the effect of *karma*, both good and bad, 475 n.

*Aghāṭikarmas*: see Note 950, p. 67 n.

*aṅgīras*: a sage, 438 n.

*aṇutva*: atomicity, 29 n.

*ataḥ*: see Note 1033, p. 165 n.

*ativāhana*: lit. carrying over; leading, escorting, 520.

**Aṣṭarvapa** : the fourth *Veda*, 85, 334.

**Aīharvan** : a division of the *Veda*, 86, 279.

**Atharva-veda** : the fourth *Veda*, 88.

**Aditi** : the mother of the gods, 527.

**adrishṭa** : unseen results of works, 17 n, 31-3, 31 n, 78-9, 118 n, 131, 156-7.

**Advaita** : monistic *Vedānta*, 245 n, 253 n, 523 n ; -ins, followers thereof, *passim*.

**adharma** : see p. 66.

**adhishṭātri** : he who rules or presides over, 77 n.

**adhishṭeya** : that which is presided over, 77 n.

**adhyayana** : studying the *Veda*, 416.

**adyāsa** : erroneous superimposition, 24, 24 n.

**adhvaryu** : see Glossary to Vol. I : 322 n, 323, 393, 446.

**Aniruddha** : the *Brahman* as presiding over the principle of egoity, 80, 82-4.

**anupraveśa** : entrance into, penetration, 182 n.

**anupraviśya** : having entered, 179, 180 n.

**anumantri** : passive guide, 15 n.

**Anumāna** : *Smṛiti*, 332.

**anuśaya** : see p. 201.

**antarā** : that which is within, 340.

**Antaryāmin** : the *Brahman* as the Internal Ruler, 528 ; -mi-*Brāhmaṇa* : *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7, where the teaching is given about the Internal Ruler, 106, 116, 174, 276.

**anna** : undifferentiated creation, 96 ; the element earth, 101-03, 181, 183 n.

**aparam** : another, 269 n.

**apahatapūṣman** : see 547 n.

**apāna** : one of the vital airs, on which see Note 388, Vol. I : 171, 172, 338, 340.

**Apāntaratamas** : see Note 672 on p. 89.

**apīti** : union, 493.

**apūrvā** : see Note 36, Vol. I : 231 n, 274-5 ; a new thing not arrived at by other means of knowledge, 308 n.

**abhākta** : not having a secondary significance, 108, 108 n.

**Abhidhamma** : philosophical teachings of the Buddha, 39 n.

**abhinishpadyate** : becomes manifest, 534 n.

**abhyāsa** ; *lit.*, practice, repeated meditation on God, 469 n.

**amauna** : what is other than *mauna*, 45.



- ambuvat* : as in water, 248.
- Aruna* : grandfather of Svetaketu and father of Uddālaka in *Chhānd. Up.* V. 3: 191, 192 n, 383, 423.
- Arjuna* : the prince to whom the B. G. is taught, 255, 455, 509-10, 524, 563.
- arthavāda(s)* : see Note 282 of Vol. I: 275 n, 287 n, 349 n, 359 n, 407 n.
- Arhat* : a sanctified teacher among the Jains, 67.
- avayava* : lit., an integral part or organ, see Note 965 on p. 72.
- avarodha* : inclusion, 214, 335.
- Avāntaratapas* : an incarnation of Nārāyaṇa, 89, 330, 331 n.
- avidyā* : ignorance, nescience, 42 n, 43 n, 339, 389.
- avivākya* : see 366 n.
- avyakta* : a state of primordial matter, on which see Note 90, Vol. I: 100, 104, 107, 502.
- Aśvapati* : name of a king, 382, 383, 401, 402 n.
- aśvamedha* : the horse-sacrifice, 423, 424.
- as* : to be, 69 n.
- asakṛit* : frequent, 457 n.
- asambhava* : see 99.
- asamskrīta* : not compounded, 49 n.
- astikāyas* : groups, 66.
- ahaṅkāra* : the material principle of egoity, on which see Note 39, Vol. I: 3 n, 7, 81 n, 84, 100, 104, 132 n, 176 n, 486, 556 n; egoism, 165.
- Aham* : I or the Self, a secret name of the *Brahman*, 311, 312 n.
- Ahar* : Light, a secret name of the *Brahman*, 310, 312 n.
- ahīna* : a sacrifice lasting several days, 549.
- Ākāśa* : the ether of space as the fifth element, 39 n, 49, 50, 92, 94 n, 351 n, 352; space, 66; the *Brahman*, 76, 84, 126, 243, 342, 350, 351 n; the individual self, 352 n.
- ākāśa-astikāya* : the category of space among Jains, 66.
- ācharati* : performs, 205.
- āchāra* : good conduct, 204-6.
- Āgamas* : scriptures, 74, 82.
- Ātman* : the Supreme Self; *passim*; the individual self, 93; the mind, 165; perhaps the body, 556 n.
- ātmanā* : see 182 n.
- ātmanā jīvena* : see p. 181.
- Ātreya* : name of a sage; lit. a descendant of Atri, 445.

*Atharvanikas*: followers of the *Atharva-veda*, 93, 146, 279 n, 281, 283, 317, 320.

*ādi*: among others, 141; mainly, 170; such as, 271.

*ādin*: eater, 82 n.

*ādhāna*: kindling the sacrificial fire, 409.

*Ānanda*: the *Brahman* as Bliss, 126: bliss, 561 n.

*ābhyantarān*: (acc. case) internal things, 39 n.

*āmanana*: see p. 337.

*āyāma*: lit., extension, all-pervasiveness, 271.

*Ānandamaya-vidyā*: meditation on the *Brahman* as bliss, 385.

*ārambhāna*: that which is reached or attained, 259.

*Āraṇyaka*: lit., produced in a forest, an *Upanishad*, 87, 90-1.

*Āroga*: one of the seven suns, 283 n.

*Ārtabhāga*: the son of Rṣabhāga, a sage in *Bṛih. Up.*, 195 n, 496-9.

*ārtvijya*: the office of the sacrificial priest. 446.

*āvṛitti*: repetition, 467 n.

*āsramas*: religiously sanctioned stages of life, *passim*.

*āsāna*: postures for meditation, 460 n.

*āsrava*: inflow, 67 n.

*āsrīti*: path, 491.

*āhavanīya*: one of the three sacred fires, on which see Note 439 in Vol. II: 219, 421.

*Itihāsas*: the epics as traditional history, 85, 527.

*Indra*: the chief of the minor gods, 175, 318, 361, 365, 405, 423, 512, 517-9, 556, 559.

*indriyas*: sense-organs, 173 n, 176.

*ishikā*: a reed, 471.

*ishṭa*: the sacrifice, 199 n.

*ishṭāpūrta*: see 14 n.

*iksh*: to see, 2.

*Īśāna*: a name of Śiva, 76, 556.

*Uktha*: see 378, 378 n.

*utkrānti*: departure of the soul from the body at death, 492 n, 497 n.

*udāna*: respiratory activity as one of the five vital airs, 171-2, 485 n.

*udgātri*: a priest who chants the *Sāma-veda*, 291, 322 n, 393, 396, 446, 447 n.

*udgītha*: the sacred syllable, 'Om', 285-94.

*udgīthavidyā* : meditation on the *udgītha*, 286-8, 293, 407-8.

*Uddālaka*: a famous teacher in the *Upanishads*, 382-3.

*Upakosala**vidyā* : a meditation taught to Upakosala, on which see Vol. II, pp. 31-44 : 331, 333.

*upachayāpachayau*: bigness and smallness, 300 n.

*upagāna*: singing, 320, 322.

*upadeśa*: teaching, 457 n.

*Upamanyu*: father of Prāchīnaśāla in *Chhānd. Up.*, 381-2.

*upalakshana*: a secondary or accidental attribute, 302 n.

*upasad*: a part of the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice, 334, 336, 337 n.

*upasthāna*.—*sthiṭi* : attainment, 357.

*upādāna*: clinging effort, 42 n.

*upāsana*(s) : worship through loving meditation, form thereof, 303 n, 390, 410-1, 415-6, 422, 427, 455 n, 456, 458, 467, 470 n.

*upāsi*: the verb, *upās*, to meditate, 459.

*upāsita**vya* : that which should be meditated upon, 364.

*upāsita* : (v.) he should worship, 279, 459.

*upāsti* : (n.) worship, 458.

*upāsse* : you worship, 459.

*upekshaka* : indifferent on-looker, 15 n.

*upaiti* : he resorts to, 549.

*Ushasta* : name of a sage in *Bṛih. Up.*, 338-346 *passim*.

*Ushasti* : a sage in *Chhānd. Up.*, 431, 432 n.

*Ūrdhvam* : up, 516 n.

*ūrdhvaretas* : one who is chaste and continent, 414 n.

*Ṛik(s)* : verses of the *Ṛig-veda*, 86, 269, 420 n.

*Ṛig-veda* : the first of the four *Vedas*, 85, 88.

*ṛita* : lit., the divine order or truth, the cause of all causes, 313 n.

*ṛitasya Brahmā* : the *Brahman*, in relation to the *ṛita* (was born earlier), 313 n.

*ṛitvik* : officiating priest, 323, 446-7.

*ṛish* : to pierce, 160 n.

*ṛishis* : sages with piercing vision, 160-1, 419 n.

*Etāvaṭ* : so many, 253 n.

*etāvattvam* : such extent, 253 n.

*eva* : only, alone, 344.

*evam* : thus, 71 n.

*Aihika* : see 455 n.

*Aitareyin(s)* : followers of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Āraṇyaka* attributed to a descendant of Itara, 318.

'Om' : a sacred syllable understood to denote the Supreme Being, *passim*.

*Auḍulomi* : name of a teacher of the *Vedānta*, 446, 542.

*Kāthavallī* : *Kāth. Up.* (whose chapter subdivisions are called *vallīs*), 131.

*Kaṇāda* : the founder of the *Vaiśeṣika* system, 35, 37, 38 n, 73, 116-7, 127.

*kan* : to shine, 556 n.

*kanyā* : see 556 n.

*Kapila* : the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* system, 2, 4, 5 n, 37, 73, 80, 89, 116.

*kapūya-charaṇa* : lit. one of disgusting conduct : see p. 204.

*karaṇa* : action, 171.

*karma* : religious works, rites and duties, 75, 206, 220-1, 318, 319 n, 397-8, 400-04, 406-11, 424-5, 436, 455-6 ; works or actions, 204-5, 272 : the impressed tendency generated in relation to the soul as a result of various actions, *passim*.

*karma-pudgalas* : the effects of *karma* as arising from sensory and physical experience, 67 n.

*karma-yoga* : a discipline leading to self-realisation taught in *B. G.* etc., 88, 402 n, 411 n.

*kalās* : instruments, 119 n.

*kalpas* : periods of time, each equal to 4,320 million solar years; see Note 246, Vol. I ; 16, 32, 471.

*Kahola* : a sage who debates with Yājñavalkya in *Bṛih. Up.*, 339-46, *passim*.

*Kāthakas* : a school of the *Yajurveda*, 317.

*kāṇḍa* : a section, particularly of the *Veda*, 4, 323, 336.

*Kāṇvas* : descendants of Kāṇva to whom is attributed a recension of some parts of the *Veda*, 116.

*Kāpālas* : a sub-section of the *Pāśupatas*, so called from their using skulls or *kapālas* as drinking cups etc., 73.

*kāma* : a desired thing, 224-225 n.

*kāmam-kāmam* : see 225 n.

*kāyās* : groups, 67 n.

*kāraṇa* : cause, 132.

*kārikās* : lit. concise explanations ; the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, 7 n.

*kārya* : effect, 132 n ; what is not established, 308 n ; the lower *Brahman*, 523 n.

*Kārṣṇājini* : a teacher of *Vedānta* mentioned in *Ved. Sūt.*, 204, 206 n.

*kāla* : time, 66, 510 n.

*Kālāpīns* : a Vedic school following *Kalāpin*, 322.

*Kālāmukhas* : a sub-division of the *Pāsupatas*, 73-4.

*kālāstikāyā* : a group of time atoms, 67 n.

*Kāvasheyas* : the sons of *Kavasha*, who expound philosophic themes in *Ait. Ār.* and *Sāṅkh. Ār.*, 406, 407 n.

*Kāśakṛitsna* : a teacher of *Vedānta* mentioned in the *Ved. Sūt.*, 400, 539.

*Kuṇḍapāyins* : performers of a sacrifice at which pitchers are used for drinking, 293.

*Kuntī* : the mother of *Arjuna*, 246, 560, 563.

*Kumārīla* : a great authority on the *Mīmāṃsā*, 403.

*kuśa* : kind of grass used in religious ceremonies, 315.

*kuśā(s)* : rods used for counting, 320, 322, 322 n.

*kṛit* : an affix used to form nouns from roots, 364.

*kṛitsnabhāva* : existent in all, 451.

*Kṛishṇa* : an incarnation of God who is the teacher in the *B. G.*, 83.

*Keśidhvaja* : a king of the *Janaka* dynasty mentioned in *V. P.*, 401, 402 n.

*kaivalya* : final release according to the *Sāṅkhyas*, 13; in inferior *mukti*, 531 n, 561 n.

*Kauravas* : descendants of *Kuru*, particularly the sons of *Dhṛitarāshṭra* in *M. B.*, 438 n, 509 n.

*Kaushitkins* : the followers of *Kaushitaka*, 295-8, 318, 320, 324-5, 512, 515-7, 520.

*ktvā* : a suffix of the past participle, 179, 180 n.

*krama* : see 247 n.

*Kshatriyas* : the military or ruling caste, 88, 153, 202, 556.

*Gaṅgā* : a famous sacred river in north India, 488.

*Gāṅgā-Yamunā* : the rivers' *Gaṅgā* and *Yamunā*, 488 n.

*gāyatrī* : a Vedic metre, 384.

*Gārgī* : a lady who puts difficult questions in *Bṛih. Up.*, 175, 334, 405, 559.

*guṇa(s)* : the constituents or qualities of *prakṛiti*, 11 n, 20 n, 23-4, 27 n, 131-4, 186 n, 560; qualities or attributes, 302 n, 303 n, 399 n.

*go* : cattle, 206 n.

*godohana* : a milk-pail, 360, 391-2, 395 n, 446.

*grahas* : sense-organs, 164 n.

*Ghāti-karmas* : murderous *karmas*, 67 n.

*Cha* : mere, 2 n ; indeed, 121, 466, 492 ; and, 149 n ; besides, 155 ; undoubtedly, 157 n ; even, 285, 437 ; only, 431.

*Chakra* : father of Ushasti in *Chhānd. Up.*, 431.

*chatūrātra* : lit., that which lasts for four nights, a sacrifice, 336.

*chamasa* : a cup, particularly one used in sacrifices, 360 n.

*charaṇa* : good conduct, 204-6.

*charati* : performs, 205.

*chitta* : the thinking principle, 165.

*chitta-chaitta-rūpān* : see 39 n.

*Chodanā* : enjoining, a scriptural injunction, 275.

*Chhandataḥ* : see 327 n.

*chhandas* : metre, particularly Vedic, 320, 322 n.

*Chhandogas* : teachers or followers of the *Chhānd. Up.*, 286, 290-1, 296, 320, 325, 430, 514.

*Jan* : to know, 60.

*Janaka* : a famous philosopher-king, 119, 401, 402 n, 411 ; father of Sītā in *Rām.*, 225.

*Janamejaya* : a famous king who was the great-grandson of Arjuna and to whom the *M. B.* was recited, 87 n.

*Jamadagni* : a famous sage, 336, 337 n.

*jarāmaraṇam* etc. : see 42 n.

*jāti* : birth, 42 n.

*Jānaśruti* : a royal pupil of Raikva in *Chhānd. Up.*, 438 n.

*Jābālas* : followers of a Vedic school, 348, 375, 419, 460.

*Jina* : lit., Conqueror ; the name by which Mahāvira, the founder of Jainism in the 6th century B. C., is known, 73, 91.

*jīva(s)* : the individual self, 66, 67 n, 70-1, 72 n, 78-82, 84-5, 181, 501 n.

*jīva-astikāya* : see 66.

*jīvan-mukti* : liberation during life, 492 n, 494 n.

*jīvena* : instrumental singular of 'jīva', 179, 180 n, 182 n.

*juhū* : see 358 n.

*Jaina(s)* : followers of Jina, 66-74 *passim*.

*Jaimini* : a teacher of *Vedānta* in *Ved. Sūt.*, 273, 274 n, 398, 414-5, 440-1, 523 n, 525-6, 528, 540-1, 548, 549 n.

*jñātṛ* : having known, 469.

- jñāna*: the Lord, 255 ; knowledge, 466.
- jñāna-yoga*: the discipline of knowledge leading to self-realisation, 88.
- Jyotishtoma*: a Soma sacrifice, 337 n, 417, 458.
- Jyotishmant*: one of the seven suns, 283 n.
- jyotis*; lit., light, the god of fire, 174.
- tat*: that, 191 ; he, 497.
- tato*: see 270 n.
- atkratu-nyāya*: the principle of results according to worship, 531 n.
- tadantarāḥ*: he who i within them, 340.
- tadvyapadeśa*: the words denoting them, 108 n.
- tanmātras*: subtle bases of the elements, 186 n.
- tapas*: the *Brahman*, 210, 331-3, 413, 415, 425, 530 ; penance, 246, 416, 417 n.
- tamas*: the quality which makes matter inert, 3, 5, 8 n, 20, 84, 134, 560 ; primordial undifferentiated matter, 107 ; the *prakṛiti*, 269.
- tavya*: a *kṛit* affix, 363.
- tasya*: of him, 497, 498 n.
- tasya ātmā*: his own self, 471 n.
- tasya syāt*: (the knower of) His (essential nature) can (not become small), 471 n.
- Tāṇḍins*: a group of followers of the *Sāmaveda* founded by a pupil of Vaiśampāyana, 325.
- tāmasa*: characterised or dominated by *tamas*, 176 n.
- tejas*: element of light and heat, 93 to 108 *passim*, 169, 178 to 187 *passim*, 213, 258 n, 259-60, 334, 465, 483, 485 n, 487-90 ; the subtle elements, 347, 507-02 ; the Bright One or the *Brahmān*, 234 n.
- tu*: mere, 2 n ; and, 98 ; alone, 99 ; indeed, 104, 439 ; but, 368 ; certainly, 461 ; however, 478, 481.
- tīṣhṇā*: desire, 46 n.
- taijasa*: relating to *tejas*, 3, 155.
- Taittirīyās*: a school of the *Yajurveda*, 317.
- tyat*: non-intelligent matter, 175.
- trasareṇu*: the tert particle, 99 n.
- traidhātaviyeshṭi*: a sacrificial rite, 361 n.
- tryaṇuka*: the tertiary particle, 29 n.
- Daśaratha*: father of Rāmā in the *Rām*., 561.
- Dahara*: see *daharākāśa*: 284, 360, 445, 541.

*daharavidyā*: the meditation on the *Dahara*, 314, 353 n, 360, 362, 364, 371, 385-7.

*daharākāśa*: the *Brahman* as the subtle ether, 316, 360-1, 399, 436.

*Daharādhikaraṇa*: *Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 13-22; 284.

*dāna*: giving gifts, 386 n.

*Divodāsa*: father of *Pratardana* in *Kaush. Up.*, 423.

*dīkshā*: initiation, 74.

*duḥkha*: grief, pain, 42 n.

*durudgītha*: defective *udgītha*, 393.

*drīś*: to see, 160 n.

*drishṭa*: lit., that which is seen, *Śruti*, 202.

*Devatādhikaraṇa*: *Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 25-9; 287.

*devas*: the principal vital air and the senses, 196.

*Devadatta*: common name used in the sense of some one, any person, etc., 98, 148, 529.

*devaloka*: see 516.

*devānām lokah*: the world of the gods, 516.

*Dramiḍāchārya*: an ancient commentator, 13.

*dravya*: substance, 399 n.

*Drupada*: the father of *Draupadī* in *M. B.*, 213 n.

*Draupadī*: the queen of the *Pāṇḍavas*, 212, 213 n.

*dvādaśāha*: a sacrifice lasting for 12 days, 366, 548-9.

*dvīparārdha*: a period of time equal to two halves of *parā*, q. v., 524.

*dvyanuka*: a secondary particle, 29 n.

*Dharma(s)*: categories, 47 n, 49 n; the cause of motion, 67; duty, virtue, 203, 220, 509; religious action, 273, 413-5, 420, 434, 436, 440-1, 452.

*dharma-astikāya*: the cause of motion as having magnitude, 66.

*dharmabhūtajñāna*: knowledge as attribute, 245 n.

*dhātus*: primary fluids in the body, 128 n.

*dhāraṇa*: steady abstraction of the mind, 460 n.

*Dhṛiṣṭadyumna*: brother of *Draupadī*, 213.

*dhyāna*: meditation, 410, 427, 458-9, 467, 469 n; contemplation as the seventh of the eight stages of *yoga*, 450 n.

*dhyāyati*: meditates, 468-9.

*Na bhavanti*: are not, 226 n.

*Nāgārjuna*: a famous Buddhist philosopher of the *Mādhyaṃika* or nihilistic school, 65 n.

*nāḍī*: blood-vessel, 230 n.



- nāmarūpa* : name and form, 42 n.
- Nārada* : a sage, 85.
- Nārāyaṇa* : a name of God, 74 n, 75-6, 89-91, 269 n, 271, 362-5, 499 n, 566.
- Nārāyaṇānuvāka* : lit. the section on Nārāyaṇa, *M. Nar.* XI; 76, 362-4.
- Nimbārka* : a commentator on the *Ved. Sūt.*, 80 n.
- nitya* : eternal, 35 n.
- niyama* : religious vows and austerities, 460 n.
- nirodha* : destruction, 49 n.
- Nirguṇa-brahman* : the attributeless *Brahman*, 495 n, 498 n.
- nirjara* : austerities, 67.
- Nirṛiti* : the goddess of death and corruption, 442 n.
- Nishāda* : a member of a non-Aryan tribe, 527.
- Naiyāyikas* : the followers of the Nyāya system, 29, 31, 50 n, 92 n, 94 n, 100 n, 143.
- naishṭhika* : the student with the vow of perpetual celibacy, 441-4, 445 n.
- Nyāya-Vaiśeṣhika* : the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika taken together on account of their similarity, 28, 35, 70 n.
- nyāsa-vidyā* : self-surrender to God, 390 n.
- Pañchāgnividyā* : lit. the science of the five fires; a meditation on the self, 189, 191, 210, 332-3, 512-3, 530.
- pañchikaraṇa* : see 50 n.
- Paṭara* : one of the seven suns, 283 n.
- Pataṅga* : one of the seven suns, 283 n.
- Pati* : Śiva, 74.
- pada* : hoof-mark, 219.
- para* : the subtle form of the *Brahman*, 83.
- paratantratā* : inference 35 n.
- Parabrahman* : the Supreme *Brahman*, 363.
- param* : higher, 269 n.
- paramāṇu* : infinitesimal atom, 29 n.
- paramāṇutva* : the quality of being the *paramāṇu*, 29 n.
- parā* : the life period of *Brahmā*, 33 n, 525.
- parābhidyānāt* : see 227.
- parārdhas* : see 33.
- Parāśara* : the author of the *V. P.*, 152, 208, 417.
- parimaṇḍala* : the infinitesimal atom, 28, 29 n.
- Parjanya* : the rain-god, 655.
- parṇa* : a sacred tree, *Butea Frondosa*, 358, 391, 392 n, 395, 399 n.
- paryāya* : modification, 68, 71, 72 n.

*palāśa* : see *parṇa* ; 358 n.

*Paśupati* : Śiva, 73-9, 89-91.

*Pāñcharātra* : a system of Vaiṣṇava worship and philosophy, 82-91 *passim*.

*Pāñchālas* : the people of a country corresponding to the Punjab, 213 n.

*Pāṭalīputra* : the ancient capital of Magadha near Patna, 488 n.

*pāṭha* : a scriptural passage, 516 n.

*Pāṇḍavas* : the sons of King Pāṇḍu in M.B., 438 n, 509 n.

*pāṇḍitya* : proficiency, 448, 449 n.

*pāda* : lit., the quarter : one of the four sections into which each chapter of the *Ved. Sū.* is divided, 81 n ; foot, part, 148, 149 n, 266.

*pāpa* : sin, 436 n.

*pāpman* : sin, 475 n.

*pāriplava* : see 424 n.

*pārimāṇḍalya* : see 29 n.

*Pārtha* : the son of Prithā, i.e., Arjuna, 510.

*Pāśupatas* : followers of the Pāśupata system, 73-91 *passim*.

*pippala* : a fruit ; figuratively the effects of *karma*, 242.

*puṇya* : moral or religious merit, 547 n.

*puṅgala* : matter, 66, 67 n.

*puṅgala-astikāya* : a collection of *puṅgala* atoms, 66.

*purāṇas* : see Note 104, Vol. I ; 527.

*puritat* see 230 n.

*puruṣa* : the individual self, 2, 4, 18-9, 21-7, 84, 90, 137, 165, 191-3, 196-7, 211-2, 315-6 ; the Supreme Person, 365.

*puruṣavidyā* : a meditation on the self as sacrifice, 315-6.

*Puruṣa-sūkta* : the famous hymn on the Supreme Person (R. V. X. 90), 267 n.

*Puruṣottama* : the Supreme Person, 150.

*pūrta* : acts of pious liberality, 199 n.

*pūrvapakṣa* : a *prima-facie* view, *passim*.

*pūrvapakṣin* : an objector, 104, 398, 400, 407 n.

*Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* : the enquiry into the earlier (or ritualistic) part of the *Vedas*, 4, 5 n, 23 n, 35 n, 273 n, 279 n, 280, 284.

*prakaraṇasama* : see 53 n.

*prakṛiti* : primordial matter, material Nature, *passim*.

*Prajāpati* : the Creator, 76, 109, 113, 119, 239, 286, 297, 318, 325, 377, 512, 517-8, 519 n, 520, 523, 536, 541 ; the *Brahman*, 528 ; one of the 'lords of created beings' first created by *Brahmā*, 33 n, 417.

*praṇava* : the mystic syllable, 'Om', 290, 393.

*Pratardana* : a king in *Kaush. Up.*, 423.

*pratiniyātasvarūpa* : a definite form of its own, 72 n.

*pratipādyate* : is established; -*nte* : are established, 190 n.

*pratīka* : symbol, 463, 465 n.

*pratītyasamutpāda* : a chain of causes, 42 n.

*prathiti* : being well-known, 513.

*pratyaksha* : the scripture, 557.

*pratyāhāra* : withdrawal of the senses from external organs, 460 n.

*pradarśanāya* : see 18 n.

*pradeśas* : see 66 n; 72 n.

*Pradyumna* : the *Brahman* as presiding over the *manas*, 80-4.

*pradhāna* : a synonym of 'prakṛiti', 1 to 28 *passim*, 77-8, 90, 96; the *Brahman* as the possessor of qualities, 299.

*prapatti* : absolute faith in and complete self-surrender to the Lord, 268 n, 317 n, 390 n.

*Prabhākara* : a teacher of the *Mīmāṃsā*, 403 n.

*prayojayatri* : inciter, 15 n.

*pralaya* : dissolution of the universe, 11 n, 19, 20 n, 33, 109, 112 n, 501 n, 554 n.

*pravachana* : reflection, 450.

*pravargya* : a ceremony introductory to the *Soma* sacrifice, 318-9; -*brāhmaṇa*, the scriptural text describing this, 318.

*Pravāhaṇa* : a king of Pāñchāla in *Chhānd. Up.*, 191, 192 n.

*pravṛttestha* : because also of activity, 10 n.

*prāk* : before, 53 n.

*Prāchīnaśāla* : a sage in *Chhānd. Up.*, 381, 383.

*prāṇa(s)* : the principal or any vital air, *passim*; the sense organs and the principal vital air, 119, 121, 123, 191-4; the senses, 159-66, 173-7; the individual self, 262-3, 268; the *Brahman*, 161-2; the element air, 168.

*prāṇavidyā* : meditation on the *prāṇa*, 294-8, 306-7, 308 n, 430-1, 432 n.

*prāṇāgnihotra* : oblations to the *prāṇas* regarded as an *agnihotra*, 363 n.

*prāṇāyāma* : control of breath, 460 n.

*Prābhākaras* : followers of *Prabhākara*, 35, 220 n.

*prārabdha*: that which has begun, a *karma* which has begun to yield fruit, 408 n; -*karma*: 470 n, 477 n, 480 n, 507 n.

*Baliivarda*: the bull, 206 n.

*Bādarāyaṇa*: a teacher of the *Vedānta*, identified with Vyāsa as the author of the *Ved. Sūt.*, 88, 274, 377, 404, 415-6, 523 n, 528-9, 542-4, 548-9.

*Bādari*: a teacher of the *Vedānta*, 206, 521-9 *passim*, 547, 549 n.

*bālya*: childlike qualities, 449 n, 463.

*bāhyān*: (accusative case) external things, 339 n.

*Buddha*: the founder of Buddhism, 39 n, 63, 73, 91.

*buddhi*: the great material principle or *mahat*, 104; the faculty of intellection, 164, 566; will, 165.

*Buddhists*: followers of the Buddha, 38-66 *passim*, 68, 86 n, 116.

*Bṛihaspati*: Samvarta's brother, 438 n.

*Bodhāyana*: the author of the *Vṛitti*, an ancient commentary on the *Ved. Sūt.*, 282 n.

*brahmatvajāti*: see 261.

*Brahman*: the Supreme Being, *passim*; primordial undifferentiated matter, 99, 103; the individual self, 560, 561 n.

*brahma bhūtānām*: the *Brahman* (was born first) among the beings, 313 n.

*brahmaloka*: the world which is the *Brahman*, 527. •

*brahmavidyā*: meditation on or the teaching about the *Brahman*, 279 n, 282, 385, 407 n, 408 n, 411.

*brahmasamsthā*: see 417.

*Brahmā*: the creator in the Hindu trinity, 33, 76, 178 n, 181, 183-4, 331 n, 365, 417, 497 n, 500, 523-5, 556, 563; a priest superintending sacrifices, 396.

*brāhmaṇa(s)*: Brahmins, 75, 82-3, 87, 242, 426, 433, 448, 478, 526; one who has *brahmavidyā*, 460-2.

*Bhakti*: devotion to God, 265, 450 n, 478 n.

*bhaktiyoga*: worship of and meditation on God with devotion, 510, 560.

*bhagāsana*: the female organ as a seat, 73, 75.

*bhaṅga*: see 69 n.

*bhava*: becoming, 42 n.

*bhākta*: secondary, 108 n.

*Bhāgavatas*: a Vaishṇava sect, 80, 82.

*Bhāṭṭas*: followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in *Mīmāṃsā*, 219 n.

*Bhārata* : the *M.B.*, 87.

*bhāva* : existence, 443.

*bhāvaśabda* : a word denoting action, 422 n.

*Bhāskara* : a philosopher who held the *Brahman* to be both different and non-different from the individual self, 27, 39 n, 69 n, 114-5, 143, 146, 154, 157.

*Bhishma* : the grand-uncle of the *Pāṇdavas* in *M. B.*, 87 n, 438, 508-9; *-parvan*: Book VI of the *M.B.*, describing the war when *Bhishma* was generalissimo of the *Kauravas*, 88.

*bhuvah* : a mystic syllable, 310.

*bhūtagrāmavān* : the possessor of the collection of elements, 340.

*bhūtādi* : the *tāmasa* variety of *ahaṅkāra*, 3.

*bhūman* : the whole, 383; the *Brahman*, 385; *-avidyā* : meditation on the *Brahman* as the Great One, 85, 383-5.

*bhūr* : a mystic syllable, 310.

*Bhrigu* : a *prajāpati*, 417.

*Bhedābheda* : the philosophy which maintains the individual self to be both different and non-different from the *Brahman*, 69.

*bhauma* : earthy, 184.

*bhrama* : (secondary) erroneous knowledge, 24.

*Bhrāja* : one of the seven suns, 283 n.

*Mathurā* : the famous city where *Śrī Kṛishṇa* was born, 488 n.

*Madhva* : the celebrated exponent of the *Dvaita* school of *Vedānta*, 80 n.

*manana* : reflection, 449 n.

*manaschit* : built by the mind, 365-74 *passim*.

*manas* : the internal organ of sense, the faculty of attention, 80, 81 n, 84, 100 n, 105, 106 n, 132 n, 164, 484 n, 485 n, 556 n.

*Manu* : a famous law-giver, 256, 423.

*mantra(s)* : a Vedic text, 149 n, 221, 317-9, 399, 461; a Vedic hymn, 275 n, 322 n, 334, 336, 378 n, 380, 527 n.

*mayā* : as myself, 182 n.

*malas* : secretions, 128 n.

*mahat* : an evolute of the *prakṛiti*, on which see Note 39, Vol. I; 2, 3, 5, 7, 24, 100, 103-4, 132 n, 186, 489.

*mahaddirgha* : what is big and long, 29.

*mahāpūrvapakṣa* : the 'great objection,' being the *Advaitic* view about *Ved. Sūt. I. 1. 1*; 145 n.

*mahāvākyas* : principal sentences, important passages, 510 n.

- maḥāvratā* : the ceremony of the last but one day in the ritual known as *gavāmayana*, 318; *-brāhmaṇa* : the scriptural text about this, 318.
- Mahīdāsa* : a son of Itara in *Chhānd. Up.*, 315.
- mātariśvan* : see 99.
- Mādhava* : a name of Viṣṇu, 88.
- Mādhyaṇḍina* : a branch of the *Vājasaneyins*, 117, 498.
- Mādhyaṃikas* : the nihilistic school of Buddhists, 39, 42 n, 63-4, 65 n.
- mānasa* : mental, 365-6.
- māyā* : the *prakṛiti*, 140; wonderful power, 225.
- Mitra* : a Vedic deity regarded as a form of the sun, 317-9, 331 n.
- Mīmāṃsakas* : followers of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, 275 n, 317 n, 399 n, 414 n.
- mukti* : final release of the self, 498 n, 531 n, 534 n.
- muni* : a meditating sage, 449.
- Mrityu* : the god of death, 372-3, 556.
- moksha* : same as *mukti*, 149 n, 234 n, 407 n, 453 n, 470 n, 501 n, 554 n, 561 n.
- Mokshadharma* : a section of *M. B. XII*, where the means to final release is taught, 87.
- mauna* : reflection, 447-52.
- Yaj* : to sacrifice, 274, 275 n.
- yajati* : he sacrifices, 549.
- Yajurveda* : the second of the four *Vedas*, 85, 88, 322 n, 336, 337 n.
- Yajus* : lit., a sacrificial formula, here the *Yajurveda*, 86.
- yataḥ* : from whom, 76 n.
- yama* : self-control, 460 n; the god of death, 207-9, 556.
- Yamunā* : a tributary of the Gaṅgā, 488.
- yaśas* : see 528.
- yāga* : sacrifice, worship, 374, 386 n.
- Yājñavalkya* : a famous sage, 119, 195 n, 339-47 *passim*, 496.
- Yādavaprakāśa* : a philosopher holding the soul to be both different and non-different from the *Brahman*, 114-5.
- Yāmuna* : Rāmānuja's teachers' teacher, 78 n.
- yāvatsampātaṃ* : as long as the *karmas* last, 201-2.
- Yudhisṭhira* : the eldest of the Pāṇḍava princes, 17 n.
- yoga* : meditation and mental concentration, 39 n, 164, 460, 468, 509-10; the philosophy of Patañjali, 88-91; *-ins* : those practising *yoga*, 88, 417, 509-10.
- Yogācāras* : the school of Buddhist monks, 38, 39 n, 56 n, 58, 59 n.

- Raṅgarāmānuja* : a commentator on the *Upanishads* and author of *B.P.*, 122 n, 166 n, 182 n, 230 n, 317 n, 352 n, 374 n, 499 n.
- rajas* : a quality of *prakṛiti*: 3, 5, 8 n, 20, 84, 134, 560.
- ramaṇīyacharaṇas* : those with a balance of good *karmas*, 204.
- ramhati* : he goes, 191.
- rasas* : essential bases, 420-2, 446.
- rājasa* : characterised by *rajas*, 165 n.
- Rāṇāyaṇīyas* : a Vedic school, 313.
- rātrisatra* : a night sacrifice, 359.
- Rāma* : the hero of *Rām.* and an incarnation of God, 83.
- Rāmānuja* : *passim*.
- Rāhu* : in mythology a demon swallowing the sun and the moon ; in astronomy the ascending node of the moon, 320, 325, 493, 528.
- Rudra* : *Siva*, 556.
- rūpa(s)* : relating to phenomena or external appearance, 34 n ; true nature, 534 n ; form, duty, 441.
- rūpatanmātra* : see 169 n.
- rūpaskandha* : see 39 n.
- Raikva* : a sage in *Chhānd. Up.*, 438, 459.
- raurava* : lit. fearful ; one of the seven hells, 209.
- Liṅga(s)* : the evolutes of *prakṛiti*, 24 ; symbol, sign, indicative mark, 363, 364 n ; the *smṛiti*, 440, 460.
- Vat* : an affix indicating likeness, 248.
- Varuṇa* : a Vedic god, 317, 331 n, 512, 520-1, 556.
- varṇa* : caste, 202.
- Vallabha* : a great Vaishṇava teacher of the 15th century, 80 n.
- Vasishṭha* : a famous Vedic sage who is also among the *prajāpatis* and the seven *ṛishis*, 330, 331 n.
- Vasudeva* : father of *Kṛishṇa*, 551.
- vastūvirodha* : see 544 n.
- vā* : also, 28, 79, 380 ; but, 199 ; indeed, 292 n, 411 ; certainly, 418.
- vāk* : the sense organ of speech, 484 n.
- Vāchaspati Miśra* : a philosophical writer of the 9th century, 23 n, 39 n, 42 n, 138 n, 323 n.
- Vājasaneyaka* : relating to the *Sukla Yajurveda* to which *Bṛih. Up.* and *Śat. Br.* are attached, 119, 288-9 ; 294-5, 306-7, 332, 350-2, 354, 365, 513 ; -*neyins* : followers thereof, 296, 309, 318, 412 n, 514-5, 517.
- Vājins* : same as *Vājasaneyins*, 286, 290-1, 430.

**Vātsya Varada**: a great teacher of *Viśishtādvaita*, 141 n.

**vānaprastha**: one in the third stage of life having passed through the student and householder stages and having left his house for the forest, 414 n, 416, 419.

**Vāmadeva**: an ancient sage, 76, 256.

**Vāyu**: air, 169 n; the god of air, 275-6, 512-8 *passim*; **-loka**: Vāyu who is a world, 516.

**Vāsudeva**: the Supreme Being, 80, 82-8, 564.

**vikalpa**: alternation, option, 372 n.

**viññāna**: relating to the mind, 39 n; clear consciousness, 42 n; senses, 105-6; intelligence, 116-7, 125-7; the self, 127, 136; internal organ, 135.

**viññānādi**: what is intelligence and the soul, 82 n.

**vid**: to know, 288, 459.

**vidi**: knowledge, 458-9.

**vidyā(s)**: meditation on the *Brahman* with devotion, forms thereof, *passim*.

**vidyāt**: let him meditate, 279.

**vipratishedāt**: because of self-contradiction, because of negation, 81 n.

**vibhava**: God in His incarnations, 83.

**Vibhāshā**: a commentary on Buddha's teachings, 39 n.

**Vibhāsa**: one of the seven suns, 283 n. •

**Virajā**: a river on the way to the Highest Heaven, 325.

**viruddha**: a kind of fallacy, 53 n.

**Vivasvat, -ān**: the sun-god, 208, 423.

**vividishanti**: they desire to know, 426.

**Viśishtādvaita**: the *Vedāntic* school of Rāmānuja, 50 n.

**viśeṣas**: qualities, things with specific properties, 186.

**viśoka**: free from sorrow, 284 n.

**Vishnu**: all-pervading God, 339.

**vr̥itta**: good conduct, 204.

**Vṛitti**: the commentary of Bodhāyana on *Ved. Sūt.*, 41 n, 272 n.

**Vṛitra**: a demon killed by Indra, 318.

**Veda**: the scripture of the Hindus, *passim*; knows, 533.

**Vedavratatvena**: through the quality of being a ceremony relating to the *Veda*, 282 n; **-vratena**: as a ceremony relating to the *Veda*: 282 n.



*vedana* : knowledge, *vidyā*, 426-7, 457-60.

*vedanā* : feeling, 42 n.

*vedanāskandha* : see 39 n.

*Vedānta* : the philosophical part of the *Veda*, *passim*; -s : the texts thereof, 378; -in : a follower thereof, 17n, 101; -*sāstras* : authoritative texts relating thereto, 467.

*Vedānta Deśika* : a great teacher of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and the leader of the Northern School among Rāmānuja's followers, 141 n, 182 n, 450 n.

*Vedāraṇyaka* : the *Vedas* and the *Āraṇyakas* (or philosophical writings connected with them), 90.

*vaikārika* : the *sāttvika* variety of the *ahaṅkāra*, 3, 165.

*Vaiśvāśhikas* : a realistic school of Buddhists, 38-9, 48, 49 n, 55, 57.

*Vaiśampāyana* : the famous sage who narrated the *M.B.* to Janamejaya, 87 n.

*Vaiśeshikas* : followers of Kaṇāda's philosophy, 5 n, 29, 31, 35 n, 38, 49 n, 68, 130.

*Vaiśyas* : the third caste consisting of farmers and merchants, 88, 153, 202.

*Vaiśvānara* : the Supreme *Brahman* as having the three worlds for His body, 278, 280, 284, 381-4; -*vidyā* : meditation on Him, 346 n, 353 n, 373, 381, 385.

*vyakta* : the evolved *prakṛiti*, 23 n.

*vyashti-sṣiṣhti* : the creation of individuals, 178 n.

*vyāna* : the 'vital air' responsible for the circulatory activity in the body, 171-2.

*Vyāsa* : a famous sage, reputed to be the editor of the *Vedas* and the author of *M.B.*, *Ved. Sūt.*, etc., 87, 89 n, 331 n, 449.

*vyāhṛiti-homa* : an expiatory fire-ritual where oblations are offered to the chanting of the three mystic syllables, as described in *Chkand. Up.* (IV. 17), 178.

*Vyūha* : the *Brahman* as the (fourfold) aggregate (of *Vāsudeva*, *Śaṅkarshaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*), 83.

*Śakti* : energy, divine energy especially as *Durgā*, the wife of *Śiva*, 80 n.

*Śaṅkara* : the great teacher of the *Advaita* school of *Vedānta*, *passim*.

*śatodana* : a *sava* sacrifice where a cow is offered with a hundred dishes of cooked rice, 283.

*Śabarasvāmin* : an old commentator on *Pūr. Mīm.*, 317 n.

*Śabda* : Vedic scriptures, 332.

*Śambhu* : *Śiva*, 463.

- śāstras*: see Note 400, Vol. I; 363, 371.
- Śātyāyana*: founder of a Vedic school, 480; *-ius*: his followers, 317, 320, 322, 325. •
- Śāṇḍilya*: • a sage, 81-6; *-vidyā*: a meditation on the *Brahman* taught by him, 309, 312, 314, 385.
- śāstras*: see Note 140 in Vol. I; *passim*.
- śirovrata*: a ceremony requiring the carrying of fire on the head, 279, 281-2.
- Śiva*: the third member of the Hindu Trinity, identified as the Divine Destroyer, 74, 76-9, 363, 265.
- śishṭi*: commandment, 392.
- śīla*: good conduct, 204.
- Śūdras*: the fourth caste, 88, 163.
- Śaivas*: worshippers of Śiva, 73, 77 n.
- Śaunaka*: a sage, 537.
- śraddhā*: lit., faith; the subtle elements, 191, 196-9, 215; waters, 197.
- śruti*: the revealed *Vedas*, *passim*.
- śreṣṭha*: the vital air, 173.
- Śrauta-sūtras*: works giving rules for Vedic sacrifices, 424 n.
- Śvetaketu*: a student of *Brahmavidyā* in *Chhānd. Up.*, 187, 191, 343 n, 423.
- śhaḍāyatana*: the six organs of sense, 42 n.
- shodaśakalam*: having sixteen parts, 265 n.
- shodaśaśchavikārah*: mere modifications are sixteen, 2 n. •
- shodaśān*: a modification of the Agnishtoma, 322 n, 323.
- samyamana*: hell, 207-8.
- samrūdhana*: worship with devotion, 255.
- samvara*: meditation, 67 n.
- Samvarta*: see 438 n.
- samskāra(s)*: innate impressions, 39 n, 41, 42 n; refining ritual, 399 n.
- samsāra*: the cycle of repeated births and deaths, *passim*.
- samsthā*: complete abidance, 417.
- Samhitā*: continuous text of the *Veda*, 433.
- Saguṇabrahman*: the *Brahman* with attributes, 492 n.
- Saṅkarshana*: the individual self, 80-1; the *Brahman* as presiding over the self, 82-4.
- saṅgrahaṇa*: admission, 335.
- sajaniya*: the name of a hymn in *R. V.*, 380 n.
- sañjñā*: name or symbol, 39 n.
- Sat*: the *Brahman*, 2, 76, 83, 99, 109, 230, 232, 343, 346-8, 462; the individual self, 175.

*sattva*: a quality of *prakṛiti*, 3, 5, 8, 9, 20, 84, 134, 450, 560; the internal organ of sense, 432.

*satpratipakṣha*: a kind of fallacy, 53 n.

*Satya*: the *Brahman*, 331-3, 349 n, 512; the unchanging real, 347.

*Satyakāma Jābāla*: a student of *Brahmavidyā* in *Chhānd. Up.*, 265 n.

*satra*: see 549 n.

*Sadvidyā*: meditation on the *Brahman* as the self-existent Soul of the universe, 343-4, 346-7, 385, 387.

*sandeha*: middle body, 381.

*sandhya*: the dream state: 223 n, 224.

*saptabhaṅginaya*: the principle of sevenfold differentiation, 69 n.

*samavāya*: inherence, 34-5.

*samashṭi-sṛishṭi*: collective creation, 178 n.

*samādhī*: see 460.

*samāna*: the vital air responsible for digestive activity, 171-2.

*sampatti*: resting, absorption, death, 553.

*sampāta*: see 201 n; 203, 479 n.

*Sambandhānupapattescha*: because of the inconsistency of the relationship, 77 n.

*sambhūta*: was produced, 95-6.

*Sarvakṛit*: He who creates all things, 247 n.

*Sarvadṛik*: He who sees all, 247 n.

*Sarvavit*: He who knows all, 247 n.

*Sarvaśaktijñāna*-etc.: He who is possessed of all energies, knowledge, strength and prosperity, 247 n.

*Sarvaśaktirjñāna* etc.: He who is all-powerful, He who is possessed of knowledge, strength and prosperity, 247.

*Sarvasya vaśi*: the Controller of all, 310 n.

*sava*: a type of sacrifice peculiar to the *Ātharvaṇikas* in which the Soma ritual is often combined with the offering of rice-dishes and sacrificial fees are given to the accompaniment of solemn rites, 283.

*Savitṛi*: the sun-god, 221, 317.

*Sāṅkhya(s)*: Kapila's philosophical system, its followers, 2-27 *passim*, 88-92, 116, 125, 129, 130 n, 131, 132 n, 134 n, 137 n, 141, 158 n, 220 n.

*Sāṅkhya-Yoga*: the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, 90.

*Sāttvata*: the Pāñcharātra, 87 n, 88.

- sāttvika* : dominated by the quality of *sattva*, 81 n, 176 n.
- Sāmagas* : the singers, i.e., followers of the *Sāmaveda*, 317.
- Sāman* : verse of the *Sāmaveda*, 287 n, 291 n, 378, 420 n; the *Sāmaveda*, 86.
- Sāmaveda* : the third *Veda*, 85, 88, 336, 337 n.
- sāmparāya* : lit. the world beyond death, here death, 325.
- Sāyaṇa* : the celebrated commentator on the *Vedas*, 14th century, 374 n.
- siddhānta* : settled conclusion, 288 n, 484 n, 510 n, 523 n, 534 n.
- sinoti* : he binds together, 266.
- Sitā* : wife of Rāma in *Rām.*, 225.
- sukha* : joy, 561 n.
- sucharitas* : good actions, 204, 206 n.
- Sutta* : the *Sūtras* of Buddhist teaching, 39 n.
- Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa* : the author of *S. P.*, 13th century, 141 n.
- suvar* : a mystic syllable, 310.
- sushuptasya* : of him who had slept, 190 n.
- sushupti* : deep, dreamless sleep, 234 n.
- Sūtrakāra* : the author of the aphorisms, i.e., the *Ved. Sūt.*, *passim*.
- śrijate* : he creates, 226 n.
- setu* : bridge, dam, 264, 266.
- Soma* : an ambrosial body, 191-2, 197-9, 215; a Vedic god, 556; a plant used in sacrifices, 366, 367 n, 369, 371, 380 n.
- Saugatas* : followers of the Sugata or Buddha, 38.
- Sautrāntikas* : a representationist school of Buddhists, 38-9, 55, 56 n, 57.
- Saubhari* : a sage who multiplied himself into 50 persons (*V. P. IV. 2*), 124.
- skandhas* : groups, 39 n.
- stuti* : *stotra*, 320, 322.
- stotras* : hymns which are sung, 322 n, 323, 369, 371.
- sparsa* : contact, body, 42 n.
- Smṛiti* : sacred texts other than the *Vedas*, such as *Manu*, *B. G.*, *V. P.* etc., *passim*.
- syāt* : may be, 69 n.
- syādvāda* : see 69 n.
- Srughna* : name of a city mentioned by Pāṇini, 488 n.
- sruch* : a wooden ladle, 358 n.
- svapataḥ* : of him who is dreaming, 190 n.
- svarūpagaṇa* : an essential attribute, 302 n.

- svarūpeṇa* : as essential nature, 182 n.
- Svarga* : a celestial world of enjoyment, 57, 133, 201 n, 202, 218-21, 274, 359, 375, 377, 388-9, 421, 435, 478 n.
- Svarṇara* : one of the seven suns, 283 n.
- svāpnyaya* : dreamless sleep, 553.
- svena* : in his own, 534 n.
- Hari* : a name of God, 86.
- hi* : because of (a reason), 379.
- hitās* : some blood-vessels near the heart, 230.
- himsā* : that which is hurtful or injurious, 220 n.
- Hiraṇyagarbha* : Brahmā, 89, 178, 180-1, 497 n, 557; the Supreme *Brahman*, 269; the lower *Brahman*, 521-8.
- hetu* : the true and effective cause, 45 n.
- hemanta* : the period of two months from the middle of December to the middle of February, 505.
- hotri* : a sacrificial priest who recites the hymns of the *Rig-veda*, 336, 393.
- homa* : fire-offering, 386.
- hrasva* : short, 28.

## UNTRACED QUOTATIONS

Quotations whose sources or exact loci have been marked as untraced or (?) in the three Volumes are listed below :

### VOLUME I.

Pages : 8, 8, 28, 29, 72, 294 and 363.

### VOLUME II.

Pages : 7, 66, 70, 97, 158, 162, 177, 178, 294, 300 and 325.

### VOLUME III.

Pages : 31-2, 73-4, 74, 82, 82-3, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 119, 125, 133, 168, 169, 172, 205, 219, 229, 317, 318, 319, 320, 322, 323, 325, 347, 377, 391, 392, 413, 418, 421, 433, 440, 441, 443, 444, 446, 461, 462, 471, 472, 479, 493, 506, 507, 520 and 549.

Of these the following have been since identified or been originally marked through oversight as untraced :

Vol. I, p. 363 : "The body.....material elements" (M.B. XII. 207. 60 with a slight variation).

Vol. II, p. 66 : "Therefore, he.....named 'Vaiśvānara'" (*Taitt. Br.* III. 11. 8); p. 294 : "One should know.....is destructible" (M.B. XII. 206. 58); p. 325 : same as Vol. I, p. 363.

Vol. III, p. 31-2 : "The upward.....of the *adṛiṣṭa*" (*Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, V. 2. 13); pp. 168 and 169 : "That which.....air" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 1. 5 with some variation); p. 172 : "Everything is.....the *prāṇa*" (*Pr. Up.* II. 6); p. 205 : "The *Vedas* do not.....of *āchāra*" (*Vasishṭa Smṛiti*, VI. 3); p. 413 : "One should.....life lasts" (*Ap. Śr. S.* III. 14. 8); p. 440 : "A twice-born.....an *āśrama*" (*Dakṣha Smṛiti*, I. 10); p. 443-444 : "But that twice-born.....be purified" (*Atri Smṛiti*, VIII. 16); p. 446 : "He gives.....*ṛitviks*" (*Satyāśhāda Śr. S.* X. 1); p. 471, 472 : "No *karma*.....*kalpas*" (*Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*, XXVI. 70); and p. 549 : "Those who wish.....*dādaśāha*" (*Taṇḍya Br.* XXIII. 23. 1).

## INDEX TO ADHIKARAṆAS

[As there are 111 *Adhikaraṇas* in this volume, they are separately indexed, instead of being included in the Glossarial Index, where, however, references to earlier *Adhikaraṇas* have been given. The word, '*adhikaraṇa*', has to be understood at the end of the names given below.]

- Amśa*:- II. 3. 42-52 ; 7th in the *pāda* ; on the individual self being a part of the *Brahman*, 143-58.
- Aksharadhi*:- III. 3. 33-4 ; 14th ; on the ideas relating to the *Akshara* being included in all the *vidyās*, 334-8.
- Agnihotra*:- IV. 1. 16-8 ; 10th ; on the *agnihotra*, etc., having to be performed for the origination of *vidyā*, 477-80.
- Agnīndhanādi*:- III. 4. 25 ; 4th ; on there being no need for celibates to kindle the sacrificial fire, 424-5.
- Āṅgāvabaddha*:- III. 3. 63-4 ; 22nd ; on the *vidyās* connected with the subsidiaries of rituals being connected with all the *Vedas*, 378-80.
- Adhyaksha*:- IV. 2. 4 ; 3rd ; on the *prāṇa* resting in the individual self at the time of death, 487-8.
- Anārabdhakārya*:- IV. 1. 15 ; 5th ; on the *vidyā* destroying the sin and merit which have not begun to produce their fruits, 476-7.
- Anāvishkāra*:- III. 4. 49 ; 13th ; on the child-like qualities required for *vidyā* meaning the non-manifestation of one's nature, 453-4.
- Aniyama*:- III. 3. 32 ; 13th ; on there being no restriction in regard to all worshippers reaching the *Brahman* by the path beginning with light, 331-3.
- Aniṣṭādikāri*:- III. 1. 12-21 ; 3rd ; on the souls of those who do not perform religious and other works of a meritorious nature, not going to the moon, 206-14.
- Antaratva*:- III. 3. 35-7 ; 15th ; on what has been taught to be within all, to Ushasṭha, being the *Brahman*, 338-49.
- Anyathāiva*:- III. 3. 6-9 ; on the *udgītha-vidyās* taught in the *Bṛih. Up.* and *Chhānd. Up.* being other than one, 285-94.
- Anyādhishṭhita*:- III. 1. 24-7 ; 6th ; on the individual soul returning to birth as a human being having on the way mere contact with things such as paddy, etc., which are presided over by other individual selves, 217-22.

**Abhāva-** IV. 4. 10-16; 5th; on controverting Bādari's view that there is non-existence of the body and the senses in regard to the released soul, 547-54.

**Archirādi-** IV. 3. 1; 1st; on the *Brahman* being attained through the path beginning with light, 511-3.

**Avibhāga-** IV. 2. 15; 7th; on there being non-differentiation between the individual self and the Supreme Self when the former rests in the latter at the time of death, 501-2.

**Avibhāgenadīśatva-** IV. 4. 4; 2nd; on the released self experiencing the *Brahman* without separation from Him, 538-40.

**Ahikuṇḍala-** III. 2. 26-9; 6th; on non-intelligent matter being an attribute of the *Brahman* and not a state of the *Brahman* like a serpent coiling up, 257-63.

**Ātivāhika-** IV. 3. 4-5; 4th; on the deities who lead the released soul to the *Brahman*, 519-21.

**Ātmavopāśana-** IV. 1. 3; 2nd; on the worship of the *Brahman* as the self of the individual self, 460-3.

**Ātmā-** II. 3. 18; 3rd; on the individual soul having no origination, 109-15.

**Ādityādimati-** IV. 1. 6; 4th; on viewing the auxiliaries such as the *udgītha*, etc., as the sun-god, etc., 465-6.

**Ānandādi-** III. 3. 11-7; 4th; on the qualities of being bliss etc. having to be included in all meditations on the *Brahman*, 298-306.

**Āprayāṇa-** IV. 1. 12; 6th; on meditation having to be performed till death, 469-70.

**Āvritti-** IV. 1. 1-2; 1st; on the need for frequent repetition of meditation, 456-60.

**Āsīna-** IV. 1. 7-11; 5th; on having to remain seated while meditating, 467-9.

**Āstityupākrama-** IV. 2. 7-13; 5th; on the mode of departure of the soul from the body being the same in regard to men of *vidyā* and others up to the commencement of the path, 490-500.

**Ītarakshapaṇa-** IV. 1. 19; 11th; on the man of *vidyā* attaining the *Brahman* after exhausting 'the other things', the good and bad *karmas* which have begun to yield their fruits, 481-2.

**Ītara-** IV. 1. 14; 8th; on the destruction and non-attachment caused by *vidyā* to other than sinful deeds, 474-5.

**Indriya-** II. 4. 15-6; 7th; on the word, '*prāṇa*', denoting the senses in addition to the vital air, 175-7.



- Utpattayasambhava-*: II. 2. 39-42; 8th; on controverting the view that the Pāñchārātra teaches the individual soul's birth, which is not possible, and that it is therefore not authoritative, 80-91.
- Upalabdhi-*: II. 2. 27-9; 4th; on the external world being real because it is perceived, 57-63.
- Ubhayalinga-*: III. 2. 11-25; 5th; on the *Brahman*'s twin attributes of being free from all evils and having all auspicious qualities, 236-57.
- Ekasminnaśambhava-*: II. 2. 31-4; 6th; on the impossibility of the presence of contradictory attributes in any one thing as held by the Jaina theory, 65-72.
- Aihika-*: III. 4. 50; 14th; on the production of the *vidyā* whose fruit is worldly prosperity, 454-5.
- Kartṛi-*: II. 3. 33-9; 5th; on the individual self being the agent of actions, 131-8.
- Karmānusmṛitiśabdavidhi-*: III. 2. 9; 3rd; on *karmas*, memory, scripture and injunctions proving the person waking up from sleep to be identical with the person going to sleep, 232-4.
- Kāmādi-*: III. 3. 38-40; 16th; on the qualities of desiring and willing the truth being common to the meditations on the subtle ether in the *Bṛih.Up.* and *Chhānd.Up.*, which thus become identical, 315-7.
- Kāryākhyāna-*: III. 3. 18; 5th; on meditation on the wearing cloth of the *prāṇa*, it being a teaching not arrived at through other means of knowledge, 306-8.
- Kārya-*: IV. 3. 6, 15; 5th; on whether the souls led on the path of the gods reach the effected *Hiraṇyagarbha* or the *Brahman*, 521-31.
- Kṛitātyaya-*: III. 1. 8-11; 2nd; on the souls departing through the path of the fathers returning to the world at the end of the experience of the effect of past deeds with a balance of *karmas*, 200-06.
- Jagadvyāpāravarja-*: IV. 4. 17-22; 6th; on the released self possessing all the powers of the *Brahman* except those relating to the creation, etc. of the world, 554-64.
- Jñā-*: II. 3. 19-32; 4th; on the individual self being the knower, 116-30.
- Jyotirādyadhisṭhāna-*: II. 4. 13-4; 6th; on the control exercised over the senses by individual self and their presiding deities like the god of fire etc., being due to the will of the *Brahman*, 173-5.
- Tatsvābhāvvyāpatti-*: III. 1. 22; 4th; on the self returning from the moon attaining indistinguishable likeness with those things through which he returns, 214-5.

*Tadadhiḡama-*: IV. 1. 13; 7th; on the attainment of *vidyā* leading to the destruction of earlier sins and non-attachment of later sins, 470-4.

*Tadantaraprātipatti-*: III. 1. 1-7; 1st; on the individual self moving in association with the subtle elements when going to another body than this, 189-200.

*Tadabhāva-*: III. 2. 7-8; 2nd; on sleep with the absence of dr-ams taking place when the self is in the *Brahman*, in the pericardium, in the veins, 230-2.

*Tadoko-*: IV. 2. 16; 18th; on the self of the man of *vidyā* having the edges of its abode made radiant and departing through its bright doorway along the 101st blood-vessel, 503-4.

*Tadabhūta-*: III. 4. 40-3; on there being no expiation for one who falls from the condition of a perpetual celibate, etc., 440-45.

*Tannīrdhāraṇāniyama-*: III. 3. 41; 17th; on determined thinking, i.e., meditation on the *uḡītha* etc., not being compulsory in sacrifices, 357-60.

*Tejo-*: II. 3. 10-17; 2nd; on the elements of *tejas* etc., ensouled by the *Brahman*, being produced by ether etc., similarly ensouled, 101-08.

*Dakṣhīṇāyana-*: IV. 2. 19-20; 11th; on the man of *vidyā* attaining the *Brahman* even when dying during the southern course of the sun, 507-10.

*Nātichira-*: III. 1. 23; 5th; on the returning soul not staying long in the ether of space, etc., upto reaching the paddy-stalk, 216.

*Niśā-*: IV. 2. 18; 10th; on the man of *vidyā* even when dying at night attaining the *Brahman*, 506-7.

*Parasampatti-*: IV. 3. 14; 6th; on the subtle elements associated with the self resting in the *Brahman* at the moment of death, 500-01.

*Para-*: III. 2. 30-36; 7th; on refuting the view that there is a higher being than the *Brahman*, 263-71.

*Parāyatta-*: II. 3. 40-41; 6th; on the power of being the agent possessed by the individual self being derived from the *Brahman*, 139-43.

*Paśupati-*: II. 2. 35-8; 7th; on refuting the view that *Paśupati* is the Supreme Lord, 73-9.

*Pāriplavārtha-*: III. 4. 23-4; 3rd; on the *Vedānta* stories not being for story-telling in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, 423-4.

*Purushavidyā-*: III. 3. 24; 9th; on the *purusha-vidyās* in *M. Nār.* and *Chhānd. Up.* being distinct, 314-7.

*Purushārtha*:- III. 4. 1-20; 1st; on the highest object of human pursuit resulting from *vidyā*, 397-420.

*Pūrvavikalpa*:- III. 3. 44-50; 20th; on refuting the view that the *manaśchit* meditation etc. are included among sacrifices mentioned earlier, 365-74.

*Pratīka*:- IV. 1. 4-5; 3rd; on the worship of symbols, 463-5.

*Pradhāna*:- III. 3. 42; 18th; on the need to meditate on the *daharākāśa* both in regard to His essential nature and as associated with His qualities, even as oblations have to be repeated in regard to the same deity in association with distinct qualities and forms, 360-2.

*Prāṇāputva*:- II. 4. 6-7; 3rd; on the senses being atomic, 166-8.

*Prāṇotpatti*:- II. 4. 1-3; 1st; on the senses being created things, 159-62.

*Phala*:- III. 2. 37-40; 8th; on the *Brahman* as the giver of all fruits, 272-7.

*Brāhma*:- IV. 4. 5-7; 3rd; on whether or not the released soul becomes manifest in his essential nature with qualities pertaining to the *Brahman*, 540-5.

*Bhūta*:- IV. 2. 5-6; 4th; on the *prāṇa* resting in the elements at the time of death, 488-96.

*Bhūmajyāya*:- III. 3. 55; 23rd; on the meditation on the *Vaiśvānara* as a whole being superior to that on His limbs, 381-5.

*Mano*:- IV. 2. 3; 2nd; on the mind resting in the *prāṇa* at the time of death, 485-6.

*Mahaddirgha*:- II. 2. 10-16; 2nd; on refutation of Kaṇāda's atomic theory that the non-spatial atoms produce the secondary and tertiary particles, 28-37.

*Muktiphala*:- III. 4. 51; 15th; on the production of *vidyā* whose fruit is salvation, 466.

*Mugha*:- III. 2. 10; 4th; on the condition of swoon, 234-5.

*Yathāśrayabhāva*:- III. 3. 59-64; 26th; on whether meditation on accessories of sacrifices are, like their basis, essential parts of sacrifices, 390-96.

*Rachanānupapatti*:- II. 2. 1-9; 1st; on the impossibility of the fashioning of the world by the *pradhāna*, as claimed by the Sāṅkhyas, 1-28.

*Rāśmyanusāra*:- IV. 2. 17; 9th; on the soul of the man of *vidyā* moving up along the rays of the sun after death, 504-6.

*Līṅgabhuyastva*:- III. 3. 43; 19th; on the abundance of indicatory marks showing that the *Nārayāṇa Anuvāka* deals with the object of worship in all the *vidyās*, 362-5.

*Varuṇa*:- IV. 3. 3; 3rd; on the position of Varuṇa in the path of the gods, 517-9.  
*Vāk*:- IV. 2. 1-2; 1st; on the sense of speech resting in the mind at the time of death, 483-5.  
*Vāyukriyā*:- N. 4. 8-11; 4th; on the principal vital air being neither mere air nor its action, 161-72.  
*Vāyu*:- IV. 3. 2; 2nd; on the position of Vāyu in the path of the gods, 514-6.  
*Vikalpa*:- III. 3. 57-8; 25th; on freedom of choice in regard to *vidyās* relating to the *Brahman*, 387-90.  
*Vidhura*:- III. 4. 36-9; 9th; on the fitness of widowers, etc., who do not belong to any of the *āśramas*, to practise the *vidyā* relating to the *Brahman*, 437-40.  
*Viyat*:- II. 3. 1-9; 1st; on spatial ether being a created effect, 92-100.  
*Vihitātva*:- III. 4. 32-5; 8th; on the necessity to perform rituals prescribed for the various *āśramas*, 434-7.  
*Vedhādi*:- III. 3. 25; 10th; on certain *mantras* relating to piercing the heart, etc., not being elements of *vidyās*, even though found near them, 317-9.  
*Śabdādibheda*:- III. 3. 56; 24th; on *vidyās* being different from one another on account of their being denoted by different words, etc., 385-7.

*Samadānādi*:- III. 4. 27; 6th; on tranquillity and self-restraint being accessories to the practice of *vidyā*, 428-30. •

*Sarīrebhāva*:- III. 3. 51-2; 21st; on refuting the view that the individual self, as in the body, has to be meditated upon, 374-7.

*Śreṣṭhānūtva*:- II. 4. 12; 5th; on the principal *prāṇa* being atomic in size, 172-3.

*Saṅkalpa*:- IV. 4. 8-9; 4th; on the released self getting what he wants solely through his willing, 545-7.

*Sañjñāmūrtikṛipti*:- II. 4. 17-9; 8th; on the creation of names and forms, 177-88.

*Sampadyāvirbhāva*:- IV. 4. 1-3; 1st; on the self becoming manifest in his own nature after attaining the *Brahman*, 532-7.

*Sambandha*:- III. 3. 20-22; 7th; on the *vidyās* relating to the Persons within the sun and the eye being the same through the association with the same object of worship, 310-12.

*Sambhṛiti*:- III. 3. 23; 8th; on the *Brahman*'s qualities of supporting the eldest powers and pervading the Heaven being limited to particular meditations, 313-4.

*Sandhya*:- III. 2. 1-6; 1st; on the twilight state of dreams, 223-9.

- Saptagati*:- II. 4. 4-5; on refuting the view that the senses are seven because of the movement with the individual self being attributed only to seven, 163-5.
- Samāna*:- III. 3. 19; 6th; on the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā* in *Sat. Br.* and *Eṛih. Up.*, being the same, 108-10.
- Samudāya*:- II. 2. 17-26; 3rd; against the Buddhist theory of the production of the aggregate of the world, 37-57.
- Sarvathānupapatti*:- II. 2. 30; 5th; on the complete incoherence of Mādhyamika nihilism, 63-69.
- Sarvavedāntapratyayā*:- III. 3. 1-5; 1st; on the unity of all meditations having the same injunction, etc., in different *Vedānta* texts, 278-85.
- Sarvānnānumati*:- III. 4. 28-31; 7th; on the circumstances under which there is permission to eat all foods, 430-33.
- Sarvāpekshā*:- III. 4. 26; 5th; on *vidyā* among householders being in need of all works, 426-8.
- Sarvābheda*:- III. 3. 10; 3rd; on there being no distinction among the the *prāṇavidyās* in *Chhānd. Up.*, *Bṛih. Up.* and *Kaush. Up.*, 294-8.
- Sahakāryantaavidhi*:- III. 4. 46; 12th; on the injunction for another aid, i.e., *mauna*, for *vidyā*, 447-53.
- Sāmparāya*:- III. 3. 27-31; 12th; on the released self giving up *karma* at the time of death, 324-31.
- Stutimātra*:- III. 4. 21-2; 2nd; against the description of the *udgītha* as the best *rasa* being mere glorification, 420-22.
- Svāmi*:- III. 4. 44-5; 11th; against the view that the agentship for meditation on the *udgītha* belongs to the sacrificer, 445-7.
- Hāni*:- III. 3. 26; 11th; on the passage relating to the acquisition of the *karma* of the released self by others being complementary to that about his giving up his *karma*, 319-24.

# E R R A T A

The more important printing mistakes are noted below :

| Page | Line                                 | For  | Read                                 |
|------|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| 7    | 26                                   | it not presided  | it is not presided                   |
| 15   | 3                                    | into (he   | into (the                            |
| 16   | 1                                    | By the mere  | On the mere                          |
| 16   | 6                                    | 878  | 879                                  |
| 16   | 11                                   | the subject) of<br>their thoughts  | the subject of their<br>thoughts)    |
| 16   | 29                                   | Anyatrabhavach-<br>cha   | Anyatrabhavachcha                    |
| 16   | Footnote, 2nd<br>col., 2nd line.     | B.G. (II. 11)  | B.G. (X. 10)                         |
| 41   | 4                                    | The Sūtra in Devanāgarī should be read<br>like that in the Roman script. |                                      |
| 41   | last line                            | earth and  | earth etc. and                       |
| 72   | 7                                    | Antyavo—   | Antyava—                             |
| 73   | 6                                    | is not to be   | (is not to be                        |
| 104  | 32                                   | 'indeed'   | 'only'                               |
| 105  | 16                                   | the both the   | both the                             |
| 108  | Footnote,<br>col. 2, 1st line.       | Sūtra 18   | Sūtra 17                             |
| 119  | Footnote,<br>column 2,<br>line 3.    | kalas  | kalās                                |
| 134  | 28                                   | upadanad—  | upadanād—                            |
| 160  | 10                                   | than   | then                                 |
| 205  | 8                                    | it of no use   | it is of no use                      |
| 205  | 21                                   | in following   | in the following                     |
| 214  | 10                                   | TATSVABHAVYA—  | TATSVABHAVYA—                        |
| 216  | 13                                   | arrived, at  | arrived at                           |
| 217  | 2                                    | ANYADISHHTA  | ANYADISHHTITA—                       |
| 232  | 9                                    | - VIDHYA -   | - VIDHYA -                           |
| 260  | Footnote,<br>column 1,<br>last line. | II. 7. 42-52   | II. 3. 42-52                         |
| 281  | 8                                    | It may said  | It may be said                       |
| 308  | 2                                    | though   | through                              |
| 334  | 2                                    | AKSHARADHYA-   | AKSHARADHYA-                         |
| 349  | Footnote,<br>column 2,<br>line 1.    | to merely  | to be merely                         |
| 374  | 1                                    | does no  | does not                             |
| 382  | 20                                   | has to undertaken  | has to be undertaken                 |
| 409  | 18                                   | 'adhana'   | 'Adhana'                             |
| 418  | 23                                   | connection the   | connection with the                  |
| 433  | 20                                   | reference all  | reference to all                     |
| 445  | Footnote,<br>column 1,<br>line 8.    | no adequate  | not adequate                         |
| 447  | 23                                   | Sūtra 37   | Sūtra 46                             |
| 465  | 19                                   | such as, the   | such as the                          |
| 512  | 26                                   | superhuman   | mentally created (by<br>the Brahman) |
| 513  | 30                                   | Vājasaneyaka   | Vājasaneyaka                         |
| 525  | 6                                    | para   | para                                 |
| 534  | 14                                   | IV. 14. 1  | IV. 4. 1                             |